UI-2025-004014
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004014
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60180/2024
LP/07664/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th of May 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON
Between
EK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, instructed by Lexmark Legal
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 16 February 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, an Albanian national born on 11th November 2002, appeals against the decision of FtT Judge Chana (the judge) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal dated 28th March 2024 of her protection and human rights claim. Although the appellant applied out of time the FtT when granting permission to appeal extended the time for application.
2. The grounds of appeal in summary assert that
(i) The judge omitted to consider highly relevant and material evidence, notably the Conclusive Grounds (CG) decision, resulting in unfairness.
(ii) The judge erred in failing to consider the respondent’s concession that the appellant was abused by her father
(iii) The judge failed to apply properly the country guidance case
(iv) The article 8 assessment was, as a result, arguably flawed.
3. In relation to ground (i) At [6] the judge referenced the reasonable grounds (RG) decision of the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) dated 29th March 2023 but failed to reference in the determination the CG decision dated 20th November 2024 whereby the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority (IECA) held there were conclusive grounds accepting the appellant as a victim of modern slavery (VoT) (as the grounds recorded) and that the appellant had been subject to ‘Forced criminality and sexual exploitation in Albania, from approximately July 2019 – August 2022’.
4. The CG decision held to a higher standard of proof (balance of probabilities) the appellant’s claim on the balance of probabilities. The judge had to engage with that CG decision and failed to do so, Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163. Thus, the appellant’s credibility was improperly assessed.
5. Similarly in relation to ground (ii) the judge failed to even acknowledge or engage with the concession made by the refusal decision of the Secretary of State. The judge had gone behind that concession.
6. In effect, as a result the country guidance and article 8 assessments were flawed.
Submissions
7. Mr West submitted in support of ground (i) that the chronology was important. He accepted that grounds (iii) and (iv) were parasitic on the first two grounds. The RG decision only considered the screening interview, but the asylum interview took place on 24th April 2023 prior to the CG decision. Additionally, the Secretary of State’s refusal decision took place prior to the CG decision on 20th November 2024. The judge disputed the timeline of events and whilst finding the appellant inconsistent, but the CG decision accepted that she had been subject to forced criminality and sexual exploitation. That CG decision was not addressed. Mr West accepted that the judge was not bound to accept the CG decision as per MS (Pakistan) [2020] UKSC 9, but the judge did need to show she had at least engaged with it. The credibility findings were merely lifted from the Secretary of State’s refusal. There was no indication that there was any challenge to the CG decision. The level of risk and obtaining protection were linked.
8. Ms Clewley relied on the rule 24 response and noted that the presenting officer relied on MS (Pakistan). It was important to look at the CG decision itself. There was no finding of trafficking. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not a VoT was not mistaken.
9. In relation to ground (ii) notwithstanding the concession, the judge found sufficiency of protection [18] as the father was a non-state agent and there was no continuing interest from the father from the date she left home [17]. The appellant could receive support from the aunt and was in touch with her sisters.
Conclusions
10. The CG decision set out in somewhat confusing terms as follows:
‘The Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority has carefully considered your case. On 28 April 2023 we said there were Reasonable Grounds to accept you may be a victim of modern slavery (human trafficking and / or slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour).
Following further enquiries into your case, the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority has concluded that there are Conclusive Grounds to accept you are a victim of modern slavery.
Our decision
We found the following types of exploitation occurred:
Forced criminality and sexual exploitation in Albania, from approximately July 2019 – August 2022.
However, we could not find grounds of modern slavery in all instances. The reasons for not accepting these instances are explained below.
…
SUMMARY
For the reasons outlined above, it is not accepted that you are a victim of modern slavery. Your account of events in Albania during 2017 - 2018 is not considered to constitute modern slavery for the reasons set out above.
DECISION
Taken cumulatively, there are not considered to be Conclusive Grounds to believe that you were subjected to modern slavery (human trafficking and or slavery, servitude or forced/compulsory labour). Consequently, a negative Conclusive Grounds decision has been made
For more information about the definitions of modern slavery, exploitation types and the criteria we used to assess this decision please refer to the attached Decision Annex.’
11. Notwithstanding the Delphic terms in which the CG is expressed, what is clear is that the judge failed to acknowledge and factor into her assessment the CG decision. The strong indication is, from reading the decision, that the judge was not aware of the CG decision is that at [6] the judge references the RG decision but not the CG decision. I am not persuaded that in this particular instance, that Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 para [2(iii)] can be used to justify the failure to mention the CG decision in the light of the other findings made. I accept that the CG decision does not refer, contrary to the initial grounds, to the appellant being a victim of trafficking but it does reference modern slavery. It also identifies the appellant as being a victim of criminality and sexual exploitation. The CG decision might thus influence the credibility assessment. Many of the findings of the judge appeared to be similar to those within the Secretary of State’s refusal letter, which does not address the CG decision or factor in the later evidence of the appellant.
12. The judge is not bound by the CG decision, which could be interpreted as inconsistent, but in view of the standard of proof engaged in the CG decision, and the apparent contradiction with the findings of the judge, for example, that the appellant ‘had no boyfriend’ [15], which is at odds with the CG decision, the findings of the judge indicate she ignored, impermissibly, the CG decision altogether.
13. In particular, the judge records at [21] ‘The appellant’s claim that she has been exploited and trafficked in the past has not been accepted.’ Ms Clewley thought this referenced the judge’s recording of the respondent’s position whilst Mr West thought this was the judge’s view. This cannot be referring to the CG decision which found the appellant had been exploited and demonstrates the lack of clarity in the findings. It is not clear whether this was the judge’s finding or not. That was a key issue. Even if the issue on trafficking specifically was not accepted by the CG, the CG on modern slavery/sexual exploitation was a matter which the judge needed to address, and which might affect the credibility assessment.
14. The judge does not have to follow the CG decision but must at least acknowledge and factor into the credibility assessment, the CG decision particularly in view of the timeline and the lack of clarity on what was accepted. Even if rejected, there needed to be an explanation why the judge departed from the CG decision or how it would affect her assessment on credibility. Nowhere is that explained. In terms of materiality, it is not clear that the decision would be the same if such as assessment which should include the relevant material had been made. This was therefore a material error of law.
15. Additionally, although the judge found the nature of the abuse from the father was inconsistent [16], she did not appear to factor in the concession of the respondent. At the very least the judge needed to address whether this was a concession.
16. Although the judge considered that there was sufficiency of protection [18] and referenced TD and AD (trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), without a proper assessment on credibility which goes to the heart of the decision, the assessment of protection is unsound as would be the assessment on article 8.
17. In view of my finding on ground (i) which was fundamental to the decision as a whole, I find that the decision as a whole should be set aside. The remaining grounds were dependent on the key finding on credibility.
18. I canvassed with the parties the matter of disposal and both agreed the matter should be remitted to the FtT.
Notice of Decision
The Judge erred materially for the reasons identified. I set aside the decision pursuant to Section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCE 2007). Bearing in mind the nature and extent of the findings to be made the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal under section 12(2) (b) (i) of the TCE 2007 and further to 7.2 (b) of the Presidential Practice Statement.
H Rimington
Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30th April 2026