Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004013

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57708/2024
LP/00606/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31st December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between

M.S.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Panagiotopoulou (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 4 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the Appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Turkey. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice but I am satisfied, taking the Appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 10th June 2025 (“the Decision”), of the FtT to dismiss his appeal on all grounds.

Background

3. The broad factual background to the appeal is not in dispute between the Parties. The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return to Turkey on account of his actual and imputed political opinion, specifically his association with the HPD and suspected association with the PKK in the context of his and his family members’ long-standing political involvement and support of pro-Kurdish political movements. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim to protection.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The Appellant appealed the Respondent’s refusal of his claim to the FtT. His appeal was dismissed on all grounds. The FtT did not accept the factual premise of the Appellant’s claim.

5. The Appellant contends that the FtT has erred in law. There are 7 Grounds of Appeal each of which were pursued before me. They are, in summary, as follows:
i. Ground 1 – the FtT has erred in failing to have any regard to/reach findings on documentary evidence submitted in support of the Appellant’s claim
ii. Grounds 2, 4 & 5 - the FtT has erred in its assessment of the evidence;
iii. Ground 3 & 6 – the FtT has erred in failing to have regard to the Appellant’s family’s profile when assessing risk upon return;
iv. Ground 7 – the FtT has erred in the assessment of the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom and the risk to him arising therefrom.

6. In a decision dated 29th September 2025 the Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal. That permission was not limited.

7. At the error of law hearing, Ms Panagiotopoulou made oral submissions and relied upon the Grounds of Appeal. Ms Nolan relied upon the Rule 24 response and submitted that the Decision must be read as a whole and that the FtT had come to reasoned and sustainable findings, demonstrably informed by all of the evidence. I mean no disrespect to either advocate by not setting out their submissions in full; I have considered them carefully.

Discussion
8. As the Court of Appeal in MH Bangladesh v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688 emphasised, “there have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT” [29]

9. I remind myself of the following principles taken from Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i. an appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. as an appellate court, the Upper Tribunal it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the FtT has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the FtT does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iii. Reasons will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

Ground 1

10. By this Ground of Appeal, it is contended that the FtT has erred in failing to have regard to:
i. An HDP application form receipt said to corroborate the Appellant’s claim to have become a member of the of the HDP party in 2017;
ii. A letter from a local Muhtar said to corroborate the Appellant’s claim to have been involved with the DEM party, targeted by the authorities in Turkey, and to be currently wanted.

11. It is said that these documents went to the core of the Appellant’s factual claim.

12. Whilst it is correct to observe that the FtT does not refer specifically to the documents cited at [10] I am far from satisfied that it follows that the FtT failed to have regard to them. That is because:
i. at [16] the FtT lists all of the bundles of documentary evidence before the Tribunal. That list includes the bundles containing the 2 documents set out above;
ii. at [17] the FtT records that “I confirm that I have had regard to all documents and a failure to refer to specific document should not be taken as a failure to consider them”;
iii. at [45] the FtT finds that “The onus is on the Appellant to show that the evidence he wishes to rely on can be relied on, in accordance with the Tanveer Ahmed caselaw principle. Given the credibility issues in this claim and for these reasons, I am not satisfied that the evidence provided demonstrated his involvement with the HDP as claimed having looked at the evidence in the round.”

13. I remind myself that I am bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the FtT has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that the FtT does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that it overlooked it. The Decision of the FtT is careful and detailed and over the course of [28-51] the FtT considers the detail of the Appellant’s factual claim. Far from compelling evidence to contrary, I find that there is evidence to support the fact that the FtT did take into account all of the documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant, including that set out at [10] above and, when considering it in the round, found the Appellant had not shown it to be reliable. There is no error of law in the approach of the FtT.

Grounds 2, 4 & 5

14. It is convenient to take these Grounds of Appeal together as they each challenge the manner in which the FtT has assessed discrete aspects of the evidence before the Tribunal.

15. For the following reasons I do not find that the FtT has erred in law as contended for in Grounds 2, 4 and 5 and by Ms Panagiotopoulou before me.

16. Ground 2 contends that the FtT erred in the assessment of a letter from Baris Kemaloglu through a failure to have regard to the totality of the Appellant’s oral evidence. The Ground relies upon an assertion by Ms Panagiotopoulou, as the author of the Grounds of Appeal and as the advocate who appeared both before me and in the FtT, as to what was said at the hearing in the FtT by the Appellant. Whilst it might have been prudent for a witness statement to be provided by Ms Panagiotopoulou (see BW (witness statements by advocates) Afghanistan [2014] UKUT 00568 (IAC) and a different advocate instructed to appear before me, it is not the case that the Respondent, whether in the Rule 24 Response or at any time, has contested what has been set out in the Grounds of Appeal. In any event, even at its highest, for the reasons below I find Ground 2 is not made out.

17. At [42] the FtT finds that “… he explained during oral evidence that his father obtained this letter on his behalf, but his sibling sent it to him by What’s App because his father was elderly and not good with technology. However, he did not provide evidence of communication via What’s App by way of screenshots, showing the way he obtained the letter”. Ground 2 maintains that the Appellant, when asked in cross examination “Have you included evidence of the chat in your evidence” responded “No, but I can show it to you right now. My sibling sent it as my father is old and does not know how”. It is argued that the FtT has acted unfairly in finding that no evidence of the communication was provided given the Appellant’s offer, in oral evidence, to show the Presenting Officer. The difficulty with that submission, in my view, is that there was no application to place the communication that the Appellant was referring to before the Tribunal as evidence. These are adversarial proceedings. It was open to Ms Panagiotopoulou to have asked for time to liaise with the Appellant and make any relevant application but as she accepted before me, she did not do so. As such the FtT, having clearly directed itself to the Appellant’s oral evidence, correctly recorded that evidence, in an admissible form such as screenshots, of the WhatsApp communication between the Appellant and his sibling had not been produced.

18. Ground 4 avers that the FtT has made factual errors but for the reasons below, I do not find that to be the case:
i. It is argued that the FtT erred in fact when assuming that the Appellant was living in his home village, Hasanova, at the time his village was raided in December 2019 and thereby erred in law in finding that the fact the Appellant was not arrested whilst other of his relatives were detracted from his account to be at risk on return. I agree with Ms Nolan that on the evidence that was before the Tribunal, there is no error of fact and the finding at [51] was open to the FtT. Whilst the Appellant does say in his witness statement that in 2017 he started University in Erzurum and graduated in 2020 [4] he does not that he was not in his home village during the raid. Furthermore, the FtT at [51] finds “That operation in 2019 was a well-known event, conducted by the Turkish authorities to suppress unwanted political activities, but the Appellant was not targeted, even though he claimed to be already heavily involved with the HDP by that time” That finding is not tethered to the location of the raid;
ii. Insofar as it is argued that the FtT has erred in fact at [36 & 37] and mistakenly considered that the Appellant gave evidence that he had posted photos of his own activities in protests in Turkey on social media, that is demonstrably not the case. At [35-37] the FtT is evidently aware that the Appellant’s account contained two parallel narratives (i) there were photographs of him attending demonstrations on a mobile telephone that he no longer had access to [35] and (ii) the Appellant had given evidence that he also posted about the protests in Turkey on social media [36]. There is no error of fact.

19. As to Ground 5, this amounts to no more than a disagreement with the findings of the FtT. As Ms Panagiotopoulou pragmatically accepted before me, taken in isolation this generic Ground of Appeal is not strong. The finding that the Appellant’s evidence lacked detail was plainly open to the FtT for the reasons given. It is clear that the Appellant was asked a number of questions in interview and, citing specific examples, the FtT was entitled to come to the view that those answers were basic and general. The FtT does not simply refer to the Appellant’s answers in interview. Reference is made to the Appellant’s initial witness statement [30 &31] which the FtT also found to lack detail. There is no error of law in the approach or findings of the FtT.

Grounds 3 and 6

20. These Grounds of Appeal are taken together as they relate to the findings of the FtT as to the relevance of the Appellant’s family’s political profile.

21. The FtT found that “It is not disputed that the Appellant came from a background of extended family members having been heavily involved in political activities in Turkey, many of whom fled Turkey, arrived in the UK and (sic) granted refugee status here” [49]

22. Ground 3 avers that the FtT erred in failing to take the Appellant’s family’s profile into account when considering the profile imputed to him by the authorities in Turkey. This Ground is not made out for the following reasons:
i. The FtT clearly took account of the evidence before the Tribunal of the Appellant’s family’s profile [49 & 50] and directly engages with the question of the profile imputed to him by the Turkish authorities.
ii. At [49] the FtT finds that “it is perfectly normal for some family members not to be involved politically whilst others have been and still are …”and importantly then goes on to find that “Furthermore, whilst there is plenty of evidence describing the other family members political involvement leading to persecution by the Turkish authorities in the appeal bundles, the Appellant has not been directly named or mentioned in any of those materials, linking his associations to them for political reasons or due to adverse interests. Also, the Appellant’s accounts in relation to his support and involvement with the HDP lacked details, therefore it is not persuasive that those led to adverse interests as claimed.” [50]. Those were findings open to the FtT;
iii. It has not been shown, as contended for in the Grounds of Appeal, that the FtT erred in its understanding of how the Appellant put his case. On the contrary, the FtT plainly understood, but having considered the evidence in the round, did not accept the account for the sustainable reasons given.

23. Ground 6 argues that the FtT has failed to have regard to the Appellant’s family’s political profile and his area of origin when coming to conclusions going to risk on return and thereby materially erred in law. I don’t agree. First of all, at [59 & 60] of the Decision the FtT expressly directs itself to IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312. Secondly, the FtT re-iterates the earlier finding at [50] that “I do not accept that he was subject to adverse interests previously as claimed due to perceived associations with the PKK, and his involvement with the HDP” and at [57] the FtT concluded that “I do not accept the material facts of the Appellant’s claim on the balance of probabilities, that he was a supporter of the HDP, detained by the Turkish authorities as claimed due to perceived associations of him to the PKK as a result of political activities with the HDP and familial connection associated to the PKK”. It is apparent that the FtT took account of the Appellant’s familial connections but found that the Appellant himself was not at risk. That finding was one open to the FtT for the reasons given. Having taken account of his factual claim and the evidence in evident detail, there is no reason to consider that the FtT did not take account of the Appellant’s area of origin when assessing the risk to him on return to Turkey.

Ground 7

24. The Appellant contends that the FtT has erred materially at [54] in failing to have regard to the fact that his sur place activities necessarily took place after his claim to protection was made and was therefore wrong to conclude that those activities were conducted to bolster his claim. That contention is not made out. The finding of the FtT requires to be read in full. The FtT finds that “I do not accept that his support towards the KPDA is an extension of his support from his involvement with the HDP because I have not accepted the material facts of his account. In the absence of active political involvements prior to leaving Turkey, the Sur Place activities which predominantly took place after the asylum claim was made, is likely to be attempts made to fabricate his claim” [54] It was open to the FtT to find, having considered the evidence in the round, that the Appellant’s sur place activities were an attempt to bolster his claim to protection. The timing of those activities was but one aspect of the evidence which the FtT was entitled to take into account.

25. Contrary to the assertion in the Grounds of Appeal, the FtT took account of the nature of the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom and his profile and found “there is no evidence that the Appellant’s activities in the UK have received attention. It is not reasonable to assume that the Turkish authorities have the resources to monitor all dissident activities in countries across the world, including those of the Appellant’s without evidence of a protracted profile attracting their attention.” [56] That approach is consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) wherein it found no error in a finding, made in the context of MH’s political profile, that “there is no evidence that it is likely that the Bangladeshi government films, photographs or monitors all those who demonstrate or speak out in public against the regime in the UK. Bearing in mind the large number of people of Bangladeshi heritage in the UK, and the likelihood that a significant proportion of those are sympathetic to the BNP” [42].

26. There is no error of law in the Decision of the FtT.

Conclusion

27. The Decision of the FtT must be read as a whole. The Grounds of Appeal, whilst lengthy, do not (whether considered singly or cumulatively) demonstrate that the Decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error of law.

Notice of Decision

The Decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Roxanne Frantzis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th December 2025