Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003924
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02131/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

BARBARA OSMANOVIC
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: No appearance

Heard at Field House on 29 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge C R Cole (“the judge”) promulgated on 21 July 2025 allowing Ms Osmanovic’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 8 November 2023 to refuse her human rights claim.
2. Whilst it is the Secretary of State who is the appellant in this matter, for consistency I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, the Secretary of State will be referred to as the respondent and Ms Osmanovic as the appellant.
Background
3. The appellant was born in Kosovo in 1986 and entered the United Kingdom with her family in 2000. She was granted indefinite leave to remain on 13 February 2006. Since her arrival in the country, the appellant has been convicted 13 times for 29 offences, most recently on 6 April 2023. Her criminal history is set out at paragraphs 7 to 25 of the respondent’s decision and is not therefore repeated here. As a consequence of her most recent convictions, the respondent decided to deport her on conducive grounds as a persistent offender. The appellant was given the opportunity to make representations as to why she should not be deported, which she set out in a letter dated 2 November 2023. However, in her decision dated 8 November 2023, the respondent concluded that her deportation to Kosovo would not amount to a breach of her right to a family and private life as protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). The appellant was granted a right of appeal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant’s appeal was heard on 4 July 2025. In the decision allowing the appeal, the judge found that the appellant met the three components of the private life exception (“Exception 1”) to deportation set out under s.117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), namely that she had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of her life; that she was culturally and socially integrated in the United Kingdom; and that there were very significant obstacles to her re-establishing her private life in Kosovo. That finding meant that the appeal was to be allowed on human rights grounds. Nevertheless, the judge proceeded to consider, in the alternative, whether there were also very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case that outweighed the public interest in her deportation pursuant to s.117C(6). He concluded that there were, essentially for the same reasons that he gave for finding that there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. On 28 April 2026, the respondent was granted permission to appeal by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge L Murray on the following two grounds:
(1) The judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant was culturally and socially integrated in the United Kingdom when considering Exception 1.
(2) When finding that there were very compelling circumstances to the appellant’s case, the judge erred by (a) failing to have regard to the fact that the threshold to be met is a high one; and (b) failing to have regard to s.117B(3) of the 2002 Act, and that it is in the public interest for those seeking leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom to be financially independent.
The legal framework
6. Where, on appeal, a foreign national offender seeks to rely on their rights under Article 8 ECHR, a tribunal must have regard to s.117C of the 2002 Act. That provision provides a framework for considering the rights of the appellant against the public interest considerations. The general principle is that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest (s.117C(1)) and where a person has been sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment (as is the case in the present appeal), the public interest requires deportation unless one of the statutory exceptions applies (s.117C(3)).
7. Exception 1, which relates to private life, is set out under s.117C(4). It applies where the person has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life, is socially and culturally integrated, and there would be very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return. Exception 2, which relates to family life, is set out under s.117C(5). It applies where the person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child, and the effect of deportation on that partner or child would be unduly harsh.
8. Where a person who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years cannot meet Exception 1 or Exception 2, deportation is required unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in those Exceptions (s.117C(6)); NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662; 1 WLR 207 at [27]).
9. Section 117B also sets out public interest considerations that must be taken into account in all cases, and not just those involving foreign national offenders. For the purposes of the present appeal, this includes, at subsection (3), that it is in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom that persons who seek to enter or remain are financially independent, because such persons are not a burden on the taxpayer and are better able to integrate into society.
10. The burden is on the appellant to prove the facts of their case applying the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
The hearing
11. As with the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant did not attend the hearing. However, this time she was not legally represented either, her solicitors having removed themselves from the record on 18 May 2026 on the basis that they have lost contact with their client. As the Tribunal does not have any contact details for the appellant (who, according to her former solicitors, is street homeless and does not have a working phone number), I was satisfied that little would be gained by adjourning the appeal and I therefore proceeded with the hearing in the appellant’s absence.
12. I explained to Ms Isherwood that, having read the papers, I was satisfied that the judge had erred in law for the reasons set out in Ground 1. I therefore asked her to focus her submissions on Ground 2. Ms Isherwood’s submissions are recorded in the record of proceedings and are not rehearsed here.
13. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
Ground 1: Social and cultural integration
14. In order to succeed with Exception 1, the appellant was required to satisfy all three criteria set out in s.117C(4). The second criterion is that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. The judge’s findings on this issue are set out at [66]-[68] of his decision:
“66. I note that the Appellant came to the UK as a child. She came with her parents and her siblings. Her mother has passed away and her father’s whereabouts are unknown. However, the documents do indicate that the Appellant has kept in contact with her siblings and their families, occasionally staying with them. She has had some employment in the UK.
67. I note that the Respondent stated in the decision letter ,“it is accepted that you may be socially and culturally integrated into the UK to an extent on the basis of your length of residency in the UK.”
68. Thus, in conclusion, I find that the length of the Appellant’s residence in the UK, starting as a child, and the fact that her siblings and their families are in the UK is sufficient to demonstrate that she is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. Despite her criminality and chaotic lifestyle, I find that, on balance, the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.”
15. The respondent contends that the judge found that the appellant satisfied the social and cultural integration requirement on the basis of her length of residence alone. That is not entirely accurate. At [66], the judge also referred to the appellant having had “some employment in the UK”. However, the evidence relating to her employment history was limited. First, there was a brief passage at paragraph 19 of the appellant’s witness statement dated 12 September 2024 in which she stated that she had worked in retail and cleaning roles in Birmingham and Manchester, including for Poundland, B&M, Manchester City Stadium and a clothing factory as a packer. She did not explain when she held those jobs or for how long. Secondly, she relied on information obtained from HMRC showing declared earnings between 2012 and 2018, which, as the judge accepted at [61], accounts for only a brief period of her time in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the modest sums involved suggest that any periods of employment were short-lived, with some earnings figures being so low as to indicate that she may have worked for only a matter of days. Although the judge did not state the weight he attached to this evidence, it was not, in my judgment, evidence capable of attracting significant weight.
16. Furthermore, it is not apparent why the mere presence of the appellant’s family members in the United Kingdom was capable, without more, of demonstrating that she herself was socially and culturally integrated, not least when they provided no evidence in support of the appeal.
17. The judge’s comment at [67] that the respondent had accepted in her decision that the appellant “may” be culturally and socially integrated on account of her length of residence mistakes what the decision actually says. Following the passage quoted by the judge, the decision goes on to make clear that the respondent believed that “[s]imply being present in the UK is not evidence of integration” and her conclusion was that the appellant’s persistent criminality indicated that she was not integrated.
18. While the judge was entitled to take account of the appellant’s length of residence, the respondent is correct to submit that residence alone was not determinative of whether she was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. I am satisfied that the judge erred by failing adequately to consider the nature and quality of the appellant’s ties to the United Kingdom during that period. In particular, he failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant never attended school in this country; that her criminal offending began almost immediately after her arrival and that she persistently committed offences; that there was no evidence from friends or family members attesting to her social ties; and that there was little or no evidence of any positive contribution to life in the United Kingdom.
19. I am therefore satisfied that Ground 1 is made out. However, for the respondent to succeed in the appeal, it must also be established that the judge erred in his assessment of whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
Ground 2: Very compelling circumstances
20. Ground 2 has two limbs. First, the respondent contends that the judge failed to have regard to the fact that the threshold for establishing “very compelling circumstances” is a high one. Reliance is placed on Secretary of State for the Home Department v Garzon [2018] EWCA Civ 1225 at [28], where the Court of Appeal endorsed the First-tier Tribunal’s observation that the word “very” denotes a particularly high threshold and that “compelling” circumstances are those which have a powerful, irresistible and convincing effect. Reliance is also placed on Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 at [38], where Lord Reed observed that a person will succeed outside the Exceptions only where there is “a very strong claim indeed”.
21. Ms Isherwood also submitted that the judge failed to engage with the factors identified at [51] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 as relevant to the assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2:
“When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. As explained by Lord Reed in Hesham Ali at paras 24 to 35, relevant factors will include Page 19 those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, summarised the relevant factors at paras 72-73 as comprising the following:
“• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
• the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”“
22. Reading the decision fairly and as a whole, however, I am not persuaded that the judge failed adequately to consider the correct threshold or relevant factors. The judge correctly directed himself at [90] that “the deportation of foreign criminals is very strongly in the public interest and is a very weighty matter in the balancing exercise” and that “[t]he more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the criminal”. In considering Exception 1, the judge made findings that were also pertinent to the very compelling circumstances assessment. He expressly recognised at [41] that the appellant had a “terrible offending history” and found at [43] that she was a persistent offender. At [46], he concluded that it was “too soon” to find that she was no longer a persistent offender. The judge also plainly had regard to the length of the appellant’s residence in the United Kingdom, having noted at [58] that she had not lived in Kosovo since childhood. He further considered her nationality and accepted the evidence of the country expert, Mr Veb Kosumi, that, in the absence of evidence that her birth had been registered with the Kosovan authorities, she would face significant difficulties in obtaining the identity documentation necessary to reside in Kosovo: see [75].
23. The judge also addressed the appellant’s social, cultural and family ties to Kosovo. He accepted that she had no family members, friends or other support network there and that she did not speak Albanian. He further accepted Mr Kosumi’s evidence that, as a Roma woman with mental health difficulties and no support network, the appellant was likely to experience discrimination and stigmatisation and would be at real risk of ending up destitute and homeless on return.
24. For the reasons given in relation to Ground 1, the judge did, however, err in his assessment of the appellant’s social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom. It is therefore necessary to consider whether that error materially affected his assessment of whether there were very compelling circumstances. I find that it did not. The impugned finding regarding the appellant’s social and cultural integration was not a significant feature of the judge’s reasoning under s.117C(6). Rather, the matters that led the judge to conclude that very compelling circumstances existed concerned the appellant’s likely circumstances on return to Kosovo, rather than the nature of her private life in the United Kingdom.
25. I next consider whether, having assessed those factors, the judge was entitled to find that they outweighed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
26. In NA (Pakistan), the Court of Appeal explained at [32] that a person who cannot satisfy either Exception 1 or Exception 2 may nevertheless succeed under s.117C(6) where the cumulative weight of the relevant Article 8 factors is sufficiently compelling. The Court stated:
“Similarly, in the case of a medium offender, if all he could advance in support of his Article 8 claim was a “near miss” case in which he fell short of bringing himself within either Exception 1 or Exception 2, it would not be possible to say that he had shown that there were “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. He would need to have a far stronger case than that by reference to the interests protected by Article 8 to bring himself within that fall back protection. But again, in principle there may be cases in which such an offender can say that features of his case of a kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 have such great force for Article 8 purposes that they do constitute such very compelling circumstances, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to Article 8 but not falling within the factors described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The decision maker, be it the Secretary of State or a tribunal, must look at all the matters relied upon collectively, in order to determine whether they are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation.”
27. As already explained, in reaching his conclusion on very significant obstacles, the judge attached significant weight to the evidence of the country expert, Mr Kosumi. He accepted that the appellant, as a Roma woman with mental health difficulties who left Kosovo as a child, lacked any meaningful support network there; did not speak Albanian; would face significant difficulties obtaining the documentation necessary to reside lawfully and access healthcare; and would be exposed to discrimination, stigma, exploitation and a real risk of destitution. The judge also took into account that the appellant has deformed feet that affect her mobility. The respondent advances no challenge to those findings or the judge’s conclusion on very significant obstacles. Indeed, the judge recorded at [84] that the Home Office Presenting Officer accepted that “it would be difficult to argue that there would not be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration into Kosovo”.
28. Although those unchallenged findings were made primarily in the context of Exception 1, it is clear that they also informed the judge’s assessment under s.117C(6). Considered cumulatively, the judge found at [93] that there were “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. In my judgment, the judge’s approach is not inconsistent with the guidance given in NA (Pakistan).
29. Ultimately, I am not satisfied that the judge failed to appreciate the elevated threshold imposed by s.117C(6). Nor am I persuaded that his conclusion that the threshold was met was irrational or unsupported by the evidence. The findings concerning the appellant’s likely circumstances on return to Kosovo were extensive, detailed and unchallenged, and were capable of bearing the weight the judge placed upon them.
30. Finally, I address the second limb of this ground. The respondent submits that the judge failed to have regard to the public interest consideration set out in s.117B(3). It is correct that no express reference is made to that provision. However, the judge had already attached substantial weight to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. In the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to see how any additional consideration of the appellant’s ability to be financially independent would have materially altered the balancing exercise, given the exceptional factors identified on the appellant’s side of the scales.
31. For those reasons, I am satisfied that Ground 2 is not made out. It follows that the error identified under Ground 1 is not material to the outcome of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. That decision shall stand.
The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30th September 2026