Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004095
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/56742/2024
LP/03012/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3rd March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

E M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Litigant in person
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Home Office Presenting Officer

Interpreter
Ms Andrea Hurtado-Monslave interpreted the English and Spanish languages.

Heard at Field House on 18 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by a citizen of Honduras, who has a dependent wife and child, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing him international protection.
2. The appellant is representing himself. He clearly has a smattering of English. It would be surprising if he did not, given the time he has been in the United Kingdom, but I am very grateful to the interpreter for her skill in translating the proceedings in the hearing room for the benefit of those present. Although he became emotional at one point, the appellant was organised and dignified in his presentation and conspicuously tried to address me about possible errors of law. I have found this a very finely balanced case and Mr Parvar, very professionally and calmly, has done his best to make it hard for me to allow the appeal.
3. The First-tier Tribunal Judge disbelieved the core of the appellant’s story and gave reasons, some of which are extremely hard to criticise and Mr Parvar rightly drew them to my attention and submitted that the essential findings were sound. I have reflected on those points but there are two, possibly three, problems with the Decision and Reasons which concern me greatly. The first is that the judge criticised the appellant for not claiming asylum in Costa Rica. It is of course near to Honduras but is not a neighbouring country and might be thought to be a considerable distance away from any threats.
4. The problem is that, as far was we can see, and Mr Parvar has helped me considerably here, it was never put to the appellant that he should have claimed asylum in Costa Rica and I cannot avoid concluding that the judge has taken a potentially important point entirely on his own initiative without putting the appellant on notice. I asked the appellant how he would have answered the point if it has been raised and the appellant said that he was as frightened of the gangs in Costa Rica as he was in Honduras. I do not know if that is subjectively true or objectively justified but it illustrates the dangers of taking points that are not put.
5. A related concern, identified in the grant of permission, is the way the judge went about commenting on the effect of a late asylum claim. When Judge Ruddick granted permission, she said:
“Of more concern is that the FTT’s criticism of the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum begins with criticisms of the appellant having worked in the UK without permission, which is said to be inconsistent with the UNHCR Handbook. It is difficult to understand how this disapproval of the appellant’s conduct is directly relevant to the credibility assessment, as it is framed more in terms of moral reproach.”
6. Judge Ruddick went on to say that the UNHCR Handbook, as far as she was aware, does not contain any such caution and I am not aware of any. This is another example of apparently lawful adverse credibility findings being intermingled with ones that are not. Mr Parvar has argued that the findings as a whole are sound but on reflection I cannot agree.
7. There is another point which is intriguing. The Decision and Reasons begins very badly. It identifies the appellant correctly as a national of Honduras but then gives a date of birth which is completely wrong. It also identifies the appellant’s wife and child by name and date of birth but the names and dates are entirely wrong. I must emphasise that I am not talking about alternative spellings of names or transcriptional errors such as letters or numbers being transposed but the wrong names and dates. The appellant argued that it may be the judge was looking at the wrong papers when he decided the case. Mr Parvar has directed me to the substance of the decision and argued that there is no evidence at all that the judge was looking at the wrong papers beyond the names and dates. I see the strength of that argument and this is one of the reasons I find this a very finely balanced case but this case concerns the welfare of a child and I cannot ignore the lurking doubt created by these wrong dates and names.
8. I am not allowed the luxury of indecision but I have decided that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law and I set aside the decision and direct the case be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.
9. I cannot preserve any controversial findings. The division of the Tribunal that rehears the case might share with the Judge who has decided it the concerns about aspects of the evidence but I cannot just assume that the adverse findings were not tainted by bad points.
10. I have made an anonymity order because this is a protection case.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 February 2026