Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003907
UI-2025-003908, UI-2025-003912
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/57824/2024, LH/00751/2025
HU/57825/2024, LH/00753/2025
HU/57829/2024, LH/00754/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
and

ELHAM RAHMANI
WAZHMA RAHMANI
SURA RAHMANI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondents: Mr Osmani of Times PBS

Heard at Field House on 13 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. By a decision issued on 29 January 2026 the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) with no findings preserved. I now remake the decision.
2. The appellant is the Entry Clearance Officer. However, for convenience, I will refer to the parties as they were designated in the First-tier Tribunal.

Introduction
3. The appellants are citizens of Afghanistan who have been living in Turkey since 2022. The first and second appellants are married. The third appellant is their daughter, who was born in 2022.
4. The appellants’ connection to the UK is that the first appellant’s father (“the sponsor”) fled Afghanistan and came to the UK in 2013. He was recognised as a refugee. The sponsor’s wife and two of his children also live in the UK.
5. There is no route under the Immigration Rules by which the appellants can gain entry to the UK. They argue that the respondent nonetheless is obliged to grant them entry clearance on the basis that to not do so breaches the UK’s obligations under article 8 ECHR.
6. The first appellant has previously applied for entry to the UK. His application was unsuccessful and subsequent appeal refused by the FTT (“the previous FTT decision”). The first appellant’s circumstances at the time of the previous FTT decision were entirely different: he was living in Pakistan with his sister; not in Turkey with a wife and child. Although the previous FTT decision must, in accordance with the principles in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702, be treated as a starting point, the change in the first appellant’s circumstances means that the previous FTT decision has not been of assistance in determining whether refusing entry at the date of the hearing would be contrary to article 8.
Issues in dispute
7. There are two issues in dispute:
a. Do the appellants have a family life with their family in the UK within the autonomous meaning of family life under article 8(1) ECHR?
b. If the answer to the first question is yes, is refusing the appellants entry to the UK a disproportionate interference with that family life?
Relevant law
8. This appeal concerns article 8 ECHR, which states:
1.Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2.There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
9. The scope of article 8 was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in R(IA) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516; a case that also concerned a family unit outside the UK seeking to enter the UK in order to join family in the UK.
10. “Family life” under article 8(1) has an autonomous meaning. The test of whether family life exists is succinctly summarised in para. 132 of IA as follows:
Family life requires close personal ties. It is normally limited to core cohabiting family, but can be extended to adult siblings if they can demonstrate additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties. The existence of real, committed or effective support is relevant, but not conclusive. The evaluation of whether family life exists is a fact-sensitive exercise where many factors may be relevant including financial support, physical and psychological health and a combination of other factors.
11. IA concerned adult siblings. However, the test is the same where, as in this case, the relationship is between a parent and adult child: see para. 118 of IA.
12. Where family life exists within the autonomous meaning of article 8(1), the proportionality of refusing entry must be determined under article 8(2). This requires the balancing of relevant considerations, including those specified in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002; and there must be very exceptional or compelling circumstances for entry clearance to be granted outside the Rules. As explained in para. 169 of IA:
It is the responsibility of the SSHD and the Government to make policy decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. The courts and tribunals must respect those policy decisions and not seek to get around them save in very exceptional or compelling circumstances.
The hearing
13. I heard evidence from the sponsor and first appellant’s two siblings living in the UK. The sponsor’s wife did not attend the hearing for health reasons.
14. I found the evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence entirely credible, and this is reflected in my findings of fact set out below.
15. I heard submissions from Mr Parvar and Mr Osmani. I have not set out or summarised the submissions in my decision. However, I have reflected on them carefully and taken them into account in my analysis.
Findings of fact
16. The appellants live in very difficult circumstances in Turkey. They have been unable to regularise their status and fear being removed/deported to Afghanistan, where they fear serious harm/persecution. The difficulties are made worse by the first appellant being in poor mental health. Their lack of immigration status in Turkey has an adverse impact on all aspects of their lives. Amongst other things, the appellants seek to avoid public locations as much as possible in order to reduce the chance of coming to the attention of the Turkish authorities. They are unable to work or access public services.
17. The appellants live in rented accommodation (the same apartment since arriving in Turkey in 2022) and have a sympathetic landlord who keeps utility contracts under his company name (as the appellants cannot register for utilities) and will sometimes bring groceries to the family.
18. The appellants’ family in the UK are (understandably) deeply concerned about the appellants and provide them with support. This takes the form of emotional support (through internet/telephone communication) and financial support. The sponsor regularly collects funds from other family members, which he then arranges to be given to the appellants along with money that he also provides.
19. The sponsor and his family in the UK have the resources and desire to support the appellants in the UK.
20. The sponsor and his wife have significant health problems.
21. The first appellant’s two siblings in the UK are both working and committed to supporting the appellants.
22. I did not hear evidence on whether the appellants speak English but will assume, for the purposes of this assessment, that they do.
Analysis
The existence of family life under article 8(1) between the appellants and their family in the UK
23. Family life under article 8(1) is normally limited to core cohabiting family, which is not the case here. The first appellant has not lived with the sponsor for over a decade, and the other appellants have never lived with him. The appellants live together as a distinct family unit that is separate from the sponsor and other family members in the UK.
24. Family life can only extend to a relationship between a parent and adult child where it can be demonstrated that there are “additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties”.
25. The sponsor’s evidence, which I accept, is that the first appellant, who is distressed and struggling because of his (and his family’s) difficult circumstances, turns to him and other family members in the UK for emotional support, which is provided through regular and frequent phone conversations. The evidence indicates that this has been the case for at least several years. The sponsor’s evidence also indicates that, to a significant extent, the appellants are financially dependent on their family in the UK.
26. In my view, the appellants have established that there is a level of dependence on the sponsor that is sufficient to establish the existence of family life within the autonomous meaning of article 8(1).
27. Although I find that there is a sufficient degree of dependence to establish family life, this is not a case of there being total dependence on the sponsor (or other family members). The first and second appellants are not alone, as they have each other; and there was no evidence indicating that they do not provide each other with emotional support. The appellants also have the (albeit very limited) support of their landlord, who has provided them with rented accommodation since they arrived in Turkey in 2022 and supports them by bringing groceries and enabling access to utilities.
Whether refusing entry to the appellants is a disproportionate interference with their family life with the sponsor (and other family members) in the UK under article 8(2)
28. I have adopted a “balance sheet approach”, as recommended in Hesham Ali v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, where I have incorporated the relevant considerations set out in section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
29. The following weighs in favour of the appellants:
a. They have a family life with their family in the UK. I attach some, but not great, weight to the relationship. The reason I only attach some weight to the relationship is that the family life is not between core cohabiting family but between family members who have not lived together for many years (or at all) and who each live within separate family units.
b. The third appellant is a child and her best interests are a primary consideration. It is in her best interests to live in a stable and safe environment (where she can access public services) and where she does not face a risk of being sent with her family to Afghanistan. It would therefore firmly be in her best interests for the appellants to be admitted to the UK. I attach weight to this.
c. The appellants have a strong desire to and interest in relocating to a country where they can have a stable and lawful status and where they do not face a risk of being sent to Afghanistan. I attach weight to this.
d. The first appellant suffers from mental health problems that are likely to be alleviated, at least to some extent, by being able to join his family in the UK and benefit from the stability (and lack of risk) he would associate with life in the UK. This, too, weighs in the appellants’ favour.
e. The sponsor and his wife suffer from significant health problems and the stress and upset they suffer due to the appellants’ circumstances will be alleviated in the event that the appellants are able to move to the UK. I attach weight to this consideration.
30. On the other side of the balance is that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. Section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act requires this consideration to be taken into account. When determining the weight to attach to this consideration, I have kept in mind that it is not the policy of the respondent, as reflected in Immigration Rules, to grant entry clearance to relatives of UK citizens (or people settled in the UK) who live in difficult – or even dire - circumstances outside the UK. Further, there is no scheme, or provision in the Rules, to permit Afghans stranded in Turkey or elsewhere to join family members in the UK. As explained in para. 173 of IA:
All those factors relating to the family’s individual case had to be balanced against the SSHD’s policies as reflected in the Rules, to which considerable weight had to be attached at a general level. As we have said, very exceptional or compelling Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. R (IA) v. SSHD circumstances had to be shown for entry clearance to be granted outside the Rules. There were, to put the matter starkly, no exceptional or compelling circumstances here. The family life with the sponsor, recently revived, was short-lived and must have been developed in the knowledge that entry clearance might not be obtained. As we have now said repeatedly, this is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK’s laws and democratic process, and for the SSHD’s decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. As a matter of fact, the policies of the SSHD did not include a Gaza resettlement scheme. Had it done so, the balance might, as we have said, been very different.
31. Accordingly, I attach considerable weight to the public interest in effective immigration controls.
32. The evidence indicates that that, upon arrival in the UK, the appellants are likely to be financially independent (given the support of their family) and, for the purpose of this assessment, I have assumed they speak English. I therefore find that the public interest considerations in sections 117B(2) (speaking English) and 117B(3) (financial independence) of the 2002 Act do not weigh against the appellants.
33. There are multiple factors weighing in favour of granting entry clearance to the appellants, including the best interests of the third appellant which is a primary consideration. However, these factors, considered cumulatively, do not outweigh the public interest in effective immigration controls, which weighs strongly against the appellants because it is not the policy of the respondent to grant entry clearance to people in the appellants’ circumstances and, as highlighted in para. 167 of IA:
The decision as to what is necessary in UK society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK is the business of the SSHD and the Government
34. I therefore find that refusing entry clearance to the appellants is not a disproportionate interference with the family life that exists between them and their family in the UK.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was previously set aside by the Upper Tribunal. I now remake the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and dismiss the appellants’ appeal.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29/5/2026