Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004121

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55266/2024
LP/04177/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

DH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed
For the Respondent: Mr Hume

Heard at Field House on 3 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant made a claim for asylum which was refused by the respondent. The appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier Tribunal who refused his appeal in a decision dated 31 July 2025 (the “Determination”). The appellant’s application for permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant made an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which was granted by the Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering in a decision dated 6 September 2025.

2. This grant of permission noted that the grounds of permission to appeal were not particularly easy to follow. It granted permission on grounds three, four and five only and refused permission on the remaining grounds.

3. The grant of permission records that Grounds 3 and 4 “raise concerns about the treatment of the arrest warrant by the judge. It is at least arguable that having rejected the arrest warrant in light of the positive credibility findings at [54] that the appellant was approached as part of a plot to kill the head of Kayah Malband, refused but revealed the plot the [sic] erred in assessing whether there was still a risk to the appellant. Ground five is potentially infected by ground three and four therefore is arguable.”

4. The respondent submitted a rule 24 response. At the hearing I heard oral submissions from both representatives.

5. Mr Ahmed pursued an application under rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Rules of Procedure for permission to adduce further evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. I refused this application for the reasons given at the hearing which were as follows:

6. It is accepted by Mr Ahmed that he cannot identify any of the grounds of appeal on which the grant of permission to appeal has been made to which the new evidence relates. Mr Hume set out the Home Office’s position that the new evidence is only relevant if material errors of law are found and such that the case is re-heard. I agree with those submissions and therefore I have decided that it would not be in the interests of the overriding objective and that it would be unfair to admit the evidence at this stage. Therefore, I do not give permission for it to be adduced as evidence in this hearing.

Grounds 3 and 4

7. Mr Ahmed relied on [31] of the Determination which set out “given that the respondent accepts under section 34 and 35 that if the key facts of his claim were accepted, then he would not be able to relocate and there will be no sufficiency of protection because he fears the PUK, I am prepared to accept that the treatment he fears from the PUK, if his claim was found to be credible, would amount to persecution under section 31.”

8. Paragraph 54 sets out the following:

9. Mr Ahmed submitted that the appellant’s claim should have succeeded because of that finding in [54] despite the finding that the arrest warrant was unreliable.

10. I referred Mr Ahmed to [55] which sets out “having found that he is not at risk from the PUK”. I asked Mr Ahmed who the appellant feared and he said the PUK and then I asked how his submission could succeed despite the Judge’s clear finding that the appellant is not at risk from the PUK. Mr Ahmed accepted that he was in some difficulties with this argument.

11. However, Mr Ahmed continued to rely on the submission. I asked if the submission had been made in front of the First-tier Tribunal that even if the appellant’s claims relating to fearing the authorities because of the arrest warrant were rejected, his claims should still succeed. Mr Ahmed accepted that he could not identify that this submission was made to the First-tier Tribunal.

12. In relation to the arrest warrant at paragraphs 50, 52 and 53 the Judge sets out findings that were open to him as to why he rejected the reliability of the arrest warrant. These reasons included that the appellant claimed that his family home was raided before he left Iraq but the warrant was dated after he left Iraq and therefore the appellant’s claims that his family were told that the PUK were looking to arrest him and the appellant’s claim that they could only do that if they had an arrest warrant could not be correct [52], that his family had no issues with the PUK after he left Iraq but did nothing to try to find out where he was [53] and that the arrest warrant is for an offence which the appellant is adamant did not take place [para 50]. These were all findings that were open to the judge on the evidence before him. The grounds of appeal in relation to the arrest warrant are little more than a disagreement with the findings of the judge. They do not disclose a material error of law.

13. In relation to the submission that the judge should have considered whether the appellant was at risk because of the findings that he was approached to participate in a plot, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that this was a submission made to the Judge at the First-tier Tribunal. A judge is not obliged to consider arguments that were not made to him. Mr Ahmed submitted that it was common sense and the judge should have considered it. I accept that that may be the case in respect of some situations but I do not accept that it is so in this case. The judge rejected the part of the appellant’s case that set out why he feared the PUK. The Judge found that the appellant’s fears of the PUK were not credible and so the appellant did not meet the condition set out in [31]. Further, it does not follow that because the Judge accepted part of the appellant’s account, which is that he declined to become involved in a plot to kill, that he is at real risk of serious harm from sufficiently powerful enough people in the PUK to succeed in his claim. Indeed, I have not been referred to evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal that could establish this and that the judge should have considered. It has not been established before me that there was anything before the judge in terms of argument or evidence to establish that the appellant could establish his claimed risk on any basis other than the existence of the arrest warrant. I find that there is no error of law.

Ground 5

14. This ground is intrinsically linked with grounds three and four and as I have found that there is no material error of law in relation to grounds three and four, I find the same in relation to this ground. Further, this is nothing more than a disagreement with the Determination.

15. In relation to re-documentation, I asked Mr Ahmed how this ground was arguable given the CPIN and SMO2. Mr Ahmed accepted my point and that the judge had given adequate reasons as to how the appellant could re-document.

16. I find that there is no error of law in relation to ground 5.

Notice of Decision

I find that there is no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 31 July 2025. The appeal is dismissed.

Judge Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 November 2025