Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003978
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61036/2023
LP/14113/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

D S S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Frost, counsel, instructed by Virgo Solicitors ltd
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) Cohen (the judge), promulgated on 21 July 2025, dismissing an appeal against the respondent’s decision, dated 18 October 2023, refusing the appellant’s protection claim.
Background
2. The appellant, a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, was born in May 1988. He claimed to hold a well-founded fear of persecution from the family of S, a work colleague, through which she became pregnant. S’s family considered that the relationship and pregnancy besmirched the family honour and targeted the appellant so as to restore their honour. The appellant claimed to be particularly fearful of S’s brother, who he said was an influential member of the PUK (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – a regionalist political party active in the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR)). The appellant claimed to have left Iraq in April 2015 and claimed asylum in Germany in May 2015. His asylum claim was not accepted, and he came to the UK in 2021.
3. The respondent did not believe the appellant gave a credible account of events that caused him to leave Iraq and refused his protection claim. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC).
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. At a hearing on 11 April 2025 the judge heard oral evidence from the appellant. In his written decision the judge found the appellant was not a credible witness. The judge gave several reasons for his findings. For the purposes of this ‘error of law’ decision, the judge found, amongst other matters, that the appellant gave discrepant evidence regarding the willingness of the police to take any action against S’s brother, that the appellant sought to bolster his claim by asserting that S had been honour killed by her family when this was not raised in his asylum interview conducted in August 2023, and that the manner in which the appellant gave his evidence was evasive. The judge additionally stated, “There are numerous other discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence and evidence which I find to be implausible but which I will not set out in further detain therein.”
The appellant’s challenge
5. The appellant obtained permission to challenge the judge’s decision in respect of several grounds, including the adverse credibility findings summarised above.
6. At the hearing to determine whether the judge’s decision contained material legal errors I was assisted by the Home Office Presenting Officer, Ms McKenzie, who helpfully indicated that she found some of the grounds, especially those summarised at [4] above, to be ‘quite strong’. Having gone through each of the grounds and having considered the measured and constructive observations and submissions of both representatives, there was consensus between the parties that the judge’s decision did contain errors of law.
Discussion
7. The issue I must decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge made a legal mistake in his decision. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal judge to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge merely because the Upper Tribunal judge may have reached a different conclusion.
8. There was a consensus between the representatives that the judge fell into legal error in respect of several aspects of his decision. The judge found there was discrepant evidence from the appellant regarding the willingness of the police in the IKR to assist him. The appellant claimed, on the one hand, that he reported threats from S’s brother to the police but they were unwilling to take any action, but on the other hand a judge ordered the arrest of S’s brother following the appellant’s complaint. On consideration of the appellant’s asylum interview, where he mentioned the judge’s order, it becomes apparent that the judge failed to consider or overlooked the full extent of the appellant’s answer. The appellant said, “I made a complaint to the police the judge ordered his arrest but he was not arrested.” The appellant’s full answer was not inconsistent with his claim that the police were unwilling to assist him. Despite an order from a judge, the appellant claimed that no arrest was made by the police because they feared the appellant’s brother (see the appellant’s answer to the following question). The judge overlooked or failed to consider this aspect of the appellant’s evidence, which undermines the judge’s conclusion that the appellant gave discrepant evidence.
9. The judge held against the appellant his failure to mention in his asylum interview in August 2023 that he believed S had been honour killed by her family. The appellant’s evidence however was that he only became aware that S may have been killed after speaking to his mother in 2024. The judge failed to engage with this explanation or to give any reasons for rejecting this explanation. This renders this particular finding unsafe.
10. The judge stated that the manner in which the appellant gave his evidence was evasive and further damaging to the appellant’s credibility. The judge however failed to give any example by way of explanation as to how the appellant’s answers were evasive. It can often be dangerous or unreliable to draw a conclusion in reliance on a person’s demeanour, especially if there is no clear description of that person’s demeanour or behaviour. The judge has simply asserted that the appellant was ‘evasive’ but has not sought to explain how he was evasive. I find the judge’s failure to give anything more by way of explanation, and to attach weight to his unexplained observation, to constitute a failure to give adequate reasoning.
11. The judge claimed there were “… numerous other discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence and evidence which I find to be implausible but which I will not set out in further detain therein.” This suggests that the judge took account of other factors as damaging the appellant’s credibility but does not identify those factors. It is a trite proposition of law that if a judge is going to make adverse credibility findings on matters those matters should be clearly identified. Otherwise, the parties do not know whether the judge was entitled to make those adverse findings. The judge’s failure to identify other discrepancies upon which he appeared to rely in finding that the appellant’s claim was a fabrication constitutes a clear error of law.
12. I am satisfied, having regard to my findings at [8] to [11], that the judge’s decision contained errors of law.
13. In determining whether it is appropriate to set the judge’s decision aside I have considered whether the errors of law identified above were material in light of the judge’s other unchallenged adverse credibility findings (such as a finding that it was implausible that the appellant had not asked his family whether they informed S’s family that he was no longer in the country, the late raising of his claim that his own family were angry at him, the absence of documentary evidence to substantiate the appellant’s claim that a judge ordered the arrest of S’s brother, vagueness in the appellant’s claim concerning S’s brother’s rank in the PUK, and the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France) or the adverse credibility findings that were challenged but not upheld (such as a challenge to whether the judge misunderstood or overlooked evidence concerning attendance at the appellant’s home by S’s family). Having considered with care the errors of law made by the judge I cannot say that his decision would inevitably have been the same even if the errors were not made. The decision is therefore unsafe and must be set aside.
Remittal to First-Tier Tribunal
14. Under Part 3 paragraph 7.2(b) of the Upper Tribunal Practice Statement of the 18 June 2018 a case may be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal if the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
15. Given that the legal errors relate to the judge’s credibility findings, I consider that, in these circumstances, there will need to be a full re-assessment of all the evidence rendering it appropriate to remit the matter back to the First-tier Tribunal for a full fresh (de novo) hearing. I note in passing that both parties were in agreement with this approach.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains a material error of law and the ‘error of law’ appeal is allowed.
The matter will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to be determined afresh by a judge other than Judge Cohen.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 April 2026