Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003989

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/55022/2024
LH/01380/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

SEBEKA EASMIN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel instructed by Internations Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 3 April 2025 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision refusing the applicant’s human rights claim dated 9 April 2024.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. On 6 January 2024 she made an application for entry clearance to enter the United Kingdom on the basis of family life with her partner and sponsor Mr Md Ahsan Habib Sunny, a Bangladesh national present and settled in the UK.
3. The Secretary of State refused the application on the basis that the appellant did not meet the eligibility/ identity requirements at paragraph E-ECP.A1.1 because she was not satisfied that the appellant provided a passport or other document which satisfactorily established her identity and nationality. This was because the appellant had provided a different name and date of birth in support of a previous visit visa application which was submitted with identity documents showing the different personal details. This threw doubt on whether the passport submitted with the current application satisfactorily established her identity. The respondent accepted that the remaining rules were met. Further, there were no exceptional circumstances resulting in unjustifiably harsh consequences to the appellant being denied entry to the United Kingdom, even taking into account the best interests of any relevant child.
Position of the appellant
4. The applicant admitted upfront that she used a different identity in a previous visit application and explained how this happened. She has provided a genuinely issued passport in her real identity with supporting documents to demonstrate this identity. She has submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate her identity. She satisfies the immigration rules in respect of validity. As the application was not refused on any part of the immigration rules and it is accepted that she has family life with her husband, it would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect to family life to refuse her entry.
The Decision of the Judge
5. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and sponsor. The judge considered firstly whether the appellant could meet the validity requirements of the immigration rules.
6. He took into account that the appellant openly admitted in her current application and covering letter that she had submitted incorrect details in a previous visit visa application in 2015, accompanied by a passport containing those incorrect details. The judge did not accept that the incorrect details had arisen as a result of a mistake by the agent because he found that the appellant must have submitted incorrect supporting documents in order to obtain her passport. The judge found that the appellant would have spotted the mistake at that time and it is not plausible that she did not realise the mistake until much later. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed, looking at the evidence in the round, the judge found that that although the appellant had provided a current passport which was accepted to be genuine and various other official documents confirming her correct personal details, the fact that a passport was previously issued to her with different details casts doubt as to whether she is who she claims to be.
7. The judge found that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the passport submitted with the application satisfactorily established her identity. The eligibility/identity requirement was not met.
8. The judge then found that it was reasonable to expect the sponsor to live with his wife and child in Bangladesh for reasons given in the decision including the best interests of the child and came to an overall conclusion at [45] that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case which would render the refusal a breach of the appellant, sponsor or their child’s Article 8 rights because continuing their life in Bangladesh as a family would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them.
Grounds of Appeal
Ground 1
9. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant had not established her identity on the balance of probabilities is erroneous and irrational or alternatively inadequately reasoned in light of the judge’s finding that the passport used for this application was genuine in conjunction with his acknowledgement that there were various other official documents confirming her correct personal details. The judge failed to engage with the Secretary of State’s guidance document cited in the appellant’s skeleton argument.
Ground 2
10. The sponsor’s evidence was not challenged in cross-examination. The judge failed to make any findings in respect of the sponsor’s credibility. The judge does not explain why he either accepts or rejects the sponsor’s evidence that he had married the person he believed to be the individual named in the passport submitted with the application.
Ground 3
11. The Article 8 assessment is flawed. The judge does not identify any public interest factor why the appellant and child should be prevented from entering the United Kingdom. The judge has not undertaken a proper balancing assessment. There was inadequate consideration of the sponsor’s private life and ties to the United Kingdom.
Permission to Appeal
12. Permission to appeal was granted on 29 August 2025 on the basis that it is arguable that the judge failed to reconcile the acceptance/finding that the passport used with the extant application was genuine yet was insufficient to discharge the identity requirements of the Immigration Rules. Grounds 2 and 3 were materially impacted by ground 1. Permission was granted on all grounds.
Rule 24 Response
13. The respondent indicated that she opposed the appeal on the basis that the grounds merely disagree with the conclusion of the judge. It was submitted that the determination of the judge was lawful because a document can be genuine yet not reliable in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed. The position of the respondent is that the details provided to the authorities by the applicant are suspect. The judge adopted a highly fact sensitive approach to the balancing exercise which was lawful.
The Hearing
14. I had before me a 211 PDF page consolidated bundle. Both parties had sight of the bundle. Both representatives made submissions which are recorded in the Record of Proceedings which I will refer to where relevant in my decision below. Mr Ojo referred me to UNHCR guidance. I am not satisfied that this guidance was relevant to this appeal. The guidance relates to refugees who apply for passports from the national authorities who they claim to fear persecution and the guidance states that in these circumstances the individual who applies might be able to obtain evidence of from the authority that issued the passport that it was for travel only.
15. Mr Ojo submitted that given the existence of passports in two different identities it was open to the judge to find that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence of her identity.
Section E-ECP Eligibility for Entry clearance as a partner
E-ECP.1.1. To meet the eligibility requirements for entry clearance as a partner all of the requirements in paragraphs E-ECP.A1.1. to 4.2. must be met.
E-ECP.A1.1. The applicant must provide a passport or other document which satisfactorily establishes their identity and nationality.
Ground 1
16. I note here as submitted by Mr Ojo, that E-ECP. A1.1 is a mandatory requirement in the sense that the applicant must satisfactorily establish their identity. I also note that this is not limited to a passport. Identity can be satisfactorily established by other documents as well as passports.
17. It is common ground that the application was not refused under the suitability requirements of the Rules. It is not asserted by the respondent that the appellant had used deception or false documents in a previous application.
18. It is also common ground that the appellant met all of the remaining substantive requirements of the rules including the relationship, financial and English language requirements.
19. The only basis for refusal was that the appellant had not provided satisfactory evidence of her identity.
20. When the appellant made her application she was very clear in the covering letter and in the application itself that she had previously made an application for a visit visa using a different but similar name to her own and using a different date of birth. She said that this mistake had arisen as a result of errors made by her agent who had used incorrect details in order to obtain a passport and entered incorrect information in her application form. She explained that she had been brought up by foster parents and that the mistake arose from the fact that the 2015 visit application was made by her foster parents. The judge rejected her explanation, finding that the appellant must have realised the mistake even if there was some confusion over the names of her parents. The grounds do not challenge the judge’s finding in this respect.
21. The focus of ground 1 is whether in light of the genuine passport submitted in support of the current application and the supporting evidence of her identity, the judge erred by finding that she had not provided sufficient evidence of her identity, either by way of irrationality or inadequate reasons.
22. In support of the current application the appellant provided a passport in the name of Sebeka Easmin, date of birth - 11 December 1988. She named her father as Md Abdur Rashid and her mother as Monuara Begum. She said that she married the sponsor on 8 December 2023 in the presence of family members and friends. She said she had known her husband since 2001. She also provided a birth certificate which was issued on August 2018, a marriage certificate issued on 2 January 2024 and a certificate issued from the National University of Gazipur, Bangladesh dated 22 April 2015. All of these documents were issued in the appellant’s identity in her current passport.
23. In the refusal the respondent indicated that there were concerns because of the use of different details in an earlier application. The respondent also noted that the birth certificate was registered in 2018 after the previous application and was not contemporaneous and that the ID card predated the registration of the birth certificate by seven months. The respondent noted that in order to obtain the first passport the appellant would have had to provide documentation with her original personal details.
Respondent’s Review
24. In support of her appeal the appellant provided significantly more documentation including a detailed witness statement, a national ID card in her current identity issued on 26 May 2008, a second biometric national ID card issued in the same identity on 30 January 2018, a secondary school examination certificate dated 2006, a higher secondary examination certificate dated 10 September 2008 as well as the previous educational certificate and a later certificate from her university. She also provided a police clearance certificate from the local police station as well as evidence of her pregnancy. All of these documents were in the identity of Sebeka Easmin date of birth 11 December 1988 which was the identity in her current passport.
25. At [41] the judge stated:
“In line with the principles summarised in paragraph 38 of the Tanveer Ahmed caselaw, it is for the Appellant to show that a document on which she seeks to rely can be relied on. I have looked at the evidence in the round. Although she had provided a passport which was accepted to be genuine and various other official documents confirming her correct personal details, I did not accept her explanation as to why a passport was previously issued to her with different details, which was subsequently used in support of that visa application in 2015. The different details associated to her casts serious doubt as to whether she is who she claims to be as shown on her current passport, visa application form and supporting documents provided”.
26. The judge’s starting point was that the current passport was genuine but he did not accept the appellant’s explanation for the earlier application in a different identity. The judge however appears to skate over the other “official documentation”. The appellant made a detailed statement which referred to her initial birth certificate which was registered on 28 July 2008 which can be verified through the government website. The appellant included the copy of the 2008 birth certificate and translation together with the birth registration verification from the Office of the Registrar General Birth and Death Registration. There is a precise match between the 2008 birth certificate and the verification. She also provided a national identity card issued in 2008 and education documents dated 2006 and 2008.
27. The sponsor also gave evidence confirming that the marriage was in the presence of his family members and friends and confirmed the identity of his mother-in-law and father-in-law as the names which were identical to the appellant’s details in her 2008 birth certificate and current passport. There was no suggestion by the respondent that the marriage was not genuine.
28. I am satisfied that the judge failed to adequately explain why this plethora of original supporting documentation predating the 2015 application which was all consistent with the current identity alongside the genuine passport was not sufficient to satisfactorily establish on the balance of probabilities the appellant’s identity, notwithstanding the submission of a previous application with a slightly different name and different date of birth. I am also satisfied that the judge did not give any reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s evidence that the appellant was who she claimed to be given that he had known the appellant since 2001 and was married to her in the presence of all of the family. His evidence was not challenged.
29. I am satisfied that the judge’s errors are material because if the judge had given proper consideration to the supporting evidence of identity the judge may have come to a different decision.
30. I indicated to both parties that on this basis, I would set aside the decision dismissing the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Disposal
31. Mr Karim submitted that I could re-make the appeal immediately given that there was no further evidence to adduce. Both parties were in agreement with this course of action.
Decision on error of law
32. I set aside the decision dismissing the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
33. I set aside the finding that that the appellant did not satisfy the eligibility/identity requirements of the immigration rules at E-ECP.A1.1.
34. I preserved the remainder of the findings.
35. I went on to re-make the appeal.
Re-making
36. The sole issue before me on re-making was whether the appellant has established on the balance of probabilities that she meets the eligibility/identity requirements of the immigration rules and therefore that she can satisfy the rules at Appendix FM in respect of entry clearance for partners.
37. Mr Karim conceded that if the appellant is not able to meet the rules, her Article 8 claim would not succeed because the decision to refuse her entry clearance would not be disproportionate to the need to maintain immigration control. It is trite the establishment of one’s correct identity is in the public interest and crucial to immigration control which is why E-ECP.A1.1 is mandatory.
38. I heard brief submissions from the representatives which are recorded in the record of
Findings
39. An application for a visit visa was submitted by the appellant in 2015 together with a passport which recorded her name as Sebeka Yasmin born on 11 December 1990 with incorrect details for her parents. I have preserved the First-tier judge’s finding that although it is credible that incorrect parents’ names were genuinely entered by mistake because the appellant was fostered, that the appellant must have realised that incorrect details were contained in the application and in the documents submitted with that application.
40. Notwithstanding this, I need to look at all of the evidence in the round in respect of the appellant’s current passport to determine whether the documents she did submit satisfactorily establish her identity.
41. My first observation is that it is accepted that the current passport is a genuinely issued document. My second observation is that in the current application the appellant made a full disclosure in respect of the previous use of different details. This is not a situation where it was the respondent who discovered the previous use of a different identity. I infer that the disclosure by the appellant is why the application was not refused on suitability grounds.
42. I turn to the remainder of the documentation. Importantly, the appellant has adduced her previous birth certificate which was registered and issued on 29 July 2008. This birth certificate has her current name and date of birth as well as personal identification number and her place of birth. It also records the details of her parents as entered onto her current passport. It is a paper birth certificate and is stamped with the seal of the Secretary and Chairman of the No 2 Sharifpur Union Council. These details correspond with the digital birth certificate submitted with the application. Although the digital certificate was issued on 23 January 2025, the certificate records that the date of registration was earlier on 28 July 2008. The appellant has verified the documents through the Birth Registration Record Verification. This document contained the same date of birth and birth registration number as on the 2008 certificate. I note that there is a very minor discrepancy between 28 and 29 July but is manifest that the Bangladeshi authorities registered the appellant’s birth in the same identity as the passport in 2008, well before the 2015 application. The appellant has also provided an identity card issued in her current identity on 25 May 2008 and a digital card issued on 30 January 2018. The details on the identity cards are consistent. The appellant has also provided secondary school certificates dated 2006 in the same identity pre-dating the 2015 application and indeed pre-dating the registration of her birth.
43. I give weight to these documents because they are consistent and cover a period of 20 years from 2006 until 2025. The more recently obtained digital documents are consistent with the earlier paper documents which predate the 2015 application. The sponsor’s evidence was that she was married to her partner who she has known since 2001 in the presence of her family and friends and she names her parents. It was not put to him that he was not telling the truth in the previous appeal.
44. It is unclear what the motivation was for the appellant using different details in the 2015 application, but I find that there was absolutely no reason for her to use a false identity in her current application. There would be no benefit to her to pretend that she was younger than she is.
45. Having had regard as to the quantity and quality of the supporting documentation, I find on the civil standard on the balance of probabilities that the appellant has produced a passport and other documents which satisfactorily establish her identity and nationality in support of the application. I find that she can meet the requirements of E-ECP.A1.1. This means that the application was valid. The respondent did not give any other reason for refusing the application which means that the appellant can meet the requirements of the immigration rules pursuant to Appendix FM.
46. It is agreed by both representatives that the appellant has established family life with her husband pursuant to Article 8 and that the decision interferes with her right to respect for family life. If that is shown, then the respondent must establish that the decision is in accordance with the law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.
47. In TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 119, as confirmed at paragraph 34, since the appellant meets the Immigration Rules in Appendix FM in respect of family life, this is determinative of her appeal. There is no public interest consideration raised by the respondent under the immigration rules. I am therefore satisfied that the refusal of entry clearance represents a disproportionate interference in the appellant’s family life.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 February 2026