Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003952

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58362/2023
LP/08102/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

DS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Mohzam, Counsel instructed by Burton & Burton Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Abdulkarim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 5 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this direction. The order is being made because the Applicant has applied for international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. The Appellant, a national of Chad, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Suffield-Thompson (“the Judge”) who by way of a decision dated 24 June 2025 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
Permission to Appeal
3. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper-tier Tribunal Judge Kebede. The learned Judge observed when granting permission to appeal that:
“Whilst the grounds are, on the whole, little more than a disagreement with the judge’s decision, it is nevertheless arguable that the judge misinterpreted the evidence at [22] of her decision in relation to question 105 of the appellant’s interview and subsequent clarification which in turn arguably impacted upon her adverse credibility findings. Whether or not that was ultimately material to the outcome of the appeal, given the various other adverse credibility findings, is a matter for consideration. Permission is accordingly granted on that basis. I do not exclude the other grounds, however, and they may still be argued”.
Respondent’s Rule 24 Response
4. A Rule 24 response dated 7 October 2025 was provided on behalf of the Respondent drafted by Mr Parvar, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer. He said in relation to paragraph 32 as follows at paragraph 3:
“The appellant has made a valid point in relation to [22], which concerns question 105 of the asylum interview record and his subsequent clarification email. In fairness to the appellant, he did state at paragraph 40 of his appeal witness statement (in response to reasons for refusal) that he was not arrested, and there is a reasonable view as to the appellant having attempted to clarify [YYC]’s arrest. The respondent is amenable to accepting an error of law in the FTTJ’s misinterpretation, but it is immaterial”.
The Hearing Before Me
5. In submissions today Mr Mohzam on behalf of the Appellant sought to take me through the grounds of appeal and he referred to certain paragraphs of the Judge’s decision and to the Respondent’s Rule 24 Response.
6. Mrs Abdulkarim in her submissions relied on the Rule 24 Response. I invited her to deal with paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision and in particular in relation to materiality. She referred me to various other paragraphs of the Judge’s decision and she said that the key issue was in relation to the way in which the Judge was concerned about the Appellant’s claimed relationship. She submitted that paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision was not really of significance to the Judge’s ultimate finding.
Consideration and Analysis
7. I remind myself at the outset that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. I also remind myself that the authorities date back to Baroness Hale’s clear judgment in AH Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; ]2009] 1 AC 678 in respect of that expertise.
8. More recently the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 revisited the proper approach to appeals. Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed, explained that the role of the Appellate Court or Tribunal must be exercised with restraint. His Lordship said at paragraph 29:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
9. As I explored with Mrs Abdulkarim during the hearing this morning, it is not possible to work out how much of an impact the Judge’s error in paragraph 22 had on her decision and to her overall conclusion in terms of her assessment of the Appellant’s credibility For example, was it just 1%, was it 50%, or was it as much as 99%. It is impossible to say precisely, but it clearly was a significant error. Importantly, in this case the Respondent concedes that the Judge did err in respect of her findings at paragraph 22. The issue is whether that error is material.
10. In my judgment, because it is not possible to separate the Judge’s error from the rest of the findings, it therefore becomes clear that the Judge’s conclusion in relation to the Appellant’s credibility as a whole has been tainted. The error made by the Judge is therefore indeed material. That is because it is not possible to separate the Judge’s factual error in relation to the arrest from the rest of her findings. In my judgment had the Judge not made the mistake that she did at paragraph 22, then her overall decision might have been different.
11. Whilst I note too that a Judge is to be commended for shorter, more focused decisions, in this case some of the shorthand were not helpful. For example, referring to things such as “pre-NABA” or “AI” but when the meaning of those abbreviations had not been defined previously or explained elsewhere in the Judge’s decision.
12. In my judgment the error of the Judge is a material error which taints the whole of the decision. I therefore must set aside the Judge’s decision.
13. I had canvassed with the parties what their submissions were if I was to find that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Both parties had recognised the need for the findings to be fully revisited.
14. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for further consideration here at the Upper Tribunal or be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. I apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that I remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.
Conclusion
15. In my judgment, the Judge materially erred in law. The Judge’s decision is therefore set aside in its entirety with no retained findings. The re-hearing will be in respect of all matters.
16. All further directions will be provided by the First-tier Tribunal but I do invite Mr Mohzam’s instructing solicitors to get in touch with the First-tier Tribunal to propose some directions, such as a time estimate for the hearing, interpreter requirements and dates for a replacement composite electronic bundle of documents for the hearing. That will enable the matter to be listed sooner rather than later. I am sure both parties are keen for the matter to be resolved as quickly as possible.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and it is set aside.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing afresh on all matters.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5 December 2025