Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003977

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65237/2023
LP/01431/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

IA
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G Brown, instructed by Luqmani Thompson
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant, born on 6 January 2007, is a national of Chad. He arrived in the UK on 14 June 2022, having left Chad in 2021 and travelled through Libya, Italy and France, and claimed asylum on arrival. His claim was refused on 29 November 2023, but he was granted leave to remain as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child. He appealed against the decision to refuse his asylum claim.

3. The appellant claimed that, following the death of his mother, his father re-married and he suffered cruelty from his step-mother who used to beat him. He claimed that he was sent to a khalwa (qur’anic boarding school) by his father and step-mother where he suffered abuse, he was forced to go out and beg, and he was lashed with an electric wire and beaten. After some years, he escaped from the khalwa with another student and returned to his home village, but his father and step-mother were furious with him for running away and his father took him back to the khalwa where he was again beaten with electric cable and treated even worse than previously. The khalwa eventually had to close down when a boy, who was beaten badly and punished, died. He returned to live with his family for a further year, but was worried that his father would send him to another khalwa, as he kept saying that he would, and so he fled Chad when his cousin told him that he was leaving for Libya and let him join him. He spent several months working in Libya before leaving in a boat with a smuggler and reached Sicily. He lived there with a family for a while and then left with some other boys and travelled to France and then came to the UK by boat and claimed asylum.

4. On 21 November 2022 a referral was made on the appellant’s behalf to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) in order for the Single Competent Authorities (SCA) to make a decision as to whether he was a victim of modern slavery. On 24 November 2022 a decision was made by the SCA that there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the appellant was a victim of modern slavery, and on 4 July 2024 the SCA decided that there were conclusive grounds to accept that he was a victim of modern slavery. It was accepted that he was a victim of modern slavery in Chad during approximately 2014 - 2020 for the specific purposes of forced criminality.

5. The respondent, in the meantime, refused the appellant’s asylum claim, on the grounds that his claim was not covered by the Refugee Convention and that he was not considered to be at risk on return to Chad. The respondent considered that the appellant’s account was inconsistent and lacking in detail and rejected his claim to have experienced significant problems in Chad, concluding that it did not amount to persecution. The respondent considered that there were domestic remedies available in Chad in any event and that the appellant could access a sufficiency of protection from the authorities or could alternatively relocate to another part of the country. The respondent considered that the appellant was not entitled to humanitarian protection and further that his removal to Chad would not breach his Article 8 human rights.

6. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 22 May 2025. The judge had before her, inter alia, a country report on trafficking in Chad, a country expert report from Dr Inge Butler, CAMHS records, medical and care reports, a letter from the Refugee Council, and a psychiatric report from Dr Juliet Cohen in which it was concluded that the appellant suffered from PTSD and severe depression. The appellant did not give oral evidence, having been found by Dr Cohen to be unfit to do so, and the appeal proceeded on the basis of submissions only. The judge made clear that she did not draw any adverse conclusions from the appellant not providing live evidence.

7. The judge accepted that the appellant was a member of a particular social group and that his claim accordingly engaged the Refugee Convention. She noted that the respondent was maintaining that the appellant’s account lacked credibility in so far as he alleged mistreatment and exploitation by his family, but that it was otherwise accepted, following the conclusive grounds decision, that he had experienced the issues claimed in the khalwa and was a victim of modern slavery from 2014 for 2020 for the specific purposes of forced criminality. The judge noted that the appellant had not given clear evidence as to whether his father had beaten him with a wire, but that in any event he did not claim to have been directly mistreated by his father during the year he spent at home before leaving Chad. She did not find the type of treatment received by the appellant from his step-mother amounted to persecution. The judge found there to be no evidence setting out any particular reason why the appellant had been in contact with his family after arriving in the UK but was currently no longer in contact with them. She found that the evidence in the records from the Refugee Council and CAMHS was somewhat inconsistent with the appellant having a genuine fear of harm from his family and/or a claim that he would not be able or not wish to return to them if he returned to Chad. She accordingly concluded that the appellant could reasonably re-establish contact with his family members in Chad and was not satisfied that he had demonstrated that he genuinely feared mistreatment amounting to persecution and/or serious harm from his family.

8. The judge concluded that the appellant could accordingly return to his family and that that would provide him with a social support network. The judge was therefore not satisfied that the appellant risked exploitation in the form of forced labour and modern slavery of the type experienced previously when he was a child. The judge found that the appellant had failed to show that a sufficiency of protection would not be available to him in Chad and considered that he could approach the authorities if needed, and further that he had not demonstrated that internal relocation to another part of the country would be unreasonable or unduly harsh. The judge concluded that the appellant would not, therefore, be at risk on return to Chad. With regard to Article 3, the judge accepted that the appellant was to be considered a seriously ill person given Dr Cohen’s opinion, but did not accept that he met the high threshold set out in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 so as to make out a claim on Article 3 grounds. The judge found that the appellant’s removal would not be in breach of Article 8, and she accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 6 June 2025.

9. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on five grounds. Firstly, that the judge had mischaracterised or failed to consider his evidence in relation to his lack of contact with his family and his past experience of mistreatment; secondly, that the judge had failed to take account of relevant evidence in relation to internal relocation; thirdly, that the judge had failed to consider relevant evidence and had misdirected herself in regard to the test for persecution; fourthly, that the judge had failed to make a decision on the risk of exploitation/ re-trafficking; and fifthly, that the judge had misdirected herself when assessing the issue of sufficiency of protection.

10. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal on a renewed application. The respondent did not produce a rule 24 response.

11. The matter then came before me for a hearing. Ms Brown produced a skeleton argument for the appellant. Both parties made submissions, which I have addressed in my analysis below.

Analysis

12. The assertion made in the first ground is that the judge, at [71], when finding there to be no evidence setting out how the appellant lost contact with his family after his arrival in the UK, failed to have regard to the appellant’s evidence in his witness statement of 22 February 2024 at paragraph 28 where he explained how he had lost his brother’s number when his phone broke. Ms Brown submitted that the question of the appellant’s contact or lack of contact with his family was material to the outcome of the appeal as it was directly relevant to the assessment of his ability to reconnect with and receive support from his family on return and that that error was therefore fatal to the judge’s decision.

13. I do not accept that there was any such omission or failure by the judge in that respect. The judge clearly had regard to the appellant’s evidence about the loss of contact with his brother when considering his evidence in his statement of 22 February 2024 at paragraph 27, referring to that evidence at [71], where he made his claim that he no longer had his brother’s number. Whilst the judge did not specifically refer to paragraph 28, she was not required to cite each and every part of the appellant’s evidence when it was otherwise clear that she had considered the relevant issues arising from that evidence. As such, the judge was perfectly entitled to find that, having provided evidence in his asylum interview in September 2023 to the effect that he remained in contact with his family since coming to the UK, the appellant had failed to adequately explain what had happened in the interim to change that situation.

14. Furthermore there were, as Ms Khan submitted, other significant reasons for the judge to have concerns about the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family, noting that the grounds omitted to address the more extensive reasoning provided by the judge in that regard at [71]. Those concerns included a lack of reasons provided by the appellant as to why he had not been able to contact any of the various other family members he claimed to have in his village, and a lack of any evidence of attempts made by the appellant to establish contact with or trace his family members. The judge also found it of relevance, in her findings at [71], that there was evidence in the Refugee Council and CAMHS’s records which undermined the appellant’s claim to be in fear of his family and raised further concerns about his claimed lack of desire to have contact with them. I note that the CAMHS records, which appear to have been omitted from the consolidated bundle but were before the First-tier Tribunal Judge, include, at page 13 of 28, a record of the appellant expressing worries about his family’s safety and worries about when he would see his family again and how he would get to them, as consistent with the judge’s observations at [71]. Those were all relevant matters which led the judge to have the concerns that she did about the reliability of the appellant’s claim as to his fear of his family and his inability to re-establish contact with them, and which the grounds simply fail to acknowledge.

15. It is also asserted in the first ground that the judge made irrational findings about the appellant’s evidence of being beaten by his father, and whether or not he had actually stated that his father beat him with a wire, as recorded in Dr Cohen’s report at [87]. However, as Ms Khan submitted, the judge’s findings were consistent with, and reflective of, the evidence before her. As the judge properly observed, the appellant, in his first lengthy statement of 2 February 2023, when referring to being beaten by his father and step-mother, made no reference to being beating in the manner described in Dr Cohen’s report (with wires/ cables) and referred to such methods of beating only in relation to the ill-treatment received at the khalwa. It was only in his subsequent statement of 5 July 2024 that he referred, at [2], to the matter, having, evidently, been prompted by the references in Dr Cohen’s report. Indeed the appellant acknowledged, in his statement of 5 July 2024, that he had not mentioned in his previous statement being beaten by a wire. It was that acknowledgment, and the appellant’s evidence in that respect, which the judge considered at [68] and [69]. It seems to me that it was perfectly open to the judge, having given full consideration to the appellant’s explanation, to draw the adverse conclusions that she did from his initial failure to mention such a significant matter and to make the findings that she did in that regard. There was certainly nothing irrational in her assessment of the evidence and neither was there any ‘denial of the language contained in the appellant’s statement’ of 5 July 2024, as asserted in the grounds. In the circumstances I find nothing of merit in the first ground.

16. The second ground asserts that the judge failed to take into account, when considering internal relocation and the appellant’s ability to find work in order to support himself, the opinion of Dr Cohen in relation to his mental health and his fitness to work in the UK. However, again, there is no merit in the appellant’s challenge in that regard. The first point to make is that the judge considered internal relocation in the alternative, following a ‘belts and braces’ approach, as made clear at [81], having already found at [75] that the appellant could return to his family in his home area and having rejected his claim to the contrary. Accordingly any findings on internal relocation were immaterial to the outcome of the appeal.

17. In any event, it is simply not the case that the judge failed to take account of Dr Cohen’s assessment of the appellant’s mental health and fitness to work when considering the reasonableness of him being expected to relocate in Chad. On the contrary, the judge’s assessment was a detailed and thorough one and took full account of Dr Cohen’s report. The judge addressed Dr Cohen’s report at [37] to [41] and in the paragraphs thereafter, under the heading of “medical evidence”. She noted some shortcomings in the report at [39], [45], [47] and [74] in relation to the brevity of the assessment and the length of time that had passed since the assessment. Although she gave weight to the report, she noted at [74] that there was no evidence of the appellant’s current mental health circumstances and observed at [80] that he was not in receipt of any treatment and was coping with his studies and his semi-independent living. With that in mind, the judge then gave detailed consideration, at [83] to [89], to the appellant’s circumstances in the UK and his mental health, and considered the implications of his health and vulnerabilities on his ability to relocate to a different area of Chad. At [84] the judge acknowledged Dr Cohen’s findings on the appellant’s mental health, but went on from [84] to [88] to give clear and cogent reasons as to why she considered that he would be able to find work and support himself in another area of Chad. The judge was perfectly entitled to reach the conclusion that she did in that regard. The assertion in the grounds as to failings and omissions by the judge in making her assessment is simply baseless.

18. The same can be said of the third ground which asserts that the judge misdirected herself when considering whether the ill-treatment the appellant received from his step-mother amounted to persecution. I note that the grant of permission recognised that this ground of challenge had less merit, albeit that it was not excluded. Again, it is relevant to note that the judge was not satisfied that the appellant had provided a credible and reliable account of the extent of ill-treatment by his family, finding at [71] that the evidence recorded in the CAMHS and Refugee Council reports was not consistent with his claim to be in genuine fear of harm from his family. That in itself is sufficient to dispose of the ground, but in any event the challenge is nothing more than a disagreement with the judge’s finding on the question of persecution. The judge was perfectly entitled to conclude, on the limited evidence before her and in the absence of any further details from the appellant in live evidence, that the treatment which he claimed to have experienced from his family did not amount to persecution. The judge considered the matter at length at [70]. There was nothing inconsistent in her findings in that regard with relevant guidance and caselaw.

19. It is asserted in the fourth ground that the judge failed to make a decision on whether the appellant faced a risk of exploitation/ re-trafficking from traffickers operating in Chad. Ms Brown submitted that, whilst the judge had considered the risk from the appellant’s family and the risk of being sent to another khalwa and being mistreated again as previously, she had failed to consider the more general question of trafficking and exploitation from traffickers on the basis of the appellant being a vulnerable person suffering from mental health problems. Ms Brown submitted that it was apparent from [22] of the judge’s decision, which in turn referred to the country expert report and the trafficking reports, that the issue was one which was raised before the Tribunal and was therefore a matter which the judge ought to have addressed. It is not entirely clear to me that the risk of re-trafficking as a general proposition was a distinct argument made before the First-tier Tribunal. It does not appear to be a matter raised by the appellant in his statements and Ms Brown accepted that she could not really say whether it was part of the appellant’s own case, as she was not the appointed representative at that hearing. Her submission was that it was a matter raised on the appellant’s behalf, if not specifically raised by him.

20. The references to trafficking and to the country information relevant to that issue at [22] appear to me to be in the context of demonstrating the relevant Refugee Convention reason, as a member of a particular social group, rather than in the context of a distinct category of risk. In such circumstances, the judge cannot be criticised for failing to determine a matter which was not specifically argued before her. In any event, on the basis that the issue was raised before the judge, it seems to me that it was adequately addressed in the judge’s findings and conclusions. The judge considered the country background information relating to trafficking in detail. She considered the US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2023: Chad, 15 June 2023, at [24] to [25] and she considered the country expert report from Dr Inge Butter at [26] to [34]. At [55] to [57] the judge rejected the arguments made as to the appellant’s social visibility in terms of his susceptibility to further exploitation and at [79] she addressed further his vulnerability to exploitation on return to Chad, noting that his previous exploitation was due to the particular circumstances at that time. Significantly, the judge made clear that the various reports to which she referred were based upon a presumption and acceptance that the appellant would be returning to Chad without any family support, observing specifically at [28] that Dr Butter’s report was written on the basis that his account was accepted in full. It was the judge’s conclusion, however, having found the appellant’s claim as regards his fear of harm from his family to be lacking in credibility, that he would have the support of his family on return to Chad, and that he would not be at risk of exploitation. That was the judge’s finding at [75] and I reject Ms Brown’s submission that that failed to address the wider risk of exploitation.

21. Finally, turning to ground five, it is asserted that the judge failed to consider relevant evidence and misdirected herself when assessing sufficiency of protection. As with the previous grounds, I do not consider there to be any merit in this ground. The judge considered the issue of sufficiency of protection in detail, from [76] to [81]. Contrary to the assertion at paragraph 18 of the grounds, the judge did not accept that the appellant was subjected to the extent of abuse from his own family as he claimed. As mentioned above, the judge gave cogent reasons for having concerns about the appellant’s account in that regard, not least on the basis of the evidence in the CAMHs records. Accordingly the judge’s finding was that the appellant’s return to his family home would be sufficient to avoid further exploitation. That was particularly given her finding, at [79], that his circumstances and profile were markedly different to those at the time he was sent to the khalwa. The judge, in any event, considered the issue of sufficiency of protection not only on the basis of the appellant’s family being a protective factor but also on the basis of a more generalised approach, giving full and detailed consideration to the expert opinions of Dr Cohen and Dr Butter relating to matters of health, access to treatment, and general circumstances and vulnerability on return to Chad. There was no omission or misdirection in her consideration of the matter.

22. For all these reasons I do not accept that the judge made errors of law in her decision. On the contrary, her decision is a detailed and comprehensive one, based upon a full and careful assessment of all the evidence and with cogently reasoned findings, applying the correct standard of proof and appropriate legal tests. The conclusions reached by the judge were fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her. Her decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

23. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 January 2026