Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003998

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/52156/2024
LE/00298/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

ADAR YOUSSOUF DOUALEH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Shahzad, Solicitor, Selva & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 2 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a citizen of Djibouti, appeals, with permission, the decision of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant her an EUSS family permit as the dependent mother of her daughter the sponsor.
Background
2. In the refusal letter, the respondent indicated that no evidence had been provided to support the family relationship, but the existence of the relationship was later conceded. The respondent said that the provision of money transfers dated between November 2021 and November 2023 and the appellant’s bank statements did not prove that the appellant was financially dependent upon the sponsor. The respondent said that they would expect to see evidence which fully detailed the appellant’s own circumstances to prove that without the financial support of the sponsor, the appellant’s essential living needs could not be met.
3. The presenting officer at the hearing before the FTJ submitted that the appellant had failed to provide a statement outlining her circumstances, and that her mobile statements showed credits from many other people whom the sponsor could not identify.
4. The FTJ found that:
(i) the monthly money transfer receipts from the sponsor did not match the appellant’s mobile bank statements and there were numerous deposits shown on the appellant’s mobile bank statements as “Fatima Ali Cabdi” which the sponsor said was a mistake as to her name made by the money transfer company. Again, many of those deposits did not match the money transfer receipts. Neither the money transfer receipts nor the appellant’s mobile statement could be relied upon;
(ii) there seemed to be numerous others who deposited money to the appellant’s mobile account which could not be explained by the sponsor; the evidence provided regarding the appellant’s finances and expenditure was unreliable and confusing;
(iii) She had been provided with no evidence at all to show that the sponsor paid for the appellant’s essential daily living needs either wholly or in part. The receipts in isolation were not sufficient to indicate that the money used came from the sponsor. She had been provided with no evidence at all to demonstrate the appellant’s own personal circumstances despite the omission being clearly stated in the refusal letter. She had seen nothing to demonstrate the appellant’s own circumstances. The appellant had failed to show that she was reliant on the sponsor’s financial support to meet her essential living needs.

Grounds; discussion, conclusions
5. The grounds fall into two parts. I use the characterisation in the skeleton argument which is unhelpfully slightly different from that in the grounds although overall the same material is covered. The first part (grounds 1 to 2) avers that the judge misunderstood the TELESOM documents, as they were not mobile bank statements, but rather spending from a mobile wallet system. Not all the funds sent by the sponsor went into that system, some being collected from money transfer agencies. Moreover, the respondent had not challenged the authenticity of the money transfer receipts or the TELESOM activity or indeed utility bills and other receipts. Holding that the money transfer receipts and the TELESOM statements could not be relied upon exceeded the scope of the issues and raised new credibility concerns which had not been put to the appellant and she never had an opportunity to address.
6. The second part of the grounds (grounds 3 to 6) avers that the judge did not consider the documentary evidence there was of the appellant’s expenditure and essential needs and when stating that there was no evidence at all to demonstrate the appellant’s personal circumstances overlooked the appellant’s age, medical evidence and the witness evidence that she lived alone and was reliant on her daughter. The conclusion that no evidence at all was provided was irrational (ground 6), the FTJ had failed to apply the correct test for dependency (ground 5), and she had failed to consider Withdrawal Agreement rights (ground 7).
7. Mr Lawson conceded that the FTJ had made material errors of law.
8. Whilst there is nothing to indicate that the FTJ applied the wrong test for dependency, the Withdrawal Agreement ground adds nothing, and it might be said that it was for the appellant to explain how the TELESOM system worked, I agree that the other grounds have force.
9. The respondent did not challenge the reliability of the money transfer receipts or the TELESOM statements. The presenting officer’s case was that the appellant appeared to be receiving money transfers from many other people. In those circumstances, in a similar way as in Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, the appellant would not have been expecting a challenge to the reliability of the documents and accordingly there was procedural unfairness in the FTJ making adverse findings without the appellant having an opportunity to address those concerns.
10. Most significantly, it is simply not right to say that the FTJ was not provided with any evidence at all to show that the sponsor paid for the appellant’s essential living needs or that she had been provided with no evidence at all to demonstrate the appellant’s personal circumstances. Whilst receipts for everyday bills cannot demonstrate the source of the monies used to pay those bills, it is not right to say that there was no evidence, because the FTJ had the witness evidence of the sponsor which spoke to the appellant’s circumstances, roughly how much money she received from the sponsor and roughly how much money she spent on various items. Of course, it was open to the FTJ to reject that evidence but if she were to reject that evidence, proper reasons needed to be given. No reasons were given as the FTJ simply concluded that she had not been provided with any evidence at all on the point. Accordingly she erred in law.
11. Whilst the FTJ was entitled to conclude that the evidence of the TELESOM system was confusing and that the deposits to the appellant’s mobile accounts apparently in the name of others could not be explained by the sponsor, she still needed to evaluate the sponsor’s overall evidence that since 2020 she had been financially supporting the appellant her mother, a widow (corroborated by documentary evidence) with health conditions (corroborated by documentary evidence). Absent such evaluation, the errors are material ones. Although there may have been shortcomings in the evidence about the appellant’s TELESOM account, I cannot say that it is clear on the materials before the FTJ that any rational tribunal would have dismissed the appeal.
12. The representatives were agreed that the appeal needed to be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for a fresh decision to be made. No findings are preserved.
13. The appellant will be able to adduce further evidence before the First-Tier Tribunal and would be well advised to adduce evidence explaining how the TELESOM system works and explaining the entries on the statement which the FTJ found confusing.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal at Birmingham for rehearing before another judge.
No findings are preserved.
A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 December 2025