Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003878

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54904/2023
LP/04768/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

NH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. S Kerr, counsel instructed by JKR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. M Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 15 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iran, was granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Fenoughty (‘the judge’) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 7 June 2025, following a hearing which took place on 2 June 2025. That appeal challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 21 July 2023. That decision had been the subject of an earlier appeal which was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal in a determination promulgated on 26 July 2024. That determination was itself the subject of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. On 12 December 2024 UTJ O’Brien set aside the decision of Judge Hawden-Beal and remitted the matter to the First-tier with no findings preserved, the Respondent having agreed that the decision of 26 July 2024 contain an error of law in relation to two grounds on which the appellant relied.
2. In the present appeal, First-tier Tribunal Judge Karbani granted permission to appeal limited to ground 1 of the three grounds the appellant advanced on 29 July 2025. The appellant renewed his application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and on 23 September 2025 UTJ Kebede granted permission to appeal on all grounds, observing that there was less arguable merit in grounds 2 and 3. The judge made an order granting the appellant anonymity in their determination. I maintain that order given the nature of the appellant’s claims.
3. The hearing took place before my by CVP on 15 December 2025. At the start of the hearing I confirmed that all parties could hear and see each other. I then heard submissions from Mr. Kerr for the Appellant and Mr. Diwnycz for the Respondent. I received a composite bundle running to 755 pages in advance of the hearing. That bundle contained an application to admit further evidence under rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 in the form of an updated printout of the appellant’s Facebook account.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. In order to understand the challenges advanced by the appellant to the judge’s decision, it is necessary to summarise that decision in a little detail. The judge began her judgment (at §§1-4) by setting out the basis of the appellant’s claim, namely his imputed political opinion including his sur place activities in the UK, supported by factors including his Kurdish ethnicity, having been shot at by the Iranian authorities while leading two people through the mountains in 2021 and his name being given as a person who had assisted the KDPI and a raid on his home which caused his exit from Iran. The judge recorded (at §§5-12) the issues in dispute and the procedural chronology and that she heard live evidence from the appellant who was cross-examined.
5. Having set out the legal framework at (at §§11-12), the judge then turned to her findings on the appeal against the refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim (at §§13-41). The judge noted that a number of matters undermine the appellant’s credibility. However, the judge noted that the appellant’s age is relevant to this issue and she took into account his vulnerability, namely that he was a child when a number of the matters he described are said to have taken place. The judge recorded that the appellant had limited information about helping strangers to the border, has gave an inconsistent account in relation to political aspects of his claim. He relied on being a Kolbar in his statement of 25 April 2022 but there was no mention of any political dimension to his claim. On 28 June 2022 he said his uncle was a member of the KDPI. There is no satisfactory explanation for his failure to mention the core elements of his claim to be at risk, that he came to be of adverse attention of the authorities in his June 2022 interview. He was asked why this was not in his interview and he said it was nothing to do with his case. He now says his former representatives did not raise this and blames them for this omission but he had not complied with the approach required by BT Nepal [2004] UKAIT 00311 where failings are asserted by previous representatives, nor was there evidence that he had taken steps to contact them or put his complaint to them, that he had mentioned relevant matters which they failed to include in his witness statement. The Judge found that the omission of reference to political activity in the appellant’s witness statement is fundamental and that his previous solicitors are not to blame.
6. The Judge recorded that the appellant claimed to have a political profile in the UK and it was on his Facebook account, but in his March 2024 statement he said he had not joined any organisation in the UK. He did not produce any statements from friends, although he was aware this was in issue. It is unclear what information has been downloaded from Facebook His account regarding the circumstances of a raid on his house and his father’s detention was inconsistent as was his evidence regarding his contact with his family. His account of having helped strangers who smuggled goods into Iran is plausible, any risk would only arise if the authorities knew his name, he said he told them his name.
7. The Judge concluded on the issue of credibility (at §40-41) that in the round there were numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the appellant’s evidence which were not explained by his young age or other vulnerabilities which significantly undermine his credibility as they relate to the core of his account. He says the men who were with him who he was leading through the mountains in 2021 must have been caught and his house was raided as they had political material. The Judge found that whilst it is plausible that the appellant might have been shot at for helping those men, the totality of his account is not credible, there were late additions to strengthen the claim including the men being KDPI supporters, the raid on his house and the detention of his father. The judge found that much of his account has been fabricated to strengthen his asylum claim.
8. The Judge then set out her findings of fact (at §§42-44) including a detailed series of findings and reasons at §42 sub-paragraphs (a)-(p) setting out the matters in the appellant’s account she accepted and those she rejected. She found that the Appellant was involved in smuggling, he was not approached by KDPI members in 2021, his house was not raided as a result and his father was not detained or interrogated. The Appellant was not politically engaged before he left Iran. His Kurdish ethnicity does not amount to a strongly held political conviction. After coming to the UK, Kurdish organisations and friends helped the appellant set up a Facebook account to post anti-government material, he has posted such material from time to time since then, he has a low level political profile, he has not joined a political organisation, he has attended a number of demonstrations, this is to strengthen his claim, not done out of genuine political conviction, he remains in contact with his family in Iran. He could delete his Facebook account and not disclose his asylum claim, he does not have firm political convictions. Applying the ‘hair trigger’ approach to risk on return, he was not perceived as a Kurdish rights supporter or political activist. Even if he helped three men they were not political activists.
9. The Judge considered the appellant’s sur place activity in light of the authorities including XX(PJAK) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) and HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (at §§45-54). The Judge found that the appellant is not a genuine activist, he could delete his account, material posted since November 2021 would not be accessible. His illegal exit and claim for asylum would not elevate his risk of persecution on return. He would not be at risk as a Kurd who left Illegally. He would be questioned but his fears of persecution are not well founded.
10. In conclusion the judge held (at §§55-63) that the Appellant is not at risk of suffering serious harm or of suffering a breach of his ECHR rights. He is not eligible for a grant of persecution. Nor was there any basis on which to grant him leave under article 8 ECHR. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Grounds of Appeal
11. The appellant advances three grounds of appeal:
i. Ground 1 argues that the judge materially erred in law by having regard to the previous decision of FTTJ Hawden-Beal, the judge should have put to the appellant an issue raised at paragraph 30 by the judge; that the appellant told the tribunal in his 2024 appeal hearing that there was no evidence from his friends in the UK and that he was aware that his credibility and motivation was in issue. The judge was not invited to read the previous decision, although there is no prohibition on it. The judge did not inform the parties that they had done so or invite submissions on this, engagement with the previous determination was unfair.
ii. Ground 2 asserts that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons and made irrational findings on material matters. It is said that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons or made irrational findings on the appellant’s sur place activities. At §29 the Judge failed to provide reasons as to why the appellant’s failure to join a political group damaged his credibility. A person can be politically active and hold views without joining a group. The Judge failed to provide reasons for finding that the appellant has a low level political profile (at §42(k)) considering BA Iran CG [2011] UKUT 00036 (IAC). The judge was wrong to find that there was nothing to support the appellant’s claim he held any role of significance when he said he led chanting, helped organisers and gave out posters for attendees to hold and his attendance at demonstrations is on his Facebook page. The judge failed to provide reasons for finding that the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and Facebook posts were not from genuine political convictions, he needed to show they were genuine, not strong.
iii. Ground 3 is that the judge materially erred in law by finding (at §§35-36) that it was inconsistent for the appellant to say that if he was able to contact his family directly he would not do so to not put them at risk, but also to be politically active in the UK. It was not inconsistent for the appellant to engage in political activities in the UK which would not put his family at risk, but to believe that contacting his family would put them at risk. It was not appropriate for the judge to make an adverse credibility finding from omissions in a child’s knowledge given his immaturity. There was no indication that the judge took account of the appellant’s vulnerability when considering his account
12. I consider these grounds in turn below.

The Rule 15(2A) application
13. Although it was only dealt with briefly by the parties, I record for completeness that I grant the application made by the appellant to admit further evidence under rule 15(2A). I accept that is comprises an updated version of the appellant’s Facebook account including his privacy settings that was not in existence at the time of the hearing before the judge. Having reached that conclusion, I record that Mr. Kerr did not take me to any specific parts of that print out, beyond the privacy settings, in support of the submissions he made on behalf of the appellant.

Ground 1: reference to the earlier determination
14. Mr. Kerr relied on the grounds of appeal and submitted that the judge erred in law in the approach to the earlier determination of Judge Hawden-Beal at paragraph 30. The case of Gashi 01TH02902 provides guidance at paragraphs 21 and 28. In this case there was no canvassing of the parties or alerting of the parties that the judge had read the earlier determination. The question is whether there was any adverse impact because of that, per Collins J in Aissaoui [1997] Imm AR 184. The Judge picked up on factual matters in the earlier determination. The rationale of the earlier judge could have influenced this determination, see paragraphs 20 and 52 of Judge Hawden-Beale’s determination. The appellant accepts that his credibility was in issue. This turns on a question of fairness. The quoted passage relates to a factual element. The Judge ought to have put the parties on notice that she had read the earlier determination. That would have led to consideration of the rationale of dismissing the appellant’s account. The appellant was not aware that that rationale could have been in the mind of the Judge. The appellant accepts that without the first sentence of paragraph 30 there is an internal logic to that paragraph. How it is reached is infected by the approach of the judge to the conclusion. While the respondent says the appellant has simply asserted he has pro-Kurdish views, it is not a smokescreen, it has been found he has that opinion. The Secretary of State has not engaged with the specifics of Gashi on this issue. It is clearly in the appellant’s favour.
15. Mr. Diwnycz relied on the rule 24 response on this issue. The Respondent submits there is no material error of law on any of the grounds pleaded. In terms of ground one, the Respondent submits that the judge was entitled to refer to the evidence before the previous FTT judge as that evidence was taken and still remains live even though the actual decision was set aside. The findings were set aside, which the grounds of appeal at paragraph 5 correctly acknowledge, the judge was permitted to read the previous determination if they wished to do so. The findings at §30 of the judge’s determination are just one point the judge makes in a number of points in relation to the Appellant’s political engagement. Paragraph §30 states that the appellant has been aware since July 2023 that his credibility in relation to his political activity and motivation has been in issue. He has taken no steps to obtain evidence which would be readily available, if his account of his political activity were genuine and not just designed to add strength to his asylum claim. The Respondent submits this observation was open to the judge to make based on the evidence before them regardless of whether the judge had read the previous determination or not. It is for the Appellant to put their case to the FTT. The Respondent does not accept that the approach the judge has taken at §30 demonstrates that the judge has not approach this case with independence. Mt. Diwnycz further submitted that the reference to the earlier FTT judge‘s decision is somewhat a smokescreen. The evidence is unchanged. The appellant says he is a supporter of the KDPI. The setting aside of the earlier FTT decision does not mean it was wrong to have reference to the facts. There was no unfairness or procedural impropriety. It was simply an assessment of the facts.
16. In assessing this ground, I note that it seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on an issue in controversy between the parties, the judge having heard the appellant give evidence and be cross-examined.
17. Therefore, in considering this Ground, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)1 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
18. In general terms, I agree with Mr. Diwnycz on this ground. First, the judge gave clear and sustainable reasons for finding that the appellant had not provided any corroboration of his account of having been politically active in the UK in the form of witness statements from friends. It is correct that the Judge referred to the earlier 2024 determination of the appellant’s claim in deciding this issue. However, the only significance of that reference was that there were no such statements before the FtT in 2024 and that there were none at the time of the hearing before the judge. I do not consider that this shows that the judge impermissibly had regard to the earlier determination and adopted findings or conclusions in that judgment to the appellant’s detriment.
19. Second, and in any event, there was no unfairness to the appellant in not putting this matter to him. The avoidance of unfairness by an FtT judge considering an earlier determination is the issue which Gashi addresses. That authority makes clear that there is no blanket prohibition on a second FtT judge considering an earlier determination. However, and in my judgment more importantly, in this case as the judge correctly recorded at §30, the appellant has been aware since the refusal of his claim in July 2023 that his credibility in relation to his political activity and motivation was in issue. The fact that he presented no evidence from his friends in the UK in his 2024 appeal hearing was simply a fact which the judge recorded earlier in that paragraph. The appellant was aware of the case he had to meet which was not altered or made in some way unfair by the judge recording that the factual position in terms of the lack of corroboration was unaltered at the time of the second hearing before the FtT. It does not give rise to any error of law on the part of the judge.
20. Third, even if there was any error of omission, it would not be a material one in my judgment. The judge rejected the appellant’s account for a multiplicity of reasons, not simply limited to or turning on the appellant’s failure to provide witness statements from his friends. In those circumstances, even if there was any error on the part of the judge in referring to a factual matter recorded in the earlier determination, it was not a material one and does not infect the remainder of the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility, either in relation to his political activity in the UK nor his claim more broadly. Without reference to the earlier determination the decision would have been the same.
21. I reject this ground.

Ground 2: failure to provide adequate reasons and/or making irrational findings
22. Mr. Kerr submitted that at paragraph 29 of the decision the judge picked up on a point in the refusal letter, that the appellant had not joined a political group in the UK. The Judge’s analysis of the appellant’s sur place activities was inadequate. The judge made findings at paragraph [42(a)-(p)]. It is not clear what the judge rejected in terms of the appellant’s activities. The judge recorded the appellant’s account on these issues at paragraph [28]-[29]. She did not find that there was doubt about his role. That is left hanging until paragraph [42]. The judge did not find the appellant does not have a political opinion. She found he was present at demonstrations. The process at paragraph [42(i)-(m)] shows a failure to consider the nature of the appellant’s activities at demonstrations. There was no clear finding of what he did. There judge ‘leapfrogged’ over the appellant’s activities at demonstrations. He could have attended demonstrations to advance a genuine political opinion which would be perceived in an adverse way on return. The failure to make a clear finding on what the appellant actually did, other than showing there was no corroboration of what he said leaves a key question hanging. That is important because of the factors in HB (Kurds). Contradictory positions can coexist, that should be properly assessed. A person can be deliberately enhancing their case, that is not accepted, they can have a genuinely held view that leads to a perception of future risk. In this ground there was a material error in how that conclusion was analysed and reached.
23. The Respondent submitted that the judge provided has provided adequate reasoning for the points made at paragraph 29. This was one observation of many when considering the issue of his political engagement. The appellant asserts that the judge made an assumption that just because someone has not joined a political group, they therefore cannot be politically active and/or hold genuine beliefs. On a fair and balanced reading of paragraph [29], it cannot be said that assumption has been made by the judge. The judge was entitled to make the observation regarding the lack of explanation from the Appellant regarding this point. This is a disagreement with the findings by the judge regarding the Appellant’s level of involvement and their overall political profile. Paragraph 46 of the determination is not an assertion but the judge’s findings from their consideration of the evidence. It was open to the judge to conclude that the Appellant did not hold a significant role at the demonstrations. This is a detailed determination which has considered the evidence in the round as confirmed at paragraph 13 of the determination. The evidence on which the appellant relies does not demonstrate the judge was wrong to conclude as they did at paragraph [46]. The appellant fails to acknowledge and engage with the judge’s findings at [44 (m)], and [47] where they made clear findings on the genuineness of the Appellant’s political views/activities. Those findings are not undermined by paragraph [42(i)].
24. First, in analysing these submissions I bear in mind the decision in Yalcin, set out above. In my judgment at their height, this ground amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings and conclusions, having had the benefit of hearing the appellant’s evidence, cross-examination and submissions from both parties on it immediately thereafter. I do not consider that the First-tier Tribunal judge’s reasoning contains any error of law with respect to the matters raised under this ground.
25. Second, the appellant criticises the judge’s approach to the issue of whether the appellant had joined any political party or group in the UK. In my judgment, the judge was plainly entitled to consider this to be a relevant factor in their assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
26. Third, at its height this ground amounts to a disagreement with an aspect of one of a number of matters which the judge considered relevant to credibility including several inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. These were proper matters for the judge to take into account and included inconsistencies over the circumstances of the appellant’s departure from Iran and the sequence of events leading up to that departure as well as regarding his activities in the UK. The judge made negative credibility findings regarding the appellant’s political profile, his attendance at and activities at demonstrations and explained why they rejected A’s account on these matters (at §§28-31 and §§45-54).
27. Fourth, I do not accept that there is any gap in the judge’s logic or reasoning between paragraphs 28-31 and 42. The judge made clear the matters in the appellant’s claim which gave rise to the findings that she made on credibility. At §42 she set out the aspects of the appellant’s claim which she accepted and those which she did not. I do not consider that there is any failure to consider the nature of the appellant’s activities at demonstrations and whether that gave rise to a risk on return to him. These matters are set out with clarity in the judge’s judgment at §42, in particular sub-paragraphs (h)-(o). The judge lucidly explained their reasons for finding that the appellant would not be at risk on return.
28. Fifth, I accept the logic of Mr. Kerr’s submission that it is possible that a person may have genuinely held political views that they nonetheless deliberately use to enhance their case and that this can give rise to a risk on return. However, there was no error in the judge rejecting this aspect of the appellant’s case. Sub-paragraphs (i)-(o) of paragraph 42 provide a series of findings where the judge explained their approach to the appellant’s account on this issue. Those findings were grounded in the judge’s earlier credibility findings which in my judgement are unassailable. No error arises from this analysis of the judge’s conclusions on this issue.
29. Sixth, taking a step back, the judge correctly analysed the issue of the appellant’s sur place activities. The judge correctly applied relevant authorities including XX(PJAK) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) and HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430. The judge correctly applied the ‘hair trigger’ approach to risk on return, recently considered by the Court of Appeal in OM v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585 at [39]-[55]. There is no error of law in the judge’s approach to the issue of risk on return to the appellant as a result of his sur place activities in the UK.
30. For these reasons, I find that ground 2 does not give rise to any error of law.

Ground 3: irrational or unfair findings
31. Mr Kerr made the following submissions on this ground. This ground focusses on paragraph 35-36 of the judge’s determination. The grounds set out the nature of the complaint. The appellant was a vulnerable witness. The Judge bookends consideration of this issue at paragraphs 15 and 41 of the determination. At a key point where benefit of the doubt ought to have been afforded, it was not. The appellant should have had the benefit of that. The appellant should have been given greater latitude on that. This ground, and ground 2 relates to credibility. All of these issues should be considered in the round. This is part and parcel of the earlier failures identified. That flawed credibility assessment necessarily infects the other aspects of credibility. The other findings become less sustainable.
32. The respondent submitted that this ground is not made out. The judge is well aware of the Appellant’s age as set out in the determination at §14 and also treated the Appellant as a vulnerable witness with consideration of the relevant guidelines. The judge also noted the representative’s submission on this point at §15. The judge clearly had the appellant’s vulnerability at the forefront of their mind when assessing credibility overall. The judge does not need to set out that they have continued to apply the relevant guidelines throughout their determination. It would be onerous to do so. It is clear that the judge considered the Appellant’s vulnerability and applied the guidelines in relation to all issues within this appeal. That approach is confirmed at §40 of the determination.
33. First, in relation to the appellant’s assertion that the judge failed to give him the benefit of the doubt due to his age at the time of events he was describing, I reject this submission. The judge explicitly stated at paragraph 14 that she treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness and at paragraph 15 of the determination that the policy guidance on assessing credibility on children’s claims applies. At paragraph 40 she made clear that the inconsistencies and contradictions in his evidence cannot be explained by his age and that this does not provide an explanation for those omissions and inconsistencies. The judge had clearly applied the correct guidance and said that she had done so. Simply because she made adverse findings against the appellant does not mean that she did not apply that approach correctly.
34. Second, the judge’s approach to the issue of contact between the appellant and his family must be considered in its context. That begins at paragraph 34 of the judge’s determination where she noted an inconsistency in the appellant’s account, stating that he did not contact his family as they had no internet and that he did not have their phone number whilst also stating that he had made contact with his family via a chance encounter with a previously unknown man in Birmingham. The judge further described this aspect of the appellant’s account as improbable. There is no challenge to that finding. Against the backdrop of those findings, the judge considered the appellant’s account that he would not contact his family so as not to put them at risk whilst at the same time becoming politically active in the UK. The judge made the findings she did at paragraphs 35 and 36 by reference to a passage from the May 2022 CPIN. In my judgement the judge was correct to note that there was a contradiction in the appellant’s claim on the one hand stating that he would not seek to put his family at risk by contacting them whilst simultaneously stating that he had contacted them via an improbably chance encounter with a previously unknown man and by engaging in political activity in the UK which could put them at risk I conclude that this part of the judge’s reasoning does not contain an error of law.
35. Third, even if there was an error in the judge’s findings on this issue I do not consider it to be a material one. That finding was made in the context of paragraphs 34 and 35 of the determination which I have considered above. Even if the judge ought to have found that there was no contradiction in the appellant’s claim on this discrete issue, that could not have led the judge to reach a different conclusion on the appellant’s credibility overall. The judge analysed a large number of matters which she considered relevant to the negative credibility findings that she made. Those negative credibility findings underpinned the aspects of the appellant’s claim that she accepted and those that she rejected which are set out at paragraph 42 of the determination. I do not consider that if the judge had resolved the contents of this ground in the appellant’s favour and had found that there was no contradiction in the appellant’s account on this aspect of his claim, that that could have led the judge to a different conclusion on credibility or on risk on return. I consider the judge’s conclusions on these issues to be unimpeachable.
36. This ground of appeal fails

Notice of Decision
37. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
38. The appeal is dismissed.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 December 2025

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email