Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003921
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51071/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

DR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Winter, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is an asylum seeker who fears persecution on return to Iraq. I continue the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal (FtT) in their decision dated 13 May 2025.
2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq. He was born in 2005. He is of Kurdish ethnicity.
3. The issue to decide is whether the FtT Judge (‘the Judge’) Kempton erred in law, in a decision dated 13 May 2025, when dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Respondent, dated 2 January 2024, to refuse his protection and human rights claims made on 4 September 2022.

Background
4. The Appellant fears return to Iraq on the grounds that he is the potential victim of an honour crime. He states that he entered into a relationship with a girl whom he knew in school. Her family refused his family’s marriage proposals on his behalf. They continued their relationship and they engaged in sexual relations in her home on 28/29 June 2022 and were discovered. The girl’s father is an arms dealer with KDP/ PUK party affiliations. He received death threats as a result. The Appellant fled for these reasons and fears return. He states that his family had to flee their home due to possible repercussions from the girl’s family.
5. The Appellant claimed asylum on 4 September 2022. His claim was refused 2 January 2024. The decision accepted his nationality and ethnicity, but she did not accept any other part of his claim. He appealed this decision.
6. His appeal was dismissed by the FtT in a decision dated 12 September 2025 on protection and human rights grounds.

Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
7. The Appellant appealed the decision of the FtT. I summarise the grounds of appeal advanced as follows:
i. Ground One: The Judge erred in law at paragraph 42 in finding that the claim was highly improbable, and at paragraph 46 in describing the claim as “completely incredible”. This leaves the reader with the impression that the claim is inherently implausible. The FTT has erred by misapplying the law (KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) at para. 28).
ii. Ground Two: The Appellant says that the Judge erred in considering the letter from Ashti Organisation for a range of reasons. Firstly, at para. 47 the reader is left in real doubt as to why the FtT has said that the Ashti letter refers in “oblique terms” to the Appellant’s problems. The letter does not use such terms and it is unclear what those are. The finding is irrational when the letter does not use oblique terms. Secondly, at para.48 the Judge is said to have misunderstood or misapprehended the evidence; he stayed at the Ashti shelter for 12 days and this was clear from his Personal Information Questionnaire (PIQ). Thirdly, the Judge at para.49 failed to have regard to the fact that the Ashti letter had the organisations email, telephone number and website. Fourthly, the Judge at para.54 erred in failing to note that the Appellant did state in his PIQ that the shelter he stayed at belonged to Ashti. It is submitted that the remaining findings are undetermined or vitiated by these findings.
8. There was a ground three in the original grounds of appeal but this was not pursued by the Appellant so I have not set this out above.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge (UTJ) Landes in a decision dated 5 November 2025. The decision reads as follows:

“1. I consider that it is arguable that the judge may have misunderstood the evidence about the Ashti organisation as set out at ground 2. The appellant explained in his 2022 statement at p 2374 of the consolidated bundle that he had stayed in the shelter for 12 days (he says he stayed longer in total in Erbil with his uncle and his uncle’s friend) and that he only left Iraq on 1 August 2022 so that there is arguably no inconsistency in the timeline given by the appellant. Reading his two witness statements together, the appellant did say that the shelter he was taken to belonged to Ashti and in the circumstances “filed a complaint... to find a solution to his issue” is arguably perfectly consistent with asking the human rights organisation to help resolve the situation with the family of the girl, as the appellant said he did. It is right that there were other adverse credibility findings, but I cannot say at this stage that even if the judge misunderstood the evidence about the Ashti organisation such misunderstanding must be immaterial.
2. It is right that the judge did say that it seemed highly improbable in the light of what is known about the expectations on Kurdish women that the girl would have invited the appellant into her home when her mother was sleeping downstairs (ground 1). However, this was not the only adverse finding against the appellant, and it is not obviously based on inherent implausibility as opposed to implausibility in the light of information about society in the KRI.
3. Ground 3 completely ignores the judge’s findings that the appellant confirmed he had an INID document [39] rather than a CSID.
4. Despite my comments I do not seek to restrict the grounds which may be argued.”
10. There was a Rule 24 Reply. This adopted the decision of UTJ Landes in the permission decision in respect of Ground One and Ground Three. In respect of Ground Two, the Respondent defended the decision on the basis that the Judge was making a finding about the Appellant having lodged a complaint three weeks after the incident when he was allegedly in Erbil being sheltered by Ashti, that the Judge was concerned about the lack of an address on the Ashti letter, and the Judge was referring to the fact that the letter makes no reference to the organisation having housed him for 12 days.
11. A Rule 25 Response was also filed by the Appellant. In respect of Ground One, the Judge does not identify what country information is relied upon to support the findings. The country information in fact supported the Appellant’s case that he and his partner could marry at age 16. The Respondent had not engaged with the first point in Ground Two. It was clear that the Judge had misunderstood the evidence and this was material. Further, the evidence before the Judge included Ashti’s Facebook page as well as the detail in the letter. Whilst there was no address on the letter none of the other information was said to be unreliable and reliability was not raised as a matter in the Respondent’s Review. The Appellant made clear she did not pursue Ground Three.

Submissions
12. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 26 February 2026.
13. I had before me a composite bundle (CB) running to 1274 pages, a List of Authorities running to 261 pages, a supplementary list of authorities running to 16 pages, a Rule 24 Reply dated 2 February 2026 and a Rule 25 Response (undated).
14. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives.

Findings and Reasons
15. I consider the grounds of appeal advanced below. I have taken the grounds in reverse order.
Ground Two
16. The Appellant argues that the Judge erred in considering the letter from Ashti Organisation for a range of reasons. Firstly, at para. 47 the reader is left in real doubt as to why the FtT has said that the Ashti letter refers in “oblique terms” to the Appellant’s problems. The letter does not use such terms and it is unclear from the decision what those are. The finding is irrational when the letter does not use oblique terms. Secondly, at para.48 the Judge is said to have misunderstood or misapprehended the evidence; he stayed at the Ashti shelter for 12 days and this was clear from his Personal Information Questionnaire (PIQ). Thirdly, the Judge at para.49 failed to have regard to the fact that the Ashti letter had the organisations email, telephone number and website. Fourthly, the Judge at para.54 erred in failing to note that the Appellant did state in his PIQ that the shelter he stayed at belonged to Ashti. It is submitted that the remaining findings are undetermined or vitiated by these findings.
17. I set out paragraphs 47-49 and paragraph 54 of the decision given the relevance of these to the issue being raised:

“47. Having regard to the letter from Ashti organisation for human rights, which is at page 60 of the stitched bundle and the translation at page 61, I comment as follows. The letter refers in oblique terms to the appellant’s problem. It refers to the appellant having filed a complaint to find a solution to his issue. He says he was being threatened to be killed by Mohammed Watman and his family due to a social problem. They go on to say that speaking to Mohammed Worthman and his family in the hope of finding a solution it became clear that the family are still adamant that they want to kill the appellant regardless of where they find him in Iraq since that is the way their honour would be restored in society. The Ashti organisation say that the appellant’s life remains in danger. They also say that he faces legal consequences due to his actions towards Mohammed Watman’s daughter which have resulted in his conviction under article 393.
48. The Ashti organisation themselves do not give any details of what article 393 relates to. I have not been referred to anything in that regard to clarify the issue apart from what the appellant himself said which did not assist me. It is also not clear why the appellant would have made a complaint to Ashti when he was supposedly fleeing the country. They say that he initially filed a complaint on 18th July 2022. That date does not make sense if the appellant’s account of his sexual encounter on 28/29 June 2022 is to be believed as he said he was in Erbil 12 days. It is almost three weeks from his fleeing Bnar’s house to him supposedly making a complaint to Ashti.
49. At paragraph eight of his statement at page 55 of the bundle I see that the appellant said that his uncle Shwana Took him to a human rights organisation in Erbil, where he remained for around 12 days while his family tried to resolve the matter. At that point, their appellant makes no mention of him making any complaint to the Ashti organisation. I note that neither page 60 or 61 give an address for the organisation and whether or not it is they who are in Erbil.
…
54. The appellant is clearly in contact with his family in order to be able to obtain the letter from the Ashti organisation. I noticed that at paragraph 28 of his statement on page 58 he says that it was his uncle Shawana who took him to the human rights organisation called Ashti. He earlier said he had stayed with an organisation for 12 days in Erbil. However, the letter from Ashti makes no reference to him having been there for a period of 12 days. If he was with such an organisation was he staying in a refuge which they provide? He simply has not addressed such a matter. He did mention staying at a shelter in his earlier statement at paragraph 23 on page 2374 of the bundle. In such circumstances it is all the stranger that the letter does not mention that the appellant stayed in one of their shelters.”
(emphasis added)
18. Having considered the letter from the Ashti organisation I agree that it is difficult to understand from the Judge’s decision why she describes the letter as referring in “oblique terms” to the Appellant’s problems. The letter says A filed a complaint on 18 July 2022 to find a solution to his issue, as he was threatened to be killed by Wathman and his family due to a social problem. They have reinvestigated the matter, after a few years have passed since the incident, by speaking to Wathman and his family in the hope of finding a solution to the problem. It is clear through their conversation that Wathman and his family are still adamant that they want to kill the Appellant regardless of where they find him in Iraq, as by killing him their honour would be restored in society. Unfortunately, the problem is ongoing and his life is still in danger. Furthermore, he is also facing legal consequences due to his actions towards Wathman's daughter, which have resulted in his conviction under Article 393. As a result, his life is in grave danger. They strongly advise against his return to Iraq, as it would likely be fatal.
19. As such, the letter gives a date for a complaint being registered with them, names individuals involved, discusses that this is an honour issue, that recent attempts at reconciliation between the families have failed, that A has been convicted in his absence and there is a real risk to his life. I note that the Judge at para.47 of the decision refers to much of this detail. This makes it harder to understand why the letter is described here as referring to his problems in oblique terms.
20. I also agree that the Judge appears to have misunderstood the evidence at para. 48 of the decision. It is suggested that his timeline of complaining to or approaching Ashti on 18 July 2022 makes no sense if he was in Erbil for 12 days after 28-29 June 2022.
21. I set out the Appellant’s evidence on this issue here:

• Paras. 7-8, 20, 28 Appeal Witness Statement 16 August 2024: “I went to my friend Mohammed's house. I did not return home. When I arrived at Mohammed’s house, I contacted my uncle Sarbaz. My uncles Sarbaz came to Mohammed's house to help me escape from my district. My uncle Sarbaz took me to Erbil. We used the back roads to go to Erbil to avoid all checkpoints. My uncle Sarbaz took me to my uncle Shawna's house in Erbil. ... My uncle Shawna took me to a Human Rights Organisation in Erbil. I remained there for around 12 days whilst my family tried to resolve the matter…. When I requested the support of the Human Rights Organisation to help resolve my matter, the elders in my family were also involved in trying to resolve the matter. The Human Rights Organisation and my family elders were unable to resolve the matter. Therefore, my family members would be unable to provide me with protection… I advised my solicitor that my uncle Shawana took me to a Human Rights Organisation called Ashti. My solicitor was able to contact Ashti and obtain a letter from them confirming I requested their help.”
• Question 98 Asylum Interview: “…I left Iraq on 1 August actually.” Question 100: “Who arranged this? My maternal uncle.”
• Paragraphs 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 PIQ/ Statement signed 9 March 2023: “I went to my friend Mohamed's house and told him what had happened. I asked to use his mobile phone so I could call my maternal Uncle called Sarbaz who lives in Qaladze…. I told my uncle Sarbaz what had happened and he told me to stay where I was and he would come and get me. My Uncle Sarbaz came to Mohamed's house as he used to transport fruit from Qalzade to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil…. My Uncle Sarbaz me in the back of his pickup truck and he took me to my other maternal Uncle Shwana called (sic) house in Erbil. My uncle Shwana was a retired policeman. … The problem escalated quickly and my family tried to resolve matters… They did this by the use of some of the family elders and also a human rights organisation. [They] were not willing to resolve matters so my Uncle Shwana told me that it was best for me to leave the country… I did not speak to my parents during this time; I found out all this information from my Uncle Shwana. My Uncle took me to a shelter which belongs to the human rights organisation where I stayed for 12 days whilst they tried to resolve the matter. I was only with my Uncle for less than one day but I stayed at his friend’s house during this time. … My Uncle Shwana made all the arrangements for me to leave Iraq…. A few days later, a few days later on the 01 August 2022, I was put in a lorry by two men in Erbil and my uncle told me that I was being taken to Turkey.”
22. Reading the above, contrary to what the Judge states at para. 48, it seems the Appellant has consistently said that he and/or his family were trying to resolve the matter by using elders and the Human Rights Organisation, namely Ashti. When they realised this was not going to happen, arrangements were made for him to flee with him leaving on 1 August 2022.
23. Further, there is nothing in the timeline when reading the evidence as a whole that does not make sense. The Appellant has consistently explained that he was taken by an uncle to the Human Rights Organisation, Ashti, in Erbil where he stayed for 12 days. He has also explained that before this he fled to a friend and then another uncle. He also has stated that he stayed with his uncle’s friend in this time. As explained above, his consistent evidence is that they also used the Human Rights Organisation, Ashti, to help them to resolve matters prior to the decision being made for him to flee. The Judge seems to have misunderstood that Ashti was the Human Rights Organisation he was taken to by his uncle in Erbil. Alternatively, the Judge has not it seems considered the entirety of this aspect of the account when making her findings at para. 48. The findings made are difficult to understand when read against the Appellant’s evidence.
24. In respect of the argument made that the Judge at para.49 failed to have regard to the fact that the Ashti letter had the organisations email, telephone number and website, I note that the Judge states that there is no address for the organisation on the letter and it is not clear if they are the organisation in Erbil, I address this grounds in parts.
25. Firstly, the Appellant’s evidence at paragraph 28 of his statement dated 16 August 2024 where he states “I advised my solicitor that my uncle Shawna took me to a Human Rights Organisation called Ashti. My solicitor was able to contact Ashti and obtain a letter from them confirming I requested their help”, and paragraph 8 of the same statement where he says “My uncle Shwana took me to a Human Rights Organisation in Erbil. I remained there for around 12 days…” addresses this issue.
26. Secondly, in respect of the second aspect of this ground, I agree with the Judge that there is no address on the letter. I note that the letter does give the website, email address and the telephone number of Ashti but this is not an address. The link given to the website on the letter does not assist much further in respect of location as it is not a site that is written in English. However, in the Rule 25 response the Appellant highlights that Ashti’s Facebook page was before the Tribunal. I note that one of the posts from that page gives the location as “Irbil, Iraq” (CB 72). I do consider that this evidence, taken with the Appellant’s own evidence, has not been considered adequately.
27. I accept the submission made that the detail in the letter (in respect of contact details, and having a publicly accessible website), and the supporting material available about the organisation in the public domain, would of course impact the weight to be attached to this evidence and any assessment of reliability of the same. I note that the Judge does not refer to this detail when assessing this evidence.
28. In respect of the final matter raised, that the Judge at para.54 erred in failing to note that the Appellant did state that the shelter he stayed at belonged to Ashti. A fair reading of the Appellant’s evidence as a whole, shows that the Human Rights Organisation that his uncle took him to, that he stayed at for 12 days and that he refers to repeatedly is in Erbil. A fair reading of the evidence as a whole shows that this organisation is Ashti. I find that the Judge’s finding at para. 54 that the Appellant has not addressed that he was staying in a refuge with Ashti/the Human Rights Organisation, is not a fair analysis of the evidence (see para.21 above).
29. I note that other findings made at para.54 by the Judge refer to the fact that the letter does not mention him staying in such a refuge with them. I accept that is correct but I have found that there are a number of errors in respect of this ground that are made out.
30. I consider that the above errors do amount to a material errors of law having regard to R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (i), (ii), (iv) and (vii).
Ground One
31. The Appellant says that the Judge erred in law at paragraph 42 in finding that the claim was highly improbable, and at paragraph 46 describing the claim as “completely incredible”. This leaves the reader with the impression that the claim is inherently implausible. The FTT has erred by misapplying the law (KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) at para. 28).
32. Paragraph 46 of the decision reads as follows:
“46. With regard to the appellant and [his partner] both being aged 16 and in year 8 at school, they were children. I simply do not find it credible that the appellant’s family themselves would countenance that he was in a position to get married at that age and that at that stage of his education. I find it completely incredible that they would even consider going to the family of a neighbour to ask for the daughter’s hand in marriage for the appellant. They were both children. They were not in a position to get married. They were still studying. How was the appellant supposed to look after a wife? He might not have thought of that, but his parents would have done and certainly the girl’s parents would have done. It is a completely unrealistic notion to expect anyone to believe that at that age, and in their particular circumstances, namely still being at school, that marriage would be contemplated by both of them.”
33. I was taken to the CB p241 in respect of the above findings. The country evidence here as set out in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Protection Considerations with Regards to People Fleeing Iraq - Update I, 30 January 2024, reads as follows:
“Child marriages are reported to occur throughout Iraq among all ethnic and religious groups at high rates. The legal age for marriage is 18, which applies to Iraqis of all sects. The minimum age can be lowered to 15 years with the consent (or non-objection) of the legal guardian, or, if considered "an urgent necessity" by the judge. In the KR-I, the minimum age for marriage can be lowered to 16 if approved by a legal guardian and authorized by a judge. Across Iraq, a high level of acceptance vis-à-vis child marriages is reported. Some families in the KR-I are reported to circumvent the stricter regulations by marrying off their female relatives in Federal Iraq or by forging their birth certificates.”
34. I do come to the conclusion that the Judge’s finding, in respect of the Appellant and his partner potentially marrying as children, appears to have been made without adequate consideration of the country evidence before the FtT.In coming to this conclusion I am mindful of KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan at para.28, which quoted from HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at para. 28. The Court held as follows:
“Further, in many asylum cases, some, even most, of the appellant’s story may seem inherently unlikely but that does not mean that it is untrue. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence (where there is any).”
35. I find this does amount to a material error of law having regard to R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (iii) and (vii).
36. Having regard to the nature of the errors I have found above and the issue that they go to in this appeal, I cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same had the above errors not occurred. I am mindful that credibility is a holistic assessment. Further, the claim is an asylum claim and deserves “the most anxious scrutiny”; see Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, at 531 and MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §66. I therefore find the errors I have set out above to be material.

Notice of Decision
37. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal. I set aside the decision on this basis.
38. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT (Glasgow/Scotland), to be heard before any Judge aside from Judge Kempton.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 May 2026