Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003941

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50528/2024
LP/09693/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

HU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Badar Counsel instructed by Lexwin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant, his wife and children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and those family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘The Judge’) dated the 4th June 2025 in which she dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim.
Background
2. The Appellant claims to be a national of Afghanistan but the Respondent asserts he is a national of Pakistan. The Appellant entered the UK on a Pakistani passport with his wife and children. Once he arrived in the UK the Appellant claimed asylum asserting that he is an Afghan national, and that the Pakistani documents had been obtained by deception.
3. In refusing the appeal the judge held that the Appellant held both Pakistani and Afghan nationalities. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim to be at risk in Afghanistan due to a lack of corroborative evidence, and rejected the Appellant’s claim to be at risk from the Taliban in Pakistan. The judge in considering article 8 found that it was in the best interests of the children;
“to remain with their parents in the UK, Pakistan, Kuwait or Afghanistan.” [42]
4. Permission to appeal was sought on four grounds;
i. Ground 1 argues that the judge erred in the credibility assessment because the she had in effect required corroborative evidence where none might be available.
ii. Ground 2 argues that findings in respect of the Taliban’s ability to target individuals in Pakistan historically had not been supported by reference to evidence and were irrational as were the conclusions on in respect of removal destinations.
iii. Ground 3 argued that the “best interests” consideration for the children was flawed as it failed to engage with obvious differences in terms of the children’s best interests in living in Afghanistan as opposed to Pakistan or the UK.
iv. Ground 4 challenges the decision on the basis of a lack of clear conclusions on the credibility of the witnesses.
5. Permission was refused by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on the 11th August 2025 but permission to appeal was granted by an Upper Tribunal Judge on the 1st of October 2025. Permission was granted on all grounds but with a caveat that ground 4 was weaker than the others as the credibility assessment could be inferred from the wider findings.
The Hearing
6. Mr Badar expanded on the grounds in his submissions. I noted that there did not appear to be an overt challenge to the findings on nationality but he in effect argued that if all the credibility challenges were unsafe then this finding was unsafe. Mr Badar also noted that he had challenged the decision in respect of a lack of clear findings about the removal destination in ground 2 which he argued entailed a challenge to the nationality findings. We then cross referenced against the Respondent’s original decision and noted that it contained a concession that the best interests of the children were in going to Pakistan and not Afghanistan which suggested that the judge had departed from that concession without indicating an intention to do so, or acknowledging that she had done so.
7. I invited Mr Walker to respond and he then highlighted that the Respondent’s decision set out in terms that Afghan nationals cannot hold dual nationality and so a central part of the Judge’s reasoning was unsustainable because she had found the Appellant to be a national of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mr Walker agreed that this amounted to a concession that the decision ought to be set aside.
8. In the circumstances both representatives then accepted that the appropriate outcome would be to remit the matter to the First-tier to be made afresh as the entirety of the credibility findings needed to be remade.
Analysis
9. I find that ground 1 is made out. It is legitimate for a judge to take into account the fact that there is a lack of corroborative evidence provided they consider whether or not that corroborative evidence would be reasonably likely to actually be available. The judge refers to 3 specific instances of a lack of corroboration [33, 35 and 37] without considering whether corroborative evidence would be reasonably likely to be available. In addition the factors set out in paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules have not been taken into account before the judge treated this as damaging the Appellant’s credibility. Accordingly the attaching of adverse weight to a lock of corroborative evidence is an error of law.
10. Ground 2 is also made out because it was clearly irrational for the Judge to find that the Appellant was both Afghan and Pakistani given that the Respondent had set out in her refusal letter that Afghan citizenship law does not permit dual nationality. That fundamental error also undermines the judges findings in respect of returnability to Afghanistan.
11. Ground 2 is also made out in respect of the judge holding that the Taliban;
“has power and reach throughout Pakistan” [34].
12. The judge does not state on what basis she has reached that conclusion and makes no reference to objective evidence to support that finding but treats it as an accepted fact. This does not reconcile with the Respondent’s position set out in the refusal letter that;
“The Taliban are non-state actors in Pakistan. The state in Pakistan, in general, is both willing and able to offer sufficient protection from non-state actors.”
13. Ground 3 is also made out. The Judge held;
“The children’s best interests are to remain with their parents in the UK, Pakistan, Kuwait or Afghanistan.” [42]
14. Given the current political situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban government it is simply irrational to have held that there is no effective difference between any of the countries from the children’s point of view. This is again amplified by the fact that the children can only be nationals of Afghanistan or Pakistan further to ground 2. This may not have impacted the ultimate outcome of the article 8 assessment but it is a significant error particularly in the context of grounds 1 and 2 having been made out.
15. Ground 4 was treated as an ancillary point by Mr Badar which is consistent with the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick in granting permission. The Judge’s assessment of credibility could be inferred from other sections of the decision but this is academic given the problems with the remaining sections of the decision.
16. I consider that the consequences of the above errors when approached together are clearly material. The Judge reached factual findings that cannot be correct and the adverse credibility findings are premised on these errors particularly the conclusion that the Appellant could have dual nationality.
Disposal
17. No findings can be preserved in this case given that they are all undermined by the approach to nationality in particular which renders the decisions in respect of both protection and article 8 unsound.
18. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the relevant issues and the extensive fact-finding exercise required, I remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete rehearing. The parties had no objection to this course of action.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of material errors of law and that decision is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete rehearing.
Directions to the First-tier Tribunal
(1) The appeal will be reheard by the First-tier Tribunal at the Taylor House hearing centre before a different judge;
(2) On rehearing the appeal, there shall be no preserved findings.

A. Seelhoff

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9th December 2025