The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004045

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55723/2024
 LH/08126/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

FAHAD USMAN
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Heybroek of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 6 June 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Finnerty (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds.
2. It is not disputed that if the appellant satisfies the Immigration Rules, he demonstrates a breach of Article 8
3. The appellant claims that, for the purposes of Paragraph EX.1 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules, there are insurmountable obstacles for him and his partner, Mrs Atena Zontea (“AZ”) to continue their family life in Pakistan because of AZ’s circumstances.
4. The appellant also claims that the respondent’s decision to refuse his appellant’s claim is unjustifiably harsh and disproportionate under Article 8.
5. The respondent disputes these claims.
6. The FFTJ dismissed the appellant’s appeal because she was not satisfied that the appellant demonstrated there were the claimed insurmountable obstacles or that the respondent’s decision was unjustifiably harsh and disproportionate.
The Grounds of Appeal
7. There are three grounds of appeal before me relied upon by the appellant.
Ground 1
8. In ground 1 the appellant submits that the FTTJ has erred by failing to engage properly with documentary evidence before her, in particular a psychiatric letter dated 6 February 2023, which confirms that AZ remains under psychiatric and is still receiving mental health treatment.
9. The respondent draws attention to the refusal letter which does not dispute that AZ has the claimed mental and physical health conditions and treatment relied upon by the appellant. Accordingly, I consider there is weight to the submission of the respondent that the context for reading what is and is not mentioned expressly by the FTTJ in the decision is that there was no actual dispute before between the parties requiring findings to be made over the state of AZ’s health and the treatment which she is continuing to receive in the UK.
10. Further, on reading the decision, I find no rejection by the FTTJ of the appellant at present suffering the claimed health problems or receiving the claimed treatment in the UK.
11. When granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Perkins queried the FTTJ apparently being concerned about reports being two years old when there was evidence of AZ still suffering from poor mental health.
12. It is correct that there is no express mention of the February 2023 psychiatric letter. However, I consider the respondent is rightly able to point out that not only does the FTTJ state at paragraph 9 of the decision that she has taken all the evidence before her into consideration but that the FTTJ expressly refers to medical evidence produced by the appellant that dates from 2025 and 2024 (see paragraphs 21,22 and 25 of the decision), which is therefore more recent than the 2023 letter, as well as other detailed medical evidence dating from 2023 (see paragraphs 20, 21 and 23 of the decision).
13. The appellant does not identify in the grounds of appeal any matter in the 2023 psychiatric letter that is not also present in the other 2023 evidence or the evidence from 2024 and 2025 expressly mentioned by the FTTJ. In these circumstances, there was no particular reason for the FTTJ to refer expressly to the less up to date February 2023 psychiatric letter.
14. The FTTJ was entitled to point out that a 2023 report before from Dr Kashmiri was two years old and lacked an updated treatment plan. However, this did not amount to the FTTJ rejecting that the AZ has continuing mental health problems and continuing treatment because the FTTJ expressly sets out at paragraph 22 of the decision, without any rejection, the 2025 summary by AZ’s GP of her health conditions and the treatment she is receiving. The FTTJ does not reject the diagnosis present in Dr Kashmiri’s report.
15. The medical evidence, which the FTTJ expressly takes into consideration when making her decision, indicates that AZ continues to be diagnosed with the mental health (and physical health) conditions identified and is receiving treatment. I am not persuaded the FTTJ fails to take into account of what was the current state of health of AZ and her treatment, as evidenced by the 2023 letter or elsewhere.
16. I find no error of law as argued under ground 1.
Ground 2
17. Here the appellant submits that the FTTJ’s findings on whether AZ could live in Pakistan with the appellant are materially flawed. The grounds of appeal make three complaints.
18. Firstly, it is argued that the FTTJ fails to consider the content of Dr Kashmiri’s report about the likely impact a move to Pakistan would have on AZ’s health. The appellant says that the FTTJ should not have dismissed this evidence lightly and without proper consideration.
19. The FTTJ expressly refers to Dr Kashmiri’s report at paragraph 20 of the decision. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the FTTJ has failed to give any consideration to this evidence at all.
20. I note that it was not argued before the FTTJ or before me that Dr Kashmiri was qualified to give expert evidence about country conditions awaiting the appellant and AZ in Pakistan.
21. I find it pertinent to note how the appellant’s case was put in the skeleton argument relied upon before the FTTJ: see paragraph 7 of the skeleton argument. The skeleton argument draws attention to the background, mental health diagnosis and the current medication as well as the opinion of Dr Kashmiri being that AZ’s mental health condition makes daily functioning difficult. I am satisfied the FTTJ had these matters properly in mind when making her decision.
22. The appellant then goes on at paragraph 7 of the skeleton argument to highlight from Dr Kashmiri’s evidence that AZ is likely to experience a deterioration in her mental health if the appellant is removed from the UK. The evidence drawn to the FTTJ’s attention focuses on the effect of any notional separation of AZ in the UK from the appellant in Pakistan.
23. Dr Kashmiri at paragraph 14.3 of her report is of the opinion that AZ relies on the appellant for emotional support that she cannot receive from anyone else and that the couple shares an immensely strong emotional connection.
24. In the circumstances of considering whether there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing for both AZ and the appellant in Pakistan, I find it was open to the FTTJ to place weight in her findings at paragraph 27 of the decision on the appellant accompanying AZ to Pakistan and being able to provide her with support, particularly where Dr Kashmiri has emphasized the importance of that support to the mental health well-being of AZ. I am not persuaded that the FTTJ has erred in her consideration of Dr Kashmiri’s evidence, particularly given how the appellant’s case was put in the skeleton argument about this evidence.
25. The second complaint of the appellant under ground 2 is that the FTTJ ignores the expert evidence of Mr Khan, who set out that mental health treatment in Pakistan is highly limited, especially outside major cities and that AZ, as a woman with serious mental health conditions and no (my emphasis) support system would be especially vulnerable in Pakistan.
26. As with the first complaint, given the express reference that the FTTJ gives to Mr Khan’s evidence at paragraph 25, I find there is no basis for saying that the FTTJ has failed to give any consideration at all to the expert evidence before her.
27. I will mention here that in her submissions Ms Heybroek, perhaps seeking to add a challenge not actually made in the grounds of appeal, criticizes the FTTJ for not engaging with the case of the appellant set out at paragraph 10 of the skeleton argument that the former CPIN of the respondent, which dates from 2020, contains evidence about limitations in mental healthcare in Pakistan as well as about there being stigma and superstition associate with mental health in Pakistan.
28. I observe that this evidence is similar to that cited by Mr Khan in his report and considered in detail by the FTTJ at paragraphs 25 (c) and (d) of the decision. The FTTJ does not reject the expert evidence given by Mr Khan (and by implication the evidence contained in the 2020 CPIN). Rather, the FTTJ finds that Mr Khan when giving opinions of country conditions in general does not engage with the particular circumstances of the appellant and does not have the medical expertise to predict how AZ’s specific diagnosis would be perceived or treated. In these circumstances, I am not persuaded there is merit in the submission of Ms Heybroek concerning the 2020 CPIN.
29. Overall I find that in Paragraph 25 (a) to (h) of the decision the FTTJ engages in detail with the opinions of Mr Khan on matters relating to the issue of insurmountable obstacles. I consider that the FTTJ makes findings open to her to make, particularly as regards the need for consideration of the specific circumstances of AZ and concerning the role that the appellant can perform in guiding and supporting the vulnerable AZ. I consider that it was open to the FTTJ to find a shortcoming of Mr Khan’s opinion was that he did not engage persuasively with how the network of support available from the appellant and the appellant’s family would affect AZ’s integration into Pakistan. I find no error here by the FTTJ.
30. The third complaint of ground 2 is that the FTTJ simply states that treatment would be available to AZ without engaging with what kind of treatment, where and whether it would be accessible to AZ and without referring to regional disparity, AZ’s gender or vulnerability.
31. Here I consider that what the FTTJ says in her findings about the 2024 CPIN, particularly at paragraph 28 of the decision, should be read alongside her previous detailed consideration of the expert evidence relied upon by the appellant. Looking at the decision as a whole, I am not persuaded that the FTTJ has failed to engage with issues relating to obstacles to healthcare needed and the relevant particular circumstances of AZ in terms of her gender or vulnerability. It was not argued before the FTTJ that the appellant and AZ could only settle in areas of Pakistan affected for the worse by regional disparity. I find no error here by the FTTJ.
32. I find no error of law as argued under ground 2.
Ground 3
33. The argument of ground 3 is that the FTTJ failed to consider whether there were any exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harsh consequences in the case of the appellant.
34. This submission, made in general terms, has no merit. The FTTJ expressly considered the issue of exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harsh consequences, using the balance sheet approach, at paragraphs 33 to 36 of the decision.
35. In ground 3 there is also a specific complaint that the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to the serious mental health conditions of AZ and her suicidal ideation.
36. When considering the issue of exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harsh consequences, the FTTJ expressly takes into account the findings she has made already, which include about the mental health of AZ. For the reasons given above, I have found these were findings open to the FTTJ to make.
37. Setting aside that the passages from the medical records cited at paragraph 13 of the grounds of appeal concerning suicidal ideation are somewhat buried in the medical records of AZ produced in the appellant’s bundle, it is to be noted that they were not specifically referenced in the skeleton argument before the FTTJ. Nor has it been asserted they were expressly referenced in submissions before the FTTJ. It is the up-to-date medical evidence, itemised in the skeleton argument, which the FTTJ considers in her decision. At paragraph 24 of the decision the FTTJ correctly notes that the May 2024 letter from Community Integrated Mental Health Service-South reports that AZ has occasional suicidal thoughts currently managed with A’s support.
38. I have already referred to the weight the FTTJ gives to the appellant being able to accompany and support AZ in Pakistan.
39. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the FTTJ failed to give full and proper consideration to the current state of the appellant’s mental health, including her state of suicidal ideation if in Pakistan but supported by the appellant, when considering the medical evidence before her. It is in this context that one should look at the FTTJ assessment of exceptional circumstances/unjustifiably harsh consequences and what factors weighed against the respondent’s decision being proportionate. I consider the FTTJ made findings open to her on the evidence before her.
40. I find no error of law as argued under Ground 3 in the FTTJ’s consideration of this issue.


Notice of Decision
There is no material error in law in the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision requiring the decision be set aside and remade. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed.

M Harris
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 December 2025