Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004158
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57326/2024; LP/02806/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

B G
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Walsh, Counsel, instructed by MCA Legal Services Ltd.
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 12 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant seeks to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s (‘the FtT’) decision promulgated on 28th June 2025 and in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 16th March 2024.
2. I have maintained the anonymity order in respect of the Appellant. I consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection, are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Turkey, of Kurdish ethnicity. He entered the UK on 3rd September 2022 and claimed asylum on that same date.
4. The Appellant maintains that he is at risk on return to Turkey as a result of his association with the Halklarin Demokratik Partisi (‘HDP’). He claims that he was arrested on two occasions and was detained and tortured by the police authorities. The Appellant states that he was accused of supporting the PKK. The Appellant maintains that he was released from detention on condition that he became an informant. The Respondent accepted at first instance that if the Appellant’s account was established, he would be at risk on return. The Respondent did however dispute the past events as claimed by the Appellant, including his own political involvement and activities.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. In dismissing the appeal and insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) The Appellant’s claim and appeal fell to be considered against the provisions contained in s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 – [8];
(b) The Judge found the Appellant’s explanation for his answers at screening interview, which failed to mention his claimed period of detention, difficult to accept – [12];
(c) The Judge was concerned that the Appellant had given incorrect answers to questions in oral evidence relating to the current leader(s) of the HDP – [17]-[29];
(d) The Judge recorded at [20] that the Respondent raised legitimate concerns about the credibility of the Appellant yet evidence which one might have expected him easily to have obtained was not made available. This included a lack of supporting witness statements or other evidence supportive of his claim to have demonstrated and been politically active in Turkey – [21];
(e) At [24], the Judge considered the report of Dr Garwood dated 5th July 2024, confirming that he did not attach much weight to this. The Judge noted that the consultation took place over a video-call and that the expert had not been given any medical records of the Appellant’s nor confirmed whether that was because there were no records for him to consider. The Judge added that the report repeated in large measure the Appellant’s account. The Judge did not find that there was any, or sufficient, analysis of what was being said by the Appellant. The Judge found that it was not clear whether the swelling and deviation of the Appellant’s nose was actually visible on the video-call or was reported to Dr Garwood, who also appeared to accept without question the psychological injuries as related to him without suggesting any other possible causes e.g. a long and traumatic journey to the UK. The Judge nevertheless concluded that he still attached weight to the report, i.e. he did not disregard this, but “placed its supportive conclusions in the mix in (his) overall determination of this appeal”;
(f) The Judge was concerned that the Appellant’s account of his connections with the HDP had changed at various stages of his claim – [27];
(g) The Judge attached some weight to the fact that s.8 credibility factors under the 2004 Act were engaged –[28];
(h) The Judge confirmed having also considered whether the Appellant, being a Kurd draft evader, was sufficient to succeed in his claim for refugee status but applying relevant authorities and country guidance, the Judge found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate this - [30].
6. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The Appellant put forward several grounds of appeal and secured permission to appeal from the Upper Tribunal. In granting permission, the Upper Tribunal Judge stated as follows:
“1. I have granted permission because I consider Ground Two to be just arguable. The FTT placed little weight on a medical report partly because it considered that the consultant may not have observed the physical injuries he described or considered other causes for the appellant’s psychological symptoms. It is arguable that these criticisms of the report overlooked what is said at [128] and [156] of the report. It will be for the appellant to show at the error of law hearing that these errors (if made out) were material, given the FTT’s other concerns about the report.
2. Ground One would not be arguable on its own. If the FTT’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s overall credibility are sustainable, there can be no error in it having failed to consider expressly that the appellant had asserted at his substantive interview that the authorities had recently visited his home.
3. Ground Three is unlikely to be made out. The FTT directed itself at [11] to the limited weight that should be put on a person’s answers at their screening interview, and at [12], it expressly considered the appellant’s explanation for failing to mention his detentions in Turkey or his membership of the HDP and gave reasons for rejecting it.
4. However, taking into account the relevant Presidential guidance and that Grounds One and Three both go to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility, I do not limit the grounds.”
8. In response, the Respondent filed and served a reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules, defending the Judge’s decision.
9. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions with Mr Walsh on behalf of the Appellant confirming that he was pursuing Ground 2 only. Helpfully, Mr Walsh had also settled a skeleton argument in advance of the hearing, which also confirmed the limited basis upon which he was proposing to pursue the appeal. Ms Clewley, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings and oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
10. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and Conclusions
11. As part of the Appellant’s second ground of appeal, Mr Walsh submitted that the Judge’s assessment of the limited weight to be attached to the medical report was unfair. This was because the expert had in fact considered alternative causation of the Appellant’s nose injury. This was at para 131 of the report, where the expert stated as follows:
“131. The characteristics of swelling and deviation do not provide the date when the injury occurred and thus a non ill treatment cannot be excluded scar are such that a number of causes other than ill treatment cannot be excluded.”
12. The above was an error of law and a material one because Mr Walsh submitted that an assessment by a tribunal judge of medical evidence must be rational and legally correct. Mr Walsh maintained that that task had not been properly undertaken by the Judge at first instance since the Judge did not take into account a proper reading of the medical evidence available to him and a proper assessment of the medical evidence went to the heart of the credibility issues and so to the appeal itself. The expert report’s conclusion at the very end of the report [TB 55] was strongly supportive of the Appellant’s account and included as follows (capitals original):
“OPINION
EXAMINATION REVEALED A PHYSICAL INJURY WHICH ARE HIGHLY CONSISTENT WITH AN ILL TREATMENT CAUSE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS THAT ARE DIAGNOSTIC OF POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER WHICH STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CLAIM TO HAVE SUFFERED ILL TREATMENT IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED.”
13. With regards to the Appellant’s mental health, Mr Walsh drew my attention to para 156, where this was considered by the expert and that in particular, the expert had in mind that the life experiences of crossing the English Channel is recognised as increasing the severity of the Appellant’s PTSD.
14. Mr Walsh otherwise accepted that the consultation between the expert and the Appellant had taken place over video-call and that no medical records had been provided to the medical expert. However, Mr Walsh noted that photographs of the Appellant, including a close-up photograph of the Appellant’s face had been provided. The close-up photograph showed the deviation in the Appellant’s nose and the other photographs were of the Appellant in hospital after undergoing surgery. Mr Walsh reiterated that the expert would have been able to observe the Appellant’s face and nose on the video-call.
15. For those reasons, Mr Walsh asked me to consider that flowing from an improper and incorrect assessment of the medical evidence, the Judge’s findings on the credibility of the Appellant’s account of past events was not sustainable since all relevant evidence needed to be considered in the round and the medical evidence had not been assessed correctly.
16. In response, Ms Clewley maintained that the Judge had not committed any error and he had properly engaged with the medical evidence. The Judge’s reasons for attaching limited weight to the medical evidence were fully explained and sustainable. Ms Clewley reiterated that the medical report did consist of large sections in which the Appellant’s claims are recounted with “some conclusions at the end”.
17. With regards to the Appellant’s nose injury, the medical expert’s consideration of this and the Judge’s assessment, Ms Clewley took me to [24] in the Judge’s decision to show that the Judge only noted a lack of consideration of alternative causes by the expert in respect of the Appellant’s mental health – not in respect of the nose injury. Moreover, Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge was correct in observing that it was unclear whether or not the deviation and scar on the Appellant’s nose and face were observed by the expert during the consultation or whether, as was the case with the psychological claimed injuries, this was another example of the expert repeating the Appellant’ own account.
18. Ms Clewley also noted the photographs relied upon by Mr Walsh and which were clearly available to the expert. However, she submitted that the photographs appeared to be of low quality and in any event, the expert had not given details of what he may have observed from these and how these assisted him in diagnosing a “highly consistent” injury.
19. With regards to the Appellant’s mental health, Ms Clewley submitted that the expert’s consideration at para 156 was not a consideration of other causes and furthermore, it was unclear what the expert had actually meant with that sentence. For ease, I reproduce this here:
“156 The life-threatening experiences on the English Channel is recognised as increasing the severity of his PTSD.”
20. Ms Clewley submitted that it was not clear whether the expert was stating that he recognised those experienced to exacerbate symptoms generally or whether the expert was again repeating the Appellant’s account of his experiences and his symptoms after having arrived in the UK. Ms Clewley submitted that that sentence, at its highest, was simply noting an increased severity and not considering whether there were alternative causes to the Appellant’s reported initial symptoms.
21. Lastly, Ms Clewley reiterated that the Judge did not in any event disregard the report and he placed this, as required, in his overall assessment of the Appellant’s claims. The Judge also noted several points in the Appellant’s favour and it was clear therefore from a reading of the decision as a whole that the Judge’s assessment was careful, fair and balanced. In the alternative, there was no material error in light of the strength of the other points that the Judge was concerned with. I have summarised those points above at para 5 and so do not rehearse these here.
22. I have very carefully considered the parties’ competing submissions. I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s second ground of appeal is made out. Ms Clewley is correct that the expert has not in anyway detailed how he observed that there was swelling and a deviation of the nose at para 128. It is wholly unclear whether this was observed from the photograph or from the video-call. There is no section in the expert’s report detailing and itemising the documents provided to him beyond a short list on the first page stating “SEF, Refusal letter, Document bundle”. I am not doubting that the photographs were provided to the expert, as Mr Walsh submitted that they were, but those photographs themselves are not dated and there is no narrative that accompanies these, as far as the report is concerned, whether from the Appellant or otherwise provided to the expert. Ms Clewley is also correct that the Judge did not ascribe the lack of alternative causes being considered to the expert’s assessment of the physical injury, as Mr Walsh also very fairly acknowledged in oral submissions before me.
23. With regards to the psychological injury, the Judge was entirely correct to note that there had not been any alternative causation considered by the expert. I do not consider that the expert’s sentence at para 156 (cited at para 19 above) amounts to such alternative considerations. It is also the case that either the commissioning of the expert’s report or the expert’s report itself is wholly deficient in failing to consider the Appellant’s medical records more generally. This is particularly important in mental health cases and contrary to the reported authority of HA (expert evidence, mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC). The Judge noted this, without expressly referring to HA Sri Lanka, and was entitled to so and in turn, to reduce the weight to attach to the report accordingly.
24. It is also unassailably the case that the report does largely consist of statements made by the Appellant, shortly followed by the expert’s short conclusions. There is no record of any questions asked by the expert of the Appellant and any answers provided to him. There is otherwise no assessment of the Appellant’s presentation during the consultation and any taking of any medical history – all components that would be expected in a medico-legal report.
25. Lastly, Ms Clewley is correct that the Judge also directed himself correctly, noting the matters in the medical evidence itself that were of concern to him and which meant that the weight to be attached to it was reduced but he did not disregard this. For this reason and those above, I am satisfied that the Judge considered the medical evidence correctly and his reasons were open to him and fully sustainable on the evidence available. He did not err in his consideration of that evidence therefore and in turn, did not err in his assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
26. The other grounds were found to be less meritorious when permission to appeal was granted to the Appellant by the Upper Tribunal and were not pursued before me in either the Appellant’s skeleton argument nor in oral submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, I consider that to have been as a result of a fair reflection and review on the part of those representing the Appellant in light of the observations made by the Upper Tribunal in the same grant of permission and the Judge’s detailed reasons for reaching the findings that he did on those issues.
27. For the reasons above, I am satisfied that the Appellant’s appeal should be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
28. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of material errors of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18.03.2026