Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003936, UI-2025-003937, UI-2025-003938, UI-2025-003939,
UI-2025-003940
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56887/2024, PA/63325/2024, PA/63328/2024, PA/63331/2024, PA/68595/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

(1) R I A K
(2) Y J A
(3) Z A
(4) Z H A
(5) M K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Holmes, Counsel for the Appellants
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and/or any member of their family, should not be identified and are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I continue the order to anonymise the Appellants. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, the need to protect the identity of the Appellants in the light of their asylum claim necessitates a departure from the principle of open justice.
2. The Appellants are a family whose appeals were and are heard together. The Tribunal has listed the Appellants in the order of the appeal numbers assigned to them by the Tribunal. The Second Appellant was the leading Appellant. The Fifth Appellant is his wife. The Third and Fourth Appellants are their minor children. The First Appellant is the Fifth Appellant’s brother. They say that they are Iranian refugees who have been living in Iraq. They say that cannot return to Iran as they would be persecuted, and they cannot return to Iraq as they have no right to live there.
3. The issue for this Tribunal to determine is whether First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge Atkins (‘the Judge’) erred in law when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 19 June 2025 to refuse their applications under the Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds.
Background
4. In 1979 the First and Fifth Appellants’ family fled to Iraq to escape persecution from the Iranian regime. Their father was a peshmerga. They were both then born in Iraq. The Second Appellant was born in Iran. In 1989 his family also fled to Iraq to escape persecution. His father was a member of the KDPI and a peshmerga. The Appellants said that they never acquired any legal status or documents in Iraq as they were Kurdish, nationals of Iran and refugees. They say they also never held Iranian ID documents.
5. The First, Second, Third and Fifth appellants left Iraq in November 2022 as they were worried about their safety. They arrived in the UK on 10 December 2022 and claimed asylum the following day. The Fourth Appellant was born in the UK in 2023. The First Appellant’s claim was refused on 7 March 2024. The Second, Third and Fourth Appellants’ claims were refused on 26 April 2024. The Fifth Appellant’s claim was refused on 29 July 2024. They appealed the decisions and their appeals were linked and heard together.
6. The FtT dismissed the appeals in a decision dated 19 June 2025. In doing so, the FtT recorded the following/made the following findings (which are relevant to the issue pursued in this appeal):
• Paras.22-25, 27 - The Fifth Appellant’s account included that she was educated in Iraq to Year 5, she was able to access healthcare and pass checkpoints using her Lawan card and showing her affiliation to the KDPI. The First Appellant’s account was that they were able to access education, healthcare (he had cranial surgery to remove a brain tumour in Iraq in 2021), travel, hold a driving licence, he held a Lawan card or temporary ID issued by the KDPI. The Second Appellant’s account was that he had a driving licence, worked as a labourer and was provided with papers allowing him to work in another city, he worked as a smuggler too transporting goods across the borders and he could have accessed healthcare with his Lawan card. The Fifth and Second Appellants married in Iraq. The Fifth Appellant’s parents lives in Iraq and remain in contact. The Third Appellant was born in Iraq.
• Para. 26 – The First Appellant attempted to obtain Iraqi ID documents at the embassy in Iraq explaining he was an Iranian national without Iraqi documents and they refused to help him.
• Para.34 - It is accepted by the Respondent that the Appellants are Kurdish. “She does not accept that they are nationals of Iran.”
• Para 39 – The CPIN on Internal relocation, civil documentation dated October 2023 is in the bundles and this says at 6.3.1 that official ID documents are ‘required to access the rights stipulated by the law, e.g., healthcare, education, and freedom of movement within the country, the state justice system, and social welfare. In addition, possession of a legal identity enables access to humanitarian assistance for displaced persons.’ They are used in all contact with ‘public authorities. It is necessary to access health services, social welfare services, schools and for buying and selling a home and a car. In addition, it must be presented when applying for other official documents, such as passports. Stateless persons who were not able to register for ID cards were reported to be unable to register marriages and to gain access to some government services without ID cards.’ At paragraph 6.7.2 it is said that the INID card was introduced in 2015 to replace the old CSID card (or INC), including in the KRI area, and that it is possible to obtain replacements for a damaged or lost INID by paying a fee. At paragraph 6.7.7, it is said that by March 2023 around 85-90% of people in the KRI had obtained an INID card. At paragraph 6.7.9 that the process of obtaining an INID card can be started at the Iraqi Embassy in London. At paragraph 6.18.1, it is said that the lack of identity documents will prevent a person from accessing health care or schools.
• Para. 40 - There is no mention, in the CPIN or elsewhere, of a Lawan card or of identity documents issued by political parties such as the KDPI. The only other mention of Lawan in the bundle is as a name for the KDPI youth wing.
• Para. 41 – The Appellants’ legal representative argued that they did not have Iraqi documents and without these they could not return.
• Para. 43 – The presenting officer for the Home Office submitted that the Appellants were Iraqi citizens or had some form of status in Iraq that allowed them to obtain identity papers.
• Para. 47 – The First and Fifth Appellants had in their screening interview said they were nationals of Iraq in early interviews and then sought to resile from this. The Second and Fifth Appellants declared themselves as Iraqi when registering the birth of the fourth Appellant but they say this was a mistake. This is taken into account.
• Para. 48 – The country evidence is very clear that it is necessary to have ID in Iraq to travel, work, access critical services such as housing, health care and education.
• Para. 49 – ‘The Appellants (as well as their parents) are not reported to have had any difficulty finding housing in Iraq. The First and Fifth Appellants went to school in Iraq. The First, Second and Fifth Appellants were able to access healthcare in Iraq (the First Appellant being able to access major cranial surgery). The First and Second Appellants were able to work in Iraq. The Second Appellant obtained papers to allow him to travel for the purposes of work. The Second and Fifth Appellants were able to pass through checkpoints with their children. All of the Appellants (apart from the Fourth Appellant who had not yet been born) travelled from their home village to Koya. The First and Second Appellants had driving licences.’
• Para. 50 – ‘I have not seen, and was not taken to, any evidence that the KDPI could produce an identity document on behalf of the Iraqi authorities. I have not seen, and was not taken to, any evidence that the KDPI are able to operate a parallel system to the identity card system. There is simply no evidence to support the only explanation the Appellants have put forward for their ability to work, travel, and access services in Iraq.’
• Para. 51 – ‘Taken together, the only possible conclusion that I can come to is that the Appellants did have some form of identity documentation in Iraq that enabled them to work, travel, pass checkpoints, access schools and healthcare, and obtain driving licences. Those identity documents can only have been issued by the Iraqi authorities. That means that the Appellants are either Iraqi citizens or have some other form of official status in Iraq enabling them to be issued with identity documents (and I also note, though it has not played a part in my decision, the frequent description of the ‘Lawan card’ in the alternative as a ‘refugee card’).
• Para 52 – ‘I am not assisted by the First Appellant’s account of his visit to the Iraqi Embassy. It is clear that he represented himself as a third country national without Iraqi identity papers. That prompted the only possible response from Embassy officials, that they were unable to help him. He had deliberately set himself up to fail. Had he gone to the Embassy with details of his Iraqi citizenship or formal status in Iraq, the result would doubtless have been very difficult.’
• Para. 53 – ‘I accordingly find that the Appellants are citizens of Iraq, or that in the alternative they have some other formal status in Iraq that would entitle them to return there.’
The Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds of appeal are dated 3 July 2025. The argue one single ground. It is said that the Judge proceeded on the basis of a mistake of fact. This error is advanced as follows:
• The determinative issue that led to dismissal of the appeal was the question of the Appellants’ nationality. At paras. 43-53 of the decision he concluded that they were Iraqi nationals and the appeal must fail. The Judge rejected the Appellants’ evidence that they resided in Iraq on reliance on a form of informal identity document which was provided by the KDPI.
• He said at para.50 he had not seen and was not taken to any evidence that the KDPI could produce an identity document on behalf of the Iraqi authorities or that they were able to operate a parallel system to the ID card system and there was simply no evidence to support the only explanation that the Appellants had put forward for their ability to work, travel and access services in Iraq.
• It is argued that it is “not clear that the Respondent ever took issue with this element of the Appellants’ evidence either in the decision letters or review; instead it seems to be recited without demur and, in fact, some (unidentified and unreferenced) background evidence is cited in the decision letters tending to support it. The Judge’s decision appears, therefore, to be the first point at which it became apparent that the Appellants’ evidence on this issue was contentious.”
• There was confirmation from recognised sources of country background material that the indulgence described was a reality for Iranian Kurds in the North of Iraq. The Appellants would seek to rely upon two reports from the Danish Immigration Service (it is unclear whether this was the source relied upon in the decision letter) which were not before the Judge, but which deal with this point. The Appellants submit that this evidence is admissible at this stage of proceedings because, in common with the situation addressed in MM (unfairness; E & R) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC), the Judge has reached an adverse view of the Appellants’ credibility when their evidence on a material and central decision can be shown to be accurate and consistent with objective evidence. The facts of this case were comparable to MM as the Judge had made a mistake of fact which in turn unfairly prejudiced the Appellants’ case.
8. Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT on 1 August 2025. This decision reads as follows:

“3. However, for the reasons set out below, the grounds do not disclose an arguable material error of law:
a. In the decision, the Judge identified that a critical issue was whether the Appellants were Iranians who required to return to Iran, or whether they were Iraqi citizens or had some other form of formal status in Iraq, permitting them to return to Iraq ([45]). The Judge recorded the accounts of the Appellants including that they had passed checkpoints and accessed education and healthcare by showing their affiliation to the KDPI and using a Lawan card or a temporary ID issued by the KDPI ([22]-[25]). The Judge considered the CPIN regarding civil documentation and found that there was no mention in the CPIN or elsewhere of a Lawan card or identity document issued by political parties such as the KDPI ([39]-[40]). The Judge concluded that: the Appellants had some form of identity documentation in Iraq that enabled them to work, travel, pass checkpoints, access schools and healthcare, and obtain driving licences; those identity documents could only have been issued by the Iraqi authorities; and this meant they were either Iraqi citizens or had some other form of official status in Iraq enabling them to be issued with identity documents ([51]).
b. MM confirms that an error of law may be found to have occurred in circumstances where some material evidence, through no fault of the First-tier Tribunal, was not considered, with resulting unfairness. However, the facts of MM differ from those in the present appeals. In MM, the documentary evidence in question was a letter which had been sent by the Respondent, shortly after the appellant’s second asylum interview setting out significant clarifications to the substantive interview record. The letter had been omitted from the evidence before the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s decision, the Judge recorded that the Appellant cross-examination, had included that she had discussed the issues with the interview record with her representatives who had told her they would write to the Respondent, before proceeding to make a positive finding that there was no such letter, and that this reinforced a material inconsistency which damaged the credibility of her claim and her credibility generally.
c. In contrast, in these appeals the documents which are relied on, and which were not before the Tribunal, are two external country reports. While these reports appear to support that a temporary residence permit, valid for 6 months but renewable, could previously be obtained from the KRG by the presenting of a supporting letter from an Iranian opposition party or a letter from the UNHCR, the decision records that it was the Appellants case that they never acquired any legal status or documents in Iraq, but rather had used a lawan card or temporary ID issued by the KDPI to travel and access services ([21]-[25]). Further, when the referred to sections of the reports are read in full, they do not clearly establish as fact the position as claimed by the Appellants, but rather contain differing evidence on this point (for example, the same section of the 2013 report includes evidence from the Erbil Residence Director including that no Iranian refugee, including members of Iranian Kurdish political parties residing in KRI, was permitted to stay in the KRI without a residence permit issued by KRG, that members of Iranian Kurdish political parties still needed a residence permit to stay in and move around in KRI, and that people with no residence card were not able to do anything in KRI which involved the KRG authorities and public institutions; and 1.2.2.2 of the 2024 report also includes evidence from an NGO that Iranian Kurds with political backgrounds were no longer asked by the KRG authorities in Sulaymaniyah to provide a support letter, and the Iranian Kurdish political parties no longer had the influence they used to have on matters related to their members).
4. Permission to appeal is therefore refused.”
9. The Appellants renewed their application for permission to appeal in grounds dated 11 August 2025 stating that the reason for which the case of MM had been cited was misunderstood. It was at least arguable from the background evidence that the Judge was in error to disbelieve the Appellants description of how their residence in Iraq was facilitated, and to reject their case as to their nationality (at least in material part) on that basis.
10. The Appellants were granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Judge (‘UTJ’) Kamara in a decision dated 15 September 2025. This decision reads as follows:

“1. The appellants seek permission to appeal, in time, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Atkins who dismissed their appeals following a hearing which took place on 5 June 2025.
2. The principal issue is dispute was whether the appellants were Iraqi nationals or had some other permission to reside in Iraq. The appellants’ account as that, as ethnic Kurds, they were able to reside in Iraq solely owing to reliance on informal identity documentation provided by the KDPI. The judge dismissed the appeals primarily on the basis that there was no evidence that the KDPI could produce an identity document.
3. It is argued in the grounds that the judge’s decision was the first occasion that the appellants’ evidence on this issue was contentious, it being suggested that the respondent had taken no issue with it.
4. Background evidence which was not before the judge is relied upon in the grounds, described as material evidence which was not considered, relying on MM (unfairness; E & R) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC).
5. For the reasons set out in the original and renewed grounds, I consider it arguable that the judge made an inadvertent mistake of fact.
Hearing and Submissions
11. The matter came before me in a hearing on 21 May 2026. I had before me a composite bundle running to 2239 pages.
12. I also had a Rule 24 Reply dated 2 October 2025. This reads as follows:

“3. The Respondent in her submissions at paragraph 43 clearly relied on the fact that the Appellant’s must, if country guidance is correct, have had access to documentation that allowed them to work, to travel freely and to be educated. It is therefore not correct to state that the issue was not a contentious one as it evidently was at the hearing.
4. The Judge was factually correct to state that he had not been referred to any evidence to contradict the Respondent’s submissions and although the Respondent has only seen the extracts in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal regarding the background reports the Appellant states supports his appeal, these documents clearly refer to the issuing of documents with a validity of at best 12 months, which is clearly not applicable to an Appellant from a family who left Iran in 1979.”
13. I heard helpful submissions from both representatives.
14. Mr Holmes relied on the grounds of appeal and addressed issues raised in the hearing. Ms McKenzie relied on the Rule 24, she argued that the issue advanced in the grounds of appeal was raised in the review and in submissions at the hearing. She said that as this was a linked appeal the fact that the matter was raised in the Review for four out of five Appellants was sufficient.
Decision and reasons
15. Having considered the grounds, the documents placed before me and the submissions made orally I have come to the conclusion that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT.
16. The grounds incorrectly assert that it is “not clear that the Respondent ever took issue with […] the Appellants’ evidence [that they relied on a form of informal identity document which was provided by the KDPI/Lawan card] either in the decision letters or review; instead it seems to be recited without demur and, in fact, some (unidentified and unreferenced) background evidence is cited in the decision letters tending to support it. The Judge’s decision appears, therefore, to be the first point at which it became apparent that the Appellants’ evidence on this issue was contentious” (emphasis added).
17. I will start by setting out the detail in some of the documents in this case.
18. In the Second Appellant’s decision letter the Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s Iranian nationality, it was noted he was able to answer nationality questions about Iraq to an adequate degree but his evidence was that he had not held not Iraqi documents and had never been able to obtain any so they could not substantiate his nationality, the daughter’s birth certificate recorded that he and his wife were from Iraq which again raised uncertainty about his and his family’s nationality (CB 1853-1854). I note that later in the decision letter in considering the claim under Appendix FM the decision says “Your wife is a national of Iran or Iraq with no immigration status in the UK” (CB 1856).
19. In the Fifth Appellant’s decision letter the Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s Iranian nationality, it was noted she said in her screening interview she was Iraqi and her explanation this was a mistake was not accepted, she had not provided documents to show she was Iranian or substantiated this part of her claim (CB 2195).
20. In the Respondent’s Review for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Appellants the following is said (CB 1952-1955):

“Although A and his wife have both made separate claims for asylum the cases are both linked and based on the same factual matrix. As such R proposes to address both linked claims in the skeleton argument and will refer to Mr Ahmad as YA and his wife as MK when referring to their evidence.
R submits that it is not accepted that YA and MK are nationals of Iran. R maintains reliance on the grounds of refusal in both YA and MK’s refusal letters.
In respect of MK, R submits that she has failed to provide a credible explanation as to why she described herself as an Iraq national at 1.5 of her screening interview (R’s bundle for MK page 16). At page 23 of R’s bundle for MK she confirms that she had understood all of the questions asked of her and as such it is not accepted that MK did not understand the question being asked and gave the correct answer at her screening interview.
R submits that YA and MK’s ability to live with little difficulties in Iraq when, other than a letter from the KDPI, they were entirely undocumented is inconsistent with the background evidence regarding the requirement for possession of a CSID or INID card.
At Qs 34-36 of YA’s second SEF interview (R’s bundle for YA page 75) YA claimed that his wife was educated in Iraq and attended public schools. Further at Q32 of MK’s SEF interview (R’s bundle for MK page 36) MK confirms that her family were
able to access healthcare in Iraq when required (which is directly contradicted by YA
at Q94 of his first SEF interview). YA was able to work and it is clear that he and his family were able to have accommodation and employment in Iraq.
R relies on the decision of the Upper Tier Tribunal in AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC) where at headnote 11 the Tribunal found inter alia,“11. Where P’s return to Iraq is found by the Tribunal to be feasible, it will generally be necessary to decide whether P has a CSID, or will be able to obtain one, reasonably soon after arrival in Iraq. A CSID is generally required in order for an Iraqi to access financial assistance from the authorities; employment; education; housing;
and medical treatment..”
In light of the above R submits that the claimed lack of documentation, and the fact
they were able to live in Iraq without such documentation, is entirely inconsistent with extensive country guidance that confirms the requirement for documentation to access the most basic of necessities in Iraq.
R submits that YA’s explanation as to why the children’s birth certificate states he was born in Iraq is not a credible explanation (YA’s witness statement paragraph 18,
YA bundle page 6). The evidence on the birth certificate is clear. It asks what country
the parents were born in, not from which country did they travel to come to the UK. It is clearly recorded that YA stated he was born in Iraq, which is directly contradicted by his own evidence that he was born in Iran. R submits that A’s claim that he had no interpreter is not credible as it is unclear how someone who speaks no English would be able to understand that he was asked what country he came from as opposed to what country he is from. The first phrase would require a knowledge of English YA and MK do not possess.
R notes that in MK’s witness statement at paragraphs 6-8 (MK bundle page 11) there is reference to further documentation allegedly providing supporting evidence to demonstrate MK’s nationality. R has not had sight of any of these documents and in the absence of any explanation as to why they have not previously been made available to R it is submitted that the Tribunal should place little weight on these documents.
…
In respect of the issue of documentation on return R submits that as neither Appellant has given a credible account, and it is not accepted that they had no documentation in Iraq, that both Appellant’s have or would have access immediately
after return to Iraq, to their CSID cards and as such their return to Iraq is feasible.”
21. It is clear from the above documents that the Respondent plainly took issue with the Second and Fifth Appellants’ evidence on the issue of their documentation in Iraq and their nationality.
22. When the above was highlighted to Mr Holmes for the Appellants in the hearing he accepted that he was constrained to accept that the issue was raised in the reviews for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Appellants but not for the First Appellant. He said that there was some evidence in the CPIN which was before the Tribunal dated May 2022 which supported what the Appellants said at 9.4.1, 9.4.4, 9.4.5 and 9.4.6.
23. In the First Appellant’s Home Office decision letter (CB 1756) it is said that he is accepted to be a national of Iraq based on questions answered. The decision goes on to record or recite his own evidence as to how he was living in Iraq as an Iranian refugee, holding a card on this basis. There is then refence to an undisclosed Country of Origin Information Request (COIR) called Iranian refugees in Iraq dated September 2021. It is said he meets the conditions for naturalisation and refers also to residency cards issued in the KRI to Iranian Kurds, it is said that he would face no issues in obtaining documents in Iraq, his parents still live in Iraq and must have been granted naturalisation and they could assist him with redocumentation (CB 1759). I note that in the First Appellant’s Respondent’s Review reliance was placed on the refusal letter and it was argued that he could qualify for naturalisation or that other documentation may be available to him (paras.25-32 CB pp1746-1747).
24. I have considered whether the Respondent’s decision and review in the First Appellant’s case means that the issue of the Appellants nationality and how they resided in Iraq was first raised by the Judge, as is asserted in the grounds of appeal. In my view, this is not correct for the following reasons:
• As is accepted by Mr Holmes and is clear from the documents, the matter was raised in the Second and Fifth Appellant’s refusal letters and then in detail in the Respondent’s review in their case.
• The Appellants appeals were linked. I asked in the hearing whether the Appellants had asked for the appeals to be linked and it was assumed so.
• In any event, one would expect the representatives to prepare the appeal documents and/or any hearing having regard to all the decision letters and documents in the case.
• The First and Fifth Appellants are siblings and so the fact the issue was raised in his sister’s documents was clearly relevant in his linked appeal.
• Moreover, it does not appear to have been argued at any stage before the FtT that there was an inconsistent approach between the Appellants’ decisions on this issue.
• Further, the First Appellant’s decision letter accepts he is an Iraqi national based on his answers in interview which is what the FtT concluded in the decision (or that alternatively he held some other form of official status in Iraq) and what is being challenged here. His case on his claimed Iranian nationality and lack of Iraqi nationality was as such in issue in the decision letter in his case too.
• Whilst Mr Holmes focussed on CB 1759, I note that reading the decision letter as a whole it is written on the basis that it is considered he is an Iraqi national and that he is not at risk on return there. I refer to CB 1760-1761 for example which states “You are a national of Iraq and entered the United Kingdom on 10/11/2022… It is noted you still have a family network in Iraq…” The aspect of the decision referred to addresses whether state protection is available. His evidence on his identification documents is not explicitly accepted there and Mr Holmes did not argue this in his grounds of appeal or before me. The Fifth Appellant’s account is recorded at CB 1759.
• The COIR referred to at CB 1759 does not appear to have been produced so it is not clear what exactly this document says. The Appellants do not seem to have sought disclosure of this document and/or to have attempted to rely on it themselves. The Judge does not appear to have received submissions on the same. As I have already said, the decision letter read as a whole concludes and accepts that the First Appellant is an Iraqi national.
• Further, it does not seem to have been argued before the FtT in any pleadings or orally in the hearing that the Respondent accepted the First Appellant’s evidence on his life in Iraq and his documentation there. I specifically note that the skeleton argument, drafted by solicitors acting in the appeal for the First Appellant, submitted that the list of issues that fell for determination in his appeal included “the credibility of the appellant’s claim to be an Iranian national and living in Iraq as refugees. The appellant was born in Iraq to Iranian parents (sic)” (CB 258). This accepts that his nationality and how he was residing in Iraq were in issue in the appeal. The Appellants’ representative made oral submissions at the hearing relating to all of the Appellants together, making no distinction between the First Appellant’s case. This is recorded at paras. 41-42 of FtT decision. I remind myself of TC (PS compliance - "issues-based" reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC) which emphasises the importance of properly setting out issues between the parties and focussing on addressing the evidence and law, the need to submit a focussed appeal skeleton argument. I also note that in the decision of Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) parties were reminded of the need to engage in a process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, the need for skeleton arguments to be focussed and for there to be clarity on the issues in dispute when before the FtT, how the appeals procedure has been reformed to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl through papers to identify the issues that need to be addressed, and how a party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal.
25. I have considered the decision in Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, which held as follows:
29. ….What fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependent on the context of the decision; although it is possible to identify a number of general principles, they cannot be applied by rote identically in every situation. An overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. Whether there is procedural unfairness is fact-sensitive. See [4] and [13]. The tribunal may identify an issue which has not been raised by the parties to the proceedings, but it will be unfair, ordinarily at least, for it to base its decision upon its view of the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it upon the matter (see [7]). As an expert body, the tribunal is entitled to reject evidence notwithstanding that the evidence has not been challenged before it. Fairness may, however, require it to disclose its concerns about the evidence so as to afford the parties an opportunity to address them (see [8]). There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12]).
30. In The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173[2004] 176 Imm AR, Schiemann LJ delivered the judgment of this court. He drew attention to the difficulties often faced by those sitting at first instance in immigration cases. Of relevance to the present appeal are the following observations. There are innumerable decisions which have stressed that the requirements of fairness are very much conditioned by the facts of each case (at [6]). A failure to put to a party a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice because he must have a proper opportunity to deal with the point (at [4]). Where much depends on the credibility of a party which has made several inconsistent statements, that party has a forensic problem as to whether to confront them or focus attention elsewhere. Fairness may in some such circumstances require the inconsistencies to be put to the witness but that will not usually be the case. Usually the tribunal can remain silent, especially if the party is represented, and see how the case unfolds (at [5]).
32. In WN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKIAT 00213, Ouseley J (President) emphasised that a failure to follow the Surendran Guidelines was not itself conclusive of procedural unfairness. At [34] he said that paragraph 5 needs also to cover the position where no issue of credibility has been raised in the Refusal Letter and yet it may be obvious that further material provided to the adjudicator raises issues of credibility. They should be raised or put to the appellant so that he may answer them, but it does not mean that the hearing is unfair where that does not take place, at least where the appellant is represented. That depends on whether the points are obvious ones going to the appellant's credibility which he could be expected to realise needed addressing in any event, such as inconsistencies with previous statements or a failure to raise a particular matter earlier.
26. For the reasons set out above, I have come to the conclusion that the issue was before the Tribunal and was not raised by the FtT in their decision for the first time. The point was raised by the Respondent prior to and in the hearing. Further, given the issues in these cases the point was an obvious one.
27. It is said that the new country evidence which was not before the FtT and which supported the Appellants’ case should be admitted because the Judge made a mistake of fact inadvertently which has led to an adverse finding on a material point, and this unfairly prejudices the Appellants’ case. The Appellants rely on the case of MM ((unfairness; E & R) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC) in this regard. The difficulty with this submission is that it is accepted by the Appellants’ representative that the issues were raised in the Second to Fifth Appellants’ cases by the Respondent prior to the hearing. Despite the issue being raised, these Appellants did not seek to put in the country evidence they now wish to rely upon and make submissions upon the same. The Appellants were legally represented. I have already made the point that the appeals were linked, the matter was in issue in the First Appellant’s case too and this was an obvious issue. I have not accepted that the Judge made a mistake of fact, for the reasons I have set out above.
28. Mr Holmes did refer me to a few pages in this new country evidence. I note that some of the evidence set out within these documents refers to permits which are valid for six months or a year and renewable. This is not what has been described by these Appellants. It also discusses (in the 2024 report) how in the last five years it has become increasingly difficult to obtain a permit in Sulaimaniyah with 80% facing difficulties in doing so, and how Iranian Kurdish political parties no longer have the influence they used to have on matters relating to their members.
29. Nevertheless, if the Appellants wish to make submissions now that fresh evidence exists which supports their claim, it is of course open to them to apply to the Secretary of State to reconsider their case under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules.
30. In the hearing, Mr Holmes submitted that there was some evidence in the CPIN Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups which was before the Tribunal dated May 2022 which supported the Appellants account at 9.4.1, 9.4.4, 9.4.5 and 9.4.6. He said that the new country report relied on was referred to in these passages (this must mean in the footnotes) and so was in some form of evidence before the FtT. The grounds of appeal do not argue that the Judge failed to have regard to this or any other background evidence before him and no application was made at any stage to amend the grounds of appeal; see Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). It does not appear that the Judge was referred to this evidence orally or in any skeleton arguments. I note that the bundle before me ran to over 2000 pages. The FtT Judge records at para. 14 in their decision that papers before him ran to over 4500 pages (with a lot of duplication). In any event, I note that nothing in these passages I was taken to refers to a ‘Lawan card’ and it was not submitted before me or demonstrated that this addresses the many detailed findings made by the Judge including about the Appellants’ ability to live the life they did in Iraq. Whilst it was said one of the new reports relied on was referenced here, it was not suggested before me that the Judge ought to have considered any of the footnotes referred to in the CPIN here and this would have been an unreasonable expectation. I myself noted none of the hyperlinks in the composite bundle at this section of the CPIN worked in any event. Moreover, referring to detail from documents within footnotes would have been procedurally unfair and amounted to the Judge carrying out their own research.
Notice of Decision
31. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are no material errors of law in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal.
32. The appeal is dismissed.

P. Solanki
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 July 2026