Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003993
First-tier Tribunal No:
RP/50111/2024
LR/00011/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

AR
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Mackenzie
For the Respondent: Mr M. Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 23 May 2025. In that decision, the FTT allowed Mr AR’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision to revoke his refugee status, which was made on 28 May 2024.
2. The SSHD is the appellant in these proceedings, but in order to make this decision easier to read and understand, I will refer to the parties throughout as they were before the FTT. All further references to “the appellant” are to Mr AR, and all further references to “the respondent” are to the SSHD.
Summary
3. This case is about whether a recognised refugee who committed a serious offence in 2007 remains a danger the community of the United Kingdom and should lose his refugee status for that reason. The appellant accepts that he committed a serious crime, but he says that he is no longer a danger to the community because his criminal offending was a result of his mental ill health, and his mental ill health has been in remission since 2017.
4. The evidence before the FTT was uncontested, and the appeal to the Upper Tribunal turns primarily on whether the FTT properly interpreted and applied the relevant Immigration Rules and legislation that set the legal framework for the appeal.
5. Under Para. 338A of the Immigration Rules, the respondent is empowered to revoke a person’s refugee status if Para. 339AC is met.1 Paragraph 339AC appears under the heading “Danger to the United Kingdom”. Because the appellant applied for asylum prior to 28 June 2022, the version of the Rule that applies in this case provides:
“This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
(i) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the United Kingdom; or
(ii) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, the person constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom (see section 72 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).”
6. Section 72 of the 2002 Act2 provides in relevant part:
“Serious criminal
“(1) This section applies for the purpose of the construction and application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (exclusion from protection).
“(2) A person shall be presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom if he is—
(a) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and
(b) sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least two years. […]
(6) A presumption under subsection (2), (3) or (4) that a person constitutes a danger to the community is rebuttable by that person.”
7. The FTT found on the basis of the evidence before it that the appellant no longer posed a danger to the community. The respondent says it was wrong to do so, because it should have disregarded any way in which the appellant’s dangerousness had been reduced through medication and mental health treatment. The respondent’s position is that the FTT was required to assess the appellant’s dangerousness from the theoretical position that he had not received any mental health treatment and will not receive any mental health treatment or support in the future.
8. This appeal is not about whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution on return to Afghanistan. The respondent accepts that he would be. Nor is it about whether the respondent can remove the appellant to Afghanistan. The respondent does not seek to do so at this time. The only issue before the FTT was whether the respondent was right to revoke the appellant’s refugee status.
9. For the reasons set out in more detail below, I find that the FTT applied the statutory framework correctly and that the factual conclusions it reached about this particular appellant were clearly open to it and in accordance with the unanimous expert evidence before it.
Background
10. The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who was born in Afghanistan in 1973. He entered the UK in June 1999 and claimed asylum three days later on the grounds that he was at risk of persecution by the Taliban.
11. The appellant was arrested for the first time in January 2000, for threatening to kill his flatmate. He was sectioned under the Mental Health Act 1983, discharged after three days and subsequently rearrested and detained on remand. On 23 March 2000, he was transferred to a Medium Secure mental health under sections 48/49 of the Mental Health Act. On 21 August 2000, he pleaded guilty to a charge of affray and was given a hospital disposal under section 37 of the Mental Health Act.
12. In October 2001, the respondent granted the appellant Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) and recognised him as a refugee.
13. The appellant was discharged from hospital in March 2002. Between then and April 2007, he was hospitalised for three further periods: from November 2003 to January 2004; September 2004 to January 2005; and 21 November 2006 to 19 January 2007. He also committed two further offences. In October 2003, he assaulted a doorman at a pub, for which he was convicted of ABH in November 2004 and sentenced to a two-year community rehabilitation order and a compensation order. On 30 January 2007, he was convicted of common assault and destroy or damage property, committed eight days before. This appears to have involved assault on a neighbour and setting a fire in the garden outside his home. He was sentenced to a conditional discharge 12 months and to pay £150 in compensation.
14. On 11 April 2007, the appellant committed the particularly serious offence that the respondent says justifies the revocation of his refugee status (“the index offence”). He entered a wine shop where he had shopped before and knew the proprietor and his family. After buying a bottle of wine, he started making comments about God and religion, and the wife of the proprietor asked him to leave. He responded by hitting her and her 14-year-old daughter with the bottle repeatedly and making violent threats against all of the members of the family. He then ran out of the shop and into another shop, where he slapped the owner in the face. The police were called and he was arrested.
15. While on remand, the appellant was on psychotropic medication and a Psychiatric Consultant who examined him on 16 August 2007 assessed him as fit to stand trial and expressed the opinion that he did not appear to require hospital treatment. The consultant also noted that the account of the victims suggested that the appellant had been acutely psychotic at the time of the offences. The consultant suspected that the appellant had had “more psychotic symptoms at the time of the offence than he was prepared to acknowledge at the time of the interview”.
16. On 7 September 2007, after pleading guilty, the appellant was convicted of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, common assault and breach of conditional discharge. In a Pre-Sentence report completed in February 2008, the appellant’s risk of harm was assessed as “medium”. The author of the report commented that:
“[The appellant’s] behaviour can become unpredictable and quite volatile when he does not adhere to his medication. In this situation, [he] can pose a risk of harm to the public. To the best of my knowledge the last offence occurred as a result of [his] failure to comply with his medication. […]
“Psychiatric treatment will need to continue for [the appellant] when released to ensure that his illness and behaviour are monitored and the appropriate treatment/medication is given.
“[…] although the potential to cause harm to members of the public exists, he is unlikely to do so unless there is a change in circumstances, for example, that the mental health support mechanisms [he] is currently receiving in custody is not successfully implemented for him when he is released into the community.”
17. The Judge who sentenced the appellant described his crime as “horrific”. He then had regard to the psychiatric evidence and the pre-sentence report and observed:
“Clearly there has been a pattern of violent behaviour when you are off your medication; sometimes aggravated by drink and possibly cannabis from time to time, although I am told that you are addressing that now […]
“[...] the question of medication is clearly critical to your continued rational behaviour and it is clear in the latest report […] that the issue of non-compliance with medication and limited insight into these issues when there is a relapse is plainly regarding by Dr (inaudible) as a risk.
“I am impressed by what you have managed to achieve in the last eight months in Prison. However, I remain very concerned that this is because you are under constant supervision, the issue of medication is under consideration by others on your behalf and I remain very concerned, as indeed does Dr (inaudible) that if you are released into the community there will be issues with regard to medication.”
18. The judge sentenced the appellant to a minimum sentence of 515 days, but imposed an indefinite sentence of Imprisonment for Public Protection in accordance with the sentencing laws then in effect. That meant that the appellant would not be released at the end of his sentence unless he satisfied the Parole Board that he no longer needed to be confined in custody for the protection of the public.
19. The appellant stopped complying with his medication in September 2008, while in prison, and by December 2008, he was noted to be expressing delusional beliefs and exhibiting inappropriate behaviour. On 26 January 2009, he was sectioned under section 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and transferred from prison to a medium secure mental health facility.
20. In 2011, the First-tier Tribunal (HESC) (the “Mental Health Tribunal”) recommended the appellant’s conditional discharge from hospital. It accepted evidence that in the past, once discharged, the appellant had “ceased to comply with his medication, leading to a rapid descent into psychosis, in which state he puts both himself and others at risk”. However, it found on the basis of the evidence before it that the appellant
“is free of symptoms, fully compliant with his medication, has used unescorted leave without incident or criticism and has developed a level of insight that has hitherto been absent.”
21. It recommended his conditional discharge, in principle, although recognising that the appellant could not be discharged due to his IPP sentence.
22. The appellant committed his final offence in November 2012, while detained in a secure mental health facility. It appears to have been committed against a member of staff who had confronted the appellant about smoking “Black Mamba” in his room (“Black Mamba” is a synthetic cannabinoid, which was at that time a “legal high” but has been banned since 2016). He was convicted of racially/religiously aggravated common assault/beating, and sentenced to pay a fine of £100.00 and a victim surcharge of £20.00. Because he did not pay the fine, he served one day of imprisonment.
23. In 2015, the Parole Board recommended the appellant’s release, but this decision was postponed due to a deterioration in his mental health and behaviour. In July 2016, the appellant was discharged from hospital and sent back to prison. His mental health deteriorated further, and in April 2017, he was readmitted to hospital.
24. After his return to hospital in 2017, the appellant began a new course of treatment with clozapine. On 4 June 2023, Dr Vivek Bisht, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, completed a psychiatric report on the instructions of solicitors seeking to overturn the appellant’s IPP sentence. Among Dr Bisht’s conclusions were the following:
“8.1.5 […] his disorder appears to be treatment resistant as he had shown limited response to a number of antipsychotics over the years. Therefore, [the appellant] is currently being treated with Clozapine, which is a well-established medication for treatment resistant psychotic disorders. There appears to be a remarkable improvement in [the appellant] since he has been commenced on this medication. His risk of violence has sharply reduced as his illness has responded well to the medication. During my interview, I could not elicit any acute affective or psychotic symptoms. There also appears to be marked improvement in his insight and it is reasonable to conclude that his illness is currently in remission. I note he is currently utilising extended periods of unescorted leave in the community which is reflective of the positive progress he has made. […]
“8.2.3 It is now well established that his risk of harm to others is intrinsically linked to his psychotic illness. When he is well and compliant with treatment, [he] is unlikely to be violent towards others. I note [his] compliance with the oral medication was erratic at the time and he had requested his medication to be stopped. It is now established that [his] mental disorder is treatment resistant, and his illness is only well controlled due to Clozapine, which was unfortunately not prescribed at the material time. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that [he] was still symptomatic [at the time of the index offence] despite being on a depot medication in the community.”
The decision to revoke the appellant’s refugee status
25. The respondent first decided to revoke the appellant’s refugee status in 2018, but she never served the decision. It only came to light in 2023, after it was disclosed to the appellant’s representatives following a subject access request. The appellant lodged an out-of-time appeal against the decision, which the First-tier Tribunal accepted, and the respondent withdrew the decision for reconsideration.
26. On 15 September 2023, Mr Omar Ramjiawon, a Forensic Psychologist, prepared a psychiatric report for submission to the respondent while she was reconsidering her revocation decision. Mr Ramjiawon had been involved the appellant’s care between 2018 and 2020 and again since June 2023. He recorded that the appellant said that he was “in control of” his mental illness, and that “being prescribed clozapine” was “the main reason for this”. In his opinion:
“6.31. [The appellant] has an established diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder; this is relapsing in nature. When acutely unwell, [the appellant] has presented with a number of psychotic symptoms, including paranoid and persecutory ideation, auditory command hallucinations, thought disorder and flight of ideas. He has displayed irritable behaviour and acted violently in response to feeling slighted and also psychotically driven i.e. setting fire to his belongings, suicidal attempts to end his life.
“6.3.2. All the above symptoms are well controlled on current psychotropic medication and he has immensely benefitted from psychological, nursing and rehabilitation interventions. He has been abstinent from alcohol or drug use since 2009.
“6.3.3. During the current admission, [the appellant] has undertaken psychological interventions and various other rehabilitation programmes to improve his understanding of his mental condition and offending behaviour. He has benefitted from pharmacological, psychological, vocation, nursing and rehabilitation interventions. […]
“6.8.1. [The appellant’s] behaviour, including bizarre behaviour and offending (i.e., index offence, fire-setting and aggressive behaviour), appear to be primarily driven by mental health. […]
“6.10.1. The majority of admissions have been under the Mental Health Act due to his reluctance to accept treatment voluntarily and in part due to the serious nature of violent incidents associated with his becoming mentally unwell. He is usually admitted to hospital after he has got involved in a violent incident […] During his current admission, however, [the appellant] has shown improvement in his insight in relation to his mental illness and recognises the importance of remaining concordant with his prescribed medication to minimise the risk of relapse. He has also shown an awareness of the consequences of not adhering to his prescribed psychotropic medication, including deterioration in his mental health and an increase in his aggressive/offending behaviour, which he would like to avoid.
“6.12.1. At present, [the appellant] is concordant with his prescribed medication, has remained abstinent from drugs and alcohol use, and engaging in nursing, occupational therapy and psychological interventions. This has helped him to remain stable in his mental state and his risk of violence towards others at this time is not considered particularly elevated. His HCR-20v3 violence risk assessment, dated 11 September 2023, indicated that his overall risk of violence towards others (including general violence and fire-setting) is low and the imminence of violence is also rated as low.
6.15.1. It is the view of the multidisciplinary team, including [the appellant’s] responsible clinician, that he suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which is currently stable on psychotropic medication. It is the view of the multidisciplinary team that [he] does not require continued detention in the psychiatric hospital. [He] has coped well during extensive testing of unescorted community leaves of varying duration to visit his family home and other rehabilitation programmes and interventions.”
27. On 1 May 2024, Mr Ramjiawon wrote a letter addressed “To whom it may concern”. This set out that the appellant’s uncertain immigration status was causing him “a considerable amount of stress” and appeared to be “exacerbating his existing mental health difficulties, particularly relating to anxiety and depression.” He was also experiencing psychosomatic physical health problems. However, there were “no concerns relating to [his] compliance with his prescribed medication” or substance use, “no significant changes to his treatment plan and no other known stressors affecting him other than the issues and uncertainty relating to his immigration status.”
28. On 28 May 2024, the respondent again decided to revoke the appellant’s refugee status. She accepted that he would be at real risk of serious harm in violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) if returned to Afghanistan but found that he was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention because he had been convicted of a particularly serious crime in 2007 and remained a danger to the community. She quoted at length from Mr Ramjiawon’s September 2023 report and May 2024 letter. She concluded from these records that the appellant’s offending was linked to his mental ill health, but that his mental ill health was exacerbated by stress.
29. His “suitability to be safely managed in the community” had not yet been determined, because he was living in a “controlled environment”, with a “full 24-hour supporting medical team”. He would also have access to drugs and alcohol in the community.
30. She further relied on an OASys assessment, described as “undertaken on 28 October 2022, at HMP Wormwood Scrubs, and produced on 9 May 2024.” She quoted from the summary, which assessed him as “low risk of reoffending and high risk of serious harm to the public, staff and prisoners” and assessed the risk as “likely to be the greatest” if the appellant:
“ • […] fails to take his medication for his Mental health issues or comply with the Community Mental health team.
• […] is under the influence of drugs. –
• […] fails to manage emotions and overreacting to stressful situations.
• […] fails to consider the consequences of his actions and the impact of this.
• […] has poor perspective thinking skills”
31. She concluded:
“46. The available evidence indicates that your mental health is exacerbated under stressful conditions and subsequently, by your own admission, leads to no control over your behaviour, which in turn increases your risk of re-offending. It has been assessed that the risk of serious harm you pose to the community is likely to be the greatest when you ‘ fail to manage emotions and overreacting to stressful situation’, amongst others.
“47. As detailed above, your multidisciplined medical team have indicted that your [sic] current [sic] experiencing ‘a considerable amount of stress and appears to be impacting on his mental health and well-being…..reporting physical health symptoms which appear to be linked to excessive or poorly adapted thinking, feeling or behaviour in response to physical health problems’[.]
“48. It is considered that the assessment above indicates that even whilst adhering to your prescribed medication and whilst remaining under the care of a multidisciplinary team, you are still experiencing ill health, linked to poorly adapted thinking, due to an inability to deal with stressful situations. This behaviour had been assessed as one of the factors where the risk you pose to the community would be the greatest.”
32. The respondent further noted that in an interview conducted in February 2012 the appellant had said that he “felt sorry” for the victims of his 2007 offence and recognised that he had been unwell at the time. He had also said that he had “full knowledge of his illness”, was “aware of the triggers”, and knew that to prevent reoffending he would need to take his medication and meet with psychiatrist regularly. He had nonetheless committed the offence of “racially/religiously aggravated common assault/beating” in August 2013 (actually, November 2012), which was “a serious violent offence.” Moreover, “even when compliant with your medication, and under the care of your mental health practitioners, you still re-offended, were [sic] you were again convicted of a serious violent offence.”
33. She therefore concluded that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption that he was a danger to the community and revoked his refugee status in accordance with Para. 339AC and 338A of the Immigration Rules.
The appeal before the FTT
34. The appellant appealed. In support of his appeal, he submitted an appeal statement setting out, inter alia, the history of his offending, his mental ill health and his previous drug use. He said that his mental health had improved significantly since 2017, when he began to take clozapine. He had also taken various courses, including in anger management, and participated in both one-on-one and group therapy. He had begun to leave the hospital on day release in late 2024, and by December 2024, he was allowed to spend five nights at a time out of the hospital, at a hostel. He said:
“I am doing all that it is being required of me - taking medication, attending meetings, and going to therapy, and I will be sure to attend meetings with my probation officer when that is required of me.”
35. The appellant said in his appeal statement that he was trying to get parole, and once it was granted, he expected to continue under the care of the hospital, in supported accommodation, for 12-18 months. He concluded:
“I am confident that I have moved on so much since I committed the index offence - I have a better understanding of my mental health issues, the effects of drugs and alcohol, I have ways to manage stress and anxiety, and I know where to turn to for help. I want to stay out of trouble and I believe that I can do this.”
36. The appellant also submitted:
(i) a statement from his brother, a British citizen;
(ii) a pre-sentence report from February 2008;
(iii) The Judge’s sentencing remarks, from July 2008;
(iv) His PNC record;
(v) A decision of the Mental Health Tribunal, dated 25 July 2011;
(vi) The psychiatric report by Dr Vivek Bisht, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 4 June 2023;
(vii) An updating psychological assessment by Mr Ramjiawon, dated 24 December 2024;
(viii) A decision of the Mental Health Tribunal, dated 27 January 2025; and
(ix) Statements from his family members, written in 2013, discussing his mental ill health at that time.
37. The respondent reviewed her decision on 2 March 2025. The respondent did not raise any criticisms of any of the medical evidence, or of the credibility of the appellant or his witnesses. She submitted that even if the appellant and his witnesses were found credible, the appeal should still be dismissed. This was because, on her view of the evidence, the appellant remained a danger to the community. She relied in this regard exclusively on the OASys report prepared in October 2022. She asserted that it had assessed the appellant as posing a “high risk of harm” to the public and recommended that “control measures” would be needed upon his release, which were an indication of dangerousness. The respondent also noted that the OASys report had recorded that the appellant had not completed a 1-1 Victim Empathy Programme and the objective of “increased understanding of consequences of actions on self and others” was recorded as “not achieved”.
38. The respondent also made the legal submission that “managed risk does not mean that the appellant is not a danger to the community”. She relied in this regard on Restivo (EEA –prisoner transfer) [2016] UKUT 00449(IAC), Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 00187 (IAC) at [59] and Binbuga (Turkey) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 551 at [46].
39. The appellant filed a 12-page skeleton argument for the hearing, setting out the appellant’s case and responding to the respondent’s review.
The challenged decision
40. In the challenged decision, the FTT recorded that it was accepted that the appellant had committed a particularly serious crime and that the presumption that he was a danger to the community set out at section 72 applied. The only issue before the Tribunal was whether the presumption was rebutted on the evidence: [7]
41. The hearing proceeded by submissions only, and the FTT summarised each party’s submissions in detail at [9]-[25]. I do not consider it necessary to rehearse that summary here, but I will refer to any relevant matters in my discussion below.
42. Under the heading “Legal framework”, the FTT directed itself to the text of section 72 and the case of SM (Article 33(2); Section 72; Essa post-EU exit) [2024] UKUT 00323 (IAC).
43. The FTT’s “Findings and Reasons” are set out from [29]-[41]. The FTT began at [29] by noting that few facts were in dispute. There had been no challenge to the medical evidence. The FTT referred specifically to the evidence of Dr Bisht, Dr Kichidi (who had given evidence at the recent Mental Health Tribunal proceedings), Mr Ramjiawon, the appellant’s forensic social worker, and the appellant’s mental health solicitor. The appellant’s lengthy statement was “supported by the other evidence.” The facts of the April 2007 offence were set out in the pre-sentence report.
44. At [30], the FTT reiterated that the only issue was whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption of dangerousness that arose under section 72. It announced its conclusion that he had, and that the reasons followed.
45. At [31], the FTT rejected the respondent’s reliance on Restivo, for two different reasons. The first was the factual difference between both the nature of the risk and the tools used to manage it:
“Factually, I consider that a risk managed by imprisonment of a hardened criminal does not equate to risk managed for a mentally ill person within the community by the application of medication regime, supervision, and support.”
The second was that Restivo was concerned with the EEA Regulations and not section 72. The FTT then made a factual finding that:
“the management of risk within the community, which has in recent years been tested, is such to considerably reduce the real risk of further offending of the same type of which this appellant was convicted some seventeen years ago. I consider that the efficacy of the treatment received, professional support and the appellant’s intentions to engage with the measures to keep him stable are all relevant considerations to rebutting the presumption of danger. “
46. At [32], the FTT rejected the respondent’s submission that the fact that the appellant had been sentenced to an indeterminate sentence for public protection was “persuasive of continued risk to the community.” It stated that each case should be considered on its own facts and on the evidence presented.
47. At [33], the FTT noted that the appellant’s mental health difficulties had arisen not long after his arrival in the UK and that although there were three offences committed between 2001 and 2007, these did not meet the threshold for “particularly serious crimes” under section 72. The only offence that met that threshold had been committed over 17 years ago. There was no further offending of a similar nature, although it was accepted that the appellant had spent a considerable period of time detained under the Mental Health Act in the intervening years.
48. At [34], the FTT noted that the respondent had not decided to revoke the appellant’s refugee status until 2018, 11 years after the index offence, and that decision had never been served. It concluded:
“In view of the lapse of time and apparent lack of urgency in acting, I infer the respondent’s concerns about this appellant presenting a danger were not a matter of priority.”
49. At [35], the FTT considered the history of the appellant’s diagnosis and treatment, as set out in two separate medical reports and the pre-sentence report and concluded on the basis of this evidence that there was a “clear link between the appellant’s illness and the index offending.” At [36], the FTT considered the sentencing remarks, two medical reports and the decision of the Mental Health Tribunal in 2011, which all supported the conclusion that “the appellant was clearly psychotic at the time of his offending and that the risk arose from his poor mental health.”
50. The FTT then turned at [37] to the question of
“what the risk presented by this appellant to the community of the United Kingdom is, and whether it continues to be, managed so as to rebut the respondent’s presumption that he presents a danger.”
51. It took into account, first, the OASys report, which reported that the appellant had “responded positively to treatment since his readmission to hospital in April 2017” and noted that this was consistent with the opinion of Dr Bisht, who had observed a “remarkable improvement” since the appellant had started taking clozapine. It then took into account the view of Mr Ramjiawon, noting that he was the principal forensic psychiatrist at the West London NHS Trust and had been involved in the appellant’s treatment since June 2023:
“His report is that the appellant’s symptoms are ‘well controlled on current psychotropic medication and he has immensely benefitted from psychological, nursing and rehabilitation interventions.’ He also notes the appellant’s increasing insight into his condition and the rehabilitation programmes that have assisted him to improve his understanding of his mental condition and offending behaviour. His risk of violence towards others, ‘including general violence and fire setting’ was considered to be ‘low’ and the imminence of violence was also rated as ‘low.’”
52. Also at [37], the FTT took into account that the appellant had been permitted unescorted leave since August 2022 and that there were “no concerns”. It took Mr Ramjiawon’s opinion and the appellant’s “presence unescorted in the community” as “considerable evidence” rebutting the presumption of dangerousness.
53. At [38], the FTT considered Mr Ramjiawon’s second medical report, dated 24 December 2024. The FTT noted that this contrasted significantly with the OASys report; the FTT does not specify here which aspect of the OASys report is in issue, but when the decision is read as a whole, it is reasonably clear that the FTT is considering the respondent’s submission before it, recorded at [19], that the author of the report had been “concerned that there would be a risk if the current position of release was to continue”. The FTT noted that, on a careful reading of the OASys report, the material before the author dated back to 2020, two years before the report was written, and that in the report itself it was stated that the author had not seen the appellant in person since 2016. Moreover, the concerns expressed in 2022 about the appellant’s release had not been well founded. It concluded:
“I find that the totality of the medical evidence is to be preferred over the OASys Report which I do accept is now somewhat out of date, is not based on any direct meeting with the appellant for some seven years at the time of writing and does not, by doubtless no fault of the writer, appear to have been based on up-to-date medical evidence being made available to them.”
54. At [39], the FTT considered Mr Ramjiawon’s recent medical report in further detail, alongside the report of his forensic social worker, and again noted that the Ministry of Justice considered the appellant suitable for overnight leave at a hostel, five nights a week. I set this paragraph out in full, because I consider it crucial to understanding the basis on which the FTT allowed the appeal:
“Mr Ramjiawon’s report confirms that the appellant’s mental health difficulties have ‘significantly improved’ and that he is ‘concordant with his prescribed medication and is complying with his treatment plan, engaging well in nursing, occupational therapy and psychological interventions.’ Whilst the appellant’s anxiety continues, Mr Ramjiawon considers that the appellant’s current presenting symptoms are ‘not related to a risk of serious reoffending.’ The Ministry of Justice have considered the appellant suitable for overnight leave at a hostel, which I accept is now for five nights per week, and that has continued. He has been managed within the community with the assistance of his social worker, Ms Aldred, who confirms that he complies with his medication without prompting and, also, in my view of considerable relevance is the fact that he has been reported to have a good insight into his illness. I consider that the evidence indicates the appellant’s desire to continue to be compliant with the medication and to engage with the support mechanisms which assist him to remain well and not to endanger others. This, too, I find to be a protective factor.”
55. At [40], the FTT noted that the Mental Health Tribunal had granted the appellant as technical discharge in January 2025, and would have granted him a conditional discharge, except that the IPP sentence meant that the appellant could not be discharged without the approval of the Parole Board. The Mental Health Tribunal had accepted Dr Kichidi’s opinion that “the appellant remained in need of treatment but could be treated in the community ‘without incident.’” The FTT accepted that finding.
56. The FTT summarised its reasons for allowing the appeal at [41]:
“I consider that at the present time the risk of the appellant committing any further ‘particularly serious’ offences is considerably reduced by the treatment with which he is complying and the support which he continues to access. It is over seventeen years since the index offence and no offences of any description have been committed since 2012, which is now some twelve and a half years ago. He has not been recalled to prison since 2016 and has been in Mental Health Act detention since 2017, but has made excellent progress and I note, in particular, this appears to be parallel with the change in his medication in 2017. His risk of reoffending is regarded as low by the professionals who treat him and the Tribunal who determined his discharge. He has moved to open conditions in the community and, at the present time, I consider that he has rebutted the presumption that he presents a danger to the community. It follows that this appeal is allowed.”
The grounds of appeal
57. The respondent applied for permission to appeal on a single ground entitled “Misdirection of law in the assessment of whether protective measures rebut the presumption that AR poses a danger to the community, and failure to take account of relevant factors.” This is, in fact, two distinct but interrelated grounds.
58. The first ground is that the FTT misdirected itself in law by taking into account “the management of risk within the community” when deciding whether the legal test of “a danger to the community” was met. This erroneously “conflate[d] the existence and extent of threat with the measures in place to manage the threat”. She submits that the proper approach was that set out in AA (Poland) v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 18 at [55]:
“[…] Measures such as imprisonment, licence conditions on release, SHPOs, and notification requirements are all put in place because a person poses a threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. The existence of such measures is relevant because they involve a recognition of that threat and the need to prevent, manage, or mitigate it. But the preventative or mitigating effects that such measures may have are not themselves material to the question of what level of threat exists. […] The seriousness of the threat that AA's personal conduct represents should have been assessed without regard to the mitigating measures on which the FtTJ placed weight.”
59. Although she recognises that AA (Poland) and Restivo “are concerned with the EEA regulations”, she submits that
“the test of a ‘threat to one of the fundamental interests of society’ is undoubtedly similar to the concept and test of ‘danger to the community’ as applies under Section 72, and danger and threat are substantively the same, and therefore the cases[‘] engagement with the proper analysis of the former wording is applicable to the Section 72 test.”
60. Therefore the FTT was required to consider whether the appellant posed a “threat to society” without regard to any “mitigating measures”. “Throughout” [37], the respondent submits, the FTT “places much reliance on the management of AR’s threat through treatment in assessing risk to society”. At [39], the FTT “contextualises the risk within the context of the [the appellant] continuing to comply with his medication and support”. At [41], the FTT concluded that the appellant had rebutted the presumption “in light of his treatment and the medication he takes.” In accordance with AA (Poland), “threat exists independent of management and must be assessed accordingly”. Therefore, the appellant’s medication and treatment should not have been taken into account.
61. Later in the grounds, the respondent adds that the distinction the FTT drew between control measures imposed by the criminal justice system and those managed by mental health services was “artificial” because “in both instances control measures exist to offset risk of danger to the community.”
62. The second ground of appeal is that the FTT failed to take into account relevant factors. The first part of this ground is an attack on the FTT’s decision to prefer the medical evidence to the OASys report. The medical evidence, it is contended, should not have been taken into account at all, as it went only to the “efficacy of mitigating measures”. It was only the OASys report that was relevant to the “matter of the threat posed.” Here, the respondent relies on [56]-[59] of AA (Poland).
63. The other relevant factor that the respondent says the FTT failed to take into account was the significant periods of time that the appellant had been detained under the Menal Health Act, which had prevented further offending.
64. The FTT granted the respondent permission to appeal. It described the criticism of the FTT’s consideration of the OASys report as “not arguable”, because the FTT had given “full, sustainable” reasons for “preferring up-to-date medical evidence from treating physicians to that of an OASYs Report written in 2020 by an individual who had not seen or interviewed the appellant personally for many years.” The remaining grounds were dismissed as nothing more than a restatement of the respondent’s case.
65. However, permission was granted for the following reason:
“[…] drawing a difference between unwell individuals receiving medical treatment and medication which addresses risk factors caused by mental illness and factors by way of control to manage criminality such as imprisonment, licence conditions and probation supervision was a live argument in this appeal. Reasons are given for differentiating the consideration of management measures for criminality from management measures by way of health treatment. However, this is a point which has not, as far as was argued in this appeal by either representative in their use of caselaw, been resolved. To the extent that it is necessary for clarification of this argument, permission is granted.”
66. The “Reasons” section of the order granting permission concluded “Permission is granted but limited to the ground above.” However, the order itself stated simply “Permission to appeal is: Granted”.
67. The appellant filed a Rule 24 response.
The hearing
68. At the hearing before me, I had sight of:
(i) A 540-page bundle, filed by the respondent;
(ii) A 684-page authorities bundle, filed by the appellant;
(iii) The decision of the Mental Health Tribunal dated 27 January 2025, submitted separately by the appellant.
69. I addressed as a preliminary issue whether the respondent’s second ground of appeal was before me. The FTT had clearly stated in its reasons that the criticism of the FTT’s consideration of the OASys report and of the amount of time the appellant had spent in detention was not arguable and that permission was refused on these grounds. However, the grant of permission had not been limited in the order itself. In accordance with Safi & Ors (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC), I considered that the second ground was still likely to be before me. In addition, after hearing submissions from both parties about this second ground, I considered that there was a sufficient overlap between it and the first ground that it was appropriate to consider it. See, Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC) at [21].
70. I therefore heard submissions from both parties on all of the respondent’s grounds. I have taken those submissions into account in making my decision and will refer to them, where relevant, in the discussion below.
Legal framework
71. The legal framework of the appellant’s appeal is set by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”), as incorporated into UK law, in part, in the Immigration Rules and section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and as interpreted by UK courts. This is because the respondent has decided to revoke the appellant’s refugee status on the grounds that he is “a danger to the community”, with reference to section 72 of the 2002 Act, which specifically refers to article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.
72. The appellant’s sole ground of appeal, moreover, is that that decision “breaches the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention”: section 84(3)(a) of the 2002 Act. Given that the ground of revocation was that the appellant posed a danger the community, neither the accepted risk to the appellant on return to Afghanistan nor the respondent’s decision not remove him there at this time was relevant. See: SA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 358.
73. Thus, by the very terms of the Immigration Rule the respondent seeks to apply and the sole ground on which the appellant is permitted to appeal, the question before the FTT was whether the appellant was “a danger to the community” as defined at section 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.
74. It is the respondent’s position that the word “danger” here does not need to be understood in the context of the Refugee Convention, but can – indeed, must – be understood in line with other domestic caselaw concerning foreign national offenders, such that the FTT erred in not applying the principles that determine whether someone is a “sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”, as defined in the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, or a “persistent offender”, as defined at section 117D(2)(c)(iii) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
75. I reject this submission. It is a well-established principle that when interpreting a statute purporting to implement the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention:
“the inquiry must be into the meaning of the Refugee Convention approached as an international instrument created by the agreement of contracting states as opposed to regulatory regimes established by national institutions. It is necessary to determine the autonomous meaning of the relevant treaty provision.”
R v SSHD ex p Adan and Aitseguer [2000] UKHL 67, per Lord Steyn at 516-7. “It cannot be that individual member states are free to adopt their own definitions” of the terms of the Refugee Convention: Al-Sirri v SSHD [2012] UKSC 54 at [34]. Yet in submitting that the FTT was required to interpret “danger to the community” according to principles developed by UK courts with regard to a different international treaty or a domestic statute, neither of which purports to have any relation to the Refugee Convention, this is precisely what the respondent proposes.
76. In accordance with this well-established principle, moreover, the caselaw interpreting section 72 has consistently taken as its starting point the language and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Thus, in EN (Serbia) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 630, Stanley Burnton LJ began with the statement “In order to understand the issues in these appeals, it is necessary to set out certain provisions of the Refugee Convention as well as those of section 72 of the 2002 Act”: [5]. He then proceeded to construe both “particularly serious crime” and “danger to the community” in light of the language and purpose of the Refugee Convention: [37]-[50]. A similar approach was taken in D8 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 33, where the sections on “The legal framework” and “Danger to national security” both begin with a consideration of Article 33(2), interpreted in light of its language and structure and taking into account, where appropriate, its purpose, UNHCR guidance and the caselaw of other States Parties: [14]-[27], [45]-[47] and [52]-[57]. See also: SB (cessation and exclusion) Haiti at [88] (“the dangerousness requirement would have to be satisfied conformably with the Convention thresholds”).
77. For this reason, I find that the FTT did not err in declining to conduct its assessment of whether the appellant is a danger to the community by reference to Restivo, AA (Poland), Chege or Binuga.
78. I therefore accept Mr Mackenzie’s submission that this appeal fell to be decided in accordance with the existing caselaw of the senior courts interpreting and applying the concept of “danger to the community” under section 72. This caselaw has not been displaced by more recent decisions considering other concepts arising under other bodies of law.
79. In accordance with that caselaw, the FTT did not err by taking into account the impact of the appellant’s compliance with his medication and treatment when assessing whether he was a danger to the community. This is because voluntary compliance with medical treatment was explicitly recognised as a relevant factor by the Court of Appeal in SSHD v MM (Zimbabwe) [2017] EWCA Civ 797. Like this appellant, MM had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which was effectively controlled by medication. His risk to the public was assessed as low as long as he was compliant with his medication regime, which he was: [5] The FTT allowed MM’s appeal against the revocation of his refugee status, finding, inter alia, that he had rebutted the presumption that he was a danger to the community “because of the medical evidence that [his] mental illness was in full remission while he continued with his treatment”. The Court of Appeal remitted the appeal to the FTT for other reasons, but Lord Justice Sales (with whom Black LJ and Henderson LJ agreed) stated at [15]:
“I do not accept that the FTT erred in its decision in relation to section 72 of the 2002 Act. In the relevant passage in its judgment at paras. [31]-[36] it plainly had very well in mind the gravity of MM's offences and took that into account in its application of section 72. On the medical evidence before it, the FTT was entitled to find that MM's schizophrenia was fully under control with medication and that he was motivated to ensure he continued to receive that medication, so that it could be said that he does not represent a danger to the community in the United Kingdom for the purposes of section 72, Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive and regulations made pursuant to it.”
80. However, as the appeal was to be remitted for other reasons, it would be open to the respondent to introduce new evidence concerning “whether MM can be relied upon to keep up with his medication.”: [16] As Mr Mackenzie rightly pointed out, the respondent has never sought to explain how her position in this appeal is consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in MM (Zimbabwe). She has simply ignored it. It is unsurprising, therefore, that she has failed to explain why the FTT should have departed from it. I can identify no basis for finding that the FTT erred by taking an approach that was consistent with that taken by the Court of Appeal.
81. If the respondent had asked me to find that the references to MM’s likely compliance with treatment in the future should be disregarded as obiter, the rest of the caselaw on the Refugee Convention and article 33(2) would still apply. I can identify no other authority that would justify, let alone require, taking a different approach from that taken by Sales LJ in MM. In SB (cessation and exclusion) Haiti [2005] UKIAT 00036, the President, Deputy President and Vice President of IAT considered the appeal against the revocation of refugee status by a man whose offending, according to the medical evidence, was related to his PTSD, “which had not been treated for many years”. The panel noted the Probation Officers’ view that the risk of reoffending could be reduced by “treatment and the Appellant’s efforts”, and did not dismiss this view as irrelevant. Instead, it gave reasons for finding that unlikely on the particular facts of the case: [79]-[80].
82. In interpreting the Refugee Convention, British courts have long treated the decisions of the higher courts in other States Parties as relevant. See, e.g.: K & Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46 at [10]; D8 at [55]; Al-Sirri 54 at [13]-[14]. I therefore accept that a decision of the Federal Court of Australia may be relevant here. In LKQD v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1591, the FCA considered the case of a refugee from South Sudan with a long history of offending, which was said to be linked to his undiagnosed schizophrenia. One reason the Tribunal below had given for finding that the appellant continued to be a danger to the community was that he had a history of not taking his medication consistently: [21]. The FCA found that the Tribunal had erred by not dealing with the appellant’s argument that his wish to have a close relationship with his son could reduce his risk of reoffending, because it would serve as “an incentive to comply with a mental health treatment plan”: [27] This contention was “capable of being dispositive […] because, if accepted, it would have led to many of the Tribunal’s concerns about the applicant’s mental illness and the effect of that on his likelihood to reoffend to be allayed.”: [43] In other words, the appellant’s likely future compliance with medication and treatment, far from being an impermissible consideration, was potentially a dispositive one. This provides support for the approach taken in MM and by the FTT in this case.
83. Although not directly related to the specific question of dangerousness potentially arising out of mental ill health, I consider that the following principles are also relevant:
(i) The prohibition on refoulement is “a core principle of international law, to which the United Kingdom government has repeatedly committed itself on the international stage, consistently with this country’s reputation for developing and upholding the rule of law.” AAA (Syria) & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42 at [26].
(ii) In general, it is necessary to take a cautious and restrictive approach to limitations on the provisions of the Refugee Convention that permit denying its protections to someone at risk of persecution Al-Sirri & DD (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 54 at [38], [75];
(iii) Article 33(2) does not require that the danger posed by the individual refugee be balanced against the seriousness of the risk they would face if refouled: SB (Haiti) at [82]. However, because there is no balancing test, the threshold for constituting a “danger” to the community is “quite a high” one: SB (Haiti) at [84];
(iv) For reasons set out in guidance issued by UNHCR, the “danger must be serious […] Something which is unlikely or minor could not be regarded as a danger.” D8 at [45]. Those reasons were set out at [18] of the decision and mirror what was said in Al-Sirri: it is because Article 33(2) creates an exception to the principle of non-refoulement; and
(v) The danger must be “real”, as well as serious: D8 at [71]; EN (Serbia) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 630 at [45].
84. I consider that taking a cautious and restrictive approach and asking whether the danger the refugee poses to the community is “real” and not unlikely requires taking into account all relevant evidence concerning the refugee’s past, present and likely future conduct. It is not consistent with an abstract, theoretical exercise in which the fact that they are voluntarily complying with medication and treatment must be disregarded.
85. Although this was not the basis on which the respondent was granted permission to appeal, Mr Pugh repeatedly submitted that it could be inferred from the terms of section 72 that any medical treatment the appellant was receiving should be disregarded. Mr Pugh drew my attention repeatedly to section 72(11)(b)(ii) of the 2002 Act:

“(11) For the purposes of this section—
[….]

“(b) a reference to a person who is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least two years—
“(ii) includes a reference to a person who is sentenced to detention, or ordered or directed to be detained, in an institution other than a prison (including, in particular, a hospital or an institution for young offenders).”
86. I explored this submission with him at some length. I accept that it makes it clear that the fact that a person committed a very serious crime while mentally ill does not prevent the presumption of dangerousness from arising. I agree with Mr Mackenzie, however, that neither here nor anywhere else in section 72 has Parliament defined “danger to the community” or specified which factors may be taken into account when deciding whether someone is such a danger.
87. When asked how section 72(11)(b)(ii) required that the impact of medical treatment and support must be disregarded, the most Mr Pugh could say was that it showed that Parliament was “not in a generous mood” when the statute in question was passed. Of course, Parliament may pass legislation that is contrary to the UK’s international obligations, but it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms. See, e.g.: SM at [42]- [43]. Otherwise, statutory provisions must be construed “as not being inconsistent with the international obligation to which they are intended to give effect.” N3 at [66]-[68]; EN (Serbia) at [73]-[75]. A mood inferred from a separate section of the statute addressing a different issue is insufficiently clear and unambiguous to persuade me that the FTT was required to interpret section 72 not in the cautious and restrictive way required by the cases cites above at [63] but in the more expansive and less generous way that “threat” has been interpreted in the context of the EEA Regulations.
88. In summary, on Ground 1 I conclude that:
(i) The term “danger to the community” in section 72 of the 2002 Act and Para. 339AC of the Immigration Rules is taken from Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. It must therefore be given an autonomous meaning, informed by the language of the Refugee Convention and its object and purpose. The interpretation and application of Article 33(2) by other States Parties may also be relevant.
(ii) Tribunals are not required to adopt principles developed with regard to other international agreements or domestic legislation when interpreting and applying section 72 or Para 339AC. It would, in fact, be an error to do so. Therefore, neither Restivo nor AA (Poland) is relevant to the interpretation and application of section 72.
(iii) Section 72 neither defines “danger to the community” nor sets out which factors can be taken into account when assessing whether a person is a danger to the community. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and all relevant evidence must be taken into account.
(iv) Where a person’s criminal offending is linked to their mental ill health, there is no bar to relying on evidence of past and future mental health treatment and support in order to rebut the presumption of dangerousness.
(v) Evidence of whether a person has been engaging with treatment voluntarily and is likely to do so in the future is likely to be highly relevant.
89. If I am wrong, and the FTT should have applied the principles set out in AA (Poland) to the assessment of the appellant’s dangerousness under section 72, I still would not find that Ground 1 is made out. This is for two reasons. First, there is a fundamental difference between the type of “mitigating measures” in issue in Restivo and AA (Poland) and the reasons that the FTT found this appellant was no longer a danger to community. The measures described in Restivo and AA (Poland) involved containment and supervision: imprisonment, license conditions, SHPOs and notification requirements. Here, although the FTT referred to the appellant’s illness being “managed in the community” at [31] and [39], it is clear from how this is described at [39] that the FTT did not have in mind measures of containment and supervision such as were at issue in AA (Poland), but forms of assistance and support, voluntarily engaged with.
90. Secondly, there was no suggestion in Restivo and AA (Poland) that without those measures of containment and supervision in place, the appellants would not pose a threat to society. By contrast, in this case, the FTT found that the actual danger posed by this appellant had considerably reduced in the 17 years since his offence, due to a range of factors unrelated to future containment and supervision. As summarised at [31] and [41], these included:
(i) the efficacy of the treatment the appellant had already received, including a change in medication in 2017, as a result of which he had made “excellent progress”;
(ii) his compliance with his medication and treatment, and his intention to continue to do;
(iii) the fact that his compliance and behaviour had been tested during his periods of release in the community on open conditions;
(iv) his lack of serious offending in over 17 years and any offending in over 12 years; and
(v) the view of all of the professionals involved in his care and of the Mental Health Tribunal that his risk of reoffending was low.
91. It is important to recognise how many of these factors refer to the appellant’s conduct in the past and the present: his medication had changed, he had made excellent progress, he had gained insight into his condition, he had been on unescorted release in the community for five nights a week, and he had not offended in any way for more than 12 years. His insight into his illness and voluntary compliance with treatment were considered to be highly significant factors – as they were in MM and LKQD. In other words, the FTT did not find that the appellant remained a danger to the community but that that danger could be mitigated by measures of containment and supervision. It found that the appellant himself had changed.
92. Taken to its logical conclusion, the implication of the respondent’s position would be that any change in an offender’s behaviour already brought about by therapy and medical treatment must be disregarded for the purposes of a future risk assessment. The risk posed by an alcoholic, for example, must be assessed not on the basis of their current understanding of their alcoholism, brought about through counselling, courses and participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, but from the theoretical, counter-factual position that the person had benefited from none of this treatment and support since the offending behaviour and none would be available in the future. If someone’s offending was linked to anger, similarly, any progress they had made through anger management courses and therapy would fall to be disregarded.
93. This is not consistent with the approach taken by probation officers, to which courts and tribunals are generally required to give considerable weight as expressing an expert assessment of future risk. Pre-sentence and OASys reports routinely consider the factors that contributed to an individual’s offending behaviour, and whether any of those factors have been addressed. This often includes considering how a person’s behaviour may have changed as a result, for example, of courses in anger management or victim empathy. Indeed, it is the respondent’s position in this appeal that the appellant’s failure to complete a course in victim empathy while in prison was of crucial relevance.
94. It is true that in AA (Poland) at [57], the Court of Appeal noted that the OASys report in that case “was not carried out for the purposes of the [EEA] Regulations nor was its methodology in harmony” with the principle that the seriousness of the threat posed by AA should have been assessed without regard to mitigating measures such as licence conditions on release, SHPOs, and notification requirements. However, those are all post-release measures of containment and supervision. These are not measures that, like those in this case, had already been in place for some time (the medication since 2017) and that had already led to a significant reduction in risk, as reflected in the unanimous opinion of the relevant professionals and the lack of reoffending while unescorted in the community. Nor were they voluntary, as the experts and the FTT found that the appellant’s engagement in treatment was.
95. For this reason, even if I had found that AA (Poland) applied, I would not have found that the FTT erred by distinguishing this case on its facts, as it did at [31].
96. Ground 2 has been put in several different ways. In the grounds of appeal, what the respondent appears to be saying at [11] is that in accordance with AA (Poland), the FTT should have disregarded all of the medical evidence regarding future risk, because it was commenting on the “efficacy of […] control and mitigation measures”. This is a fundamental misreading both of the medical evidence and the findings the FTT made on the basis of it. The medical evidence engaged in a detailed consideration of the appellant’s medical history from 2001 until shortly before the appeal and contained recent assessments both by an independent forensic psychiatrist and the appellant’s treating psychiatrist. These were far more than an assessment of the efficacy of future mitigating measures. They were an assessment of the risk the appellant currently posed, as a result of past and current treatment, and was likely to pose in the future if – as was considered likely – the currently established treatment were to continue. This is how it was understood by the FTT, as set out above at [71]-[72] of this decision.
97. At [8] of the grounds, the respondent submits that the FTT erred by failing to take into account three specific aspects of the OASys report: that the risk of harm in the community was “high”; that the appellant had not completed a recommended course in Victim Empathy; and that the “goal of ‘increased understanding of consequences of actions on self and others’ is recorded as ‘not achieved’.” This is not arguable. The FTT gave detailed and sustainable reasons for putting little weight on the OASys report, because it was written in 2022 by someone who had not spoken to the appellant since 2016 and had not taken into account any medical evidence since 2020. Having decided to place less weight on the OASys report as a whole, the FTT was not obliged to dismiss each specific argument that the respondent had made on the basis of it. It is trite that tribunal judges are not required to deal with every submission made by the parties.
98. At the hearing before me, Mr Pugh pursued two new lines of argument . The first was that the FTT was wrong to put weight on the medical evidence because it was based on what the appellant told those treating him. He then withdrew this submission, recognising that – as had been repeatedly noted by the FTT – the respondent had raised no criticisms of the medical evidence. His final submission was that the appellant’s failure to complete a Victim Empathy course in prison was of such significance that the FTT was required to deal with it. This was because it significantly undermined the more recent medical evidence suggesting that he would continue to comply with his medication regime and treatment in the future. He submitted that there was a “fundamental distinction between treatment complied with voluntarily” and treatment that was “at some level coerced.” He did not explain on what basis the appellant’s current compliance with his medication and treatment should be considered to fall into the latter category (in spite of the repeated references to voluntary engagement), while attendance at the course in prison would have fallen into the former.
99. This is a truly hopeless submission. The OASys report makes it clear that the reason that the appellant had not completed the Victim Empathy course was that it was a course offered only in prison, and that he had not completed it because he had been transferred to hospital. Compliance – voluntary or coerced – had nothing to do with it. Even if he had refused to complete the course prior to his transfer to hospital in 2016 (something for which there is no direct evidence), it is difficult to see the relevance, let alone the fundamental importance, of this fact to the appellant’s compliance with medication and treatment nine years later.
100. The final aspect of Ground Two is equally unfounded. The respondent says that he FTT failed to take into account the periods of time that the appellant was prevented from reoffending because he was incarcerated. This is simply inaccurate. When placing weight on the many years in which the appellant had not offended, the FTT explicitly acknowledged that the appellant had “spent considerable time detained under the Mental health Act”:[33]. It also, as noted repeatedly above, placed weight on the evidence of the appellant’s conduct during the his periods of open release in the community, which demonstrated its awareness of the importance of considering the appellant’s conduct when not detained.
101. For these reasons, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no errors of law requiring it to be set aside.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 23 May 2025 is upheld, with the result that the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to revoke his refugee status is allowed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

05 March 2026