Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003946

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/61814/2023
LH/06006/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

MARIANA DEL CARMEN GUANO PAZMINO
Appellant
and

SECETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Lam, Counsel instructed by MRKS Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Office

Heard at Field House on 26 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the First-tier Tribunal decision promulgated on 27 June 2025. The Judge dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 26 September 2024.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Ecuador. She entered the United Kingdom on 15 September 2001 as a visitor visa. On 10 January 2002, she applied to remain in the UK as a student. This application was refused on 20 February 2002. On 26 February 2002, the appellant claimed asylum which was refused on 5 April 2002. In a decision promulgated on 17 October 2003, Adjudicator Dennis dismissed her appeal. On 2 August 2022, she applied for leave to remain in the UK on human rights grounds based on 20-year residency. The application was refused on 26 September 2023 and her appeal against that decision was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal Judge on 31 March 2025 (‘the Judge’).
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Judge notes the decision of Adjudicator Dennis and his finding that the appellant’s evidence was unreliable before him. He correctly directs himself on the law and the fact that he should exercise caution [22, 23].
4. He provides a comprehensive and lengthy decision in which he sets out in full the appellant’s background and the documentary evidence before him. He confirms that he heard evidence from the appellant, her sister and her nephew. In the absence of a Home Office Presenting Officer, he directs himself correctly on the application of the Surendran guidelines and the case law relating to them [26]. He questioned the witnesses on points that he needed to consider and invited the appellant’s representative to raise objections.
5. He notes that the sister and nephew confirmed that the appellant had not left the UK since 2001 and whilst he takes ‘all this evidence into account when considering the evidence as a whole’ he notes ‘none of these witnesses can properly be described as independent’ [28].
6. He refers to the written evidence of other witnesses noting that their absence reduces the weight he can place on their evidence. He specifically notes that there has been no good reason given for her brother-in-law, a pastor in her local church, to attend to give evidence. Similarly, with her friend, MP, he notes that she says she is abroad for medical treatment, but the only evidence is an untranslated document which he can place no weight on. He notes that no application has been made to adjourn the hearing for witnesses to attend.
7. In the determination, the Judge’s focus appears to be the lack of medical records. He correctly directs himself that there is no requirement for independent evidence but nevertheless suggests that it is ‘reasonable to expect an individual who claims to have lived in the UK for 20 years to be able to produce medical records or an explanation’ [34].
8. He notes that the appellant relies on a letter from her private GP, The Oval Medical Centre which she states that she attended regularly for consultations in 2009, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018. He does not overtly dismiss the evidence but raises a number of problems with it. Firstly it doesn’t make any reference to medical records being unavailable nor is there evidence of the appellant requesting them. There is no explanation why there is an overlap between having a private GP and an NHS GP. Whilst invoices and prescriptions have been provided from the Oval Medical Centre, he was unsuccessful in obtaining clarification from the appellant when questioned as to why no medical records were produced.
9. Having noted the fact that the invoices and prescriptions were provided in the appellant’s original bundle, he comments that there is no explanation why the letter dated 2022 was only provided in the supplemental bundle uploaded on 15th January some three weeks prior to the hearing. He found elements of the evidence to be inconsistent and implausible and raises a concern that the ‘records may not exist or that they contain information the appellant does not wish to disclose’ [41]. He expresses concern that she has not given a full and frank account of her passports due to inconsistencies and that she could have left the UK either clandestinely or there was nothing to prevent her obtaining an Ecuadorian passport after her old one expired. He accepts that she was likely to be in the UK until 2003/2004 and after 2018/2019 he could not be satisfied that she had been in the UK continuously between those dates.
Grounds of Appeal
10. The parties rely on an appeal bundle (‘AB’) of 354 pages which includes the original FTT bundle as well as the appellant’s supplementary bundle.
11. Mr Lam relies on his grounds for permission to appeal (AB19) together with his renewal grounds (AB26). He took me through each of the grounds in turn. Mr Hulme responded on each point.
12. The first Ground is titled ‘Misconceived assessment of the evidence’ and submits that the Judge does not consider the witnesses to be independent but that this does not mean their evidence is untruthful or unreliable and should have been considered on its merits. He relies on Khan R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 416 (Paragraph 61). In short, the Judge does not say why the evidence was not taken into account.
13. The second Ground relates to procedural unfairness. This is a very narrow point which relies on the fact that the Judge noted the inconsistency as between the appellant’s stated address in 2002 and the address used in the first adjudication. The Judge states that as he did not ask for clarification it does not give the inconsistency ‘undue weight’. It is submitted that this is contradicted by the judge’s further comment that he nevertheless considers the point when looking at the evidence as a whole.
14. The third Ground relates to ‘irrational and perverse findings’. This is predicated on the Judge’s finding that it would be reasonable to expect an individual to produce medical records with an explanation why they are not available, having been in the UK 20 years. It is submitted that the appellant provided evidence by way of the Oval Medical Centre letter which ‘must be given significant weight’. The Grounds note that the Judge considers it unlikely the patient’s medical records would not be kept by a provider but that the letter’s reference to a number of years attendance should be sufficient. It is submitted that the apparent inconsistency in the sister’s evidence should not take precedence over the doctor’s letter. A final criticism relates to a typographical error at [41].
15. It is submitted that the authenticity of the Oval letter and invoices has never been challenged and that the speculation that the appellant is hiding information is irrational and not supported by evidence.
16. The fourth Ground is based on the failure to give reasons for the Judge noting that people can leave the UK clandestinely or the appellant could have obtained a new passport. It is submitted that the appellant has never used a false identity and the Judge’s conclusion is speculative and an error of law.
17. Ground five is also based on ‘irrational and perverse findings’. It submitted that the Judge discredits MP’s evidence because he reduces the weight he can place on it as she is not in attendance. However, he then uses her evidence to identify inconsistencies. It is submitted that it is irrational and contradictory to draw this conclusion based on evidence that he places reduced weight on. The fact the Judge has raised the possibility of fabricated evidence renders the determination unsafe and was not a point relied upon by the respondent.
Discussion
18. I accept Mr Lam’s submission that in cases where an appellant is seeking to prove 20-year residency it is common and important to have friends and relatives giving evidence. He relies on Lord Justice Beatson’s comments in Khan at [61] on what he described as ‘an amnesty clause’. He notes that people without status will have no official documentation.
19. This point is accepted by both parties and expressly referred to by the Judge at [24] and [34] including reference to Khan. Mr Lam submits that the Judge gave no reasons why the evidence of the sister and nephew were not credible and provides reasons which he described as ‘very generic’. Based on the Judge’s approach he suggested that no one would win a 20-year case. It is correct that the Judge fails to set out the oral witnesses evidence in detail and his reasons why he does not specifically accept it. However, he expressly states that he takes their evidence into account when considering the evidence as a whole. The fact that he goes on to note that the witnesses are not independent does not of itself undermine his approach to the evidence as a whole. He goes through the evidence methodically, overtly expressing both that he is taking it into account whilst not placing great weight on certain aspects of the evidence, namely, letters and statements from witnesses who did not attend. He considers the explanations why two key witnesses did not attend to give evidence and finds there to be no good reasons and at the same time noting that an adjournment had not been requested.
20. At this point it may be instructive for me to set out what I consider to be the guidance that it is appropriate to follow in cases of this nature.
21. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 which was recently set out and approved by Lady Justice Falk in Alexander Isaac Hamilton v Mark Colin Barrow (1), Claire Michelle Barrow (2) and Matin Welsh (3) [2024] EWCA Civ 888 and also by Green LJ in Hafiz Aman Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26]. The latter emphasised that
“the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30]”
22. It is helpful to set out the guidance given in Volpi by Lord Justice Lewison;
The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.[2]
23. The Judge expressly makes reference to all the evidence before him, and I consider him entitled to gauge the weight he places on each element of the evidence. Whilst it would have been helpful to go through the witnesses’ evidence and explain why it was rejected, the lack of such explanation does not undermine the determination. This is because he displays care at looking at the evidence and is clear in his approach that he is looking at the evidence as a whole and placing weight (or reduced weight) on its different elements. The Judge is entitled to reach his own conclusions on the weight to be placed. For example, it is perfectly proper to place less weight on the evidence of witnesses who fail to give oral evidence, especially in the absence of what he considers to be cogent reasons.
Ground 1
24. It is important to note that as set out at [26], the Judge examined the witnesses following the Surendran guidelines. The Judge expressly states that he takes all of their evidence into account when considering it as a whole. The lack of independence because they are family members is a proper factor to note but such a reference is not indicative that this is the sole reason for dismissing their evidence because he is at pains to say that he is considering the evidence as a whole throughout his decision. Mr Lam submits that the nephew gave ‘compelling oral evidence’ but it is for the Judge to decide what evidence he finds compelling and to which significant weight would be placed in contrast to those aspects of the evidence that he does not find compelling.
25. Bearing in mind the guidance above [22] I do not find there to be a material error of law because the Judge’s finding that the appellant has not been a resident for 20 years is not ‘plainly wrong’ or a conclusion that no reasonable judge could reach.
Ground 2
26. This relates to the Judge’s after thought that the address given at the time of the adjudication was different to that referred to in evidence at the hearing. As noted in the Grounds, because he did not seek clarification he does not ‘give this inconsistency undue weight’. It is argued that he then places ‘some weight’ on the inconsistencies when he says he takes it into account. Whilst this may be clumsy, it is not a direct contradiction. In taking the inconsistency into account he may do so without placing any meaningful weight upon it. I cannot accept there was mistake of fact or unfairness based on this remark.
Ground 3
27. This relates to the perversity of the Judge’s finding that it would have been reasonable to expect the appellant to produce medical records or an explanation. It appears to be argued that this is perverse because she did provide a letter from her private GP. The amount of weight the Judge places on the letter is a matter for him and we find that he provides detailed and adequate reasons why he has concerns over this evidence. He expresses his concern that the private GP would not retain medical records and that the appellant had no meaningful answer in examination as to why they did not have them or did not provide them. It is quite appropriate that the Judge highlighted the lack of explanation as to why the letter was only provided three weeks before the hearing and not two years earlier when it was dated. As noted above at [22] (iv), it is a matter for the Judge what weight he places on the evidence and his focus on the medical records cannot be said to be irrational or perverse.
28. I rely on H (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 when Brooke LJ stated;
It is well known that "perversity" represents a very high hurdle. In Miftari v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 481, the whole court agreed that the word meant what it said: it was a demanding concept. The majority of the court (Keene and Maurice Kay LJJ) said that it embraced decisions that were irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense (even if there was no wilful or conscious departure from the rational), but it also included a finding of fact that was wholly unsupported by the evidence, provided always that this was a finding as to a material matter.[11]
29. Based on this guidance I do not find there has been a material error of law.
Ground 4
30. I do not find it to be an error of law that the Judge simply states the obvious that people do travel in the UK clandestinely or by using false documents or that she could have obtained an Ecuadorian passport. Whilst it is speculation, the Judge is merely giving examples of why or how an individual could have left the UK during the period claimed to be here in the UK.
Ground 5
31. This is a similar point to the above in that it is for the judge to place whatever weight he wishes on the evidence of MP and he is entitled to reduce the weight he places on it due to her absence. It is not irrational or perverse to nevertheless rely on inconsistencies in her evidence. Just because a judge does not place great weight on evidence does not mean to say he can ignore it or not take into account inconsistencies. The submission cannot reach the high hurdle of perversity.
Conclusion
32. I disagree with the closing submission that the Judge has made a catalogue of material errors and that in their absence the appellant would have succeeded. I am not satisfied that the Judge was plainly wrong in his conclusions on primary facts. As noted above ‘plainly’ does not refer to whether this Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion. I may have reached a different conclusion but do not find that the Judge’s decision is one that no reasonable Judge could have reached.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the first-tier Tribunal shall stand.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28/11/2025