Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003841
UI-2025-003843

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66428/2023
PA/66423/2023
LP/03664/2025
LP/03667/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

IK
AI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Gayle, Counsel/Solicitor for Elder Rahimi Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 20 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants, who are a father and his adult son, appeal against the decision (“the decision”) of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), dated 17 July 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 13 December 2023, refusing their joint asylum and human rights claims, made in November 2020. There are also four dependants on the appeals, who are the first appellant’s wife and his three younger children, aged 21, 15 and 10.

2. In summary, the appellants’ case before the First-tier Tribunal was that the second appellant had met a girl, who I will call ‘P’, from a prominent family connected with the KRG authorities, and started a sexual relationship with her in secret. Marriage proposals to her family were rejected by her family. The fact of the sexual relationship became known to her family, who put pressure on the first appellant to kill the second appellant to remove the dishonour. The whole family then fled to the UK, travelling through Turkey and then Italy, claiming asylum on arrival here.

3. When refusing the protection and human rights claims, the respondent had found the claim not to be credible. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed on the same basis by the judge, who gave reasons in the decision.

The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the grant of permission to appeal

4. The appellant appeals against the decision, with permission from the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) granted on 20 August 2025 on all 3 grounds, which are briefly summarised below:

Ground 1 – Failure to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters

5. At paragraph 25 of the decision the judge found ‘The Appellant’s story is at odds with the well-known country information for the KRG, of which numerous reports were provided’, and then relied on a judicial summary of what the country information said, which is below:

“In summary, “Iraq, including the IKR, is a patriarchal society with clearly defined gender roles. Women have a lower status in the family and are expected to be subservient to men with restricted interaction in public spaces. A simple rumour can lead to sullying a woman’s public standing and reputation and may end up in extreme forms of “honour-related” violence, including murder”. Published figures indicate that around 40 to 50 women are victims of honour crimes each year.”

6. It was argued that the judge had rejected the central proposition of the appellant’s claim, which was that men can be victims of honour crimes, and in doing so had failed to reconcile or balance the above extract with country information provided by the appellant set out at paragraph 7 of the grounds.

7. The extract above also originated from the 2021 CPIN: Iraq ‘Honour’ crimes (Version 2), which had been withdrawn by the date of hearing. The new CPIN: Iraq blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence of July 2024, did not assert that women ‘have restricted interaction in public spaces’. Finally, the statistics relied upon were from a report from May 2020, which was also not cited in the 2024 CPIN. The judge therefore relied on out of date country information and failed to have regard to the appellant’s country information.

8. It was argued that these were material errors which undermine the assessment of credibility and risk on return.

Ground 2 – perverse findings contrary to the background evidence and/or failure to give adequate reasons

9. It was argued firstly, that the judge’s findings that the marriage proposal to P’s family ‘bordered on the absurd’ and made ‘little or no sense’ [at 28 and 32] was contradicted by the country information, which says marriage is a ‘means of getting away with’ extra marital sex in young couples and so the judge’s findings were perverse.

10. It was argued secondly, that the judge made three findings that failed to engage with the principle in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, which is that findings of fact require reasonably drawn inferences made in the particular light of information about the country in question without conjecture or speculation. These were that the judge found personal freedom for young people living at home was scarce, that young people mixing freely outside of their families was counter to the conservative social norms of the KRG, and that P’s father would be able to detect changes in his daughter’s mood and behaviour, because this was the advantage a parent had over a child. These findings were not supported by country information or other evidence.

11. It was argued that thirdly, if P’s family were as prominent as claimed, they would not risk their social standing by involvement in murder or honour killing. This was contradicted by the country information, including the 2024 CPIN which said that the KRG authorities themselves engage in ‘extrajudicial killing’.

12. It was argued that fourthly, the judge’s findings about the appellant’s ability to redocument himself by providing personal information, ran contrary to the CPIN and what it said about what was required to obtain documentation.

13. Finally, it was argued that the judge gave insufficient reasons for rejecting the country information relied on by the appellant.

Ground 4 – Misdirection of law as to the applicable standard of proof

14. It was also argued that the judge erred in numerous parts of the decision, when rejecting aspects of the appellant’s account, using formulations such as ‘made no sense’, ‘improbable’ and ‘absurd’ [at 26-36] and applied too high a standard of proof.

Permission to Appeal

15. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds with the following reasons and observations:

“Ground 1 is arguable – there is citation from an outdated CPIN as well as insufficient consideration of and reasons given as to the material adduced by the Appellant.

Ground 2 is likewise arguable. The reasoning is arguably over speculative and under supported including but not limited to the position on redocumentation.

Ground 3 is arguable. On the one hand the judge clearly states the correct standard of proof in a number of places. On the other hand due to the frequency of unfortunate language in terms of the assessment of the account it becomes arguable whether the judge in practice applied a different standard.

There are therefore arguable errors of law in the decision.”

The Hearing

16. I have before me a bundle running to 1039 digital pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal before me, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.

17. I heard detailed submissions from Mr Gayle and Ms Isherwood, and indicated that I would reserve my decision and now provide this below with reasons.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Ground 1

18. I have considered the evidence that was before the judge. The appellant criticises the judge’s reliance on an outdated CPIN, and a failure to have regard to country information submitted by the appellant, and to give sufficient reasons for preferring one over the other.

19. As was raised by the appellant, the extract in quotation marks in the judge’s decision [at 25] is summarised in the 2021 CPIN at 2.4, and in the section on the position of women in society, the full extract and source from which it originates is set out at 4.1.2. This is a May 2020 study entitled ‘Covid-19, Gender and Cyber Violence in the Kurdistan Region’. By the date of the appellants’ hearing on 11 July 2025, the respondent had published the new July 2024 CPIN, and at 3.2.6 the summary statement of the status of women in society does not have the same sentence about interaction with women being restricted in public spaces. There is also reference to the consequences of extra marital relationships between men and women (3.2.5 to 3.2.9) in that same section. The section in the 2024 CPIN on the ‘position of women in society’ contains no reference to the article above, and does refer to women being marginalised in society, but does not contain the same reference to restriction in public spaces.

20. I also note that the newer 2024 CPIN contains some similar commentary about restrictions on interaction between men and women, in that it also comments (11.5.1) on the consequences of pre-marital sex, but says ‘traditional societies do not permit unsupervised contacts between males and females who are not married to one another and who could have sexual relations with one another’, so it is also not wholly different from what the 2021 CPIN said.

21. The question is whether the judge fell into error in considering 2021 CPIN and the sources relied on within it, when assessing the credibility of the appellants’ account and whether it was consistent with the country information. I will also note it has not been put to me that the CPIN from 2021 was withdrawn due to inaccuracy, rather because it was updated in 2024.

22. I find that the 2021 CPIN formed part of the evidence before the judge at appeal, in that it was relied on and footnoted in the respondent’s decision, which was made in December 2023, before the new CPIN was published. A judge is entitled to have regard to the country information and CPIN relied on in the respondent’s decision.

23. The presenting officer at the FtT hearing also submitted [at 22] that the country information ‘clashed’ with the appellant’s account and so this was an issue for the judge to determine.

24. While it is argued the judge also relied on that CPIN as part of the assessment of risk on return, the issue raised in the grounds primarily relates to the credibility assessment undertaken by the judge, because the appellant was found not to be at risk because his claim was not credible.

25. I note that the events relied on by the appellant took place between November 2019 and September 2020. It should not be contentious that this is also the period in which there was an international pandemic, due to Covid, which may well in turn have had an impact on the ability of people from different families to interact in public and other spaces in the KRG. That is what the May 2020 report relates to, in part, which is also obvious from its title. It has not been argued that the May 2020 report cited in the March 2021 CPIN was inaccurate, and as such, that and the respondent’s CPIN which relied upon it, were arguably relevant to the assessment of cultural and social norms and the situation in Iraq, at the time of the events the appellant relied upon. As such, I find the judge was entitled to have regard to it, since it formed part of the evidence before him, had been relied on by the respondent in the decision, and it related to the situation in Iraq (KRG) at the time of the events which gave rise to the claim.

26. I find too that the judge was required to consider whether the account and elements of it were consistent with and supported by the country information available and to view the account and credibility through the lens of what the country information says about the situation in the KRG at the relevant time.

27. As to the reference in the judge’s decision [at 25] to there being 40 to 50 female victims of honour crimes each year it is unclear to me whether this is said to have contributed to the overall reasoning in relation to credibility. The 2024 CPIN gives similar figures for 2017 and 2018 (at 11.6.3) but gives a figure of 120 for 2019. The judge had regard [at 27] to the risks of an extra marital relationship, with a possible penalty of ‘stoning or self-immolation’ and so did not appear to diminish the evidence that women are the victims of honour killings in the KRG. The judge did not make any finding to the extent that males are not the victims of honour killings or that a family would not want to seek reprisal against a male in a matter of family honour.

28. The appellant also says the judge failed, when placing weight on what the CPIN and May 2020 report says, to have regard to the country information the appellant submitted. There is reference [at 30] to the appellant’s article about an honour killing, which was said to undermine rather than support his case, and to the ‘extensive recent country background evidence’ produced by the appellant [at 21]. The appellant relies on country information, some of which is dated before and some after the events relied upon, which asserts that women are the victims of honour killings, men can also be targeted, albeit ‘only occasionally’ and pre-marital affairs do occur. This is similar to what the March 2021 CPIN says in any event (at section 5), that the judge referred to [at 25]. I find it has not been established that the judge failed to have regard to what the appellant’s country information said.

29. This then raises the question of whether, having the country information before him, the judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his findings that ‘appellant’s story is at odds with the well-known country information for the KRG’ [at 25]. In relation to that finding, the judge set out the specific elements of the ‘story’ he found were not consistent with the country information, such as that P ‘enjoyed unusually high degree of freedom for a young single woman’ [at 27], who was Muslim and from a prominent family, in being able to attend a mixed-sex summer camp, and being able to form a friendship with a young single male, who was additionally of a lower social class. As above, he relied on what the CPIN said about men and women having restricted interaction in that period of time. Further, that the country reports say there are dire consequences for a woman engaging in pre-marital sex, particularly where P’s family were said to be influential and powerful. This was also relied on in relation to adverse credibility findings, in the context of the situation in the KRG.

30. The judge also had regard to the plausibility of the appellant’s failure to make enquiries about P’s family and their standing, when entering into the relationship and making marriage proposals, which was also found not to fit with what the country information said about the role and power of the Kurdish parties, and the importance of family connections within society. The judge further found the disparity of social standing, wealth, employment and influence, would be relevant to whether the appellant’s family would have made marriage proposals or anticipated they would be accepted, in the context of what the country information said about society in the KRG. The judge also found the account of P telling her parents of the relationship, in the context of what the country information said about the importance of ‘honour’, was implausible [at 30], as was the family’s decision to make a third marriage proposal, despite the response to the first two, having regard to religious and social norms [at 32].

31. While the country information says that pre marital relationships do exist and honour killings do occur, the judge did not find the account to be inconsistent with the country information on the basis that they do not, but took issue with numerous elements of the account, and whether they were consistent with the country information or plausible in the context of what it said about cultural and social norms in the KRG. It has not been argued that these aspects of the country information relied on were not accurate. I find that he was entitled to have regard to these issues and so those findings were open to him.

32. I further must note that there has been no criticism of other aspects of the judge’s findings on credibility. These were not restricted solely to consistency of elements of the account with what the country information says, but also related to elements of the account found to be vague or lack fundamental detail, internal inconsistencies between the interviews and oral evidence at hearing, plausibility, the evidence about the family coming to the UK and the failure to claim asylum in Italy.

33. Accordingly, I find that the judge’s findings and reasons given do not amount to an error of law.

Ground 2

34. The appellant also argues that the judge made findings that were not supported by sufficient reasons and were speculative and so were perverse. I do accept that some of the judge’s language might be described as unfortunate, but perversity represents a ‘high hurdle’ (R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982). As was said in HK [at 28]:

“Further, in many asylum cases, some, even most, of the appellant’s story may seem inherently unlikely but that does not mean that it is untrue. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence (where there is any).”

35. The appellants’ first point is that the background material supports the credibility of marriage being proposed to resolve the possible impact of a pre-marital relationship on familial honour. I find the judge’s reasoning does not amount to a rejection of the concept that marriage could be arranged for this purpose, but rather that the family’s expectation of how the marriage proposals would be received was not credible, or the decision to keep making marriage proposals, taking into account factors such as age, social standing, wealth, employment, disparity in power and influence, as well as the familial response to the reported sexual relationship, once it became known.

36. The appellant’s second point is in part dealt with above under ground 1, in that I find there was country information that the judge was entitled to take into consideration, which was relevant to his findings about the ability of men and women from different families to interact socially, in the circumstances claimed, at the time the events were said to have happened. As to the finding about whether P’s father would have been able to detect from her behaviour that something was wrong, this is arguably not supported by any evidence, but in any event, is one of a series of cumulative points made about the plausibility of the account, which include that P would not have had unrestricted access to a single male in the circumstances claimed and so would not have been able to hide such a relationship from her family. I find this is a minor point and finding by itself that had little impact on the overall assessment of credibility, given the numerous other findings, and should only be read in context with the other cumulative points made [at 29]. If an error, it is not a material one.

37. The appellants’ third point relates to findings the judge made about plausibility and consistency which I find were wider than that the family would not risk their social standing by acting as claimed. The judge also found this could trigger a scandal that would draw attention to the killing and the honour issue, given what the appellant’s article said about calls for investigation into honour killings. Further, that it was not credible they would have left the appellant’s father to decide how to proceed, when it was their familial honour at stake, and when to do so could lead to the issue becoming known and the appellant escaping. The appellants say the CPIN shows the authorities do engage in extrajudicial killing. The judge found that if P’s family were motivated to kill the appellant to avoid familial shame and scandal, it was not plausible they would not simply do so immediately and secretly rather than warning the appellants first, and so that finding is not inconsistent with the CPIN.

38. The appellant’s fourth point relates to documentation. I find the judge’s findings are wider than the appellant could redocument himself by providing key information. The judge found the appellants were evasive about their documentation, and their evidence was internally inconsistent. At one point they had said their family members had their documents, then they denied that. On these bases their evidence about their inability to redocument themselves was rejected as unreliable.

39. I therefore find the judge did give sufficient reasons for the findings made and did not reject the country information as such, but rather made findings about the consistency and plausibility of aspects of the account and evidence, in the light of what the country information said, which was open to him to do. I therefore find the reasoning is not perverse and no error of law has been established.

Ground 3

40. As noted in the grant of permission to appeal, the judge directed himself appropriately throughout the decision as to the correct standard of proof, being the lower standard. There is, as was also noted, language that might be described as unfortunate, for example, with regard to elements of the claim making no sense and being absurd. The grounds do not go so far as to assert bias, however.

41. I do find, however, despite the use of such language, that the decision engages in detail with the elements of the claim and the judge appropriately had regard to relevant factors and matters, when assessing credibility, such as cultural and social norms in the country of origin, what the country information says, consistency, both internal and external, evasiveness, plausibility and s.8 considerations. These matters were open to the judge to consider, and I find the reasons given were sufficient to support the findings made. While it is argued the judge rejected the premise of a possible honour killing as being inconsistent with what the country information says, the judge went on to explain how each element of the factual matrix relied on was not consistent or plausible, and so the assessment of credibility was more detailed and nuanced than is asserted.

42. I therefore find it has not been established that the judge failed to apply the lower standard and so no error of law has been identified.

Notice of Decision

43. The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of errors of law and so it stands, and the appeal is dismissed.

H Graves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 December 2025