Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-003964
(HU/58598/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

Child A
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Halliday, Counsel instructed by RH & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in Edinburgh on the 23rd June 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her, any of her witnesses or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

DECISION AND REASONS

1. Child A is a Pakistani national who is now 4 years old. She seeks permission to enter the United Kingdom as the de facto adopted child of her Sponsors, whom for the purpose of this decision we shall refer to as Adoptive Father and Adoptive Mother.

2. Child A made her application for entry clearance on 22 April 2024. It was refused on 26 June 2024. Child A appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In its decision promulgated 21 March 2025 the First-tier Tribunal made a number of findings in her favour. The Tribunal was not however satisfied that all of the requirements of the rule were met, and so dismissed the appeal. That decision was set aside, in part, by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Deakin on the 24 February 2026. On 14 April 2026 Principal Resident Judge Mandalia made a transfer order to enable the matter to come before us so that the decision in the appeal can be re-made.

3. The parties are in agreement that the relevant rule in this case is the now deleted paragraph 314 of the Immigration Rules, in force at the date that Child A made her application. It is accepted before us that if Child A can demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that she meets all of the requirements of the rule then her appeal must be allowed: TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109. It was expressly agreed before DUTJ Deakin that this is a not a case where the adoptive parents would need to produce a certificate of eligibility. Paragraph 314 reads:

Requirements for limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement as the adopted child of a parent or parents given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement

314. The requirements to be met in the case of a child seeking limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement as the adopted child of a parent or parents given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement are that he:

(i) is seeking leave to enter to accompany or join or remain with a parent or parents in one of the following

(a) one parent is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement and the other parent is being or has been given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement; or

(b) one parent is being or has been given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement and has had sole responsibility for the child’s upbringing; or

(c) one parent is being or has been given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom with a view to settlement and there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for the child’s care; or

(d) in the case of a de facto adoption one parent has a right of abode in the United Kingdom or indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom and is seeking admission to the United Kingdom on the same occasion for the purpose of settlement; and

(ii) is under the age of 18; and

(iii) is not leading an independent life, is unmarried and is not a civil partner, and has not formed an independent family unit; and
(iv) can, and will, be accommodated and maintained adequately without recourse to public funds in accommodation which the adoptive parent or parents own or occupy exclusively; and

(v) (a) was adopted in accordance with a decision taken by the competent administrative authority or court in his country of origin or the country in which he is resident, being a country whose adoption orders are recognised by the United Kingdom; or

(b) is the subject of a de facto adoption; and

(vi) was adopted at a time when:

(a) both adoptive parents were resident together abroad; or
(b) either or both adoptive parents were settled in the United Kingdom; and

(vii) has the same rights and obligations as any other child of the adoptive parent’s or parents’ family; and

(viii) was adopted due to the inability of the original parent(s) or current carer(s) to care for him and there has been a genuine transfer of parental responsibility to the adoptive parents; and

(ix) has lost or broken his ties with his family of origin; and

(x) was adopted, but the adoption is not one of convenience arranged to facilitate his admission to the United Kingdom; and

(xi) (where an application is made for limited leave to remain with a view to settlement) has limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; and

(xii) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity

Discussion and Findings

4. It has since the outset been accepted by the Respondent that the terms of sub-paragraph (i) are met. Child A is seeking leave to enter the UK to live with her adoptive parents. Adoptive Mother is a British citizen, and Adoptive Father has leave to remain as her spouse. He is on a path to settlement and currently has leave until 2027.

5. Nor is it in issue that the requirements of sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii) are met. Child A is under 18 years of age and is not leading an independent life.

6. The ability of the adoptive parents to maintain and accommodate Child A has also been accepted since the outset: the requirements of sub-paragraph (iv) are therefore met.

7. Adoptions in Pakistan are not recognised by the United Kingdom. Child A’s case is that she meets the requirements of sub-paragraph (v)(b) of the rule because she is the subject of a de facto adoption. This was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal and the Respondent has not challenged that finding in this Tribunal. The facts as found are that Child A was born to her biological parents in January 2022 in Pakistan. Her biological mother is the sister of Adoptive Father. Child A’s biological parents came to an arrangement with her adoptive parents that they could bring her up as their own; in accordance with Pakistani custom she was ‘given’ to her maternal uncle and his wife, who have been her carers since at least October 2022. Although it remains their intention to return to the UK and make their family home here, they have remained in Pakistan with Child A since at least October 2022 when the transfer of parental responsibility took place. On 3 March 2023 they obtained an order from the Family Court of Rawalpindi appointing Adoptive Father as her legal guardian in that country.

8. This transfer of parental responsibility occurred when both adoptive parents were in Pakistan with Child A. It is not in issue that the requirements of sub-paragraph (vi) are met.

9. Child A is the only child of her adoptive parents and so no issue arises in respect of sub-paragraph (vii) of the rule.

10. Sub-paragraph (viii) requires that Child A demonstrate two things. First she must show that there has been a genuine transfer of parental responsibility to the adoptive parents. This matter was resolved in her favour by the First-tier Tribunal and it is a finding expressly preserved by the decision of DUTJ Deakin.

11. The second limb of 314 (viii) remains in issue. That requires Child A to show that she was adopted due to the inability of her biological parents to care for her. The First-tier Tribunal found against Child A on this issue, but that decision was set aside by DUTJ Deakin for a lack of reasons. This is the first of the matters in issue that we must consider.

12. The evidence on this point consists of sworn affidavits from Biological Father, Biological Mother, Adoptive Father, Adoptive Mother, as well as the oral evidence given before us by Adoptive Father. The consistent position in that evidence is that this de facto adoption was necessitated by the financial circumstances of Child A’s biological parents at the time of her birth and subsequent adoption. Biological Father explains that in 2021 he had borrowed money from friends and relatives to set up his own mobile phone repair shop. It had not however done very well and it was not providing a regular income. At that time his monthly expenses were exceeding his income and he was falling further and further into debt. He and his wife already had two boys when she became pregnant with Child A. They were living in a two bedroomed property with his mother, who had several health issues. She lived, and in fact still does, in one room whilst he, his wife and their children live in the other. They knew that they could not afford another child at that time, but as practising Muslims he and his wife do not believe in abortion so had no choice but to let the pregnancy proceed. After Child A was born his wife and her brother proposed this solution. In oral evidence Adoptive Father was asked what the family would have done had he and his wife not adopted Child A. He replied that he did not know, but another solution would have to have been found. His sister’s financial situation was, he told us, not a small matter: “it is a very big problem. If you can’t feed your kids, that is a very big problem”. All of the witnesses have been consistent about this reason for the adoption, and before us Ms Arif did not challenge the evidence of Adoptive Father that his sister and her husband simply could not afford to feed another child.

13. On behalf of the Respondent Ms Arif accepted that poverty could constitute a valid reason why biological parents would be unable to care for a child. On the facts before us, and in light of the unchallenged evidence, we are satisfied that the test is made out here. We note that the biological parents have, since the de facto adoption of Child A, had a fourth child, who has remained living with them. Although Ms Arif made no submissions on the point we have considered whether this calls into question the assertion that they were unable to care for Child A. We have been assisted by the decision of the Upper Tribunal in ST (Adoptions: ‘overseas’ adoptions; para 310) India [2025] UKUT 00352 (IAC). That decision confirms what is perhaps evident on the face of the rule, that the relevant date for the purpose of the enquiry is the time of the adoption: “was adopted due to the inability of the original parent(s) or current carer(s) to care for him”. Having regard to the evidence before us we accept and find as fact that at the time that Child A was handed over to her adoptive parents, her biological parents were living in very challenging financial circumstances. They were living in cramped accommodation and had less coming in that they had going out, resulting in very straightened living conditions for themselves and their existing children. We note Biological Father’s latest affidavit, in which he explains that he has now sold his failing business and has taken employment with a large mobile phone company. This has provided him with a stable income, and the proceeds from the sale of the business enabled him to pay back at least some of his debts. His financial situation has therefore improved, which enabled him and his wife to look after their fourth child in a way that they could not for Child A. Given the use of the past tense in the rule, and the conclusions in ST (India), we do not think that any of that makes any difference at all to the outcome of this appeal.

14. The next requirement of the rule is in sub-paragraph (ix). This requires Child A to show that she has “lost or broken ties” with her family of origin. On this matter the witnesses have been quite candid. Child A has plainly not lost all contact with her biological parents because they remain part of her family. Her Biological Mother and Adoptive Father are siblings and they naturally continue to see one another, for instance during Eid celebrations she travels from her home about 45 minutes away to visit her parents. Child A, Adoptive Father and Adoptive Mother are all living in that house in Rawalpindi pending the outcome of this appeal. The evidence is that Child A interacts with her biological mother as if she is her aunty. She behaves towards her as she does any other visitor to the house. In its decision the First-tier Tribunal does not expressly address the requirements of 314 (ix) and this is therefore a matter that we are required to make a finding on. We have been assisted in this regard by the decision in Boadi v Entry Clearance Officer [2002] UKIAT 1323. Considering an earlier incarnation of the same provision the Tribunal conclude that the rule should not be interpreted so as to mean a complete severance of all ties:

“Modern thinking does not believe that it is necessarily in the best interests of an adopted child to lose all contact with his or her parents or families of origin. Furthermore, the adjudicator’s construction would make it almost impossible for an adopted child from a culture which recognises, for example, the adoption by childless couples of children of relations who are unable to provide for them to achieve compliance with 310(x) [which is equivalent to paragraph 314(ix)]… It is intended to ensure that the adoption is not as it were temporary and that, once the child has obtained the entry to the United Kingdom which the adoption will achieve, the family of origin takes back responsibility. There must be a loss or break of the ties of responsibility. Those of affection may remain. Were it otherwise, a child of a single parent who was smitten with a terminal illness and was wholly unable to care for him or her could not join adoptive parents merely because he or she retained affection for and visited the dying parent.”

15. Having had regard to the unchallenged evidence before us we are satisfied that Child A’s biological parents have relinquished all “ties of responsibility” for her. They are no longer considered, by themselves or others, to be her parents. It is Adoptive Father and Adoptive Mother who are providing her with her day to day care and who are taking all decisions on her behalf. Whilst we do not doubt that they continue to love her, they do so from afar, respecting the arrangement that they have come to in this intra-familial adoption. As the witness statements of the biological parents make clear, they regard this arrangement as being very much in Child A’s best interests and we have not seen any suggestion that they have ever sought to go back on it.

16. It is not part of the Respondent’s case that this de facto adoption has been contrived to facilitate Child A’s entry to the UK: see sub-paragraph (x).

Conclusions

17. The issues before us were narrow, and having had regard to all of the evidence before us we find that it all points in the same direction. This is a genuine de facto adoption by parents who are, as far as their long term intentions are concerned, settled in the UK. We accept and find as fact that this de facto adoption arose because of the inability of Child A’s biological parents to care for her and that although she still sees them from time to time, all ties of responsibility have been severed. It follows that Child A meets the requirements of the rule.

18. The First-tier Tribunal found as fact that Child A enjoys an Article 8 family life with her adoptive parents. It is accepted by the Respondent that the Article is engaged by the refusal to grant entry clearance. Applying the ratio of TZ (Pakistan) we are satisfied that compliance with the rule renders the refusal disproportionate, and it follows that the appeal must be allowed.

Decisions

19. The decision in the appeal is remade as follows: the appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.

20. There is an order for anonymity, granted because the Appellant is a minor and we consider such an order to be in her best interest.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 June 2026