Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-003870
[HU/00530/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued
On 10 February 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

S F A
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Field House
On 30 January 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Toora, Counsel
(instructed by HS Immigration Consultants)
For the Respondent: Dr S Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 24 September 2025 against the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s human rights appeal (entry clearance application for settlement) made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Doyle in a decision and reasons dated 9 January 2025.

2. The Appellant, a national of Eritrea born on 26 October 2006, sought entry clearance as the minor relative of his sponsoring brother, who has been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom. The Respondent initially disputed the fraternal relationship but subsequently accepted it after DNA evidence was provided. It was otherwise not accepted that the requirements of Appendix CNP of the Immigration Rules were met, nor that there was any reason to consider the Appellant’s Article 8 claim outside of the Immigration Rules. The Respondent considered that the Appellant failed to make out compelling compassionate family circumstances.

3. Judge Doyle made the following findings:

“10. (a) The Appellant was born on 31 October 2006. He is the brother of the sponsor, who was born on 18 July 1993. Both men are Eritrean nationals.
(b) In January 2018 the Appellant’s sponsoring brother left Eritrea. He was granted refugee status in the United Kingdom on 11 May 2021.
(c) The Appellant’s parents are alive. The Appellant’s mother suffers from a mental disorder. The Appellant’s father cares for the Appellant’s mother.
(d) The sponsor married in Eritrea in 2015. After the sponsor left Eritrea, the Appellant was cared for by the sponsor’s wife. The sponsor last saw his wife in October 2020 in an Ethiopian refugee camp.
(e) The Appellant and the sponsor’s wife now share accommodation in Uganda, where the Appellant has applied for asylum.
(f) When the sponsor claimed asylum, he said that the Appellant and one other sibling are his dependents.
(g) The Appellant has six siblings. The sponsor is the oldest of the siblings. Because of their mother’s mental illness, the High Court in Asmara granted the sponsor custody of all six of his younger siblings on 12 April 2012.
(h) The Appellant celebrated his 18th birthday in October this year. The Appellant was 17 years old when he submitted his application.
(i) The Appellant left Eritrea in September 2020 and travelled to Ethiopia. He remained in Ethiopia until September 2023. In September 2023 he spent one week in Kenya, before arriving in Uganda. The Appellant was alone when he left Ethiopia. The sponsor’s wife joined the Appellant in Uganda later in 2023. They now share accommodation in Kampala.
(j) The sponsor has worked as a taxi driver since May 2023. He earns more than £22,000 per annum. The sponsor lives in rented accommodation for which his rent is £96.53 per week. The property has two bedrooms and one sitting room.
(k) The Appellant and the sponsor are in regular contact. The sponsor sends money to his wife in Kampala regularly. Part of that money is for the Appellant’s maintenance.“

4. Judge Doyle continued:

“11. (b) The Respondent is correct to note that CNP 3.2 requires a calculation to be carried out. Even at appeal the Appellant does not produce sufficient information for that calculation to be correctly made. There is evidence of the sponsor’s income. The sponsor’s evidence of the level of rent that he pays is unchallenged, but the sponsor coyly declines to specify his council tax payments. Instead, he gives details of Council Tax Reduction he is entitled to. No evidence is provided about utility bills.
(c) The result is that only a limited glimpse of the sponsor’s finances is given. That limited glimpse is clouded by the sponsor’s declaration that he will soon submit an application for his wife to join him. The harsh truth is that the calculation required by CNP 3.2 cannot be carried out, so the Appellant does not establish that he can be maintained and accommodated without recourse to public funds.
(d) Paragraph CNP 3.2 (c) says that the decision maker must be satisfied that there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the applicant undesirable. The question of serious and compelling family circumstances is not properly addressed in the evidence presented at appeal.
(e) The Appellant establishes that he is related to the sponsor. He establishes that the sponsor was granted custody of the Appellant and their siblings in 2012. He establishes that the sponsor and the Appellant separated in 2018 and might have been briefly reunited in 2020 in an Ethiopian refugee camp. He establishes that for most of the time since 2018, he has received live-in assistance from the sponsor’s wife.
(f) There is no evidence driving at serious and compelling family circumstances. The evidence is that the Appellant is a young man, who was a 17 year old child at the date of application. The Appellant establishes that he now lives safely in Uganda, where his needs are catered for. There is no reliable evidence that the Appellant does not have safe accommodation in Uganda. There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant faces destitution. The weight of reliable evidence is that the Appellant has sought asylum in Uganda.
(g) In making an application for refugee status in Uganda, the Appellant acknowledges that he is in a safe country where his needs are provided for.
(h) The Appellant cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.”

5. Judge Doyle went on to find that there was no family life between the Appellant and his sponsor but that, if he were wrong, any interference was proportionate to the public interest.

6. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal, contending that there were material errors of law in the decision, including perverse findings. The grounds were as follows:

(1) The FTJ failed to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters - whether the Appellant satisfies CNP 3.1.(d): existing, genuine family relationship;
(2) The FTJ failed to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters - CNP 3.2.(c) whether there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make the Appellant’s exclusion undesirable;
(3) The FTJ made perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome – adequate maintenance;
(4) The FTJ failed to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters - CNP 3.3.; and
(5) The FTJ failed to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters - Article 8: whether the Appellant is leading an independent life.

7. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Tozzi, but granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. The grant of permission to appeal was in the following terms:

“As contended in ground one, the Judge expressed no clear conclusion as to whether the relationship between the Appellant and the sponsor is an existing, genuine family relationship which would satisfy the definition in paragraph CNP 3.1(d). Any such error would not have been material (at least to the conclusion under the Rules) if the Judge’s calculation of maintenance was sound. Those conclusions were arguably flawed in law for the reasons given in ground three, however, and I am particularly concerned about the point made at [16] of the original grounds (as to the irrelevance of household bills under the policy). The remaining grounds are less meritorious but I make no direction limiting the arguments which might be pursued before the Upper Tribunal.”

8. There was no rule 24 notice from the Respondent however Dr Ibisi indicated that permission to appeal was opposed.

9. Mr Toora for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal submitted and UTJ Blundell’s grant of permission to appeal. The grounds are set out above at [6], above, and need not be repeated here. Mr Toora emphasised that the Appellant met the maintenance requirement. Mr Toora submitted that there were clear material errors of law, such that the decision could not stand. The appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.

10. Dr Ibisi for the Respondent submitted that there was no material error of law. The circumstances at the date of the hearing were that the Appellant was an adult living in safe accommodation. The de facto custody before that was that the Appellant was living with his sponsor’s wife. Regardless of the council tax position, no utility bills had been provided. Adequate findings had been made and the public interest had been identified as outweighing the private interest.

11. In reply Mr Toora submitted that utility bills were not required under the Immigration Rules. The requirement was for housing costs, including council tax, and that had been met.

12. The Tribunal indicated at the close of submissions that it found that there were material errors of law, such that the decision would have to be set aside and the appeal remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Full reasons were reserved, and now follow.

13. The Upper Tribunal should always be slow to interfere with the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge, especially an experienced judge, who has heard and seen the witnesses. Unfortunately in the present appeal interference is necessary. The Judge correctly began by considering whether the relevant Immigration Rules, Appendix CNP, had been met, since if the Immigration Rules are met the margin of appreciation (i.e., proportionality) for Article 8 ECHR purposes has been satisfied.

14. An obvious issue of central importance was whether there would be adequate maintenance available if the Appellant came to the United Kingdom. Here the Judge found that the required information had not been provided, and that the sponsor had been “coy” about doing so. That finding was, however, perverse as it was contrary to the evidence provided on behalf of the Appellant. The Appellant’s bundle contained the sponsor’s council tax bill dated 9 July 2024, in the hefty sum of £987.37 per year. The figure was set out in the Appellant’s skeleton argument, where the calculation based on Ahmed (benefits: proof of receipt: evidence) Bangladesh [2013] UKUT 84 (IAC) was set out. It is hard to know what went wrong, but the error by the Judge is plain and material. Nor were utility bills required to be produced. The Judge’s findings as to maintenance were therefore mistaken, which error goes to the heart of his decision, as it was the Appellant’s case that his application met the requirements of Appendix CNP, with the consequence that his appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds succeeded.

15. The Judge’s finding that the evidence failed to show that there were serious and compelling family or other considerations sits uncomfortably with his findings of fact concerning the Appellant’s current circumstances as an asylum seeker in a foreign country. The Appellant had no other right to be in Uganda and the outcome of his asylum claim or when it might be decided was by no means clear. Moreover, the Judge’s view that there was in any event no family life similarly sits uncomfortably with his finding that the Appellant had been living with (or receiving assistance from) his sponsor’s wife, i.e., his sister in law, since 2018. It is difficult to see how that equates to independence.

16. The Tribunal concludes that the decision is unsafe and cannot stand. No findings are preserved. Given that the Respondent now accepts the family relationship between the Appellant and his sponsor, it would be sensible for the Respondent to review the decision if possible prior to the rehearing in the First-tier Tribunal, especially if (as was indicated) the Appellant intends to serve up to date evidence as to the sponsor’s financial position or any other relevant matter.

DECISION

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed. There were material errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and reasons. That decision is accordingly set aside in its entirety. The Appellant’s appeal must be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal before any judge except Judge Doyle. The anonymity order previously made remains in force.

Signed Dated 3 February 2026

R J Manuell
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell