Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004114

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56114/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

R R
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Gherman, instructed by Nag Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Honduras born in 1982. He appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 6 August 2025 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his protection claim on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of fulfilling the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.

3. It is the appellant’s case that he cannot return to Honduras owing to his fear of the MS13 gang. The appellant ran a tailoring business in Honduras and was subject to extortion by the gang. When his business became more successful MS13 sought to increase the extortion sum due to an amount which he could not afford. He was threatened by the gang of the severe consequences that would result from non-payment. Unable to pay, the appellant and his family ﬂed from their home. The appellant came to the UK and his wife and children remain in Honduras.

4. The respondent did not accept the facts of the appellant’s claim and concluded that section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 applies. The appellant had failed to establish he was in fear of persecution. The respondent found there was sufficiency of protection and the appellant could internally relocate. On his own evidence he had lived with his in-laws prior of coming to the UK and his wife and children had not received any threats or adverse attention since he left.

Grounds of appeal

5. The appellant submitted the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) failed to give reasons for finding the appellant’s account was lacking in detail and inconsistent. Ground 1 alleges the judge failed to identify any inconsistencies in the appellant’s account; or explain why he found the appellant’s witness statement was generalised and lacking compelling detail; and/or identify the serious problems which arose during cross-examination and how they impacted on the appellant’s credibility.

6. Ground 2 submits the judge came to speculative conclusions on points which were not put in issue and the appellant was not given the opportunity to explain. Ground 3 submits the judge erred in attaching weight to the grounds of appeal. The background evidence showed that family members may be at risk but the judge approached this evidence as if it was a certainty.

7. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal Judge Dhanji on the basis ground 1 was arguable. Judge Dhanji stated there was less merit in grounds 2 and 3 but granted permission on all grounds.

Submissions

8. In summary, Ms Gherman relied on MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and submitted the judge was under a duty to give reasons but none were given for finding that the appellant’s witness statement lacked detail. No inconsistencies were identified by the judge or relied on by the respondent in the refusal letter and none were apparent on the face of the documents. The judge compared the appellant’s account with the background evidence but failed to give adequate reasons for his overall finding that the appellant was not credible.

9. In addressing grounds 2 and 3, Ms Gherman submitted the consequences of non-payment of a financial demand was not put to the appellant by the respondent in cross-examination or by the judge. There was nothing in the CPIN to show that the appellant would not be given 24 hours to pay. The judge’s findings were very specific and, in the interests of fairness, the appellant should have been given the opportunity to comment. The judge found that the failure to meet the demand from gangs would have resulted in murder. This was contrary to the CPIN and not part of the appellant’s testimony. The three grounds taken cumulatively demonstrated an error of law in the judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal.

10. Ms Ahmed relied on the rule 24 response and submitted the judge summarised his credibility findings at [22] and then went on to explain why he found the appellant was not credible. The judges reasons were sufficient and the reader was left in no doubt why an adverse credibility finding was made. The failure to point out inconsistencies was not material. In relation to ground 2, the onus is on the appellant to prove his case and it was clear that credibility was in issue. The judge considered the appellant’s evidence and the background evidence and his findings at [26], [31] and [32] were open to him. There was no merit in ground 3. It was apparent from [15] that it was the appellant’s evidence that the gangs will resort to summary execution of relatives if they cannot trace their target.

Conclusions and reasons

11. I have considered MK Pakistan and I also acknowledge that reasons for the decision will always be capable of having been better expressed and I should not subject the judge’s decision to narrow textual analysis: Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.

12. It is apparent on reading the decision as a whole that the judge gave sufficient reasons for finding the appellant was not credible. In summary, the appellant’s account was not capable of belief when viewed in the context of the background material and section 8 applied. There was no plausible explanation for why the appellant’s family remained unharmed in Honduras or why he reported the gangs to the police whom he believed were corrupt and in league with the gangs.

13. The failure to identify inconsistencies or explain why the account was “lacking any compelling detail” was not material because the appellant’s statement gave significantly more detail than his interview in which the appellant’s answers can properly be described as vague and lacking in detail. The problems revealed in cross-examination are evident from the judge’s summary of that evidence at [8] to [19] and the judge’s reasoned conclusions at [22] to [33]. Ground 1 requires the judge to give reasons for his reasons and does not establish a material error of law.

14. The hearing before the FTT is a full merits appeal in which the judge is under a statutory obligation to address the grounds of appeal. It is not the case that the judge cannot rely on a matter not put in cross-examination or not referred to in the refusal letter. The appellant was represented before the FTT and the judge is not obliged to put matters to the appellant. It was the appellant’s case that he was in fear of being killed because he had refused to pay money to the MS13 gang. He accepted in evidence that the gang will execute his relatives if they cannot locate him. There was no unfairness in the conduct of the appeal and the judge did not misunderstand or misconstrue the evidence. Grounds 2 and 3 disagree with the judges conclusions but fail to disclose an error of law.

15. The judge considered all the evidence in the round and his findings were open to him on that evidence. He adequately explained why the appellant was not a credible witness and it is clear from the decision why the appellant’s appeal has been dismissed. I find there is no material error of law in the decision dated 6 August 2025 and I dismiss the appellant's appeal.

Notice of Decision

Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 November 2025