Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003920
UI-2025-003430

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00027/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

Tomas Konya
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Alban, instructed by Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 28 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of the Czech Republic born on the 26th of September 1999, appealed against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson dated the 14th of April 2025 to dismiss the appellant’s human rights claim against deportation.
2. The appellant claims that he arrived as a minor in 2006 and has lived in the UK since. He now has a wife who is also a Czech national and two children under 7 years. On the 6th of June 2023 the appellant was convicted for the offence of possession of a controlled Class A drug and concerned in the supply of heroin and crack cocaine. He was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 30 months on the 4th of August 2023.
Grounds of appeal and permission
3. The grounds of appeal were as follows:
(i) the judge erred in his assessment as to whether the appellant had established permanent residence before 2020 and yet acknowledged that the appellant was in school in the United Kingdom from July 2009 until August 2016. The appellant would thus automatically have gained permanent residence as a minor and have gained settled status in 2014. The appellant had provided wage slips for 2018 showing he was exercising treaty rights, and the judge had erred and finding that the appellant had not provided evidence for the years 2018 to 2019 and in 2023. It was submitted that if the appellant had settled status his children would be British citizens at the time of their birth.
(ii) there were factual errors in the credibility assessment not least in relation to the relationship the appellant had with his half-brother. It was never contended that the stepbrother did not have contact with the stepfather, but it was the appellant and his mother who maintained that they had no contact with the appellant stepfather. This was relevant because it was a material error to find there was an ongoing cordial relationship between the appellant’s family and the appellant’s stepfather as found at [42] and there was not.
(iii) there were factual errors at [48] in finding the appellant had worked in the Czech Republic and there would be no impediments to work. The appellant left the Czech Republic at the age of 7 and had never worked in the Czech Republic and knew only basic written Czech language and was a recovering heroin addict. Further there was a failure to consider factors such that the appellant's partner had no family in the Czech Republic, the appellant's children and partner had established a life in the United Kingdom, the appellant had no family in the Czech Republic apart from estranged half-brothers or stepbrother.
(iv) the judge erred in relation to the assessment of very compelling circumstances When referring to very significant offending at [56] and this was not the case. The appellant provided evidence of employment and payments at rent to support his family contrary to the judge’s observation. The judge had failed to consider all the factors in the round when making an assessment of very compelling circumstances.
(v) the judge failed to make a full assessment as to the best interests of the children.
4. Permission to appeal was granted on the grounds listed above. Permission was granted by the FtT on the last ground.
5. UTJ Jackson granted permission on the remaining grounds (save for two which related to an error in the assessment of dependency between the appellant and his twin brother and the assessment of the partner’s medical condition which were refused and I take no further).
6. UTJ Jackson gave permission stating that it was arguable that the FtT erred at [32] in concluding that the appellant did not have permanent residence by requiring evidence in relation to the period 2009 – 2016 because the appellant was a minor at the time and so may fulfil the requirements in regulation 4(1)(d) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
7. UTJ Jackson found there were slips in relation to other points raised, although perhaps less serious but the best interests of the children ground was arguable, she granted permission on all grounds cited above.
Conclusions
8. Ms Alban submitted that the errors particularly in relation to the status of the appellant and the factual errors meant that the application of the exceptions in s117C Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 was flawed and thus so too was the assessment of very compelling circumstances flawed. She contended that the matter should be returned to the FtT.
9. At the outset, Mr Lawson, on behalf of the Secretary of State conceded there were fundamental errors of law in the decision and that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing de novo.
10. I note that s117C (4) of Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA) sets out that
Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
11. The factual errors pertained to the question of lawful residence, integration and very significant obstacles (particularly with reference to CI (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15) and it appeared there were material errors in that assessment; those factors in turn were relevant to the assessment under s117C (6) NIAA (very compelling circumstances).
12. At the outset, Mr Lawson, on behalf of the Secretary of State conceded there were fundamental errors of law in the decision and that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing de novo.
13. In the light of the Secretary of State’s concession, I set aside the decision owing to a material error of law and remit the matter to the FtT.
Notice of Decision
The Judge erred materially for the reasons identified. I set aside the decision pursuant to Section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCE 2007). Bearing in mind the nature and extent of the findings to be made the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal under section 12(2) (b) (i) of the TCE 2007 and further to 7.2 (b) of the Presidential Practice Statement.
Directions
1. The appellant is to advise no later than 3rd March 2026 whether an interpreter is required for the relisted hearing and if so, the language.
2. Any further evidence is to be filed and served no later than 21 days prior to the relisted hearing.

H Rimington
Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29th January 2026