Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004026
UI-2025-004027

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56489/2024
LH/00534/2025
HU/56495/2024
LH/00533/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:
On 13 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

a1
a2
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Ms Lydya Marshall-Bain, Counsel, instructed by SS Basi & Co LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Amrika Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re‑making of the decision in the appeals brought by two children, A1 and A2, against the Secretary of State’s decisions to refuse the human rights claims made in their applications for entry clearance to the United Kingdom. They seek to join their father, Mr Obinna Frank Nwosu, who, among other matters, has been convicted of sexual activity by penetration with a female child aged 13.
2. A1 and A2 have been granted anonymity. I will not name them in this decision, nor will I name their younger sibling. The victim of Mr Nwosu’s offending, who is not related to him, is protected by lifetime anonymity by law. I have, however, decided to refer to Mr Nwosu and his wife by their names. They do not enjoy anonymity. Mr Nwosu was not anonymised in the criminal proceedings. As noted in Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2022, Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, at [25], the fact that someone has committed a criminal offence will not justify the making of an anonymity order, even if it is known that such a person has children who may be more readily identified if the details of the person are known. The principle of open justice, which promotes the rule of law and public confidence in the legal system, requires referring to adults by their names.
Factual background
3. A1 and A2 are citizens of Nigeria. A1 is a boy born in 2016. A2 is a girl born in 2017. They reside in Nigeria. Their father, Mr Nwosu, is present and settled in the United Kingdom.
4. On 9 August 2010, Mr Nwosu was convicted at Bournemouth Crown Court of sexual activity by penetration with a female child under the age of 16. He was initially charged with rape. He pleaded guilty to sexual activity with a child. The Crown Prosecution Service considered the matter and concluded that, in light of the guilty plea to sexual activity with a child, they would not seek a trial on the charge of rape. He, along with another individual, went out in a car to pick up a prostitute for sexual activity. Instead, they picked up a troubled female child aged 13. According to the sentencing remarks, their lust overruled their better judgement and they took advantage of the situation. Mr Nwosu had full sexual intercourse with the child victim, whereas his co‑offender inserted his finger into her vagina. They stated that the child got into their car willingly and that what happened was with her consent. However, as the sentencing judge pointed out, they did not reasonably believe that she was 16 or over. The sentencing judge took what he referred to as an exceptional course in light of the circumstances and imposed a sentence at a level significantly below the sentencing guidelines. Mr Nwosu was sentenced to 50 weeks in custody, and his co‑offender was sentenced to 44 weeks in custody. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) increased his sentence on 25 November 2010 to 2 years in custody.
5. This is not Mr Nwosu’s only criminal conviction. On 19 March 2010, he was convicted at Bournemouth Crown Court of four counts of acquiring criminal property, four counts of money laundering, and one count of possession of a Class A drug. He received concurrent sentences of four weeks in custody for those offences. He was convicted of driving offences on 20 November 2017 and of failing to surrender on 8 March 2017, and received non‑custodial sentences.
6. In 2014, when Mr Nwosu was visiting Nigeria, he commenced a relationship with Ms Stella Akudo Oduh, a Nigerian national. A1 and A2 are their children, born in 2016 and 2017 respectively, in Nigeria. Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh married in 2021. Ms Oduh, along with A1 and A2, made applications to join Mr Nwosu in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State granted Ms Oduh’s application but refused the applications made by A1 and A2 on 24 April 2024. In short, the Secretary of State considered that Mr Nwosu posed a risk to A1 and A2 in light of his criminal conviction against a child.
7. A1 and A2 appealed against the Secretary of State’s decisions to the First‑tier Tribunal. The First‑tier Tribunal (First-tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton) heard their appeals on 20 May 2025 and allowed them on Article 8 grounds in a decision promulgated on 18 June 2025. The Upper Tribunal (Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Malik KC) heard the Secretary of State’s appeal from the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision on 28 November 2025. By a decision promulgated on 25 February 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision as being wrong in law. The Upper Tribunal retained the appeals for the purpose of re‑making the decision and issued further case management directions.
8. In the meantime, on 10 June 2024, Ms Oduh arrived in the United Kingdom, leaving A1 and A2 in Nigeria, and joined Mr Nwosu. She has leave to remain in the United Kingdom until 1 February 2027. She gave birth to another child (“C”), a girl, on 7 August 2025 in Guildford. C is a British citizen.
Appeal hearing
9. At the appeal hearing listed before me, Ms Lydya Marshall‑Bain appeared on behalf of A1 and A2, whereas the Secretary of State was represented by Ms Amrika Nolan. I am grateful to both representatives for their assistance.
10. In its direction issued on 25 February 2026, the Upper Tribunal directed A1 and A2 to file and serve a new composite hearing bundle no later than 10 days before the hearing. There was also a direction requiring A1 and A2 to file a skeleton argument and a composite authorities bundle no later than 5 days before the hearing. Accordingly, the deadline to file a new composite hearing bundle was 8 June 2026, whereas the deadline to file a skeleton argument and a composite authorities bundle was 15 June 2026. Regrettably, there was a wholesale failure to comply with the Upper Tribunal’s directions. In light of the failure to file the new composite hearing bundle by 8 June 2026, the Upper Tribunal wrote to those representing A1 and A1 on 9 June 2026 reminding them of the deadline in the directions issued on 25 February 2026. They were asked to file any further documents by 15 June 2026. Despite this reminder, they failed to comply with the Upper Tribunal’s directions.
11. On 15 June 2026, they filed a bundle consistent of 33 pages. It was not a new composite hearing bundle, directed by the Upper Tribunal on 25 February 2026. There should have been one composite bundle with all relevant documents. In any event, the bundle filed did not comply with the President’s Guidance Note, CE File and Electronic Bundles. Contrary to paragraph 9, the digital PDF page numbers do not correspond to the paginated page numbers. Contrary to paragraph 12, there are no hyperlinks on the index. Contrary to paragraph 13, there is no bookmarking. Contrary to paragraph 17, the bundle is not text‑based and appears to be a scan of a hard‑copy bundle. No optical character recognition was undertaken, so the text was not word‑searchable and comments or highlights could not be imposed. The non‑compliance with these mandatory requirements made it quite difficult to navigate this bundle.
12. Accordingly, when the hearing commenced before me, there was no new composite bundle filed on behalf of A1 and A2. There was no skeleton argument on their behalf. There was no authorities bundle. I asked Ms Marshall‑Bain to take instructions and provide a reason for the non‑compliance. She took time but, unfortunately, was not able to provide any explanation for the default. With considerable reluctance, I admitted the 33‑page bundle but directed that an explanation be provided as to why there was a failure to comply with the Upper Tribunal’s directions. I also had before me the original composite bundle prepared by the Secretary of State for the earlier error of law hearing, which included all documents that were before the First‑tier Tribunal.
13. There was a further problem with the 33‑page bundle. It contains letters written by Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh. Ms Marshall‑Bain informed me that she intended to call them for oral evidence and would ask them to adopt those letters. This was an unsatisfactory invitation. Letters are not witness statements. If the intention was to call Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh to give oral evidence, witness statements should have been provided to stand as evidence‑in‑chief. Again, with considerable reluctance, I accepted Ms Marshall‑Bain’s invitation and allowed her to call Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh to give oral evidence.
14. Those representing A1 and A2 wrote to the Upper Tribunal following the hearing, stating that they were directed to file and serve the bundle by 15 June 2026, and that it was filed on the portal on that date. No explanation has been provided for the failure to provide a skeleton argument or an authorities bundle. Likewise, there is no explanation for the failure to provide a new composite hearing bundle, nor for providing a non‑compliant 33‑page bundle.
15. Mr Nwosu adopted his letter of 15 June 2026 and his witness statement of 22 July 2024, made at the First‑tier Tribunal, in examination‑in‑chief. Ms Oduh adopted her letter of 15 June 2026 and her witness statement of 3 July 2024, made at the First‑tier Tribunal, in examination‑in‑chief. They were both cross‑examined by Ms Nolan. I then heard detailed closing submissions from Ms Nolan and Ms Marshall‑Bain respectively. In short, Ms Nolan submitted that the requirements of the Immigration Rules are not met and that the interference with Article 8 rights is justified and proportionate. She invited me to dismiss the appeals. In short, Ms Marshall‑Bain accepted that the requirements of the Immigration Rules were not met, but invited me to find that the interference with Article 8 rights is unjustified and disproportionate. She invited me to allow the appeals.
Immigration Rules
16. Paragraph GEN.1.1 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules provides:
“GEN.1.1. This route is for those seeking to enter or remain in the UK on the basis of their family life with a person who is a British Citizen, is settled in the UK, is in the UK with protection status (and the applicant cannot seek entry clearance or permission as their family member under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of these rules), is in the UK with permission as a Stateless person, is in the UK with limited leave under Appendix EU, or is in the UK with limited leave as a worker or business person by virtue of either Appendix ECAA Extension of Stay or under the provisions of the relevant 1973 Immigration Rules (or Decision 1/80) that underpinned the European Community Association Agreement (ECAA) with Turkey prior to 1 January 2021. It sets out the requirements to be met and, in considering applications under this route, it reflects how, under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, the balance will be struck between the right to respect for private and family life and the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and the economic well-being of the UK; the prevention of disorder and crime; the protection of health or morals; and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (and in doing so also reflects the relevant public interest considerations as set out in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). It also takes into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK, in line with the Secretary of State’s duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.”
17. Section EC‑C of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules sets out the requirements for entry clearance as a child. So far as relevant, paragraph EC‑C1.1 of the Immigration Rules provides:
“EC-C.1.1. The requirements to be met for entry clearance as a child are that-
… (c) the applicant must not fall for refusal under any of the grounds in Section S-EC: Suitability for entry clearance; …”
18. The suitability requirements in Section S‑EC of Appendix FM include the following:
“S-EC.1.9. The Secretary of State considers that the applicant’s parent or parent’s partner poses a risk to the applicant. That person may be considered to pose a risk to the applicant if, for example, they –
(a) have a conviction as an adult, whether in the UK or overseas, for an offence against a child;
(b) are a registered sex offender and have failed to comply with any notification requirements; or
(c) are required to comply with a sexual risk order made under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and have failed to do so.”
19. Paragraph GEN.3.2 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules provides:
“GEN.3.2.(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), where an application for entry clearance or leave to enter or remain made under this Appendix, or an application for leave to remain which has otherwise been considered under this Appendix, does not otherwise meet the requirements of this Appendix or Part 9 of the Rules, the decision-maker must consider whether the circumstances in sub-paragraph (2) apply.
(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) above applies, the decision-maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance, or leave to enter or remain, a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant, their partner, a relevant child or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from that information would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.
(3) Where the exceptional circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (2) above apply, the applicant will be granted entry clearance or leave to enter or remain under, as appropriate, paragraph D-ECP.1.2., D-LTRP.1.2., D-ECC.1.1., D-LTRC.1.1., D-ECPT.1.2. or D-LTRPT.1.2.”
Findings and discussion
20. I find Ms Oduh to be a credible witness. Her responses to Ms Nolan’s questions were measured and consistent. She appeared to be someone who was genuinely trying to assist me in establishing the facts. I accept her evidence. Separation from A1 and A2 has been an agonising experience for her. She has missed them deeply and consistently. A1 and A2 currently reside with her sister in Nigeria in rented accommodation. Mr Nwosu sends remittances to Nigeria for their support. They both attend school. Ms Oduh feels that Nigeria is not safe, and she wishes A1 and A2 to join the family in the United Kingdom.
21. On the other hand, I find Mr Nwosu to be a thoroughly dishonest witness. He was seeking to manipulate evidence and would not hesitate to advance falsehoods if it served his purpose. In his witness statement of 22 July 2024, which he adopted as part of his evidence‑in‑chief, he stated as follows:
“Leading up to the offence I was at home. My co-defendant Stephen came to pick me up so we could go out. We went to Bournemouth Town. We had food and drink, on the way-back home one lady flagged us to stop. My friend was driving and pulled over. They started talking and she wanted a drink which my friend bought for her from the off license. My friend then drove us to the sea front. We had a few more drinks. My friend and her kissed and were intimate. I had left car to smoke a cigarette. I had no sex with the alleged victim. She then wanted a lift to the train station where we dropped her. My friend dropped me home. The next day the police came to my house. I was interviewed, I denied sexual conduct. I was told the alleged victim was 13 years old. The police charged Stephen and I. The solicitor advised Stephen and I to plead guilty. I received a custodial sentence for less than a year. This was a one-off incident which I wanted to forget and move on with my life. I totally regretted the offence and having Stephen as a friend.”
22. This is a blatant lie. Mr Nwosu’s suggestion that he “had not sex with the alleged victim” is a falsehood. As the sentencing judge noted, he had full intercourse with the child. The suggestion that he “had left the car to smoke a cigarette” while his friend kissed their victim is a fiction. His co‑offender inserted his finger into the child’s vagina while he had sexual intercourse with her. They were not “on the way back home” when they committed this heinous crime; they went out to pick up a prostitute but targeted a troubled 13‑year‑old child instead. Mr Nwosu did not reasonably believe that the child was 16 or over. The suggestion that he “received a custodial sentence for less than a year” is also false. As noted above, the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was two years in custody. I have no doubt that this witness statement was a calculated and deliberate attempt to mislead the reader. In making these findings, I am mindful that individuals may exaggerate or fabricate aspects of their evidence in an effort to reduce the risk of an appeal being wrongly dismissed. There may be many reasons why a person lies, and such behaviour is not necessarily inconsistent with their telling the truth about the central issue of fact.
23. In cross‑examination, when the obvious falsehoods in his witness statement were put to Mr Nwosu, he admitted that he was seeking to “downplay” his offending and stated that he took “full responsibility” and felt “remorse”. In my judgment, his witness statement was not merely an effort to “downplay” his offending; it was an outright lie intended to mislead. In his letter, he stated that he makes “no excuses” and is “thoroughly ashamed”, and that he understood that his actions “caused the victim to be distressed”. He added that he was “deeply sorry for the harm”. I regard these as insincere efforts to downplay the falsehoods in his witness statement. He was caught in the act of giving false evidence. It was his attempt to lie his way out of the situation. He mistakenly believed that his conviction occurred so long ago that the details of his offending would not be discovered. As those details have now been discovered, he cannot continue to lie about the nature of his offending. His original stance has become untenable. He therefore changes his tack by pretending to take full responsibility and expressing sympathy for the victim.
24. I note that the sentencing judge accepted that he had deep remorse and apologised to the Court. Although I have serious doubts about Mr Nwosu’s sincerity, I do not go beyond that finding. However, expressing remorse and having an understanding of the effect of sexual offences on children are two separate matters. I do not accept that he has demonstrated sufficient insight into his offending. His victim empathy is hollow. His written and oral evidence focused on the effect of his conviction on him and his family, rather than on his victim.
25. There is no evidence before me that Mr Nwosu completed any targeted programmes or courses relating to sexual offences against children. When he was asked about this in cross‑examination, he stated that he was unable to recall what, if any, such programmes or courses were completed during his time in prison and on licence.
26. Mr Nwosu has adduced a risk assessment report prepared by Surrey County Council. Under the heading “Background and historical context”, the report states that:
“… He reported that there was kissing and sexualised touching and acknowledged that sexual activity may have occurred, although he stated he could not fully remember due to intoxication … he was sentenced to a custodial sentence of approximately 56 weeks …”
27. I am troubled by this description. I do not know what information was provided by Mr Nwosu to Surrey County Council, nor what documents were before the author when this report was prepared. As the sentencing judge noted, his offending was not limited to “kissing and sexualised touching”; it entailed full sexual intercourse with a child. In that context, his acknowledgment that “sexual activity may have occurred” is misleading. Further, as noted above, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) imposed a sentence of two years in custody.
28. In any event, the report, under the heading “Insight, remorse and accountability”, states that:
“… there remains some lack of full clarity regarding the exact circumstances of the offence, particularly around the extent of sexual activity and his recollection of events. Whilst this does not negate his remove, it indicates that his insight, although present, may not be fully developed in an offence-specific way. It is also evident that his current understanding of the seriousness of the situation has been significantly influenced by the impact on his family, particularly the Home Office refusal affecting his children’s visa”.
29. These are legitimate concerns, and I take them into account in conjunction with all other evidence.
30. The report further records that Mr Nwosu may not have been fully transparent with Ms Oduh about the details of his offence, which may have limited her understanding. Her understanding is still developing and, according to the report, with ongoing support and targeted interventions he has the potential to be a consistent and effective protective factor. The report also records that there is no evidence of offence‑specific intervention work, such as targeted programmes addressing sexual behaviour, and that Ms Oduh’s protective capacity has not yet been fully established.
31. The report is directed to C. It is not about A1 and A2. It concludes that there is no evidence that Mr Nwosu poses a current safeguarding risk to C and that the risk is appropriately managed through existing Child in Need planning and parental compliance. However, there remain residual concerns regarding full insight, offence clarity, and Ms Oduh’s developing understanding of risk. The report concludes with a recommendation that, if there are plans for other children to join the household, a further updated risk assessment should be undertaken.
32. I have taken into consideration the letter written by The Rev Fr Alistair Simmon, Parish Priest, stating that Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh are devoted parents and a stable part of the worshipping community, and that C’s baptism was recently celebrated. It is not clear whether the author of this letter was aware of the full facts relating to Mr Nwosu’s offending. It does little to address the key areas of concern. I also take into account the other character references provided in this case. None of the individuals who provided those references attended the hearing. The letters do not indicate that they were aware of Mr Nwosu’s offending or his denials. Mr Nwosu is not a person of good character. His offending included a sexual offence against a child and other offences involving dishonesty. I attach little weight to these character references.
33. The Secretary of State has concluded that the applications made by A1 and A2 should be refused by reference to paragraph S‑EC.1.9 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules. This is because the Secretary of State considers that Mr Nwosu poses a risk to them. As the provision makes clear, a person may be considered to pose such a risk if, for example, they have a conviction as an adult, whether in the United Kingdom or overseas, for an offence against a child. The fact that the Secretary of State considers that Mr Nwosu poses such a risk means that A1 and A2 cannot qualify for entry clearance under the Immigration Rules.
34. Under paragraph S‑EC.1.9 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules, it is for the Secretary of State to decide whether Mr Nwosu poses a risk to A1 and A2. However, for the reasons set out above, I wholly agree with the Secretary of State’s conclusion. I also find that he poses a risk to them.
35. The sole ground of appeal available to A1 and A2, under section 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, is that the Secretary of State’s decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being incompatible with Article 8. I find that Article 8 is engaged. The Secretary of State’s decisions amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life. The interference is of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. It is in accordance with the law. It is necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of legitimate aims. The ultimate question is whether the interference is proportionate.
36. It is well‑settled, as the Supreme Court endorsed in Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74 [2013] 1 WLR 3690, at [10], that the best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under Article 8. In making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration. Although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant. It is important to have a clear understanding of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child’s best interests before one asks whether that interest is outweighed by the force of other considerations.
37. There are three children involved in this case, namely, A1, A2 and C. As noted above, A1 and A2 are Nigerian citizens who reside in Nigeria with Ms Oduh’s sister, whereas C is a British citizen who resides in the United Kingdom with Mr Nwosu and Ms Oduh. I treat the best interests of these children as a primary consideration. I attach particular weight to the fact that C is a British citizen. As noted in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 [2011] 2 AC 166, although a child’s British citizenship is not a trump card in this context, it is of particular importance in assessing their welfare. The intrinsic importance of citizenship should not be played down. As a British citizen, C has rights which she will not be able to exercise if she moves to another country. If she moves to Nigeria, she will lose the advantages of growing up and being educated in her own country, her own culture and her own language. She will have lost all this when she comes back as an adult. In this context, it is not enough to say that a young child may readily adapt to life in another country.
38. It is uncontroversial that all children should, where possible, be brought up with a close relationship with both parents, and that children deprived of a parent’s company during their formative years are at risk of suffering harm. However, for the reasons set out above, as Mr Nwosu poses a risk to A1 and A2, it is not in their best interests to join him in the United Kingdom, particularly in the absence of a risk assessment relating to them by Surrey County Council, as suggested in their report. I recognise that A1 and A2 are currently residing in Nigeria with their mother’s sister. I consider that it would be in their best interests for their mother to join them in Nigeria. She was providing care for them prior to her arrival in the United Kingdom and, as she stated in her oral evidence, had no issues regarding their safety. They can rent accommodation without any difficulty.
39. On the other hand, C is quite young. It would be in her best interests to remain with her mother. If Ms Oduh moves to Nigeria with C, as noted above, C would lose the advantages of her British citizenship and of growing up in the United Kingdom. It would be in C’s interests to remain in the United Kingdom with her mother and to take advantage of her British citizenship, and for A1 and A2 to join them here. C’s best interests are no doubt a primary consideration. However, her welfare is not the paramount consideration in these appeals. Her British citizenship is not a trump card. In this instance, her best interests are outweighed by the force of other considerations.
40. Mr Nolan suggested that Mr Nwosu could relocate to Nigeria with Ms Oduh and C, and that they could reside with A1 and A2. Under cross‑examination, Mr Nwosu accepted that he could find employment in Nigeria, though it would not be as good as his current employment in the United Kingdom. He has provided no evidence of any significant difficulties that relocation to Nigeria would entail. Alternatively, if Mr Nwosu remains in the United Kingdom, Ms Oduh and C could return to Nigeria, and Mr Nwosu could provide financial support. There is no evidence of any threat to the family in Nigeria. There is force in these submissions. However, if Mr Nwosu poses a risk to A1 and A2 such that they are not permitted to enter the United Kingdom, it would seem counter‑intuitive to suggest that he could join them in Nigeria or visit them regularly. Ultimately, as A1 and A2 are Nigerian nationals and reside in Nigeria, it is for the Nigerian authorities to protect them from any risk posed by Mr Nwosu. Nevertheless, the fact that Ms Oduh and C could return to Nigeria and reside with A1 and A2 without serious difficulties is relevant, and I take it into account in making my assessment.
41. In accordance with section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, I take into account the considerations listed in section 117B of that Act. In particular, I am mindful that the maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest.
42. A1 and A2, as noted above, do not qualify for entry clearance under the Immigration Rules. They do not meet the suitability provisions, although all other requirements are met. Mr Nwosu poses a risk to them. In Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 [2017] 3 All ER 20, at [53], the Supreme Court emphasised that the failure to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is a relevant and important consideration in an Article 8 assessment because the Rules reflect the assessment of the general public interest made by the responsible minister and endorsed by Parliament. Likewise, in Agyarko v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11 [2017] 1 WLR 823, at [47], the Supreme Court emphasised the need to bear in mind the Secretary of State’s constitutional responsibility for policy in this area and the endorsement of the Immigration Rules by Parliament. As the Court of Appeal recently reminded in IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, [2026] 2 WLR 1001, at [159], in conducting the proportionality assessment it is important to demonstrate respect for the United Kingdom’s laws and democratic process, and for what the Government determines is necessary in society to protect the economic well‑being of the country and the rights of others. I take the Secretary of State’s policy into account as reflected in the Immigration Rules and attach considerable weight to it at a general level, while also considering all relevant facts.
43. In all the circumstances, I find that the interference with Article 8 rights is justified and proportionate. The Secretary of State has correctly refused the applications under the Immigration Rules. There are no exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance a breach of Article 8. The Secretary of State’s decisions do not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for A1, A2, C, Ms Oduh or Mr Nwosu. The decisions are compatible with Article 8.
Conclusion
44. For all these reasons, I re-make the decision by dismissing the appeals brought by A1 and A2.
Notice of decision
45. The appeals are dismissed.
Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 24 July 2026
Fee award
46. I make no fee award in light of my decision to dismiss the appeals.
Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 24 July 2026