Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003984

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55869/2025
LH/01642/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

ZEYNAP TEKTAS
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Burrett, Counsel instructed by Stuart and Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Turkey. The Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and Alevi faith and is a widow with three adult children in the UK.
2. The Appellant came to the UK as a visitor shortly after her home was destroyed in an Earthquake and then applied for leave to remain in the UK with her British son and his family. In March 2023 she was formally diagnosed with depression and PTSD.
3. The Respondent refused the application on the 14th May 2024 and the Appellant appealed.

The Judge’s Decision
4. In a decision dated the 29th August 2025 the Judge dismissed the appeal. The Judge found the Appellant and her witness credible but found that there were not “very significant obstacles to integration” on return and that accordingly the requirements of Paragraph PL 5.1 (b) of Appendix Private Life of the Rules was not met. The Judge then considered Article 8 outside the Rules and in that consideration had regard to Appendix Adult Dependent Relative (ADR). When considering the rules in respect of Appendix ADR as part of a wider proportionality assessment, the Judge found that the Appellant did require “long term personal care to perform everyday tasks” but nonetheless found that it was not disproportionate for her to be expected to leave the UK.
5. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal. Permission was refused by a First-tier Tribunal Judge, but permission was granted by an Upper Tribunal Judge on the 2nd October 2025.
6. Ground 1 challenges the finding that there were not “very significant obstacles to integration”. Grund 2 challenges the proportionality assessment outside the Rules.
7. In the grant of permission to appeal The Upper Tribunal Judge noted in particular that it had been accepted that the Appellant required long term personal care to perform everyday tasks [30] but that the full implications of that had not been considered when evaluating whether the requirement of Appendix Private Life were met.
The Hearing
8. Mr Burrett expanded on the grounds noting that the finding in respect of the Adult Dependent Relative provisions was a finding that the Appellant had more needs than had in fact been considered when assessing whether there were very significant obstacles to integration.
9. Mr Walker resisted the appeal noting that all factors in the case had clearly been taken into account.
10. I then indicated that I was satisfied that there was an error of law, but that given the universally positive credibility findings which had not been challenged I considered that I was in a position to remake the decision.
11. I gave the parties time to consider whether they were ready to proceed with the second stage of reconsideration and they decided they were. I then heard further submissions from each representative and reserved the decision on remaking.
Reasons
12. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the decision of another judge. It is also correct to note that the judge has in the course of her decision engaged with all relevant facts in the case.
13. In respect of ground 1, the question of whether there are “very significant obstacles to integration” are set out over 11 paragraphs of the decision [21-31].
14. When assessing the Appellant’s vulnerability in those paragraphs the judge noted;
“The Appellant’s mental ill health has, according to her and the Sponsor, sometimes meant she is unable to get out of bed, and I accept that this will inhibit her ability to integrate if returned to Turkey.” [27]
15. The analysis of the obstacles to integration is then carried out on the basis that she could positively act to build a social life and integrate in Turkey.
16. However when considering proportionality generally the judge found;
“Having found the Appellant and Sponsor to be credible witnesses, I accept that, due to her illness which has endured for a lengthy period, she requires long term personal care to perform everyday tasks; they explained that on some days she is unable to get out of bed, to cook for herself, or to shower.” [36]
17. The Judge then goes on to confirm by her assessment that the Appellant would need “care” that it would not be possible for relatives to provide it but that “paid carers” would be an option.
18. The fact that the Appellant needs “long term personal care” on this level was clearly a factor that should have been taken into account when deciding whether or not there were “very significant obstacles to integration.” It is not an answer to say that this was addressed elsewhere in the decision as it needed to form part of the consideration of Appendix PL and the implications of potentially meeting the Immigration Rules for the outcome of the appeal.
19. In respect of ground 2 and the challenge to proportionality I do not consider that there was a discrete error in that respect as it does appear all factors were taken into account in that assessment.
Remaking
20. I start by noting that meeting the test of “very significant obstacles to integration” under PL 5.1 (b) is very different from meeting the requirements of Appendix ADR but the same factual findings are relevant to both assessments. Accordingly I draw findings from across the First-tier’s decision in remaking it.
21. In respect of remaking the decision I note that the relevant findings from the First-tier decision are;
i. The Appellant and her son are “credible witnesses” [36]
ii. The Appellant’s home was destroyed by an earthquake [25] 9 days before she left Turkey [4]
iii. The Turkish authorities restricted aid to the Kurdish and Alevi communities after the earthquake [25]
iv. The Appellant would need to find a new home and it may not be possible to do that in her home area [26]
v. The Appellant cannot perform everyday tasks reliably including getting out of bed, cooking or washing for herself. [36]
vi. The Appellant’s needs care provided by a third party [37].
vii. Her relatives in Turkey cannot provide care. [37]
viii. Her health may further deteriorate on return [27]
ix. Financial Assistance would be available from the family in the UK. [29]
x. Private Care has not been shown to be unavailable [37].
xi. Her adult children could visit her in Turkey [29]
22. Based on the positive credibility findings in respect of the witnesses I also rely on the son’s evidence in his statement that he could not move to Turkey given that he has his wife in the UK and they have children in school here. The Appellant confirmed in her statement that her other children are also settled in the UK with children and not able to live in Turkey with her.
23. In SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, Sales LJ (as he then was) said the following about the meaning of ‘integration’:
It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country… The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
24. Considering the above and bearing in mind the Appellant’s disabilities I find that someone who cannot perform everyday tasks as set out above would not be in a position to find herself a home on return to Turkey. Whilst care may technically be available I find that she would not be able to access that care for herself. I find that she would not be able to operate on a day to day basis to ensure that her own essential needs were met.
25. In terms of integration whilst the Appellant is a Turkish national, she is an Alevi Kurd who would need to find a new place to live in the context of a country in which the Respondent accepts Kurds face societal discrimination “Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Kurds” July 2025.
26. On the basis of the findings about the level of care the Appellant currently needs it would clearly not be possible for her to meaningfully integrate on her own in the sense explained in Kamara. The Appellant could not on her own operate on a day to day basis in society, secure her own accommodation, her own care or build the network of “human relationships” which was considered to represent integration in Kamara.
27. I have considered whether the Appellant could meaningfully integrate in Turkey with the assistance of her family in the UK. The fact is that someone else, probably her son, would need to take significant time to go to Turkey probably ahead of her to source accommodation, and to arrange for carers before she went back. If that care could be put in place, there would then be no one in Turkey to manage and supervise the care which the Appellant could not do for herself during times when her health is bad.
28. In all the circumstances of the case I find that there are very significant obstacles to integration on return such as means that the Appellant does meet the requirements of Appendix PL 5.1 (b) of the Immigration Rules.
Disposal
29. It is accepted that there is sufficient accommodation and financial means available to support the Appellant in the UK. Accordingly when taking into account my finds above, the requirements of Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules are met in full.
30. It follows with reference to TZ Pakistan v. SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 that the appeal should be allowed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the Upper Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside.
I remake the decision.
The appeal is allowed on Article 8 grounds.
It would not be appropriate to make a fee award as the case could not have succeeded on the evidence submitted with the original application.

A. Seelhoff

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9th December 2025