Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003965
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65183/2023
LP/03442/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

BZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr W Ahmad, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Dyer (“the judge”). By her decision of 27 June 2025 (“the decision”), the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Albania, born in 1998. She entered the United Kingdom in November 2021, having left Albania the previous month she travelled to Spain, Belgium and France before her arrival in the UK. She claimed asylum on her day of arrival. A National Referral Mechanism (NRM) referral was made on 10 March 2023; and a negative reasonable grounds decision was given five days later. Her application for asylum was refused on 27 September 2023, with the respondent’s refusal letter disputing the credibility of her account.
3. The appellant’s account of how she came to the UK is summarised in her statement dated 12 July 2024. An undated supplementary statement sets out some corrections to that statement. The appellant stated therein that she had been forced into prostitution by her then boyfriend, from whom she eventually escaped.
4. The appellant relies upon the Albania County Expert Report of Dr James Korovilas, commissioned by her solicitors and dated 28 June 2024, which considers the appellant’s account. The conclusion to his report reads as follows:
“Based on my professional expertise and having reviewed the objective materials and having considered the particular circumstances of [the appellant’s] case I am of the opinion that it would be difficult for [the appellant] to effectively and safely re-establish herself in Albania.
“I believe that [the appellant] faces a real risk of being recaptured by the criminal gang that had previously trafficked her into sexual exploitation in Albania. [The appellant] would also at risk of exploitation from other similar criminal networks if she was required to relocate in order to avoid detection by her former traffickers. I do not consider that she would be able to live safely in another part of Albania and I do not believe that the Albanian state would be able to offer [the appellant] sufficient protection from the various risks that she would face should she return to Albania.”
The grounds of appeal
5. The appellant’s grounds of appeal (“the grounds”) are dated 10 July 2025, the headings of which are as follows.
a. Ground 1: Unlawful and flawed approach to credibility assessment.
b. Ground 2: Failure to apply relevant guidance on vulnerability and trafficking claims.
c. Ground 3: Failure to engage with Country Guidance and CPIN materials.
d. Ground 4: Failure to consider Article 8 ECHR.
6. The appellant had relied on a fifth ground, though this was not pursued before me.
7. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lester on 5 August 2025; but granted on all grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 26 September 2025.
8. The matter came before me having relisted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Rae-Reeves on 26 November 2025: the bundle being late and incomplete having necessitated an adjournment of the original listing.
Analysis
9. In his submissions on ground 1, Mr Ahmad, appearing for the appellant, argued that the judge conducted her credibility assessment in reverse order: she made adverse credibility findings without regard to Dr Korovilas’s opinion; and, moreover, without making allowances for the appellant’s vulnerability. In that regard, ground 1 overlaps with ground 2, though I shall consider ground 2 separately below. From his conclusion quoted above and the analysis that led to it, it is plain that Dr Korovilas found the appellant to be credible. The judge refers to Dr Korovilas’s report at three places in the decision, which are as follows.
“I have considered with care the appellant’s skeleton argument and the expert report of Dr Korovilas. I have considered the evidence in the round and applied the lower standard of proof to the protection claim. I have also read and had regard to the CPIN Albania: Human trafficking v16.0 July 2024 and Albania: Mental Healthcare v3.0 January 2025 and Albania: Actors of Protection v3.0 February 2025. [16]
“I have read the report by Mr [sic] Korovilas. His conclusion regarding the risk to the appellant is ultimately based on her account being proved and so I shall deal with her evidence first. I am aware that the appellant received a negative reasonable grounds decision from the NRM.” [17]
“As stated above, Dr Korovilas’s findings are all made on the basis that the appellant was in fact sexually exploited by a criminal gang member. I have noted that he found her account to be consistent with his understanding as an expert on the modus operandi of criminal gangs, but as I have rejected her account on those facts for reasons of credibility, his report does not take her case further.” [38]
10. These paragraphs, argues Mr Ahmad, demonstrate that the judge’s erroneous approach was not, as the correct approach should have been, to assess the appellant’s credibility in the light of Dr Korovilas’s assessment: instead and wrongly, she first found the appellant to be incredible per [37], and then went on to cross-check her adverse findings against Dr Korovilas’s report.
11. Developing his argument, Mr Ahmad refers me to MVN v London Borough of Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942, which at paragraph 28 therein sets out five principles to which a court should have regard in assessing credibility. I set these out in full:

(1) Decision makers considering asylum claims should take everything material into account. Their sources of information will frequently go well beyond the testimony of the applicant and include in-country reports and expert testimony: Karanakaran v Secretary of State of the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11 per Sedley LJ in his judgment at [2].
(2) It is an error of law for a decision maker to seek to assess the credibility of a claim in isolation without considering other relevant evidence such as reports regarding a country that corroborate a person’s claims: R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p Ahmed [1999] INLR 473.
(3) It is also an error of law to fail to take account of relevant expert evidence when assessing credibility: Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367.
(4) Further, in assessing credibility in the context of trafficking, this must be done “in the round”: R (AA (Iraq)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 23 at [67] per Sir David Keene.
(5) Allowances should be given to the fact that asylum seekers (and similarly victims of trafficking) may have problems giving coherent accounts of their history: R (N) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 1952 (Admin) at [25] per Blake J (“most people who have experience of obtaining a narrative from asylum seekers from a different language or different culture recognise that time, confidence in the interviewer and the interview process and some patience and some specific direction to pertinent questions is needed to adduce a comprehensive and adequate account”).
12. While that case was an age assessment case, Mr Ahmad argues that the principles hold true in this case. Principles (1), (2) and (3) goes directly to whether the judge had proper regard to Dr Korovilas, while principle (5) goes to the appellant’s vulnerability.
13. More generally, and relying on MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC), Mr Ahmad argues that a failure to explain why evidence is rejected or why a witness lacks credibility must be explained by the judge and, if she does not do so as is argued here, that constitutes a material error of law. It is said, relying on HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 more generally that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s narrative in the round and, as the grounds put it, failed to take into account the “corroborative material and trauma-informed explanations for perceived inconsistencies”. Relying on MS (Trafficking – credibility) Pakistan [2016] UKUT 226 (IAC), Mr Ahmad submits that the judge’s credibility assessment is not bound by a negative NRM decision referenced at [17].
14. Mr Nappey submits that the judge has not fallen into error. While [17] and [38] are brief, it is clear that the judge had Dr Korovilas’s report in mind. The adverse credibility findings from [21] to [37] are clearly and carefully made. The judge says at [37] that she has “considered the evidence in the round” and that is what she has done. The inconsistencies she found in the appellant’s evidence, and why she gave different pieces of evidence the weight that she did, are all expressly articulated. It is, in sum, a very thorough decision.
15. Key to my mind in [38] of the decision is the sentence “I have noted that he found her account to be consistent with his understanding as an expert on the modus operandi of criminal gangs…”. It is here and, I think, only here, that the judge demonstrates that she has had regard to Dr Korovilas’s view that the appellant is credible, within the known context of Albanian trafficking networks and systemic vulnerabilities. While the reference is brief, I do consider that it shows the judge did not fall into error by making adverse credibility findings without reference to the expert report before her, but rather, as she should have, properly considered Dr Korovilas’s expert opinion as part of her credibility assessment.
16. I do not find that Mr Ahmad’s wider arguments on ground 1 disclose a material error of law. I do consider that the judge has provided adequate reasons as to why she found that the appellant lacked credibility. The judge carefully considered all material aspects of the appellant’s account. The judge’s credibility findings are not improperly reliant on the negative NRM decision. The credibility assessment is sound.
17. As I have said, there is some overlap between grounds 1 and 2. Mr Ahmad argues that just as the judge referenced but failed adequately to take Dr Korovilas’s expert report into account, the judge acknowledged the appellant’s vulnerability but did not adequately consider how it would affect the coherency of her evidence.
18. The judge considered the appellant’s vulnerability at [6], which I reproduce in full:
“As the appellant was assisted by an interpreter I began by confirming that the appellant and interpreter could communicate adequately with each other in the Albanian language. I introduced the parties and explained the format of the hearing. I gave the prohibition on recording and explained what to do if a break or consultation with lawyers was required. I was invited to direct that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness based on the contents of her GP letter, and I did so. Her vulnerability was accommodated by a direction for sensitive and focused questioning and regular breaks.”
19. The grounds set out the appellant’s arguments:
“7. Despite accepting the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, the Tribunal failed to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 and relevant Home Office guidance on assessing claims involving victims of trafficking. This led to undue emphasis on minor inconsistencies and withdrawal from therapy, contrary to trauma-informed standards. See AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1330.
“8. The Tribunal failed to ensure adequate procedural safeguards such as breaks and adjustments during the Appellant’s evidence. This failure impaired her ability to give evidence coherently and undermines fairness: see Nwaigwe (Adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC).”
20. The issue, says Mr Ahmad, is that acknowledgement of a legal duty does not imply its fulfilment. There is no further reference in the decision to the appellant’s vulnerability; and the natural reading of the judgment is that the forensic manner in which adverse findings were made did not take into account that vulnerability tends to inconsistency.
21. Mr Nappey argues that [6] should be taken at face value: “her vulnerability was accommodated”. While it is right that the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010, is not specifically referred to in the decision, I should bear in mind the dictum expressed by Sir John Dyson SJC at paragraph 45 of MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 that “where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account”. There is nothing in [6] or elsewhere that it has not been taken into account. Mr Nappey also relies upon SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC) for the proposition that vulnerability does not immunise an appellant from adverse credibility findings.
22. I am satisfied that the judge did not fail to apply relevant guidance on vulnerability and trafficking claims. The grounds state that the judge failed to provide breaks to the appellant, which [6] directly contradicts. The judge records that she was invited to direct that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness, and she did so. There was a direction for sensitive and focussed questioning. There is no reference to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 and relevant Home Office guidance, but the judge’s approach tends only to suggest she had it in mind; and there is not, reading the decision in the round, anything to suggest that I should infer she did not have it in mind. Ground 2 does not disclose a material error of law.
23. Mr Ahmad argues with respect to ground 3 that the judge failed to address the country guidance in TD and AD (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) or engage with, as the grounds put it, the “detailed CPIN evidence on Albania (CPIN: Albania – Trafficking v16.0, July 2024), particularly on corruption, risk of re-trafficking, and social stigma against returnees”. Citation of that CPIN, says Mr Ahmad, does not mean the judge adequately engaged with it. It is argued in the grounds that the judge wrongly found at [40] that the appellant had family support in Albania a despite unchallenged evidence that her nuclear family resides in the UK; though following updating instructions the position seemed to be that there might be some support, but that it is not available at the moment. In any event, for the reasons I give below, I do not consider that last point to give rise to a material error of law.
24. Mr Nappey maintains that these points amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. The CPIN is referenced at [7] and [16] of the decision. It is right that TD and AD is not cited; but TD and AD would only need to be considered by the judge if she had found the appellant to be credible. As she did not, the appellant’s argument is circular: it presumes that the judge’s findings are wrong on some other basis. Ground 3 can only succeed if the appellant also succeeds on ground 1 or ground 2.
25. The fundamental difficulty with ground 3 is that observed by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan in his grant of permission. The judge found the appellant would not be at risk; and so there was no need to consider state protection and internal relocation. That the judge intended [40] to be read this way is clear from its starting with the words “Even if I am wrong…”. The finding that the appellant has family in Albania must be taken in that light. In any event, I am not satisfied that the judge failed to engage with CPIN materials and Country Guidance: the former are expressly and appropriately referenced; the need for consideration of TD v AD with respect to the latter point, as observed by Mr Nappey, does not arise because of the findings the judge made in the decision.
26. Ground 4 may be considered briefly. Mr Ahmad says that while Article 8 ECHR is referenced at [15], there is no meaningful engagement with it there or in the discussion at [41] to [43]. He submits, as he did with respect to other grounds, that passing reference does not amount to engagement. Mr Nappey submits that [41] to [43] deal adequately with Article 8 in the context of the decision as a whole.
27. While the reasons in [41] to [43] are brief, I am satisfied that they, taken with the findings made and reasons given by the judge in the rest of the decision, which I have considered above, do demonstrate that the relevant considerations were taken into account. The judge’s reasons are clear. Ground 4 also discloses no material error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and stands.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026