Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004122
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023
LP/09371/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOLLIFFE

Between

AC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Peter Jorro, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal (“the FtT”), promulgated on 22 June 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
2. The appellant’s protection claim arises from events in Bangladesh connected to his long‑standing political profile within the Bangladeshi Islami Chhatra Shibir (BICS) and Bangladesh Jamaat‑e‑Islami (BJI), and his past association with former Brigadier Abdullahil Amaan Azmi. The appellant maintains that he was detained and tortured in 2016, and is now subject to two politically‑motivated criminal cases, one brought under the previous Awami League government and one brought under the subsequent interim government installed in mid‑2024.
3. The FtT accepted significant aspects of the appellant’s political profile, including his seniority within BJI and his role as personal assistant to Brigadier Azmi, and accepted that the appellant witnessed the Brigadier’s abduction on 22 August 2016. However, the FtT rejected the core allegations of detention and torture in 2016, and rejected the existence of the two criminal cases said to be pending in Bangladesh. These adverse credibility findings were determinative of the outcome.
4. The appellant challenges those adverse findings, contending that the FtT failed to consider key corroborative evidence, acted unfairly in refusing to admit late documents, and misapplied several principles of asylum law including section 8 of the 2004 Act, the correct approach to delay, and the assessment of sur place political activity.
Procedural History
5. The FtT dismissed the appeal in a decision dated 22 June 2025. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the FtT, which was refused by Judge Cartin on 20 August 2025.
6. The appellant renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal. In a decision dated 8 October 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst granted permission to appeal on all grounds, observing that each of the seven grounds advanced was arguable.
7. The Secretary of State filed a Rule 24 response on 27 October 2025 opposing the appeal, maintaining that the FtT did not commit an error of law and that the grounds amounted to disagreement with findings open to the FtT.
Issues Before the Upper Tribunal
8. In accordance with the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission, the issues for determination are:
a. Whether the FtT acted unfairly in refusing to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025.
b. Whether the FtT’s adverse credibility findings were reached in error of law by reason of failing to consider or engage with material corroborative evidence.
c. Whether the FtT misdirected itself in its application of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
d. Whether the FtT’s findings were inconsistent or contradictory, particularly in light of its acceptance of the appellant’s senior political role.
e. Whether the FtT placed irrational weight on minor or immaterial inconsistencies.
f. Whether the FtT erred in its treatment of sur place activities, including its approach to the Facebook evidence and to the relevant CPIN material.
Legal Framework
9. In assessing credibility, the FtT must evaluate all the evidence in the round, including corroborative material, consistency with country background evidence, and the internal coherence of the account: Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367.
10. Behaviour falling within section 8 of the 2004 Act may damage credibility, but it does not mandate rejection of an account: SM (Iran) [2005] UKAIT 00116.
11. Late evidence must be considered in accordance with the overriding objective and the principles in Maleci (non‑admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 28.
12. Where decision‑making is significantly delayed, the FtT’s findings must be scrutinised with “particular care” to ensure the delay has not infected the determination: SS (Sri Lanka) [2018] EWCA Civ 1391.
13. Where a Judge accepts part of a claim which on its face increases the plausibility of another part, the Judge must demonstrate coherent reasoning if nevertheless rejecting the related element: HK (Afghanistan) [2006] EWCA Civ 1037.
The Hearing
14. The appeal was heard at Field House on 11 December 2025. Mr Peter Jorro appeared for the appellant and Mr Tufan appeared as Presenting Officer for the Secretary of State.
15. Mr Jorro submitted that the FtT Judge accepted important parts of the appellant’s account—most notably his senior political role and his close association with Brigadier Azmi—but rejected the central allegations of detention, torture, and the existence of two criminal cases. It was argued that the Judge’s adverse findings were based on procedural unfairness and legal error.
16. Ground 1 focused on the FtT’s refusal to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025. While the FtT admitted additional Facebook material, it refused to admit the appellant’s wife’s email and the Bangladeshi lawyer’s clarificatory letter—both of which, it was submitted, directly addressed the discrepancies relied on adversely by the FtT. The appellant argued that this selective exclusion was unfair and contrary to the overriding objective, particularly given the significance of the matters at issue.
17. Turning to Grounds 2 and 3, Mr Jorro submitted that substantial corroborative evidence was not adequately considered or engaged with. This included the statements of Brigadier Azmi’s brother, senior BJI officials, and multiple Bangladeshi lawyers who verified the authenticity of the criminal case documents. Reliance was placed on Tanveer Ahmed, with emphasis on the steps the appellant had taken to obtain precisely the kind of verification that case law contemplates.
18. It was submitted that the FtT failed to put its concerns to key witnesses, including the Brigadier’s brother, contrary to well-established principles of procedural fairness recently restated by the Supreme Court in in Griffiths v TUI [2023] UKSC 48.
19. Under Ground 4, it was argued that the FtT misapplied section 8 of the 2004 Act. The Secretary of State did not rely upon delay in claiming asylum in the refusal letter; the FtT nevertheless relied on it without properly engaging with the appellant’s detailed explanation in his witness statement.
20. Grounds 5–7 challenged the FtT’s reasoning as inconsistent, contradictory, and legally flawed. It was submitted that having accepted the appellant’s political prominence and presence at the Brigadier’s abduction, the FtT’s rejection of detention and subsequent targeting was irrational.
21. On disposal, Mr Jorro submitted that the adverse findings were fundamentally flawed and should be set aside, but the FtT’s positive findings should be preserved. Given the nature of the errors, he submitted that the appropriate course was for the Upper Tribunal to retain the appeal for re‑making.
22. For the Secretary of State, Mr Tufan relied on the Rule 24 response. He submitted that the grounds amounted to disagreement with findings open to the Judge but did not identify any substantive legal error.
23. He emphasised that the FtT found at paragraph 47 that Brigadier Azmi had been released following the change of government and was living freely. This finding, he submitted, was unchallenged and undermined the appellant’s risk profile: if the Brigadier was no longer of interest to the authorities, his former assistant would be at even lower risk.
24. In relation to Ground 1, he submitted that Maleci supported the FtT’s refusal of late evidence. The Judge admitted the Facebook material because it caused no unfairness, but was entitled to exclude other material filed late and without explanation.
25. On delay, he relied on SS (Sri Lanka), submitting that no causal nexus was shown between the delay and the FtT’s findings.
26. He contended that any failure to put matters to the Brigadier’s brother was immaterial, given that the Judge had accepted that the appellant was present at the abduction, and that circumstances in Bangladesh had “moved on” following the change of government.
27. On section 8, he submitted that the FtT had directed itself adequately and had properly considered the appellant’s delay.
28. Finally, he submitted that the FtT’s approach to sur place activity, including its reliance on CPIN material, disclosed no legal error.
29. In reply, Mr Jorro submitted that the respondent’s reliance on the Brigadier’s release overlooked evidence from the Brigadier himself indicating ongoing monitoring and surveillance. In any event, the appellant faced criminal proceedings whereas the Brigadier did not.
30. He emphasised that the core issue was not delay per se but the FtT’s failure to engage with highly material evidence. The FtT’s refusal to admit complementary clarificatory evidence was central to the unfairness.
31. He submitted that the determination was fundamentally flawed in its treatment of credibility and should be set aside with preservation of the FtT’s positive findings.
ERROR OF LAW ANALYSIS
32. I am satisfied that the FtT’s decision contains material errors of law. The adverse credibility findings were not reached through a correct and lawful process. It is not necessary for me to determine all the grounds which were argued, as the outcome is the same, and so this judgment will not go through all of the pleaded grounds of appeal one by one but instead will focus on the core errors of law. Some of the grounds overlap, and will be considered as one rather than individually.
Ground 1 – Procedural unfairness (refusal to admit late evidence)
33. The FtT refused to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025, whilst admitting other late evidence from the same tranche (namely the Facebook download). The excluded evidence consisted of (i) an email from the appellant’s wife, clarifying the timeline of his detention and hospitalisation, and (ii) a letter from the appellant’s Bangladeshi lawyer addressing a typographical error on the forensic report and verifying the status of the criminal proceedings.
34. Both documents bore directly on matters the FtT later treated as central inconsistencies undermining the appellant’s credibility. By excluding material which addressed concerns raised at the hearing, yet relying on the absence of such clarification to make adverse findings, the FtT acted unfairly. The selective admission of some parts of the late evidence but not others was not adequately reasoned and resulted in an unbalanced evidential picture.
35. While the Courts have stressed the importance of procedural rigour in numerous recent decisions, the overriding objective requires the FtT to deal with cases fairly and justly, particularly in protection appeals, where consequences are of the utmost gravity. The FtT’s approach prevented consideration of evidence directly relevant to the appellant’s central claims and infected the fairness of the process. This constitutes a material error of law.
Grounds 2 & 3 – Failure to take account of material corroborative evidence
36. The FtT rejected the appellant’s account of detention and torture in 2016 and his claim to be subject to two outstanding criminal cases. In doing so, the FtT failed to engage with extensive corroborative evidence from multiple sources, including:
• the unchallenged oral evidence of Brigadier Azmi’s brother;
• letters from senior BJI officials confirming the appellant’s detention;
• statements from several long‑standing associates;
• multiple verification letters from Bangladeshi lawyers who attended court offices and confirmed the existence and authenticity of both sets of proceedings.
37. The FtT described some of this evidence as “particularly persuasive” (in relation to the Brigadier’s brother), yet did not reconcile its acceptance of the appellant’s political prominence and his presence at the Brigadier’s abduction with its rejection of the subsequent detention. The FtT instead focused on discrete discrepancies without considering the corroborative weight of the evidence in the round.
38. As emphasised in Mibanga, the FtT must consider all evidence before reaching a rejection, rather than reaching a negative view and then seeking confirmatory support for that rejection. The treatment of the documentary evidence relating to the criminal cases was similarly flawed. The FtT relied heavily on a single typographical error (“23.09.25”), whilst ignoring verification evidence directly addressing this point.
39. Taken cumulatively, these failures disclose a pattern of selective analysis inconsistent with the required holistic assessment. This constitutes a material error of law.
Ground 4 – Misapplication of section 8 of the 2004 Act
40. The FtT relied on the delay between the appellant’s arrival in the UK (October 2019) and his asylum claim (January 2021) as an adverse credibility factor under section 8. However, the FtT did not engage with the appellant’s explanation for this delay, as set out in his witness statement, nor did it address the fact that the Secretary of State did not rely on section 8 in the refusal letter in relation to delay in claiming asylum.
41. Section 8 does not mandate an adverse finding simply because delay exists; the Tribunal must consider the explanation and then assess its significance in light of the evidence as a whole. The FtT did not conduct such an evaluative exercise. Its treatment of delay was therefore incomplete and legally flawed.
Grounds 5–7 – Inconsistent reasoning, irrational reliance on minor discrepancies, and failure to assess sur place activity properly
42. The FtT accepted that the appellant was a senior BJI activist, the President of the Young Lawyers Group, the personal assistant to Brigadier Azmi, and a witness to the Brigadier’s abduction. Yet, without adequate explanation, it rejected the natural consequences of such a profile—namely, that he would have been targeted for detention and ill‑treatment.
43. It does not necessarily follow from the findings about the appellant’s work as an activist that he is entitled to a grant of asylum or humanitarian leave.
44. However, the FtT placed considerable weight on minor or explicable inconsistencies such as perceived imprecision in timelines. It did not grapple directly with the extensive corroboration supporting the detention narrative.
Cumulative assessment
45. Even if some individual errors might not, taken alone, be material, their combined effect is to undermine the FtT’s adverse credibility findings which formed the foundation of the decision. The FtT’s acceptance of the appellant’s significant political profile renders the errors particularly consequential. The determination cannot stand.
46. I therefore find that the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal involved the making of errors of law and must be set aside.
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSAL
47. Having found material errors of law, I must determine whether to remit the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal or retain it for re‑making.
48. The FtT made several positive findings that are not the subject of any challenge by the Secretary of State, including that the appellant held leadership positions within BJI and BICS; served as the personal assistant to Brigadier Azmi; was present at the Brigadier’s abduction; and has engaged in sur place political activity in the UK. These facts are unaffected by this judgment.
49. The adverse findings, which are infected by error, cannot safely be preserved. However, the preserved findings represent a substantial evidential foundation. The appellant’s credibility must be reassessed, but not from a standing start.
50. Given the nature of the errors and the wide-ranging factual inquiry which needs to be undertaken, this is a case that falls within paragraph 7.2 of the Presidential Guidance on remittal. The fact‑finding necessary is extensive and best conducted by the First‑tier Tribunal.
51. This judgment should not be understood as indicating any view about the ultimate outcome of the case, and in particular should not be taken to suggest that the appeal should be allowed. It may well be that the judge who determines the appeal refuses it.
52. Accordingly, the appropriate course is to:
a. set aside the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal;
b. preserve the positive findings identified above; and
c. remit the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal (not before Judge Ketteley) for a complete re‑hearing on the remaining issues.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law. I set aside the decision. The appeal will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal

John Jolliffe

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 March 2026