The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003848
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61634/2023
LP/11657/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th November 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

RI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant represented himself
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, born in 1989, appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (‘the judge”), promulgated on 19 February 2025. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim.

2. The appellant arrived in the UK in October 2019 on a student visa, which was valid until November 2020. His wife joined him as his dependent in January 2020. Her status, as the judge put it at [1], falls to be determined in line with the appellant’s: she is not a British citizen, is not settled here within the meaning of the Rules, and took no part in the hearing before the judge. The appellant claimed asylum in November 2020 and underwent a screening interview on the same day. He completed a Preliminary Information Questionnaire in December 2020; and underwent an asylum interview in October 2023. The appellant’s claim was refused on 10 November 2023, per the refusal letter (“the refusal letter”) of the same date.

3. It is accepted by the respondent, per the refusal letter, that the appellant was an active member of the Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal (“JCD”) wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) in Bangladesh. It was not accepted by the respondent that the appellant is of adverse interest to the Awami League (“AL”) and authorities in Bangladesh; nor that he is a high-level member of the JCD wing. Meanwhile, the appellant avers that he would be at risk on return because of his long-term and active dedication to the BNP both in Bangladesh and thereafter in the UK. He also relies upon three extant criminal charges in Bangladesh (“the charges”) brought against him between 2019 and 2023: these are said to be false and, as such, demonstrate an ongoing persecution of himself and his family that would inevitably result in his conviction because of his political convictions. I shall set out the appellant’s evidence in further detail below. The judge’s findings were essentially in line with the respondent’s position, which I shall also set out in further detail below when considering Mr Terell’s submissions.

4. The grounds of appeal (“the grounds”) dated 6 March 2025 are summarised at paragraph 11 therein.

a. Ground 1: the judge failed to consider all the objective/background evidence.
b. Ground 2: the judge failed to make findings and engage with the objective evidence.
c. Ground 3: the judge failed to apply a relevant CPIN.
d. Ground 4: the judge failed properly to apply the lower standard as set out in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] Civ 11, in the context of it being unclear what impact, if any, the change of government in Bangladesh in August 2024 may have brought about; where the appellant has had false charges brought against him.

5. Those grounds were drafted by solicitors; but the appellant represented himself at this hearing. On being invited to make submissions he declined to make any; nor did he make any reply to the respondent’s short submissions, made on the respondent’s behalf by Mr Terell. Instead, he invites me to consider the evidence before me. I have therefore been particularly careful to weigh all of the evidence contained in the 594-page stitched bundle provided to me.

6. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering on 24 July 2025. Permission was subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on 9 February 2026. Judge Neville’s reasons were as follows:

“The decision of Judge Hawden-Beal is detailed and does touch on aspects of evidence said in the grounds to have been neglected. Given the applicable standard for permission to be granted however, the appellant’s case is arguable that the Judge gave inadequate reasons or failed to resolve material conflicts of evidence as to risk arising from extant criminal charges.”

7. While Judge Neville’s grant of permission thereby focusses on the first two grounds, no restriction was placed on the third and fourth being advanced.

8. The thread that runs through all the grounds is that the judge was wrong to find, as she did, that the result of the change of government in Bangladesh in August 2024 (displacing the AL-dominated government with an interim government of different composition) is that the appellant is no longer at risk upon return: either because of his political activities or because of the charges.

“Given the change in the political situation in Bangladesh since the refusal letter, I am not satisfied that the appellant is at risk upon return because of his previous and current membership and support for the BNP. I am further satisfied that the appellant will be more than able to demonstrate that he was not involved in the 2022 and 2023 offences and that upon representation by his lawyer, he will be able to overturn those warrants and that issued against him in 2019, given that they are all politically motivated matters and those instigating such arrests are no longer in a position to maintain them. The judiciary are no longer as politicised as the CPIN notes and their independence is being restored and unjust cases are gradually being withdrawn. [48]

“I am satisfied that the appellant is no longer at risk of persecution because of his political opinion and I find that the appellant has not discharged the burden of having a well-founded fear of persecution for any convention reason.” [49]

9. As regards grounds 1 and 2: as proper reading of the evidence, says the appellant, shows that the risk remains. The skeleton argument prepared on his behalf dated 10 October 2024 (“the skeleton argument”) highlights three main documents for the judge to have considered:

a. the appellant’s witness statement dated 10 October 2024 (“the appellant’s statement”)
b. the legal expert report of Saqeb Mahbub, barrister-at-law, dated 30 May 2024 (“the country expert report”); and
c. the medical expert report of Dr Al-Wakeel dated 8 July 2024 (“the medical report”).

10. The appellant’s statement describes a political career supporting the BNP that started while he was still in school in 2001. The appellant describes being beaten with sticks whilst on a protest, which injuries took three weeks to recover from. He describes beaten again in 2006, now as a student, when he was “personally threatened to stop politics”. In 2008, he describes being beaten in his room; and being threatened with death and if he did not stop. Harassment continued: including being shot at in 2012. In 2013 the appellant became a lecturer: while a lecturer, he describes in 2019 having to stop delivering a speech in which he criticised the government. Finally, between March and June 2019, the police came to arrest him on several occasions. He hid himself; and was informed through a colleague that he had been charged with vandalism of government property and conspiracy against the government. This charge was the first of the three aforementioned charges. He entered the UK on a student visa in October 2019. Unable to complete a degree due to Covid, he claimed asylum in November 2020. While in this country, he maintains that he and his family continue to be of interest to his political opponents: the appellant says that his father was attacked multiple times, with an attempt being made to kill his father in January 2024.

11. At [42] of the decision, the judge notes that the appellant relies upon two further cases – the second and third charges – lodged against him: the second in 2022, when he was accused of marching past Mirpur police station shouting anti-government slogans; and the third in 2023, when he and others were accused of attacking a group of three men. There is no dispute that both of these cases refer to a time when the appellant was physically in the UK, and therefore could not have committed those crimes. The documentation relied upon as evidencing the three charges is considered in the country expert report. That documentation comprised scanned copies rather than originals. However, considering the First Information Reports in respect of all three cases, Mr Mahbub writes at paragraph 16.16:

“On the basis of the above considerations, in my opinion that the aforesaid certified case documents are reliable and genuine since they conform to the general format of genuine case documents insofar as the columns and headings, language, typefaces, structure, official stamps, and other bureaucratic and legal conventions are concerned. As such, in my professional opinion the information contained in the said cases is consistent with the content found in genuine criminal cases.”

12. I am invited by the appellant to accept Mr Mahbub’s expert view; and to infer that if charges are still being brought against him in his absence, he must therefore still be of interest to his political opponents. I reproduce further paragraphs of the country expert report in full that expressly consider not just the broader risks to the appellant on return to Bangladesh, but also the particular risk posed by the charges against him. Mr Mahbub opines:

“Based on [the appellant’s] alleged circumstances, he is likely to be a target of persecution owing to his alleged political involvement with Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal and his family’s alleged involvement with BNP.” [Paragraph 17.3]

“As seen in paragraphs 5.1-5.16 above, the ruling political party of AL, are hostile towards members and activists of the BNP. Bangladeshi political parties are often associated to corruption and greed for power. Thus, supporters and activists of BNP are possibly targeted as a tactic to eliminate any form of threat from the BNP. The BNP party members are subject to attacks and violence in broad daylight by AL, Charto League and are not afforded any protection by the police who are heavily influenced by the current ruling party, AL. Thus, [the appellant’s] claims that he is a target of AL, is consistent with the context.” [Paragraph 17.4]

“Thus, it is unlikely that if [the appellant] is arrested in the politically motivated cases, he will get justice at the courts as the verdict is likely to be dictated by the authorities. It is likely that he will be convicted, regardless of the availability or strength of evidence and the quality of the prosecution against him.” [Paragraph 17.9]

13. The reference to paragraphs 5.1 to 5.16 therein concern violent attacks against BNP activists and candidates. Mr Mahbub states at paragraph 5.6 that: “Even an individual, who demonstrate [sic] simple allegiance to BNP, are susceptible to violence from the ruling party and are often exposed to harsher state action than central senior leaders.”

14. The appellant also relies on the medical report as supporting his claim of the physical abuse he suffered in Bangladesh, which I summarised above. Under the section ‘Conclusions and Opinion’, Dr Al-Wakeel states:

“Currently, [the appellant] is suffering from the presence of multiple scars on his neck and his limbs as well as post traumatic stress disorder symptoms like agitation, nightmares and leg pain. On examination he was found to have: scars on his neck, forearm and leg which are typical of blunt injuries as described by the claimant that have been caused by an irregular blunt object. They are, according to the recommendations found in Chapter C. Section D, paragraph 188 of the Istanbul Protocol and according to my expert opinion intentionally caused. The deformity of the left little finger represents a bony injury to one of its phalanges. It is a typical of blunt injury that has been caused by a blunt object. In my professional opinion it is likely that intentionally caused. There is a small other possibility that this injury could have been caused accidentally. The small lump in his loin could be due an injury or a fatty tissue (lipoma).”

15. Its ‘Discussion’ section concludes:

”With regard to the age of [the appellant’s] scars, I can say that they are of many years; however it is quite difficult for me by clinical examination to give a precise age. [The appellant] has made a good recovery from the physical injuries sustained though residual scarring will remain but do not require plastic surgery.”

16. While, as I have said, the skeleton draws particular attention to these three documents, the appellant relies upon many other documents as well. The judge records at [14] that she had available to her a stitched bundle of 1042 pages, as well as the oral evidence of the appellant. It is said by the appellant that, had the judge had proper regard to the totality of this evidence, she would have to have come to a very different view. I note that Part D of the bundle before me includes articles post-dating the change in government in Bangladesh. Therein, an article in the Dhaka Tribune dated 26 January 2025 entitled “BNP-interim govt divide wides over election”, opens by opining that “In the aftermath of the July mass uprising, the relationship between the BNP and the interim government has become increasingly strained”. Another Dhaka Tribune article, dated 4 February 2025, entitled “Interim govt has also started culture of killing, claims BNP's Shamsuzzaman”, reports that a Jubo Dal leader was killed days before the article was written. A short article in New Age, dated 14 September 2024 and entitled “Swechchhasebak Dal central leader killed, 22 injured” I quote in full: “At least one Bangladesh Nationalist Party volunteer wing Swechchhasebak Dal central leader was killed and 22 others were injured as Awami League activists launched an attack on Swechchhasebak Dal central president SM Jilani’s motorcade at Gunapara crossing under Sadar upazila Gopalganj Friday afternoon. The victim is Swechchhasebak Dal central committee sports affairs secretary Md Shaukat Ali Didar”.

17. Turning to ground 3, the CPIN on which the judge relied is CPIN: Country Policy and Information Note, Bangladesh (December 2024), which I will henceforth refer to as “the 2024 CPIN”. At 3.1.10, it states:

“The protest movement led to the resignation of AL Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024 and the establishment of an interim government on 8 August under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who is not from any political party. It is made up of students, civil society representatives the BNP and members affiliated with Jel. There are no representatives from the former ruling AL party. The interim government dismissed elected city mayors and hundreds of public representatives from local government across the country who were loyal to the AL and replaced them with interim administrators.”

18. The judge notes at [37] and [38] that the 2024 CPIN reflects that, in effect, the tables have turned and it is now AL activists that face attacks.

19. However, the grounds argue that a relevant – indeed, more directly relevant – CPIN is CPIN: Country Policy and Information Note, Bangladesh, Actors of Protection (November 2023), which I will refer to as “the 2023 CPIN”. The 2023 CPIN states at 2.1.1:

“In general, the state is able to provide effective protection. However, the willingness of the authorities to protect will depend on the profile of the person, in particular their links with the ruling party. Most reports on human rights violations by law enforcement agencies focus on the treatment of political opponents or those perceived as such. Therefore, it can be difficult to differentiate between the treatment of those seen as dissenting and the treatment of the general population.”

20. This, it is said, evidences that the appellant remains at risk.

21. I have set out ground 4 above. Paragraph 12 within the grounds expands on it:

“These failings have to be viewed in the context of the very low threshold applicable in protection cases, see Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11 (25 January 2000) and more recently MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 (28 February 2023) where the Court reminds everyone as to how the lower standard of proof is applied…”

22. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are as follows:

“For the Appellant’s fear to be well-founded means he must demonstrate a reasonable degree of likelihood of being persecuted for a Convention reason if he were to be returned to his own country. This standard of proof applies also to the assessment of accounts of past events.” [29]

“So far as humanitarian protection is concerned, this is only applicable if the Appellant does not qualify for refugee status and there must be substantial grounds for believing that he faces a real risk of suffering serious harm as set out in paragraph 339 (C) of HC395 as amended, if he is returned to the country of return.” [30]

23. In his brief submissions, Mr Terell says that none of the grounds disclose a material error of law and amount only to disagreement with the decision. Starting with ground 3, he says that the judge was right to rely on the 2024 CPIN as she did; and made no material error of fact in asserting at [37] that “the AL are no longer in power”. The country expert report, which predates August 2024, is predicated upon the AL being in power. That is no longer the case; and it follows that the judge was entitled to use the 2024 CPIN as her starting point rather than the report. There is therefore no force in ground 3.

24. There is, Mr Terell says, no force in grounds 1 or 2 either. It is clear that the judge engaged with the full range of the objective evidence, as is set out at [39]:

“I have considered the newspaper reports submitted by the appellant but do not take account of those dated July 2024 in light of the change in the situation in the country since August 2024. The most recent reports submitted from 2025 do not assist because they do not demonstrate that members of the BNP are at risk upon return. They illustrate the state of flux which is present within Bangladesh politics with the participants in the interim government all jockeying for their particular ideas to be given precedence whether it is the students, who orchestrated the July 2024 uprising which caused the fall of the previous government, trying to ensure that there is no neutral government or the BNP indicating that a neutral government was the only way forward to ensure fair elections. These reports do not assist the appellant’s claim to be at risk upon return even though the AL are no longer in power because there is no evidence to demonstrate that the BNP members are at risk as they were in the past.”

25. It is trite, submits Mr Terell, relying on Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, to say that the judge does not have to refer to everything, not least where she considered so voluminous a bundle. My task, he says, is not to embark upon a reconsideration of the evidence, but rather to determine whether the judge’s conclusion was rationally supportable. There is sufficient reference throughout the decision to demonstrate that the judge engaged with the evidence before her. Vague references at paragraph 7 of the grounds to oral evidence not considered by the judge does not disclose an error of law where it is not clear in the grounds what that oral evidence actually was.

26. Specifically addressing the Dhaka Tribune article dated 4 February 2025 referred to above, Mr Terell says that it describes BNP Vice Chairman Shamsuzzaman’s claim that the new government had already begun a pattern of killings as “a remark”, apparently made in the course of calling for elections. That choice of word, says Mr Terell, is telling: it does not suggest grave concern. In any event, says Mr Terell, the article does not evidence a national problem with violence.

27. Finally, submits Mr Terell, ground 4 is misconceived. It is clear at [29] and [30] that the judge applied the correct standard. As to the remainder of the ground, that overlaps with grounds 2 and 3 and fails for the same reasons: the change in circumstances brought about by the fall of the AL is plainly set out in the 2024 CPIN; and the change of government answers the issue of the charges.

28. In my decision, it is convenient to take the grounds on reverse order. The point made in ground 4 that the judge failed properly to apply the lower standard of proof has no merit. I have already quoted [29] and [30] above. While Karanakaran v SSHD is not expressly referenced, there is nothing in the judge’s self-direction, nor anywhere else in the decision, to suggest that the judge applied the wrong standard. Ground 4, as observed by Mr Terell, does indeed overlap with other grounds: I will consider those overlapping issues below.

29. Ground 3 may be disposed of briefly. It was not an error for the judge to rely on the 2024 CPIN. It is right to say that the 2024 CPIN does not replace the 2023 CPIN: the former updates and addresses the political situation following the fall of the AL government in August 2024; while the latter remains a separate guidance document on state protection and law enforcement capabilities. It is also right to say that the appellant’s skeleton refers to the 2023 CPIN, which is not directly cited in the decision. However, the natural reading of [20] is that the judge did specifically consider the 2023 CPIN; and for reasons I shall set out below, the decision in any event addresses the argument raised by the appellant that the AL still controls the police.

30. An analysis of ground 2 must begin with the pivotal finding in [48] and [49], as quoted above, that the appellant is no longer at risk in Bangladesh because of his political opinions as the political situation has changed. The grounds take issue with this finding, at paragraphs 1 and 2 stating it to be “a material error of fact” that the judge “rubberstamped” the respondent’s assertion the interim government no longer contains any AL representatives in spite of “The fact that the BNP or Jaamat-e-Islami does not represent the interim government was drawn to the attention of the FTJ during the hearing. Unfortunately, this was ignored.”. It is correct that the judge does state at [34] that the interim government “no longer contains any AL representatives”; but the characterisation given to the judge’s findings in the grounds is hardly a fair one. I have already referred to [37] and [38], where the judge carefully considers the 2024 CPIN. [38] reads as follows:

“Paragraph 12.3.3 also notes The former powerbrokers on campuses and the AL’s muscle on the streets now face eviction, [and] retribution … for their role in trying to suppress the popular revolt against Hasina and for the rights violations they allegedly committed while she was in power…The violence… did not end with Hasina’s fall. The former perpetrators of state atrocities became the new targets as hundreds of AL politicians and members, including students, were attacked or killed. Many went into hiding or were detained while attempting to flee….The wave of violence against Awami League-affiliated students has spread across campuses’.”

31. This is the basis of the judge’s finding that the political situation has changed. The judge explains at [35] that she has given little weight to the country expert report because it predates the change of government. [39], quoted in full above, explains why the reports that postdate the change in government do not demonstrate that BNP members are at risk on return. While the country expert report states at paragraph 5.19 that: “Even minimal involvement with the opponents of the ruling or disapproval of the ruling party via social media posts can cause tragic consequences for individuals.”, echoed later at paragraph 17.6, where Mr Mahbub writes that “The likelihood of the current ruling party, AL, exerting undue influence on members at different levels along the hierarchy of the court system is high”, the political framework considered by Mr Mahbub is out-of-date. The judge’s conclusion that Mr Mahbub’s analysis of the appellant’s level of risk is predicated upon the previous, and not the present, regime is sound. The finding that the political situation has changed in Bangladesh is safe.

32. Turning to the particular level of the appellant’s involvement with politics, the judge at [36] finds, taking into account the medical evidence in support of ill-treatment, that the “appellant has been involved with the BNP for some time and indeed did have high level roles within his local units, but he never had a national profile”. At [40] and [41] the judge makes clear, on the evidence provided, that the appellant would not be at risk either on the basis of his BNP involvement in Bangladesh or subsequently in the UK: even though, as she explains at [37], it was “highly likely” he would have been at risk on return if the government had not changed. The appellant’s case though is that, even if the new government does not pose the same risk to the appellant, given his political activities, as the previous one did per se, there is a special risk posed to the appellant because of the extant criminal charges. The appellant argues the Judge failed to make findings by omitting to resolve material conflicts of evidence as to risk arising from the charges, or failed to give adequate reasons for the same. Had she undertaken the exercise properly, she would have come, it is said, to a different conclusion.

33. The judge specifically considers the charges at [42] to [47]. I reproduce [46] and [47] in full.

Even if I accept that these warrants are genuine, which I note the review does not actually challenge, merely saying that they are not determinative of persecution, given the change in the political conditions he will be returning to, I am not satisfied that the appellant is correct when he says that the police and the judiciary are still run by those who are loyal to the AL, given that the CPIN from December 2024, at paragraph 13.3.5 notes During her fifteen years in power, Sheikh Hasina worked assiduously to undermine [Bangladesh’s institutions] their independence so that they would do her bidding. She typically did so by stacking them with supporters, showering them with largesse or cowing their senior officials. Already, the interim government has replaced several senior and mid-level members of key institutions, particularly in the judiciary, bureaucracy and police. Many officials close to the AL remain in place, however. A full clean-out is impractical, and the government wants to give all those who remain a chance to get behind the reform agenda… ‘The interim government has already taken several steps to restore the judiciary’s independence. Under pressure from student demonstrators, the former chief justice resigned shortly after Hasina fled, with a respected jurist, Syed Refaat Ahmed, taking the job. Unjust cases filed against protest leaders in July and August are being dropped; earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn gradually. On 21 September, the new chief justice outlined judicial reforms aimed at addressing the “crisis of public trust”. His main plan is to abolish the executive’s control of promotion and transfer of judges, creating instead a separate secretariat under the Supreme Court to select the most capable jurists. In the meantime, the interim government has transferred and promoted more than 300 lower court judges. A senior judge told Crisis Group that his colleagues already feel a new freedom. “The biggest change is the level of politicisation and pressure that we faced before – nothing like that is happening now”, he said.

“Given that the appellant has a lawyer representing him in the 2019 matter, there is nothing to indicate why he has not asked him to get the 2022 and 2023 warrants withdrawn by the court, given that there is clear evidence that he was not in the country at the time of the alleged offences as well as applying for the 2019 matter to be withdrawn if it was a politically motivated charge as the appellant and his lawyer claim, other than the fact that that would then, in theory, clear the path for his return to Bangladesh.”

34. The natural reading of [46] is that the judge does take the charges to be genuine: noting both the opinion of the country expert report and that the respondent does not challenge that opinion. It follows that there are indeed three outstanding charges against him in Bangladesh. Relying on the 2024 CPIN, the judge’s finds that the appellant would nonetheless not be at risk on return because:

a. there has been a reorganisation of the judiciary [46];
b. the appellant has already been able to obtain a lawyer to seek to dismiss the first charge as being politically motivated [47];
c. there is no apparent reason the appellant could not do or has not already done the same as regards the later two charges; and
d. there is clear evidence that, being in the UK at the relevant times, he could not have committed the acts as alleged in the later two charges [47].

35. The 2024 CPIN at 13.3.5 as quoted in [46] sets out concrete changes made to the judicial system that demonstrate the AL’s reduced influence not just in the political sphere, as the judge already found, but in the legal sphere. That reduction is encapsulated in the final sentence of 13.3.5: “The biggest change is the level of politicisation and pressure that we faced before – nothing like that is happening now”. The appellant’s having instructed a lawyer demonstrates his ability to engage with the legal system, which now lacks the politicisation that would previously have worked against him. The judge has made sufficient findings to support the overall finding that the respondent may safely return to Bangladesh, notwithstanding the extant charges. Ground 2 is not made out.

36. It follows that ground 1 is also not made out. The grounds assert that the judge has not engaged with the evidence: that is not, in my view, a fair reading of the decision. As to the three documents highlighted in the appellant’s skeleton, I have already set out the judge’s engagement with the country expert report in some detail. That “The appellant confirmed the contents of his October 2024 statement to me”, as well as his giving oral evidence, is stated in [15]; while the medical evidence are, as observed above, referred to at [36]. As to the rest of the evidence, I have already quoted the judge’s engagement with the documentary evidence at [39]. It is not right to say that the judge has relied solely upon the 2024 CPIN and gone no further.

37. There is, as I have said, a degree of overlap in the grounds; but for all of the above reasons, the grounds do not disclose a material error of law, collectively or individually.

38. I repeat that I have considered the evidence before me in the light of the appellant being unrepresented. I note that paragraphs 16 to 19 of the grounds raise matters that are not set out in grounds 1 to 4 as expressed at paragraph 11 therein and as above. Those other matters have, accordingly, not been commented upon by Mr Terell. I observe, only for the avoidance of doubt, that paragraphs 16 and 19 of the grounds express only a general disagreement with the decision; while paragraph 17, which states that the judge did not refer to the case of Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, is plainly contradicted by the judge both citing the case and applying it at [52]. The argument in paragraph 18 that the appellant would not be able to defend himself in Bangladesh from the false charges against him has already been considered by the judge as above. None of these matters undermine the decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and stands.


D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


31 October 2026