Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004112
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60490/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

WMC
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G. Brown, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 15 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge O’Hanlon) promulgated on 10 July 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 31 October 2023 to refuse her protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that her rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background is summarised briefly in the decision of the FtTJ between paragraphs 1-5. The appellant is a citizen of Botswana, who entered the United Kingdom on 10 March 2019 by way of a visit visa. She applied for asylum in July 2021 and this was considered but refused in a decision taken by the respondent on 31 October 2023. During the time, the United Kingdom she gave birth to her daughter in 2021 who was dependent on her claim.
4. The claim made to the respondent was that she had been a victim of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of the mother and mother’s partner from the age of 15 until she ran away from the home at the age of 18 (this would be in or about 2004). Between 2004 and 2019 the appellant lived in various locations before meeting someone for the church who helped her to travel to the UK in March 2019 for work. Upon arrival in the UK the appellant was forced to work for family and to take care of their child without remuneration. The appellant managed to escape from the family and eventually claimed asylum in the UK on 12 July 2021.
5. The FtTJ set out that the appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of membership of a Particular Social Group as a lone woman with a child and no family to rely on for support upon return to Botswana. She claimed that she feared her family, becoming destitute and being ostracised as a single mother if forced to return to Botswana. It is also stated that the appellant fears re-trafficking in the event of return to Botswana.
6. The FtTJ recorded the respondent’s position at paragraphs 4- 5 . It was accepted that her factual account of being subject to abuse by her mother and partner was accepted and that it was further accepted that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery within the United Kingdom . The respondent’s case was that there was sufficient protection available to the appellant and that the police in Botswana were willing and able to provide that protection. It was also maintained that the appellant could reasonably internally relocate to Botswana to named different areas
7. The FtTJ heard the appeal on 30 June 2025 and in his decision promulgated on 10 July 2025 dismissed her appeal on all grounds. The FtTJ set out his reasoning in the decision and found that in all the circumstances he was not satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the appellant would be at risk of harm or persecution from either her mother or her mother’s partner in the event of her return to Botswana. He addressed the issues of sufficiency of state protection and internal relocation and did so in the light of the country materials before him but reached the conclusion that there would be sufficiency of protection available to her as those she claimed to fear were non-state actors and also that internal relocation was reasonable in her circumstances. The FtTJ also considered the risk on return in the context of re-trafficking but for the reasons that he gave in the decision he was not satisfied that the appellant was at risk of re-trafficking in the event of return to Botswana. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, based on 2 grounds. Permission to was refused by FtTJ on but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on 24 October 2025.
9. The hearing took place on 15 April 2026. The Appellant was represented by Mr Brown, of Counsel, who did not appear before the FtT and the Respondent by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer.
10. Mr Brown indicated that he relied upon the grounds of challenge and the skeleton argument he had provided prior to the hearing. He provided his oral submissions in support of the grounds. Mr Wain Senior Presenting Officer confirmed his reliance upon the Rule 24 response served under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and that the position of the Respondent was that there was no error law or any material error of law in the decision of the FtTJ.
11. I am grateful for the submissions made by the advocates and the assistance they have given during the hearing.
12. There are two grounds of challenge. The first ground is mistake of fact relying on paragraphs 28 and paragraph 33 of the FtTJ’s decision and that the FtTJ proceeded on a mistake of fact by appearing to suggest contrary to the evidence that the appellant was not subject to trafficking whilst in Botswana. It is submitted that the judge appeared to suggest that the appellant had come to the United Kingdom for some unrelated purpose before being trafficked within the country but that is artificial and inconsistent with the evidence.
13. It is further submitted that the judge’s approach as taken in the decision betrays a failure to understand the phenomenon of human trafficking and failed to assess the appellant’s case against the recognised definition of it. In the renewed grounds it is further argued that the failure to appreciate that she was trafficked in Botswana impinged directly on the assessment that she could access state protection or internally relocate. As the judge failed to correctly assess the risk to her he could not assess the ability to avoid that risk. It is further argued that internal relocation was not an answer to the risk of trafficking and that where the risk is not tethered to any one person it could occur anywhere in the country and that the extent to which she is vulnerable to re-trafficking is relevant to the assessment of internal relocation.
14. Ground 2 is based on the failure to apply the Paragraph 339K “presumption” to the question of whether the appellant may face a repeat of the serious harm, which is the episode of trafficking and exploitation, to which she was subject in Botswana. As it was accepted that she had been trafficked, paragraph 339K applied and that such conduct would be repeated absent good reason why it might not be. It is argued that the judge did not direct himself to that settled principle.
15. Mr Brown had provided in advance of the hearing his skeleton argument entitled “appellant’s outline arguments.” In that document it sets out that there was no dispute that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery and that it occurred by being befriended by a lady in a church and then arrangements were made for her journey to the into the UK where she was exploited. It is submitted that she was vulnerable and isolated as a result of her experiences and that in Botswana with no family support she would be discriminated against.
16. It is further submitted to paragraph 5 that the error made by the FtTJ went to the heart of the conclusion relating to the risk of re-trafficking and there appears to be a paucity of evidence taken on the factors referred to in TD and AD ( Albania).
17. In his oral submissions Mr Brown referred to there being a reasonable grounds decision. However, there was no copy in the appellant’s bundle before the FTT and no document was put before the FTT. Nonetheless there had been a concession made by the respondent on the facts as set out in the decision letter and that she was a victim of modern slavery. Dealing with the first ground, he relied upon the grounds of challenge and the mistake of fact. He submitted that it was plainly material because it went to the issue of re-trafficking. He submitted that if accepted on the facts as presented that she had been trafficked, it must be assumed that it occurred in the appellant’s home area where mother and stepfather lived and that the accepted abuse took place in the context of whether protection was available. Therefore, she had to move away from the home area and was exposed to circumstances which led to her vulnerability in making the decision to accept the offer of work.
18. He submitted that if ground 1 was made out and there was a mistake of fact then this also demonstrated that the FtTJ failed to address Paragraph 339K as set out in ground 2. He submitted that whilst the FtTJ dealt with sufficiency protection and internal relocation he did so on a different basis and therefore the decision was unsafe. He submitted that the FtTJ had not approached the central issue properly and that the tribunal should revisit this issue.
19. Mr Wain relied upon the rule 24 response dated 22 January 2026. It submitted that it cannot be said that the FtTJ was unaware of the underlying fact of how the trafficking took place as it is set out in his decision. In any event it is submitted that her status as a victim of trafficking was peripheral to the matters in issue in the treatment which she claimed to fear was from her mother and her mother’s partner. The accepted Convention reason was a single motherhood and that she had sought employment abroad despite not needing to do so for reasons of safety from her alleged persecutors as the judge’s adverse findings concluded from paragraphs 14 – 27.
20. It was submitted that what the FtTJ meant at paragraph 28 and 33 was that but for the appellant looking for work abroad, she would not have been trafficked.
21. In the alternative, and as argued by Mr Wain the FtTJ specifically addressed the risk of re-trafficking, having undertaken a full assessment of the relevant factors in light of the evidence before the FTT and also addressed whether any risk of re-trafficking could be mitigated through sufficient protection or internal relocation. That was set out in his assessment at paragraph 34 of his decision.
22. In his oral submissions Mr Wain referred to the procedural background and the decision in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC)by reference to the issues in the case. He submitted that the issue of risk of re-trafficking had not been raised in the ASA but had been raised at the hearing and by reference to the factors in TD and AD (Albania). He submits that there was no factual error at paragraph 33, and that where the FtTJ referred to the appellant not being trafficked in Botswana when she was residing there from 2004 – 2019, that was not incorrect because the trafficking happened in 2019 which the respondent accepted and as set out in the decision letter.
23. In any event he submitted the FtTJ had carried out a full risk assessment at paragraph 34 where he assessed the risk of re-trafficking on return to Botswana. The FtTJ took into account all the circumstances of the appellant’s case and the risk arising from her seeking work abroad which was because she feared her mother and her mother’s partner, and assessed the factors identified including her vulnerability as at the date of the decision and on the evidence provided. He brought to the attention of the court that the appellant’s representative had made no submissions on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. However, the FtTJ had made findings on both of those issues by reference to the evidence. The grounds do not challenge the findings made by the FtTJ arising from her family in Botswana or the assessment made of sufficiency protection or internal relocation.
24. As to ground 2, Mr Wain submitted that the FtTJ in his assessment of the evidence and by undertaking an assessment of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation therefore reached his conclusion that finding that the presumption did not apply.
25. Mr Brown by way of response submitted that Paragraph 339K had been set out in the refusal letter and therefore impacts on whether it was raised. By reference to paragraph 33 of the decision, he submitted that the difficulty was that the judge had referred to it taking place in the UK. He submitted that the risk of re-trafficking was that she was vulnerable and would be more vulnerable on return as she would be exposed to the risk of re-trafficking.
Discussion and analysis:
26. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
27. I remind myself that restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by the judge for his decision. In HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72] Lord Hamblen said:
It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
i. They alone are the Judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection’s simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
ii. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson
iii. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.
28. When assessing the grounds, it is necessary to set out the background to the appeal. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 March 2019 on a visit visa. On 12 July 2021 she applied for asylum. On 08 July 2021, a referral was made on her behalf to the National Referral Mechanism in order for the Competent Authorities (CA) to make a decision as to whether she was a victim of modern slavery. In a decision taken by the respondent on 31 October 2023, her claim for asylum was refused.
29. The decision records the following factual account :
“You are a national of Botswana were raised by your aunt until the age of 10. You then went to live with your mother and her boyfriend due to your aunts passing. Your mother’s boyfriend abused you at the age of 15, your mother, uncles and the authorities refused to believe you and your mother started abusing you until you ran away at the age of 18.
You lived between a friend’s house and your family home as the abuse from your mother was still present, you fell pregnant at 18. The child was removed from your care by the birth father, and you lived with your friend permanently getting part time employment in childcare to support yourself.
Between 2004- 2019 you lived in various places within Botswana and met a friend through church who helped you to travel to the UK for work.
On arrival to the UK, you lived with a lady of this friend and were forced to work for the family and take care of their child for no money, you escaped in 2019 with help from a lady you met on the flight and travelled to various places within the UK. You fell pregnant in 2020 and have no relationship with the father of the child.
If returned to Botswana you fear family, destitution, and lack of acceptance by your family and the community, for being a single mother.  You have confirmed that this basis of claim also applies to your child x.
30. Under the heading “Material facts I accept” it was stated, “ Abuse by your mother and mother’s boyfriend and Victim of Modern Slavery within the UK.”
31. The respondent set out Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules but gave the following reasons why the appellant would not be at risk on return to Botswana. They are as follows :
(1) I do not accept you are at real risk on return because you have previously been able to internally relocate in Botswana so that you do not live near your family and have had no contact with your family since 2019 on your arrival to the UK. You were not treated differently in society when you had your first child and there is no external evidence to confirm that this would be the case.
(2) The state has introduced new procedures and help for victims of Gender Based Violence and Sufficiency of Protection is available. Meaning that the persecution you have faced is not likely to be repeated.
(3) It is considered that there would be sufficient protection from persecution in your country of origin . The police in Botswana are generally willing and able to provide protection in similar circumstances to you. ( 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Botswana) who prohibit such practises as inhuman, cruel, or degrading treatment.
(4) The persons and society you claim to fear are non-state state actors and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Botswana (AIR Q73 & Q77). They do not work or have connections to the authorities that will create a risk to you or your child.
(5) You previously made a claim to the authorities of the abuse you suffered from your mother’s boyfriend nothing was done by the authorities within the area you lived at the time, but this is not accepted as evidence of sufficient protection not being available to you as the authorities are willing and able to provide protection.
(6) Internal relocation: It is considered that you could relocate to X, Y and Z within your country of origin. There is general freedom of movement in Botswana. See ‘The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.’
(7) The persons and society you claim to fear are non-state actors and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have sufficient power or influence to be able to locate you anywhere in Botswana.
(8) You have lived in other areas of Botswana successfully obtaining work, religious activities and friendships without interaction or threats towards you from society or your family. You claim to have seen your mother’s boyfriend in Ghanzi but were able to hide before he seen you, as you were not approached by him or received any direct threats it is unlikely, he was there looking for you considering you had no contact with him from 2004-2019 (AIR Q52). You have changed your mobile number so the contact your mother had to send threats or abuse was stopped in 2019, therefore if you were to internally relocate into Botswana therefore it is not accepted that if you were to internally relocate you would be treated unfairly within society.
(9) Relocation is considered to be reasonable in light of your study in the UK to obtain GCSE grades and your previous employment in Botswana. The health conditions you have will not stop you from obtaining employment and can be treated in Botswana as they have a public healthcare system. There is government and charity support throughout Botswana for single mothers and an education system for all children. Reintegration assistance worth up to £3000 is available if you were to return to Botswana voluntarily.
32. The decision is also dealt with issues raised in on human rights grounds. It is not necessary to set those out for the purposes of this decision.
33. Following the refusal of the application, the appellant appealed the decision. During the procedural parts of that process and as set out in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), and by reference to the relevant practice directions, the parties are required to provide their written documents in the form of the Appeal Skeleton Argument (ASA) which is then responded to by the respondent’s review, thereby addressing what she described as the “principal controversial issues”.
34. Notwithstanding the reference to the material facts accepted that the applicant had been a “victim of modern slavery within the UK “, when addressing the “principal controversial issues,” the appeal skeleton argument (“ASA”) made no reference to the NRM decision or its contents, nor was there a copy available in the trial bundle before the FTT. In fact, there was no reference in the ASA to the issue of risk of re-trafficking.
35. The issue in dispute as set out in the ASA were said to be, “has the appellant established to the and sufficiency of protection and internal relocation and not available to her.” In the section entitled “submissions” the ASA cites part of the country materials relating to gender-based violence and the factual context of the appellant’s case that she could not internally relocate as she did not feel safe anywhere in Botswana she fears her family will find wherever she relocates and somebody would inform her mother (see paragraph 15). The summary is set out at paragraph 16 set out that “the Appellant has provided a credible account of all the problems she has suffered whilst in Botswana. She has established to the lower standard that as a victim of GBV she is at risk on return to Botswana and cannot rely on the state to protect her nor is internal relocation a viable option for her as a lone single parent without any support networks.”
36. There was no reference to the issue of trafficking or re-trafficking or risks relating to that. This is further supported by the respondent’s review (p177AB) dated 24 November 2024 which addresses the issues raised in the ASA.
37. I turn to the position before the FtTJ at the hearing on 30 June 2025. As set out above the ASA did not refer to the issue of trafficking or re-trafficking, and it was not raised in the most recent witness statement by the appellant dated 14/12/2023 (p48AB). The factual basis for fear related to being unsafe in Botswana and that somebody would tell her mother that she had returned and that it would put her at risk of witchcraft (see paragraph 6). She referred to the police providing no help to her and did not listen to her when she suffered abuse from her mother’s boyfriend(see paragraph 9) and that she would struggle as a single parent to look after herself and her daughter (paragraph 8).
38. The FtTJ recorded the position of the parties at the hearing at paragraph 7 of his decision. Firstly, that at the outset of the hearing the appellant’s representative advised that he was not intending to call the appellant to give evidence and wished to rely upon submissions only. The FtTJ also recorded that the representatives confirmed that the issues between the parties were whether there was sufficient to protection available to the appellant in the event of return to Botswana and whether she could reasonably internally relocate to a different area of Botswana other than her own area. The FtTJ also recorded at paragraph 7, “in addition the appellant’s representative confirmed that he would be making submissions on the basis that the appellant would be at substantial risk of re-trafficking in the event of return to Botswana”.
39. Further on in the decision, the FtTJ recorded that, “in his submissions the appellant’s representative confirmed that no concessions are made with regard to the appellant’s position that there would not be a sufficiency of protection available to her nor that internal relocation would be reasonable but the appellant’s representative did not make any submissions on either of these issues” (see paragraph 20).
40. At paragraph 28 of his decision the FtTJ further recorded that, “in his submissions the appellant’s representative suggested that the central issue of his submissions was the extent to which the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking and in this respect he referred to headnote H of the country guidance case of TD and AD (Albania) [2016] UKUT 92”.
41. It is difficult to see how the central issue had shifted from the previous principal controversial issues of fear of her family and boyfriend and the risk in the factual context as previously claimed to that of re-trafficking when it had not been expressly raised in the ASA. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent submits that this came as a surprise to the respondent as it was not raised in the ASA nor was respondent on notice that submissions were to be made on this basis or by reference to the CG decisions later raised. Nonetheless it is not suggested by the respondent that the presenting officer was not able to deal with the issues, and it is clear that this was an issue raised at the hearing and the FtTJ addressed this in his decision.
42. It is this assessment which is challenged in the grounds. However, for the reasons I will go on to give I am satisfied that the FtTJ undertook a proper lawful consideration to this issue of risk of trafficking or re-trafficking on return to Botswana and did so both in the context of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation based on the evidence and the submissions that were made. In this context the FtTJ addressed the issues on the basis that there had been no oral evidence called before him (see paragraph 7) and thus the FtTJ could only assess the evidence based on the written material and the submissions made. Further, the judge expressly recorded that no submissions were made on the issues of sufficiency protection and internal relocation.
43. Turning to the factual findings made by the FtTJ, they can be summarised as follows.
44. The FtTJ set out the basis upon which he made as factual assessment at paragraph 12, identifying the written material before him and between paragraphs 14 – 17 set out a comprehensive assessment of the expert report relied upon by the appellant. He concluded that he was not able to give any significant weight to the report for the reasons that he gave when dealing with issues of sufficiency protection and internal relocation.
45. It is important to note that the grounds do not challenge any of the findings of fact made by the FtTJ relating to risk in Botswana. Nor do the grounds challenge the assessment of the expert report, or the conclusions reached from the assessment of the country materials relating to Botswana in the context of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
46. The FtTJ had set out the background facts between paragraphs 3 -5 in his decision. There were two periods of time firstly, that it was accepted by the respondent that she had been a victim of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her mother and her mother’s partner from the age of 15 until she ran away aged 18 (this would have been in or about 2004). The second period was between 2004 and 2019 when she left Botswana and that she had been living in various locations during that time. The FtTJ proceeded on the acceptance in the respondent’s decision letter that she had been a victim of modern slavery within the UK.
47. The FtTJ found that between 2004 (after leaving her mother and mother’s partner) to 2019 there was no evidence that the appellant’s mother or partner had attempted to locate the appellant prior to her leaving Botswana. The FtTJ found that the appellant had been residing in Botswana from 2004-2019 and that the appellant put forward no substantive evidence as to problems she had with the mother or her mother’s partner within that period of time (see paragraphs 16 and 18).
48. During that period of time the FtTJ found it had not been claimed in her evidence that her mother had harmed her in any way after she left her mother’s house in 2004. He further found that there was no indication that the appellant had to take any precautions to hide her whereabouts from her mother or mother’s partner during the period 2004 – 2019. In that context the FtTJ made a finding rejecting the conclusion reached by the expert that she could not internally relocate because her mother would find her as the police were open to bribes and on the basis that Botswana was a small country where news travelled fast. The FtTJ stated, he could place no great weight on that assertion as no evidence had been put forward in the report as to how the police would know the whereabouts of the appellant and how and why the appellant’s mother may seek to locate her on the basis there was no evidence that she had attempted to do so several years prior to the appellant leaving Botswana in 2019. The FtTJ found that on the appellant’s own evidence she had on occasions returned to her mother’s home. The FtTJ records that in the submissions made by the appellant’s representative no reference was made to any abuse either physical or mental abuse inflicted upon the appellant by either her mother or a partner after she left their home in or about 2004. The FtTJ concluded that in all of the circumstances he was not satisfied that the appellant would be at risk of harm or persecution from either her mother or her mother’s partner in the event of her return to Botswana ( see paragraph 20).
49. The FtTJ went on to address issues of sufficiency protection from state authorities in the event of the appellant’s return and also that of internal relocation. The FtTJ ‘s consideration of those issues can be found between paragraphs 20 – 27. The FtTJ undertook that assessment based on his factual findings and in the factual context of the claim and also on the basis of the country materials and the CPIN -Botswana : women fearing gender-based violence published January 2025. The FtTJ proceeded on the acceptance that the appellant had been abused by her mother and partner and that abuse was based upon the family relationship between them and the appellant rather than any generalised gender-based violence. The judge took into account that was gender-based violence is widespread in spousal relationships, but that women as a group were not likely to be at risk of gender-based violence from non-state actors. Those identified by the appellant were non-state actors.
50. The FtTJ set out the relevant parts of the country materials at paragraphs 21 – 23, and that the Constitution and the Penal Code provided women with protection from discrimination and violence and the government had put in place policies and programmes to uphold and advance women’s rights. There were laws and policies to combat gender-based violence and also a functioning criminal justice system able to detect, prosecute and punish perpetrators. The FtTJ addressed the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the appellant had previously reported the abuse at the hands of her mother and her mother’s partner to the police and they not taken action , and that this would make her feel particularly vulnerable upon return with her daughter. The FtTJ concluded that whilst the appellant had referred to the abuse her at the hands of her mother and her mother’s partner to the police that was before 2004 when the appellant was much younger than she is now. The appellant was a minor at the time. The FtTJ took into account that the appellant had not suggested that she had suffered any abuse at the hands of either her mother or a mother’s partner since 2004 when she left her mother’s home and that the appellant had not referred matters to the police authorities when she was an independent adult. The appellant had not claim to have suffered any abuse at the hands of a mother or a partner since she left her mother’s home in 2004 that she needed to report to police. The FtTJ having considered the country materials in the context of the claim found that there would be sufficiency protection available to the appellant if she were to return to Botswana as a person she claims to fear were non-state actors ( see paragraph 25).
51. On the question of internal relocation, the FtTJ addressed the expert’s conclusion that internal relocation would not remove the risk of the appellant’s mother finding her on the basis that the police in Botswana were open to bribes or that Botswana was a small country where news travels fast ( see paragraph 26). The judge did not place any great weight on the expert’s report for the reasons that he had set out between paragraphs 14 – 17 but in any event took into account that the appellant had not claimed that she was actually hiding from the mother at any time after she left her home in 2004 and on occasion she had returned to her that home for clothing and other items. It had been the appellant’s account that she left a mother’s home seven years prior to leaving Botswana and there was no evidence put forward by the appellant of any contact with her mother or her mother’s partner in that time nor any attempt on the part of the mother to locate her other than sending some unpleasant texts. The FtTJ addressed the issue of it being a small country but that the appellant continued to reside there seven years after the last time she had seen a mother without any physical contact and no attempt had been made to locate her thus it did not suggest that the appellant would be at risk if she went to a different part of the country. The judge therefore concluded that internal relocation was available in any of the areas referred to in the decision letter and would be a reasonable option for the appellant.
52. The FtTJ went on to address the submission made by the appellant’s representative that the central issue was the extent to which the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking. I observe that the FtTJ recorded the basis upon which the submissions were made and that he should consider the issue applying the decision in TD and AD (Albania) (as cited). As the FtTJ observed that case concerned the circumstances of women as victims of trafficking on the country materials relevant to Albania. Specific risk factors were identified by reference to country conditions prevalent in Albania. Nonetheless, the FtTJ recognised the general principles that would relate to the assessment of risk which is what he set out at paragraph 28 and evidenced by his reference to there being a “useful checklist” of items to be taken into account.
53. The relevant issues advanced on behalf of the appellant were recorded by the FtTJ at paragraph 28 as her social status and economic status of the appellant’s family, the appellant’s health, the fact that she had an illegitimate child and the area of origin in the sense of the appellant had been fairly transient for a number of years, her age and risk of exploitation and the absence of support network. The FtTJ recorded that “I have taken all of these factors into account “.
54. The FtTJ assessed the factors. It was submitted by Mr Brown that there was a paucity of evidence taken on the factors referred to in TD and AD (Albania) ( and see paragraph 5 of the appellant’s outline arguments). However, I observe that the FtTJ did not hear oral evidence from the appellant about her circumstances and background and was therefore only able to consider the evidence that was provided in the written documents. Within his assessment he identified the lack of evidence relating to her individual circumstances ( see paragraph 30 and 31).
55. As regards the social status and economic standing of the persons family, he recorded that the evidence was that she came from a poor family but that there was little evidence before him of the appellant’s education, which was one of the factors referred to in TD ( see paragraph 30).
56. The FtTJ addressed her state of health but found that there was no evidence that she suffered any significant health conditions including her mental health. He took into account that she had an illegitimate child, but that she was now 40 years of age, six years older than when she arrived in the UK. As to her support network, the FtTJ found that there was little evidence before him in this respect. That was a finding in my judgement that was open to him and the FtTJ was entitled to find that she lived apart from her family since 2004 without appearing to have any significant difficulties in terms of maintaining herself between 2004 and 2019. The FtTJ therefore found that she must have had some means of maintaining herself during that period of time (see paragraph 32).
57. The FtTJ found that there was no evidence before him of any particular vulnerability on the part of the appellant, either physical or mental. He took into account her age of 40 years and that she would return to Botswana with a dependent child but was entitled to find that whilst that was a factor referred to in TD in the context of Albanian society, that there is no evidence to suggest that the same situation would prevail in Botswana.
58. Standing back at this point, the FtTJ plainly addressed the factors which had been raised on behalf of the appellant that were relevant to risk on return in the context of being a former victim of trafficking or exploitation and based on her own circumstances.
59. I therefore turn to the specific basis upon which the grounds are advanced and by reference to the decision. Mr Brown on behalf of the appellant submits that the FtTJ made a material mistake of fact and that the FtTJ approached the risk of re-trafficking on the wrong factual basis. In this respect he relies upon paragraph 28 where the judge stated, “it is the case that there is no evidence put forward at the appellant having been the subject of trafficking while she was in Botswana. The evidence is that the appellant believe that she was being offered the opportunity of employment in the UK and that she took that offer.” At paragraph 33 the FtTJ referred to the trafficking suffered by the appellant effectively took place in the UK after the appellant had come to the UK in the expectation of finding paid work. He went on to say that she had resided in Botswana from 2004-2019 and there is no suggestion the appellant’s account overall that she been the subject of any trafficking or exploitation in Botswana during that period of time.
60. The written grounds assert that the FtTJ appears to suggest that the appellant had come to the UK for some unrelated purpose before being trafficked and that this approach betrayed a failure to understand the phenomenon of human trafficking and to assess a case against the recognised definition of it. Thus, it is argued by Mr Brown that having made that material error of fact, the FtTJ’s assessment of risk on return was undermined both in the assessment made of the risk of re-trafficking but also applying Paragraph 339K ( as set out in the second ground of challenge).
61. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent submits that there was no material error of law in the decision of the FtTJ. He submits that at paragraph 33 where the FtTJ stated that the appellant was not trafficked in Botswana when residing there from 2004 – 2019, was not a mistake as the trafficking happened in 2019 which the respondent accepted. The concession set out in the decision letter was that she was a victim of modern slavery within the UK. But in any event, the FtTJ carried out a risk assessment as to whether she would be at risk of being re-trafficked if she returned to Botswana and this assessment was carried out at paragraph 34 of the decision and in light of the factual findings that the FtTJ had made on the evidence before him. He further submits that the FtTJ properly considered the factors that had been relied upon by the appellant and the submissions were made which included any vulnerability that she may have and in the context of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. It is of note he submitted that counsel made no submissions on sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. He further submitted that the judge was entitled to draw upon the previous findings relating to risk from her family members. Again, he submitted the grounds do not challenge any of those factual findings, nor the assessment made of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation.
62. I have considered with care the submissions made by each of the advocates have done so in the context of the evidence that was before the FTJ, the issues as they were raised and the decision reached by the FtTJ. As with any case of a decision made by the FTT the decision should be read as a whole and in its factual context. Having done so, I am satisfied that the FtTJ made no material error of law such as to lead to this decision being set aside. I set out my reasoning as follows.
63. As set out earlier, the FtTJ did not have any decision from the NRM before him. It was not in the appellant’s bundle before the FTT nor has it been provided in any updated bundle. As Mr Brown indicated the respondent accepted as a material fact that “the appellant was a victim of modern slavery within the UK.” That is what is stated within the decision letter by the respondent.
64. There is no dispute that the definition of human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of the person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The essence of trafficking is that the victim is coerced or deceived into a situation in which they are exploited. There are 3 elements - firstly an action where the person has been the subject to the act of recruitment, transportation or transfer which is achieved by the second element, namely the means which can include the threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion including fraud, deception abuse of power or abuse a position of vulnerability and the third element of exploitation which can include sexual exploitation or forced labour or services , slavery or practices similar to slavery. On the factual information here it relates to the activities of the person subject to an active recruitment achieved by deception, which led to the appellant taking a job in the UK where she was used for the purposes of forced labour. Thus, that factual information meets the definition of human trafficking. Even if it could be said that the FtTJ had not appreciated the legal definition of trafficking, I do not think that the FtTJ was unaware of the basis upon which this occurred as the FtTJ set out the factual account at paragraph 3 of his decision where he stated that between 2004 – 2019, the appellant lived in various locations before meeting someone through the church who helped to travel to the UK in March 2019 for work. Upon arrival in the UK the appellant was forced to work for a family and take care of their child without remuneration. The FtTJ was therefore not unaware of the underlying factual account of how the trafficking took place.
65. It is also important to consider the factual evidence before the FtTJ contained in the written material as this was the only evidence the FtTJ had as the appellant did not give oral evidence. She provided no detail or evidence relating to risk of trafficking or re-trafficking in the most recent witness statement for the hearing dated 14/12/23. In her previous witness statement, dated 5/8/2021, she referred to meeting a woman called A through the church and that the appellant had explained to her what she’d been through and A offered to bring her to the UK and brought her a flight ticket. She gave an account of arriving on 10 March 2019 been collected by a lady called K who was originally from Botswana but was now a British national and she was made to work there.
66. The substantive interview took place after that witness statement was provided. The interview took place on 22 September 2022. It is clear from reading the interview that the interviewer sought to clarify parts of her factual account and this included this part of her account. At question 36 (p59RB) reference was made to the lady called A but also she referred to meeting a lady at a wedding who had said to her that if she wanted to come to the UK that she would help her. This reply was not entirely clear and the interviewer returned to this question 78 (p164AB) by asking an open question- in 2011 you met A tell me more about this relationship? When looking at the reply given to that question, it demonstrates that contrary to what she had set out before in the witness statement the person identified as A was someone who she described as being very good to her and that as to the events that had occurred, the appellant referred to going to a wedding and meeting a couple there, the man was from Nigeria and the woman from Botswana (but was a British national) and that the Nigerian man had offered to contact his sister and had given the appellant £400 and invited the appellant to the UK. The interviewer clarified the appellant’s account as to A at question 80, and the appellant stated that A was not friends with the couple she had met at the wedding. She further identified at question 81 that it was a lady, not identifying A, with whom she lived in the UK.
67. The appellant’s evidence was that she wanted to leave Botswana because she was in fear of her family and mother and mother’s partner and had sought employment abroad as a way of leaving Botswana. However the findings made by the FtTJ, which are not challenged in the grounds, were that the appellant’s subjective fear of her family members was not objectively well-founded because of the reasons that he gave and by taking account of the lack of interest and lack of any contact with the appellant between 2004 – 2019. Thus, she had no need to seek employment abroad for reasons of safety.
68. I have set out the evidence that was before the FtT which demonstrates that when reading the decision of the FtT and paragraph 34 the FtTJ addressed this in his findings on the correct factual basis. At paragraph 34 the FtTJ returned to his consideration of the risk of re-trafficking, making it clear that this was undertaken on the basis of having considered all the evidence before him “in the round” but found that the appellant would not be at risk of re-trafficking in the event of a return to Botswana. He was therefore not restricting himself to the circumstances in the UK but was expressly considering risk on return to Botswana. The FtTJ returned to the findings made as to the social standing of the family, and that she would not have a family support network available to her and that she had an illegitimate child. Those findings were subject to the evidential difficulties already outlined by the judge between paragraphs 30 – 31. He balanced against those factors identified that there was no evidence that she had any health considerations either physical or mental health problems as at the date of the decision which was in June 2025. This was six years after the incident of trafficking and thus relevant to whether she had any vulnerabilities. He was entitled to take into account that factor and was also clearly entitled to take into account her age which was age 40 at the date of the hearing. Thus, there had been a gap between 2019 and the date of trafficking to her current position and again it was a relevant factor to the issue of any vulnerability on return and in the context of trafficking. The FtTJ was also entitled to consider that for a significant period between 2004 and 2019 she was able to support herself but then went on to find that if there was any pressure brought to bear on her in the event of a return to Botswana that could possibly lead to her being re-trafficked there would be sufficiency of protection for her from the state authorities to prevent the risk of re-trafficking. In my judgement that finding made by the FtTJ which referred to “any pressure being brought upon her” plainly related to any pressure from individuals, who in the appellant’s case as advanced were unidentified, who may wish to engage in re-trafficking her. There was no evidence before the FTT that those who were involved in her previous trafficking had contact with the appellant or had any influence over the authorities in Botswana. I further observe that the FtTJ recorded that there were no submissions made on behalf of the appellant in respect of sufficiency of protection. The question is not whether a receiving state has complied with particular standards of conduct but whether the evidence as the result is such as to reduce risk below that of a real risk. Therefore, the FtTJ was entitled to find that there was sufficient protection for her from the authorities.
69. The FtTJ also made a finding that internal relocation would be reasonable in the circumstances of the appellant, and that if she were concerned about returning to an area where she previously resided and which had led her coming to the UK and being exploited by way of trafficking she could move from that area to another area as identified. Thus, the FtTJ assessed the circumstances, including her past vulnerability in the context of the present circumstances, and reached the overall conclusion by assessing the evidence “in the round” that she had not demonstrated that she would be to real risk of being re-trafficked in the event being returned to Botswana. There is no error of law in that assessment.
70. In the light of that assessment, ground 2 which is based on Paragraph 339K cannot succeed. The FtTJ as a judge in a specialist tribunal can be presumed to be aware of the provision referred to in the grounds as Paragraph 339K and any lack of reference to that does not demonstrate that the FtTJ was unaware of it. The FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for reaching the conclusion that notwithstanding her earlier trafficking in 2019 that there were good reasons to find that she would not be subjected to re-trafficking on return to Botswana therefore he addressed Paragraph 339K in substance.
71. Consequently, for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

27 April 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds