Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003926

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66322/2023
LP/00345/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

M H
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Solomon, Counsel instructed by Brit Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 19 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant seeks to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s decision promulgated on 11th May 2025 and in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 13th December 2023.
2. I have maintained the anonymity order in respect of the Appellant. I consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection, are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, who entered the UK as a student in January 2010. The Appellant made a number of extension applications thereafter and was granted leave in the same category until his leave was refused on 4th September 2013. The Appellant then made a number of applications, which were unsuccessful including as an Extended Family Member of an EEA national, on family/private life grounds and as a Direct Family Member relying on Zambrano derivative rights. The Appellant claimed asylum on 17th June 2019 and that claim was refused by the Respondent on 13th December 2023.
4. In summary, the Appellant has claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of political opinion as a result of his active membership of the Bangladesh National Party (‘BNP’) and an outstanding warrant for his arrest generated as a result of a false prosecution, which would lead to his arrest and detention. The Appellant at first instance also pursued a claim under Article 8 ECHR private and family life. The Appellant has not sought to appeal the Judge’s findings under Article 8.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. In dismissing the appeal and insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) At [22]-[25], the Judge considered the background evidence and noted in particular paras 3.1.1, section 13.3 and several passages of note in sections 5-6 of the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Bangladesh, Political Situation’, December 2024;
(b) The Judge then noted at [26] that the material submitted by the Appellant, in the form of newspaper reports and reports on the current state of Bangladesh pre-dated the change in government and is of limited use in assessing the specific situation this Appellant is in;
(c) The Judge considered at [27]-[29] the Appellant’s claim in respect of his political affiliation and activities. The Judge found at [29] that the bulk of the evidence provided on behalf of the Appellant related to his (political) activities in the United Kingdom and there was limited evidence to assist with determining what his involvement with the BNP was prior to arriving in the United Kingdom. However, the evidence taken as a whole showed an individual wholly committed to the BNP over a significant period, and whose participation with their activities is considerable. It supported the account the Appellant had provided. The Judge found him credible about his membership of the BNP in the UK and in Bangladesh. The Judge found that he was, as he described, an organising secretary for the youth wing of the BNP in Bangladesh and is a joint secretary here in the United Kingdom. The Judge also found in the same paragraph that the Appellant had posted content in support of the BNP on Facebook and had participated in demonstrations and meetings along with others from the BNP in the United Kingdom;
(d) With regards to the claimed false prosecution and its documentary evidence, the Judge considered this at [30]-[38] and recorded at [30] that the Respondent did not accept the documentation produced by the Appellant to support his claim to have a false prosecution taken against him in Bangladesh, which related to an alleged offence having taken place on 5th December 2023. The Respondent sought to challenge how the documents came to be in the Appellant’s possession;
(e) At [32]-[33], the Judge recorded that the Appellant’s legal team had communicated directly with a law firm in Bangladesh and tasked them with independently verifying the status of the Appellant’s claimed case. The Judge summarised the law firm’s report and the checks undertaken by them. The Judge also recorded the Respondent had not sought to challenge the lawyer’s identity or status. However, the Judge then noted at [32] the fact that they are who they say they are, does not eliminate the possibility of fraud. The Judge also noted at [33] that no court paperwork relating to the latest case update or its progress to cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses (having recorded that the examination-in-chief of those witnesses had been completed, as per the lawyer’s update). The Judge found, also at [33], that the “timing of the emergence of the case against the appellant after his asylum claim was made is a relevant consideration”;
(f) Taking a point forward made by the Respondent, the Judge considered at [34] that no evidence from the Appellant or the lawyers in Bangladesh had been provided to show any attempts made to make representations (in the on-going claimed prosecution in Bangladesh) on behalf of the Appellant. The Judge found it notable that at no stage has the Appellant instructed a lawyer to act on his behalf to make representations. The Judge found this to be relevant as it supported the Respondent’s general contention that the false prosecution was a device by which to bolster the Appellant’s claim. This was particularly so given that the Appellant had instructed lawyers to attend court and confirm whether the prosecution had been instigated against the Appellant;
(g) The Judge also considered at [35] when assessing the documents provided by the Appellant relating to the claimed prosecution, that in one of the documents the Appellant’s entry was the only one in which his address was given in full vs “a long list of the defendants in the case”. The Judge found the differing format to indicate that the Appellant’s (fuller) address had been inserted into an existing document. The Judge then assessed this concern with relevant information contained in the CPIN and cited this in full at [36];
(h) Having reminded themselves of the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKIAT 00439, and having weighed the provenance of the documents (summarised above) in the light of the other evidence in this case, the Judge concluded at [37] that the documents and the Appellant’s entry in them not to be genuine. The Judge did not find the evidence to be credible and did not find that there was a live case against the Appellant in Bangladesh;
(i) The Judge applied at [38] s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and found that the delay in making his claim is detrimental to the Appellant’s credibility but not determinative of it;
(j) Drawing the above together at [39]-[41], the Judge concluded that they had found the Appellant to be credible about his BNP membership and found him to not be credible in respect of the live prosecution against him and the outstanding warrant. The Judge added that in assessing the current risk to the Appellant, they took into account the change in the political situation since the Appellant first claimed. The Judge recorded the submission that despite the change in power, the current government is a temporary one and the situation in Bangladesh remains unstable, with positions of power still dominated with members of the previous regime. The Judge reflected on this and conceded that there is a degree of uncertainty as to how the situation will develop, but they were required to make findings as to the regime as it exists at present, rather than on the basis of speculation as to what may or may not take place in the future;
(k) The Judge then went onto find at [40], having considered section 3.1 and 12.4 of the CPIN, that there was no indication that persons with an actual or imputed political adherence to the BNP would generally be at real risk of persecution or serious harm and the Appellant had not shown he would be at risk in the country.
6. The Judge went on to consider the Appellant’s claim raised under Article 8 ECHR at [44] finding against the Appellant. I do not summarise those findings any further since the Appellant has not pursued any grounds of appeal seeking to challenge this aspect of the Judge’s decision.
7. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The Appellant put forward three grounds of appeal all relating to the Judge’s consideration of the claimed false prosecution issue. I summarise these three grounds and submissions as follows:
(i) In not accepting the claimed prosecution and warrant, the Judge failed to appreciate that the verification carried out was on direct instructions from the Appellant’s solicitors and not the Appellant himself – in those circumstances, considerable weight should have been attached to such a report, pursuant to PJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 1322;
(ii) The Judge had misunderstood the role of the verification lawyer in this case and failed to appreciate the purpose of the instruction to them - the fact that the Appellant himself did not instruct a lawyer to make representations on his behalf in relation to the claimed ongoing case has no relevance to the independent verification that was carried out or the weight to be attached to it and it is irrational to conclude otherwise;
(iii) Whilst the Judge directed himself correctly, the Judge erred in his failure to apply the Tanveer Ahmed principles correctly.
9. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal on 16th September 2025. In granting permission, the Upper Tribunal noted the following:
(a) Having read the Judge’s decision with care, there might appear to be relatively cogent reasons provided for the conclusion that there was in fact no ongoing case against the Appellant: [32]-[37];
(b) However, it is arguable that the Judge failed to assess the lawyers evidence for what it was, namely the (purported) verification of the existence of the case and the genuineness and reliability of the accompanying documents. Arguably, the nature of that evidence meant that it would stand distinct from the possibility of lawyers being instructed in the case itself;
(c) There is arguable merit in the contention that the Judge’s finding that the documents were in fact not genuine (i.e. false) required a specific legal approach which might not have been adopted;
(d) The Appellant will need to demonstrate that country evidence relating to treatment in pre-trial and/or post-trial detention was brought to the Judge’s attention as part of the protection claim and that such evidence was capable of demonstrating that he might have faced the risk of persecution and/or Article 3 ill-treatment as a result of the alleged criminal proceedings.
10. In response, the Respondent did not seek to file and serve a reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
11. In reply to the issue raised in the grant of permission, summarised at para 9(d) above, the Appellant filed and served a witness statement from his counsel at first instance. This is dated 15th November 2025 and confirmed that although Counsel did not have a clear recollection of the hearing, he had retained copies of his typed pre-hearing notes and his handwritten record of proceedings. From these, he could see that, in support of the argument that the Appellant was at risk of torture, even if only detained for a short period of time, Counsel relied on the sections in the US State Department report on torture and prison conditions, which appeared at p.220 of the Appellant’s bundle, and which were located at p.255 of the stitched bundle (before the FtT).
12. Those pages were re-produced at p.362 of the Appellant’s consolidated bundle (containing 1386 pages) prepared for this hearing (‘TB’). I was able to check at the outset of the hearing whether Mr Ojo had any objections to this witness statement being admitted into evidence for the purpose of my determining whether the Judge made a material error or errors of law. Mr Ojo confirmed that he had no such objections and I duly admitted this document accordingly, as it was directly relevant to whether the Appellant’s third ground of appeal was made out.
13. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Mr Ojo, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
14. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons. I am sorry for the time that it has taken me to issue this decision, which has been as a result of my professional and other commitments in the time that has passed since the hearing.
Analysis and Conclusions
The Appellant’s first and second grounds of appeal
15. As the first two of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal relate to the Judge’s approach to the Bangladeshi lawyers’ verification report, I consider and address these grounds together.
16. The first verification report is dated 14th May 2024 and appears at TB [156]-[160]. The second report is dated 21st April 2025 and appears at TB [161]-[162]. Mr Solomon elaborated on the grounds pleaded and submitted, on behalf of the Appellant, that the Judge had failed to assess the independent lawyers’ evidence for what it was, namely an independent verification by lawyers in Bangladesh whose credentials were not disputed and whom had been approached directly by the Appellant’s immigration lawyers here in the UK. As a result of this, it was submitted that this evidence should have been accorded considerable weight. It was also submitted that whilst the Judge did refer to the verification reports, what they had failed to do was to then to go on and properly evaluate those reports in the context of this being independent verification evidence of the arrest warrant and the FIR relied upon by the Appellant.
17. In this respect, the Appellant continued to rely on PJ (Sri Lanka) at [42] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment: the observation there can apply equally to this instance case, concerning the failure to appreciate that verification had been carried out on direct instructions from the solicitors, as opposed to the lay party themselves. There was therefore an inadequacy of reasoning for rejecting the reports.
18. In response, Mr Ojo emphasised that the Court had also in turn emphasised the Tanveer Ahmed principles in PJ (Sri Lanka). In this vein, Mr Ojo submitted that the Judge had expressly considered at [29] that the instruction of lawyers did not create a presumption that documents produced were reliable. Mr Ojo continued that the Judge had clearly assessed credibility in accordance with the structured approach and this was demonstrated by the last sentence in [32] and the last sentence in [33]. The Judge had also clearly taken into consideration the background evidence concerning the provenance of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh, cited at [25] and extracting para 6.5.3 of the CPIN. The structured approach to credibility was also apparent from the issue taken at [35]-[36] concerning the differences in addresses in the FIR and the consideration of s.8 credibility factors at [38].
19. Taking this together, Mr Ojo maintained that the Judge had given adequate reasons for their findings and their conclusions adverse to the Appellant and had considered the evidence available to them in the round. Mr Ojo also submitted that unlike the appellant in PJ (Sri Lanka), the lawyers’ verification did not include the court documents – see [41] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which was directly relevant to the Judge’s finding in this appeal at [33] concerning the absence of “court paperwork”. Mr Ojo concluded that the Judge’s decision clearly set out how they took all of the relevant evidence in the round and it could not be said that the Judge had failed to note the lawyers’ own credibility and/or expertise and independence.
20. I have considered the Appellant’s submissions very carefully but I am not satisfied that the grounds pursued concerning the lawyers’ verification are not made out. It cannot be said that the Judge misunderstood the nature of the instructions, the role of the Bangladeshi lawyers and their independence, nor the purpose of the verification. The independent nature of the instruction is noted at [32] and the credentials, so to speak, of the lawyers, not disputed by the Respondent, are also noted at [32]. An accurate and adequate summary of the checks undertaken by the lawyers is also set out at [33] but it is also correct that “no court paperwork relating to the latest case update or its progress to cross-examination has been provided”, as noted by the Judge also at [33].
21. Against this, the Judge noted the following other relevant factors:
(i) The timing of the emergence of the case against the Appellant after his asylum claim was made – [33];
(ii) The Appellant had not instructed a lawyer to act on his behalf to make representations in the claimed prosecution. The Judge concluded that the lack of instruction in this respect was relevant as the Appellant had been able to instruct other lawyers, through his UK solicitors, to conduct the verification checks – see [34];
(iii) The issue with the addresses in the FIR at [35] (summarised at para 5(g) above);
(iv) Background evidence on corruption being widespread in the courts and the police and it is possible that genuine documents are fraudulently obtained as part of this process, making it possible that fraudulent or forged certified copies of FIRs can be obtained – [36];
(v) The delay in claiming asylum being relevant under s.8 – [38].
22. With regards to the factor noted at para 21(ii) above, I have emphasised “a” lawyer, which is what the Judge noted. I do not read this passage as the Judge expecting the same Bangladeshi lawyers instructed to verify the prosecution to have made representations on his behalf or to have been instructed to do so by the Appellant. The Judge noted that there was no evidence from the Appellant himself, or the lawyers in Bangladesh to show any attempts made to make representations on behalf of the Appellant. It was reasonable in my view of the Judge to note that evidence of any representations having been made could have emanated from the Appellant himself or from the same Bangladeshi lawyers upon inspection of the Court file, detailed in their report. This does not mean, and I do not read this passage of the Judge’s decision to mean, that the Judge expected the same lawyers to have made those representations themselves. This disposes in my view of the Appellant’s second ground of appeal and the submissions made at paras 10-11 of the grounds.
23. Concerning the background evidence cited at [36] and paraphrased at para 21(iv) above, it is also necessary to read this together with the background evidence considered by the Judge at [25], which specifically reports on corruption within the courts themselves.
24. Thus, whilst noting the lawyers’ verification checks and independence, it was open to the Judge against the background evidence available to them concerning corruption and the ability of persons to obtain false or forged documents, including court documents (see paras 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the CPIN cited at [25]), to conclude as they did. The Judge assessed all relevant evidence in the round. Whilst considerable weight may be attached to the verification report, the Judge was still entitled to reach the conclusion that he did. That does not mean that the Judge failed to appreciate that the verification carried out was on direct instructions from the Appellant’s UK solicitors. Rather the Judge did not accept that the verification checks were conclusive as to the existence of a false prosecution. Nor do I agree that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for that conclusion – as I have already addressed, those reasons also lie in the other factors weighed in the round summarised at para 21 above.
25. As was also covered by the guidance of the Court of Appeal in PJ (Sri Lanka), re-affirming the Tanveer Ahmed principles, documents should not be viewed in isolation and the evidence needs to be considered in its entirety. Furthermore, as Mr Ojo rightly submitted “(t)he involvement of lawyers does not create the rebuttable presumption that the documents they produce in this situation are reliable” – see [29] of PJ (Sri Lanka).
26. For the above reasons, I am satisfied that contrary to the Appellant’s grounds and submissions, the Judge has not erred for the reasons set out in the first and second of these grounds. The Judge had clearly understood the nature of the lawyers’ verification report and its purpose and considered this in the round with the rest of the evidence available.
The Appellant’s third and final ground of appeal
27. Mr Solomon acknowledged, as was the case in the written grounds of appeal, that the Judge directed and reminded themselves of the guidance contained in Tanveer Ahmed but Mr Solomon submitted that the Judge had nevertheless failed to apply this. It was emphasised that the Judge had failed to consider the evidence as a whole, in the round, particularly in a context where positive credibility findings had been reached by the Judge concerning the Appellant’s political profile and activities. Similarly in a context whereby the background evidence supported the Appellant’s claim to have been the victim of false prosecution.
28. Within this ground, the Appellant effectively pleads irrationality. It was submitted, both in writing and orally that the Judge expressly accepted the Applicant’s history in full, had the benefit of two reports from independent lawyers who had verified the case with the court, and the background evidence clearly stated that false cases/politically motivated cases (in their hundreds of thousands) have been taken against those opposing the Awami League, noting that the case was commenced in 2023, when the Awami League was in power. It was further submitted that had the Judge assessed the documents in the round, the only reasonable conclusion to be reached was that they were reliable. This is in contrast – it was submitted – with the Judge who went further and concluded, without any documentary evidence to support their conclusion, that the documents relied upon were not genuine. It was submitted that this amounts to an error of law.
29. In terms of the changing country conditions with the change in government, Mr Solomon submitted that the error made was material because of the background evidence concerning the risk of detention and poor prison conditions, for which the witness statement from Mr Solomon’s predecessor at first instance and the background evidence at TB [362] assisted. Mr Solomon also sought to distinguish the Appellant’s case from MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 as the appellant in that appeal did not have an extant arrest warrant issued against them.
30. I accept that the Judge has phrased their concerns with the Appellant’s false prosecution claim and the accompanying evidence of the same with terms such as fraud, false and not genuine. This is illustrated at [30] with the Judge’s last sentence there, the Judge setting out their task as needing to assess whether the documents are genuine at [31], the consideration of the possibility of fraud at [32] and the Judge’s finding at [35] that the issue of the addresses “indicates that it (the Appellant’s address) has been inserted into an existing document” at [35].
31. It is however the case, as I have found when considering the Appellant’s first two grounds, that the Judge has weighed and assessed all relevant evidence in the round. It also remains the case that the Judge has also used the terms ‘genuine’ and ‘credible’ inter-changeably – see [37]. Whilst the use of different terms, as noted here and at para 30 above, does risk some confusion as to the issues raised against the Appellant, I am satisfied when reading the Judge’s decision and reasons as a whole that the Judge has directed themselves correctly and applied such a direction to their consideration of the evidence in its totality. It is clear in my view, when reading the decision as a whole, that the Judge reached findings on the reliability of the documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant, when considered on the round, concluding that the Appellant had not discharged the burden of proof that rested upon him.
32. In this respect, the following passage resonates from Tanveer Ahmed at [35]:
“In almost all cases it would be an error to concentrate on whether a document is a forgery. In most cases where forgery is alleged it will be of no great importance whether this is or is not made out to the required higher civil standard. In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).”
33. The Judge at first instance did not view a particular document in isolation and for the reasons that I have set out above, the Judge did look at the evidence as a whole. In particular, I note that the Judge has not made a finding that the disputed documents in question were forgeries. When reading the decision as a whole and [37], it is clear in my view that the Judge reached findings on the reliability and credibility of the disputed documents. Whilst this could have been expressed in clearer and more consistent terms, I am not satisfied that that in itself is an error of law, particularly considering that the Judge’s decision is otherwise very comprehensive and detailed.
34. For the reasons above, it is not necessary for me to consider the point taken with regards to the background evidence and current country conditions since I am satisfied that the Judge has not materially erred on the issue of the Appellant’s claimed false prosecution.
35. It follows from the above that the Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be dismissed on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
36. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of material errors of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

06.02.2026