Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003858

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57635/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between
G K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Briddock of Counsel (Direct Access pro bono)
For the Respondent: Mr P Deller, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The hearing was held on a hybrid basis. Mr Briddock for the appellant joined remotely via CVP with Mr Deller attending in person at Field House. I confirmed that everyone could hear and see each other before proceeding.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal by which his protection appeal was dismissed.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Georgia. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 26 May 2019 after being issued with a business visa on 20 May 2019 valid until 20 November 2019. He became an overstayer and claimed asylum in July 2022.
4. In his screening interview dated 22 July 2022, the appellant said he came to the UK to claim asylum because he was a gay man who feared persecution in Georgia. His asylum claim was dismissed on 15 March 2024. Although the respondent accepted that the appellant was a gay man and that he feared persecution in Georgia, she did not accept that his fear was objectively well-founded and that he would be at risk on return.
5. The appellant appealed the respondent’s refusal to the First-tier Tribunal on 18 March 2024. By a determination dated 17 May 2025, the appeal was dismissed, following a hearing, by First-tier Tribunal Judge Cary (‘the judge’).
6. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 22 September 2025. Judge Blundell granted permission on all three grounds but considered Ground 2 to be the strongest.
7. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so, whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
8. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Briddock and Mr Deller, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
Grounds
9. The appellant brings three grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: Failure to take into account the evidence when making findings on return risk and a lack of anxious scrutiny. By this ground, the appellant avers that despite citing extensively from CPIN Georgia: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, Version 2.0 September 2024, the judge did so selectively and ignored evidence that showed that the appellant’s fear of persecution was well-founded. Further, the judge failed to refer to a survey cited by the respondent (Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre (EMC)) which showed that nearly 30% of LGBTI persons aged 18-29 had experienced physical violence due to being LGBTI and that 52% experienced violence which included psychological forms. Finally, it is averred that the judge failed to give weight or even consider the new anti-LGBTI laws introduced in September 2024. Overall, the appellant submits that the failure to take into account significant parts of the CPIN clearly puts into question the judge’s conclusion that sufficiency of protection is available and whether anxious scrutiny was applied in a case where the appellant was unrepresented.
Ground 2: The Judge appears to go behind the respondent’s acceptance that the appellant’s account is true. By this ground, the appellant asserts that even though the respondent explicitly accepted that what he said was true, the judge made findings where he disbelieved the appellant’s account in respect of: (i) the reason for the delay in filing his asylum claim; (ii) whether he would be at risk from his family and in particular his brother, who threatened had to kill him, or about his disclosure to them about the refusal of his asylum claim; (iii) his claimed suicide risk; and (iv) the veracity of his international protection claim.
Ground 3: The Judge failed to conduct the hearing appropriately with the appellant as a litigant in person in line with his duties set out at Chapter 1 of the Equal Treatment Bench book. By this ground, the appellant relies on AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [16] and on the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance.
Submissions
10. Mr Briddock for the appellant, relied on the grounds of appeal document. Briefly, in relation to Ground 1, he accepted that it was not necessary for a judge to lay out every part of the CPIN in their decision but in this case all the information relied upon by the judge appeared to go in one direction, rather than looking at the CPIN in the round, which he submitted was an error of law.
11. Further, it was not lawful for the judge to find there was a sufficiency of protection without having properly taken into account the content of the CPIN which referenced physical violence experienced by LGBTI persons as well as the use of abusive terminology and aggression shown by the police towards such persons when they were called upon to protect them. The judge did not consider the gravity of the new anti-LGBT law which criminalised certain behaviour in public when considering the risk on return.
12. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Briddock cited the appellant’s claimed suicide risk as reflective of the judge’s attitude of going behind the respondent’s acceptance of the appellant’s credibility. In this respect, he submitted there was no reason provided by the judge as to why he considered the appellant had made up the claim.
13. Turning to Ground 3, Mr Briddock submitted that as an unrepresented appellant who had claimed to have suicidal ideations and which was before the judge, the judge should have considered treating him as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance. In this regard, Mr Briddock relied on AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [16] which states that failure to follow the Guidelines will most likely be an error of law.
14. Mr Briddock also stressed the importance of the judge complying with the provisions of the Equal Treatment Bench book to ensure that the appellant was fully able to participate in the proceedings. In this respect he relied on AM (Afghanistan) at [26] which states that it is ‘beyond argument that the Tribunal and the parties are required so far as practicable to ensure that an appellant is able to participate fully in the proceedings …’
15. Mr Deller on behalf of the respondent relied on the filed Rule 24 response. He explained that simply because the respondent had not questioned the appellant’s credibility based on what was said at interview did not mean that he was to be treated as ‘credible forever.’ The judge was not bound to accept everything said by the appellant in his evidence as credible at the hearing. Further, any shortcomings in failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness was in any event immaterial based on the findings that in general, sufficiency of protection was available in Georgia.
16. Looking at the appeal grounds in the round, Mr Deller conceded that it was not a safe determination. The judge had failed to keep an open mind and did not appear to have considered the CPIN in the round or the impact of the new anti LGBTI law. This was an error of law.
Findings and reasons
17. In my view, Mr Deller was right to concede that the judge had made an error of law in the making of the determination.
18. In respect of Ground 1, the judged failed to properly take into account the CPIN in the round and the impact of the new anti-LGBTI law by the ruling party. The result casts doubt on the lawfulness of the sufficiency of protection finding.
19. In respect of Ground 2, the judge made adverse credibility findings, for example in respect of the appellant’s suicide risk, without any proper evidential foundation thereby undermining the respondent’s acceptance of the appellant’s credibility.
20. Further, the judge failed to consider at a minimum the appellant’s vulnerability given his declared suicidal ideations, and to also consider the provisions of the Equal Treatment Bench book to ensure his full participation as an unrepresented appellant in the proceedings.
21. It follows that the appeal must be allowed. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cary contained a material error of law and must be set aside.
22. I canvassed the parties in respect of further steps in view of the finding of a material error of law. The parties agreed that in the circumstances the matter would be better remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing than being retained in the Upper Tribunal. That is my view also. Given the critical nature of the conclusions reached on credibility and the failure to properly consider the CPIN no part of the determination can be preserved.
Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cary of 17 May 2025 did involve the making of an error of law and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a differently constituted tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

K.A Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber