Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003976
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51061/2024
LP/06067/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No Attendance
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the refusal decision of the Secretary of State dated 22nd December 2023 on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The appeal was allowed by First-tier Tribunal on 30th July 2025 but on 17th November 2025 UTJ Lodato allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, on the basis the judge materially erred in law in his approach to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation and the matter was transferred to me for remaking.
3. The hearing listed for remaking on 21st November 2025 was adjourned, in the interests of justice, because the appellant did not attend the hearing. His previous representatives were no longer instructed and a notice for the new hearing date (as above) was issued to the appellant. I am satisfied that he was notified of the date, time and venue and that he was warned that any failure to attend on a second occasion may lead to a decision being made in his absence.
4. On the second occasion of the hearing Ms Clewley objected to any further adjournment and I considered it fair and in accordance with the overriding objective under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to proceed with the hearing. The interpreter was discharged.
Documentation
5. The documents before me were those before the FtT and which included witness statements dated 10th February 2024, and 11th March 2024 of the appellant, his screening and asylum interview and the underlying decision letter from the Secretary of State. There were various country background information reports including Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) and where relevant I have applied the up-to-date Country Policy and Information Notes for Albania, for example the Country policy and information note: actors of protection, Albania, February 2025 updated in October 2025 and the Albania 2022 Human Rights report, Albania: Trafficked boys and young men 2019.
6. I admitted documentation from the Secretary of State which included a report from UNICEF 2024, on a scheme in Albania entitled ‘Youth Guarantee in Albania: Real opportunities for employment, skills and education and a UN development programme in relation to a work scheme entitled the Youth Guarantee: the Four Month Promise.
7. The appellant asserted is that he is at risk from money lenders who lent his father money in Albania. He contended that he could not benefit from sufficient protection from the Albanian authorities and could not reasonably internally relocate to find sanctuary from those he fears.
8. I extract from the error of law decision the findings of UTJ Lodato as follows:
5. On appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, the judge rejected the proposition that the appellant’s reasons for fearing persecution engaged the Refugee Convention because he was found not to be a member of a particular social group [14]-[16] of the FtT decision. The claim was therefore assessed on humanitarian protection principles.
6. The judge accepted the appellant’s evidence that he knew little of the details surrounding his father’s debt, but that he was aware of threats which had been made ([18]-[19]). “Judicial notice” was taken of it being commonplace for money lenders to target the sons of debtors ([21]). There was not found to be tension in the idea that an otherwise abusive father might also help his son flee the country when the threats escalated ([24]-[26]). The judge found that the appellant was at risk from the moneylenders on return to Albania ([26]-[27]). The issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were considered between paragraphs [28] and [31]:
I find that the police would not be able to provide him with protection because I accept that he does not know the identity of the moneylenders. As such the police would be unable to assist him, even if I were to find that in general corruption in the police has been reduced to make them a reasonably effective force.
I have also considered internal relocation. One problem with this is that the appellant does not know the identity of the moneylenders and could not be sure he was moving to a safe area.
I accept on balance that the appellant is no longer in contact with his family and therefore could not rely on them for support on return. Furthermore, returning as a young man, with no home, no job and limited chances of finding work (albeit he did have some hairdressing experience in Albania) would put him at risk of exploitation by gangs.
Therefore, I find that internal relocation is not an option in this case.’
9. At [10] Judge Lodato stated
‘The respondent’s primary argument is that the judge’s assessment of the important question of sufficiency of protection was fundamentally flawed and turned on a non-sequitur; that the Albanian authorities could not protect the appellant unless he could identify the moneylenders he feared’.
At [16]
‘In my judgement, the judge materially erred in law in his approach to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. I set aside the decision.’
and at [17]
‘There was no real dispute between the parties that it would be appropriate to remake this decision in the Upper Tribunal given the narrow scope of the issues to be decided. This was because it was agreed that the judge’s findings on credibility and risk on return should be preserved if the appeal were allowed.’
10. Judge Lodato, however, in the Notice of Decision stated that he preserved the findings of fact reached between [14] and [27] of the FtT decision.
11. At [17] of the FtT decision in relation to Humanitarian Protection grounds, the judge found the appellant entered the UK on a false passport and travelled through safe countries, but this did not damage his credibility as he was a minor and was travelling with an agent.
12. The judge added as follows that the account of the money lending was very vague [18], he was unable to say who his father owed money to or how much money was owed. The judge found it credible that owing to the patriarchal society in Albania this was not the sort of thing he could ask his father. On balance the judge found the appellant was a credible witness and that his father owed money to money lenders and that they threatened his father [20]. Further the judge took judicial notice that in Albania it is not unusual for sons to be targeted when their fathers owe money [21]. His mother helped him obtain the passport in April because he was planning to flee his abusive father who was violent towards him and then his father ‘helped him use that passport to leave the country and gave him money to do so when the threats came in’. [23].
13. The account although according to the judge was contradictory (initially the father would not agree to his son fleeing from his ‘due to the impact on the father’s reputation’), it was accepted by the judge that the father was helping his son escape from others rather than abandoning him [24] owing to parent/child relationships could be complex. The judge accepted that the appellant had been downplaying his father’s abuse in his witness statement. The judge found that the appellant was at risk from moneylenders in Albania and that on balance he would still be at risk on return to his family home [26]. It was pointed out that the appellant was never visited in his workplace or home although the judge thought that this did not mean the appellant would be safe currently and that the moneylenders were searching for him and if he came to their attention on return, he would be at risk, [27].
14. In relation to sufficiency of protection, the judge accepted as the appellant did not know the identity of the moneylenders the police would be unable to assist him. This would also prevent relocation as the appellant would not know whether he was moving to a safe area [29]. This finding was not preserved.
15. Further the judge accepted that the appellant was no longer in contact with his family and could not rely on them for support. The appellant would be returning as a young man with no home no job and limited chances of finding work and this would put him at risk of exploitation by gangs.
Submissions
16. In submissions Ms Clewley submitted that the appellant’s home area was Bathore about an hour and half from Tirana. The Secretary of State relied on A.D. AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN - 22283/21 (No Article 3 - Prohibition of torture : First Section) [2024] ECHR 402. There was a functioning judicial system and police force in Albania. She relied on the Country Policy and Information Note: Actors of Protection Albania February 2025 which set out measures to tackle corruption at section 7. The police force was referenced at section 5 together with legislative reforms.
17. The appellant had not gone to the police and did not claim that the group was bribing the police or that the members were in the pocket of the police. The police could make enquiries as to the moneylenders if so required. There was nothing to indicate the appellant could not relocate. The appellant had gained his majority and was an adult. He would be returning as an adult son and could live elsewhere. There was no credible information about the power of the group.
18. In terms of the harshness of relocation, the appellant was an adult with no diagnosed vulnerability, many young people lived independently, and he had been educated to the age of 16. He had attended classes for barbering and undertaken ESOL. His own evidence was that he had been a barber when in Albania and given money to his parents. His evidence to the social worker was that he had a passion for barbering, had good attendance at college, was sociable, had independence skills such as cooking and cleaning, and also had an uncle in the UK who could assist him with arrangements for his return.
19. The appellant was eligible for the youth guarantee scheme as identified in the documents. This was an EU funded scheme to ensure young people could seek assistance and work. The development programme recorded that 83% of applicants had received offers of work, education or training with four months. He was not a victim of trafficking. I was invited to dismiss the appeal.
Conclusions
20. I note that the FtT judge accepted that the appellant was at risk from moneylenders in Albania and that on balance he would still be at risk on return to his family home. There was no indication at all that the appellant had been trafficked.
21. In Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 A.C. 489 it was held that the legal standard must not be applied unrealistically. At p. 500F Lord Hope held:
The primary duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the substitute cannot achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward LJ said [2000] INLR 15, 44G, under reference to Professor Hathaway's observation in his book, at p 105, it is " axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection.
22. AW (sufficiency of protection) [2011] UKUT 31, stresses the importance of considering the particular circumstances of an individual’s case and whether that person could expect to receive adequate state protection. There is however no guarantee of protection.
23. The European Court of Human Rights in AD v Sweden found that there was in general a sufficiency of protection, including protection from organised criminal gangs. It was concluded that Albania had a largely functioning judicial system, there were challenges and that corruption continued to be a problem, but that Albania had made concerted efforts to address the issues and that specialised bodies working against corruption and organised crime had been established and were operational. In particular ‘vetting processes for judges and prosecutors are ongoing, regular police operations against criminal organisations are carried out and there are examples of investigations, arrests and convictions in cases relating to corruption and to organised crime…’
24. In the light of recent reports, the ECHR considered the Albanian authorities’ capacity to protect their people could not be regarded as insufficient.
25. Additionally, at 2.1.8 the CPIN: Actors of Protection recorded
‘Whilst instances of corruption, misconduct and inefficiency have been reported, the scale and extent of these issues do not, in general, indicate a police system that is unwilling or unable to offer effective protection. The government has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, a commitment to reforming the police force, including by vetting senior officers; by introducing an integrity verification process in December 2023 which is designed to address criminal infiltration and corruption within the police.’
26. Section 5 of the CPIN addressed the efficacy of the police force and stated:
5.2.6 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (Global Initiative), an independent civil society organisation which seeks to establish an inclusive global strategy against organized crime[footnote 24], published a report, based on institutional analysis and interviews with key informants, entitled ‘Integrity and Independence of Criminal Justice Institutions in the Western Balkans’ in November 2024. This report stated:
‘The Albanian state police is a well-structured law enforcement organization that is regulated by a relatively comprehensive legal framework and system of internal regulation. There are specialized departments that deal with specific areas of law enforcement, including an anti-corruption sector, yet overall power within the organization is centralized in the hands of the general director. …The funding of the police is channelled through the interior ministry, yet the annual budget of the state police is lower than the average for EU countries…
27. Section 7 of the CPIN addressed the reform and accountability in relation to corruption and that an Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2030 and an action plan for 2024-2026 were due to be adopted at the end of 2024. In particular at 7.2 it was recorded that ‘Albania may be struggling with high levels of corruption at all levels of society, but the country is taking a new approach to tackling this crime with the introduction of a special anti-corruption body, known as SPAK’ (Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime).
28. At 7.2.2 the CPIN identified:
7.2.2 In the ‘Nations in Transit 2024’ report, covering the year 2023, Freedom House stated:
‘SPAK, in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, was able to bring down a powerful organized crime network operating in the cities of Tirana, Shkodra, and Kukës in July 2023, arresting police officers, prosecutors, and businesspeople for involvement with the criminal group. A similar powerful organized crime network operating in the cities of Elbasan and Lushnjë, which allegedly had free reign due to its close ties with law enforcement and the judiciary, was brought down by SPAK in September 2023. SPAK prosecutors have been threatened with their lives since the crackdown on these organized crime networks, and local observers have called for increased security for the SPAK’s magistrates’
Section 7.3.3 referenced significant improvements in the functioning of the judiciary that must be maintained.
29. It was reported at 7.4.2 that
‘On 25 June 2024, Gazeta Tema, a ‘politically unrelated daily newspaper published in Tirana,’[footnote 117] published an article stating:
‘Albania has cracked down on misconduct within its State Police, resulting in the arrest of 48 officers over the past six months. Allegations of illegal activities, law violations, corruption, and unprofessional behavior have prompted swift action from authorities.’
30. These are just examples which underlined the existence of an operating judiciary and police force in Albania and the progress and reforms made within Albania to tackle corruption and inefficiency.
31. As noted, however, the appellant did not know who the moneylenders were. There was no evidence therefore that they had any influence or power over the government authorities or the security or judicial systems. In view of AD v Sweden and the CPIN as set out above on non-state agents, which those threatening are, I find that there is sufficiency of protection. As AD v Sweden pointed out even where there is organised crime there is sufficiency of protection in Albania. There was no indication that the moneylenders were part of an organised crime gang.
32. Thus, even in his home area the appellant, I find, could avail himself of sufficiency of protection. If he chooses, he could relocate elsewhere. Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 held [20] that the reasonableness analysis is approached by asking "Can the claimant, in the context of the country concerned, lead a relatively normal life without facing undue hardship?" A simple lowering of living standards or worsening of economic status may not be sufficient to reject a proposed area as unreasonable.
33. The appellant did not attend the hearing to respond to questions as to his contact with his family and whether this could be resumed. I note that he has an uncle in the UK whom he may be able to contact to seek support for his return but even if he could not contact his parents nor derive support from his uncle, the appellant has managed to move to a completely new country, is now an adult, has developed independence skills, can speak some English, is familiar with the language of Albanian, went to school in Albania and has work experience as a barber earning money. Indeed, he confirmed he has had training in barbering (he stated at AIR Q 15 that he practised barbering for 2 years in Albania) and worked in barbering (which was referred to in a social worker report as something he was very keen on) and I conclude that he could seek work in that field on return.
34. The appellant produced no significant medical evidence precluding his return to Albania or to work. I accept he is young and there may be ‘no bright line’ as to maturity but the appellant appears from the social work documentation to be adaptable and sociable and relatively independent. The CPIN Albania: Medial and healthcare provision May 2023 confirmed that Albania has a state provided medical care system.
35. Additionally, as Ms Clewley pointed out, he could, if need be, obtain support from the EU programme.
36. I do not find that the appellant is unable to secure sufficiency of protection or would be unable to relocate to Tirana an hour and half’s drive from his home area. There is no indication that the appellant had been trafficked and bearing in mind his independence skills as outlined elsewhere in this decision, I do not accept that he would be at risk of trafficking or exploitation on return. The country background material produced in that respect does not assist.
37. As such humanitarian protection is not made out as required and further there would be no breach of article 3 on the appellant’s return.
38. In terms of article 8 the appellant cannot meet the Immigration Rules. He did not attend the hearing and gave no evidence of either a partner or child in the UK. He has not lived in the UK for 20 years and further to PL 5.1(b) of Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules, there was no evidence that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Albania. I have found that his return would not warrant humanitarian protection nor breach article 3.
39. Secretary of State v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 demands a ‘broad evaluative judgment’ as to as to ‘whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.’
40. The appellant asserted that he could not be able to find work, but no firm evidence was produced, and Kaur, R (on the application of the Secretary of State) [2018] EWCA Civ 1423 at paras 56-57 emphasises that bare assertions are insufficient. I am not persuaded there is any cultural or financial barrier to his return to Albania.
41. The appellant has demonstrated that he could gainfully work, can speak the language and I accept that he would be eligible for not only the EU youth programme but also, as set out in the reasons for refusal letter, he can contact the ‘Home Office Voluntary Returns Service’ which may be able to assist him financially and practically. Even if not eligible this would not prevent removal to Albania. He has no significant health issues.
42. Further to Section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 there is minimal evidence that the appellant can speak English or is yet financially independent in the UK contrary to s117B (2). The appellant has been in the UK unlawfully since 2022 and little weight should be attached to his private life, s117B (4).
43. In the light of my findings above, and that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s return to Albania nor any very compelling circumstances presented, when applying the relevant test under Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 of any unjustifiably harsh consequences on removal, I dismiss the appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
The appeal remains dismissed on asylum grounds
The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
Thea appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds (article 3 and article 8).

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30th April 2026