Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003975
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64262/2023
LP/08310/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
9th December 2025

Before

Deputy upper tribunal JUDGE Kelly

Between

HA
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood, Counsel instructed by Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on the 26th of November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead member of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran. The Respondent refused his protection claim on the 16th November 2023 and his appeal against that refusal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge I Lewis on the 12th May 2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan granted permission to appeal against Judge Lewis’s decision, and hence the matter came before me.
The appellant’s case
2. The essence of the appellant’s claim before the First-tier Tribunal was that he had worked as a ‘kolbar’ (smuggler) in Iran in the course of which he had assisted the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) by delivering clothes and shoes to members of the Peshmerga and, subsequently, by putting up posters at a university.
3. He was arrested by the Iranian authorities for his activities as a kolbar (but not for assisting the KDPI) in June 2020 and held for 25 days. In September 2021 (15 months after his release) he and a friend were putting up KDPI posters at a university when they were apprehended by the authorities and his friend arrested. The appellant subsequently learnt that his family home had been raided and that his father ahd been arrested by the authorities whilst he (the appellant) was at the home of his paternal uncle. He therefore fled to the United Kingdom where he has attended demonstrations and posted on Facebook against the Iranian regime.
Findings of the First-tier Tribunal
4. Judge Lewis noted that (a) the appellant had made his Protection Claim on the 17th November 2021 and that the standard of proof was accordingly that of a reasonable degree of likelihood [16], and (b) the respondent accepted that the appellant worked as a kolbar in Iran [19]
5. The judge then went on to make their findings in respect of the other factual issues, which can conveniently be summarised as follows –
(i) The appellant had not only failed to explain why he had not mentioned his claimed detention for working as a kolbar during his Screening Interview, but he had also replied ‘no’ when asked if he had ever been detained in any country at any time, mentioning only his claim to have worked as a kolbar [19 to 23, 29]. The first mention of his claimed detention and of his claimed political activities in Iran appeared in a ‘supplementary questionnaire’ that he completed some two and a half years’ later [28 to 34].
(ii) The appellant’s attempts at explaining the above anomalies were found to be unsatisfactory [31, 32, 33 to 42].
(iii) Further or alternatively, the appellant had by his own account resided in Iran for a further 17- or 18-months following his claimed release from detention and had not come to the further adverse attention of the authorities during that time. It was moreover reasonable to expect him to refrain from working as a kolbar in the future [23].
(iv) The appellant had accordingly failed to substantiate his claim that he had been detained by the authorities in Iran for his activities as a kolbar [27].
(v) For similar reasons, his account of his political activities in Iran were “a fabrication” [40].
(vi) The appellant had not joined any political party or other organisation since coming to the UK and his claimed postings on social media were inconsistent with his claimed illiteracy [44 to 48]. He did not to have a political profile [50, 51].
(vii) Dr Shortt had not adequately explained their diagnosis concerning the appellant’s mental health. Accordingly, it was not accorded “any weight, either as corroborative evidence of the Appellant’s claimed history or as to his ability to recall and recount a reliable narrative” [64]. The report was moreover, “of limited assistance as to the cause of the Appellant’s scarring” given the lack of any exploration as to other possible causes as required by the Istanbul Protocol [65]. Accordingly, neither the appellant’s mental health symptoms nor his scars were, “sufficiently reliable indicators of the truth of his narrative to outweigh the deficiencies in his evidence explored elsewhere in this decision” [67].
(viii) The appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to claim asylum in France and this damaged his credibility [68 to 70].
(ix) Whilst the appellant had posted anti-regime articles on a Facebook account in his name and had attended demonstrations against the regime in the UK, this did not represent his genuine beliefs and was undertaken for the sole purpose of supporting his asylum claim [44 to 51].
The grounds of appeal.
6. There are four grounds of appeal. The grounds that are originally numbered as 1 and 3 are linked and, as Mr Wood accepted, stand or fall together. I have therefore reordered them as grounds 1 and 2 in the following summary -
(1) In finding that the appellant had not mentioned in his Screening Interview that he had been detained by the Iranian authorities for his activities as a kolbar, the judge failed to give ‘anxious scrutiny’ to evidence contained within his subsequent Asylum Interview wherein the interviewer appeared to accept that he had mentioned his claimed arrest in his Screening Interview (albeit not mentioning the reason for it) [paragraph 4(i), above].
(2) The above failure was arguably material to the outcome of the appeal given that, contrary to the finding of the judge, country guidance suggests that a previous criminal record can lead to an enhanced risk of persecution on return [paragraph 4(iii), above].
(3) The judge’s approach to the report of Dr Shortt was flawed in (a) not treating it as supportive of the appellant’s account of how he came by his scars [paragraph 4(vii), above] and (b) only considering the report after they had already reached an adverse conclusion concerning the appellant’s account of being detained in Iran [paragraph 4(iv), above].
(4) The judge failed to make findings upon material matters concerning the appellant’s political activities in the UK, including (i) the theme of the demonstrations which it was accepted he attended, (ii) the appellant’s role and extent of his participation in them, and (iii) the level of publicity that they had attracted.
Analysis
7. I take the grounds in turn and in the order set out above.
Ground 1
8. The record of the screening interview shows that the appellant provided biographical information in answer to the questions set out in part 1 of the relevant form and that he gave an account of his journey to the UK in answer to the questions set out in part 3. With respect to the questions set out in part 5 (‘Criminality and Security’) the appellant is recorded as having replied “no” when asked if he had ever been detained for any reason in either the UK or elsewhere, and he is recorded as having replied “no to all” when asked if he had been involved (or accused of being involved) in various specified political activities. However, the space provided for his replies to the questions set out in part 4 (‘Basis of asylum claim’) is left entirely blank.
9. The judge dealt at length (at paragraphs 32 to 40) with the appellant’s various explanations for the lack of any written record of him having mentioned his arrest as a kolbar and his subsequent political activities in Iran. At paragraph 33, the judge noted that the appellant had acknowledged in his questionnaire, completed some 2 ½ years after his screening interview, that there were certain paragraphs of the screening interview that, “needed to be corrected”, but also noted that he had made, “no attempt … to explain how the omissions/contradictions arose”. At paragraph 34, the judge found that, “the first attempt to explain any discrepancy between the record of the screening interview and the real basis of [his] claim”, was contained in his witness statement, dated the 19th February 2024. However, that explanation (which is not detailed in the judge’s decision) was limited to his failure to mention his arrest and detention rather than his failure to mention his political activities in Iran. At paragraph 35, the judge noted the appellant’s explanation in cross-examination that his screening interview had been conducted by telephone, and that there had been “connectivity problems” to such an extent that there had had to be a change of interpreter part-way through it. Moreover, the appellant had been told to keep his answers brief. At paragraphs 36 to 38, the judge gave their reasons for not accepting those explanations. They also gave their reasons (at paragraph 39) as to why they discounted the possibility of the anomalies in the screening interview having arisen from the appellant’s acknowledged vulnerability.
10. The first ground of appeal does not directly challenge the above reasoning. However, the evidence in respect of which Mr Wood submitted the judge failed to give ‘anxious scrutiny’ appears within the questions (rather than the replies) that are numbered 57, 59, and 72 in the record of the appellant’s substantive asylum interview –
Q 57. You mentioned in your screening interview and your questionnaire that you were arrested. Why were you arrested?

A. I was smuggling when the Ettla’at came and arrest me.

Q 59. You mentioned in screening interview and questionnaire that you were introduced to the KDPI party by Aram, is that correct?

A. Yes though Aram I supported the democratic party.

Q 72 You mentioned in your screening interview that you were putting up political posters, what were written on the political posters?

A. I was posting Iranian government like killing kolba
[Emphasis as it appears in the grounds].
11. Mr Wood argued that had the judge given ‘anxious scrutiny’ to this aspect of the evidence, he would have noted that the interviewer had apparently accepted that the appellant had mentioned the above elements of his claim during his screening interview, notwithstanding that the written record of it appeared to show that he had not done so. Mr Wood further argued that the judge’s failure to give the matter ‘anxious scrutiny’ was apparent from them drawing adverse conclusions from the appellant’s supposed failure to mention in his screening interview that, (i) he had been arrested as a kolbar whilst in Iran [19, 21], (ii) he had been introduced to the KDPI by his friend Aram [32], and (iii) he had been politically active whilst in Iran [29, 32]
12. Amongst other things, Ms Everett drew attention to the fact (not emphasised in the grounds of appeal) that the interviewer had also referred in questions 57 and 59 to the appellant having mentioned these matters during his ‘questionnaire’, which (as the judge had pointed out at paragraph 32) was completed some 2 ½ years after the Screening Interview. In response, Mr Wood pointed out that questions 57 and 59 refer to the appellant having previously mentioned the relevant matters in both his screening interview and his questionnaire and, moreover, that the interviewer refers only to the appellant’s screening interview (not the questionnaire) when asking question number 72.
13. At paragraph 5 of the grounds of appeal, Mr Wood drew attention to the decision of R on the application of YH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116 in which Carnwath LJ (as he then was) provided the following elucidation of the phrase ‘anxious scrutiny’ at paragraph 24 –
As I suggested in AS (Sri Lanka) (para 39), the expression in itself is uninformative. Read literally, the words are descriptive not of a legal principle but of a state of mind: indeed, one which might be thought an “axiomatic” part of any judicial process, whether or not involving asylum or human rights. However, it has by usage acquired special significance as underlining the very special human context in which such cases are brought, and the need for decisions to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of an applicant has been properly taken into account. I would add, however, echoing Lord Hope, that there is a balance to be struck. Anxious scrutiny may work both ways. The cause of genuine asylum seekers will not be helped by undue credulity towards those advancing stories which are manifestly contrived or riddled with inconsistencies.
14. However, the foregoing application of ‘anxious scrutiny’ in my judgement applies only to the evidence and arguments that have been presented to the judge at the appeal hearing rather than those that may be capable of further exploration. This is because such hearings are essentially adversarial rather than inquisitorial. Subject to the overriding duty to consider a so-called ‘Robinson obvious’ point, therefore, the judge is entitled to assume that all matters requiring resolution have been advanced in the evidence and the arguments that are placed before them. In this appeal, the respondent made it clear in their ‘Reasons for Refusal Letter’ that they considered the appellant’s failure to mention his claimed arrest and detention in his screening interview was something that undermined his general credibility. Moreover, the appellant did not suggest in his witness statement of the 19th February 2024 that he had in fact mentioned his claimed arrest and detention during his screening interview. Rather, he claimed to have no recollection of, “ever having been asked this question in that interview”, and to having been told that he could provide more details at a main interview, and thus did not need, “to give too much information at screening” [paragraph 26]. The clear implication of this was that the appellant was accepting he had not mentioned his arrest and detention during his screening interview and was accordingly seeking to explain why he had not done so. According to the judge’s unchallenged record of the appellant’s replies in cross-examination, he may have been implying that he had mentioned his arrest and subsequent political activism during his screening interview, and to have been explaining that the reason this had not appeared in the written record of that interview was because of “connectivity problems” experienced during the telephone interview. However, those replies could equally be interpreted as him explaining why he had been unable to mention the matter at all. Given that Mr Wood had not represented the appellant at the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, he was unable to assist as to whether the anomaly arising from the interviewer’s apparent cross-reference to the screening interview in questions 57, 59, and 72 of the substantive asylum interview had been raised at that hearing. Neither did Mr Wood suggest that this was a ‘Robinson obvious’ point. To my mind, this demonstrates the difficulties in attempting to ‘second guess’ factual findings that were made by the First-tier Tribunal on the basis of evidence that it alone has had the benefit of seeing and hearing at first-hand.
15. I also note that in refusing permission to appeal at first instance, Judge Saffer suggested that if the appellant was concerned as to the accuracy of the record of the screening interview then he ought to have sought the audio recording of it. Mr Wood rightly points out that screening interviews are not audio recorded. However, the general point remains; namely, that this was essentially a matter that could only be resolved by pre-hearing investigation on the part of the appellant and/or his representative by, for example, seeking a direction that the respondent answer interrogatories on the point. As it was, I am satisfied that it was neither feasible nor required of the judge to investigate the matter of their own volition at the substantive hearing of the appeal.
16. Further and alternatively, the judge’s adverse findings were not (as Ms Everett pointed out) solely based upon the appellant’s failure to mention his claimed detention and subsequent involvement in political activities in his screening interview. They were also based upon the appellant’s positive assertions that he had not been so detained or involved. As the judge put it at paragraph 19 of the decision, the appellant’s replies to the questions in part 5 of the screening interview were, “not a mere omission of detail, but a statement to the contrary”.
17. I am not therefore satisfied that the first ground of appeal is made out. It follows from this that the judge was entitled to find (for the reasons they gave) that the credibility of the appellant’s account of his detention and political activism in Iran was significantly undermined.
Ground 2
18. The second ground of appeal (failure to consider the enhanced risk on return due to the appellant’s claimed previous detention) is based upon the judge’s alternative finding that, “even if [the appellant] was arrested, he has not advanced anything to suggest any continuing adverse interest in him by the authorities because of his activities as a kolbar” [23] and that, consequently, “there is no risk to the Appellant as a kolbar if he were to return to Iran such as to give rise to an entitlement to international surrogate protection” [24]. It is unclear why the judge considered it necessary or appropriate to make this finding given their rejection of the premise upon which it is based. As it is, I am satisfied that the judge’s hypothetical musings were in error because a criminal record is recognised as being a ‘risk factor’ when combined with illegal exit from Iran (SB (risk on return – illegal exit) Iran CG [2009] UKAIT 00053). However, as Mr Wood accepted, this error of law would only have been material to the outcome of the appeal if the judge’s findings concerning the appellant’s claimed experience of arrest and detention in Iran were to be held to be unsafe. I therefore turn to consider the remaining ground of appeal that is concerned with this issue.
Ground 3
19. The third ground of appeal concerns the judge’s approach to the expert medical opinion of Dr Shortt, contained in a report dated the 18th April 2024. It has two limbs: (i) failing to treat Dr Shortt’s opinion that the scarring to the appellant’s left hand and face was “highly consistent” with his account of torture as supportive of that account, and (ii) deferring consideration of Dr Shortt’s opinion until after he had reached an adverse conclusion concerning the appellant’s account of being detained in Iran.
20. I can take the first limb shortly. It is predicated upon the judge having accepted Dr Shortt’s opinion that the scars were appropriately categorised under the Istanbul Protocol as being “highly consistent” with the appellant’s account, whereas the judge in fact gave cogent reasons (at paragraph 65) for finding that they were “merely consistent” with that account. Mr Wood did not seek to challenge those reasons and accordingly did not press this limb of the appeal.
21. There is however more substance to the second limb of this ground of appeal in that the judge appears to have definitively concluded (at paragraph 27) that the appellant had “ultimately” (sic) failed to substantiate his claim, “even to the lower standard”, that he, “was ever detained”. Only subsequently did the judge consider (at paragraphs 67) that the appellant’s mental health symptoms and scars were not, “sufficiently reliable indicators of the truth of his narrative to outweigh the deficiencies in his evidence explored elsewhere in this Decision”. Mr Wood submitted that this approach offended against the principle enunciated in the well-known judgement of the Court of Appeal in Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367, which I set out below for convenience -
It seems to me to be axiomatic that a fact-finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto. Just as, if I may take a banal if alliterative example, one cannot make a cake with only one ingredient, so also frequently one cannot make a case, in the sense of establishing its truth, otherwise than by combination of a number of pieces of evidence. Mr Tam, on behalf of the Secretary of State, argues that decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact-finder and that, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact-finder's function in assessing credibility. I agree. What, however, they can offer, is a factual context in which it may be necessary for the fact-finder to survey the allegations placed before him; and such context may prove a crucial aid to the decision whether or not to accept the truth of them. What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant's evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence. Mr Tam has drawn the court's attention to a decision of the tribunal dated 5 November 2004, namely HE (DRC - Credibility and Psychiatric Reports) [2004] UKIAT 00321 in which, in paragraph 22, it said:
"Where the report is specifically relied on as a factor relevant to credibility, the Adjudicator should deal with it as an integral part of the findings on credibility rather than just as an add-on, which does not undermine the conclusions to which he would otherwise come."
22. There can be little doubt that the judge in this appeal did precisely that which was counselled against in the judgement of Mibanga. It would therefore have been better had the judge simply explained their reasons for attaching either more or less weight to this or that piece of evidence, including the evidence of Dr Shortt, prior to reaching their ‘ultimate’ conclusion as set out in paragraph 27 of the decision. The question remains, however, as to whether this structural error vitiates the entirety of the judge’s factual findings. To this end, it is necessary to look at the decision a little more closely.
23. The judge began their analysis of the evidence (at paragraph 17) with the following statement -
It is perhaps convenient to address each of the three core elements of the Appellant’s narrative and claim in turn: work as a kolbar; political involvement in Iran; sur place political activities in the UK. However, in doing so, it should be understood that I have had regard to all such matters ‘in the round’, including the interplay between such matters, and including all other evidence in the appeal. In this latter context I have throughout had regard in particular to the medical evidence and the Appellant’s vulnerability and have evaluated credibility bearing all such matters in mind.
24. Whilst it would have been better had a statement to this effect followed the judge’s detailed analysis of the various strands of the evidence, there is nevertheless no reason to take it at anything other than face value, and Mr Wood did not suggest otherwise. When taken together with the cogent and detailed analysis of the medical evidence that appears at paragraphs 56 to 65 of the decision, this statement is in my judgement sufficient to assuage any concerns that may otherwise have arisen from the structure of the decision. In short, the error is one of form rather than one of substance and does not in my judgement undermine the safety of the judge’s factual findings.
Ground 4
25. The judge’s assessment of the risk on return to Iran due the appellant’s political activities in the United Kingdom can be found at paragraphs 44 to 50, leading to their conclusion (at paragraph 51) that, “the Appellant’s sur place activities [do] not avail him in this appeal”. Those findings may be conveniently summarised as follows –
(i) The documentary and photographic evidence sufficed to establish the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and posting of “items of a political nature” on a Facebook account in his name [44]. He had however been assisted in creating his Facebook account (the appellant being incapable of doing so alone due to his illiteracy) “for no other reason than to generate evidence to support his asylum claim”. The posts on it did not therefore, “provide reliable evidence of the Appellant’s political opinions and consciousness” [47]. There was thus no reason why he would be unable to take down those posts before returning to Iran or applying for an emergency travel document. The attendance at demonstrations was moreover motivated solely by, “a wish to generate photographs to present in support of his asylum claim” [47].
(ii) There was “no evidence or indeed claim” that the appellant had been involved in any other type of activism, such as joining a political party or organisation [45]. He accordingly lacked, “any profile”, and was thus, “essentially … no more than a ‘hanger on’” [50].
26. Mr Wood did not challenge the findings concerning the appellant’s lack of sincerity in pursuing his political activities in the UK (summarised at (i), above). Rather, he submitted that the judge failed to consider whether those activities were of themselves sufficient to create a risk of persecution on return to Iran. He referred in this context to the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT (IAC) 36 in which it was said that regard should be had to the following list of relevant factors -
(i) Nature of sur place activity

• Theme of demonstrations – what do the demonstrators want (e.g. reform of the regime through to its violent overthrow); how will they be characterised by the regime?
• Role in demonstrations and political profile – can the person be
described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime?
• Extent of participation – has the person attended one or two demonstrations or is he a regular participant?
• Publicity attracted – has a demonstration attracted media coverage in the United Kingdom or the home country; nature of that publicity (quality of images; outlets where stories appear etc)?

(ii) Identification risk

• Surveillance of demonstrators – assuming the regime aims to identify demonstrators against it how does it do so, through, filming them, having agents who mingle in the crowd, reviewing images/recordings of demonstrations etc?
• Regime’s capacity to identify individuals – does the regime have advanced technology (e.g. for facial recognition); does it allocate human resources to fit names to faces in the crowd?

(iii) Factors triggering inquiry/action on return

• Profile – is the person known as a committed opponent or someone with a significant political profile; does he fall within a category which the regime regards as especially objectionable?
• Immigration history – how did the person leave the country (illegally; type of visa); where has the person been when abroad; is the timing and method of return more likely to lead to inquiry and/or being detained for more than a short period and ill-treated (overstayer; forced return)?

(iv) Consequences of identification

• Is there differentiation between demonstrators depending on the level of their political profile adverse to the regime?

(v) Identification risk on return

• Matching identification to person – if a person is identified is that information systematically stored and used; are border posts geared to the task?
27. Mr Wood’s focus was very much on what he described as the judge’s failure to make material findings of fact concerning the first of these factors; namely, the nature of the appellant’s participation in sur place activities with particular reference to the number of demonstrations he had attended whilst in the UK. However, as Ms Everett pointed out, the appellant’s evidence before the First-tier Tribunal was somewhat limited in this regard. Thus, during his substantive asylum interview of the 5th October 2023 he stated that he had attended demonstrations “6 to 7 times” [Q. 71], whilst in his interview of the 26th October 2023 he said that he had attended a KDPI party gathering with “a lot” of others [Q. 13], that the aim of that demonstration had been to protest “about the killings of Kolbars” [Q. 15], and that he had shouted anti-regime slogans and had taken photographs [Q. 16-17].
28. The respondent did not question this account of his participation in UK demonstrations in their ‘Reasons for Refusal Letter’. It was accordingly unnecessary in my judgement for the judge to make ‘findings’ about it, and it is in any event clear that they accepted that account (at paragraph 44) as the basis for their assessment of the risk on return. That the assessment was based upon the appellant’s own description of his activities in his second asylum interview is put beyond doubt by the judge’s express reference to it in the second sentence of paragraph 45 of the decision.
29. The respondent did however question (i) the plausibility of the appellant, as an illiterate person, composing or even being aware of the contents of the posts on his Facebook account, and (ii) the absence of a letter of recommendation from the KDPI. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it was to these issues that both the appellant (at paragraphs 33 to 35 of his ‘rebuttal statement’ dated the 19th February) and the judge (at paragraphs 45 to 47 of the decision) addressed their attention. Thus, as with the matter forming the basis of the first ground of appeal, it is far from clear that the question of whether the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK were of themselves sufficient to place the appellant at risk of persecution on return to Iran was one that canvassed in the First-tier Tribunal.
30. Mr Wood additionally drew attention to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 in which it was stated (amongst other things) that the fact-finding tribunal must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities, and that it is accordingly necessary for the tribunal to employ common sense in determining the degree of likelihood that the applicant has been (or is being) subjected to convert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. That said, the same authority draws attention to two important limitations to this principle, namely that (i) the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter requiring expert evidence given that (a) states differ in their capabilities, and (b) such capabilities change over time, and (ii) if the person is not already of interest to the regime, the question of whether there is a real risk of them becoming so will depend upon such matters (by way of example) whether they are standing at the front of a large demonstration waving a placard bearing a slogan hostile to the government or merely standing at the back without a placard.
31. The appellant did not however provide any evidence to the First-tier Tribunal concerning the technical capabilities of the Iranian regime to monitor the political activities of its expatriates in the UK, and neither did he provide detailed evidence concerning the degree of prominence of his appearance at demonstrations of the kind contemplated in the above guidance. It was no doubt with this in mind that Mr Wood has sensibly made an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules to adduce further evidence in the event of an error of law being found in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal that requires subsequent determination of the issue in the Upper Tribunal. Tellingly, the proposed further evidence is in the form of background country evidence concerning the Iranian authorities’ monitoring of political activities by its expatriates, and a screen shot of a Facebook post showing the appellant attending a demonstration whilst bearing a placard. The very fact that this application is considered necessary seems to me to be a tacit acknowledgement that, on the evidence that was before it, it was reasonably open for the First-tier Tribunal to conclude that that the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution on return to Iran on account of his political activities in the United Kingdom. It also deepens my suspicion that this was not a matter that was raised as an issue for determination in the First-tier Tribunal. Even if it was, I am far from satisfied that there was a real prospect of it affecting the outcome of the appeal given the very limited evidence about the matter that had been placed before the First-tier Tribunal.
32. I accordingly do not uphold the fourth ground of appeal.
Notice of Decision
33. The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

David Kelly Date: 3rd December 2025
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber