Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004162
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03912/2023
LP/02620/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOWARTH

Between

RM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No appearance.
For the Respondent: Miss A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 24 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction:
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon, dated 8 September 2025, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge M. Symes (the ‘judge’), dated 14 July 2025, refusing the appellant’s appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
Background:
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, born in 1969. He came to the United Kingdom in June 2010. He claimed asylum in 2018 on the basis of his membership and activities with the BNP. The appellant claimed his activities with the BNP continued in the United Kingdom up until 2017, when his health declined.
First-tier Tribunal Decision:
3. The First-tier Tribunal judge rejected the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim. The judge also dismissed the human rights claims, concluding that his removal from the United Kingdom would neither be in breach of his right to a private life under Article 8 ECHR, or his Article 3 rights, in view of his poor state of health.

4. In relation to the appellant’s ill health the judge accepted at [6] read with [15] that:
a. As outlined in a GP letter from June 2024, the appellant suffers from coronary artery disease, ischaemic heart disease, anxiety and depression and is prescribed ibruprofen, AS saliva orthana spray, atorvastatin, asprin, lansoprazole and sertraline;
b. The June 2014 letter also indicated it would be difficult for the appellant to travel long distances on public transport;
c. He had previously suffered from other conditions, including type 1 respiratory failure when he caught Covid 19, and he had been fitted with a stent during heart surgery;
d. There was also clinic note from May 2024 which recorded that he had complained of weekly chest pain and indicated it would be investigated.

5. At [15] the judge concluded as follows:
“I accept that the Appellant suffers from the health conditions that I have summarised above. Doubtless these are significant. But whilst a significant weight of medical evidence appears in the bundle, it largely amounts to appointment letters and treatment updates. The June 2024 GP letter summarises his conditions but provides no detailed diagnosis of the actual difficulties he faces in terms of the severity of his symptoms and nor is there any prognosis of how his condition may develop in the future, with or without medical treatment in the UK or Bangladesh. There is no evidence from which I can reasonably infer that he would suffer serious irreversible harm in the near future of a significant reduction in life expectancy, either during or after the flight home. […]”

6. The appellant appealed against the judge’s determination, setting out five grounds of appeal. Permission was granted on only two of those grounds, which concerned the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s ill health.
Proceedings before the Upper Tribunal:
7. The error of law hearing was first listed before the Upper Tribunal on 15 December 2025. On that occasion, the appellant attended in person and was represented by counsel. Unfortunately, the hearing had to be adjourned because the error of law hearing bundle had not been filed and served pursuant to the directions, and the Rule 24 Notice had been incorrectly entered on CE-File and had not been received by the appellant.

8. The hearing was adjourned until 24 February 2026. A notice of the hearing was sent by post to the appellant on 28 January 2026, as well as to his representatives by email on the same date.

9. On the evening of 23 February 2026, the appellant’s legal representative emailed the Upper Tribunal and indicated they were without instructions and funds, so would not attend the hearing, or instruct counsel to attend the hearing, which should therefore proceed without representation. The solicitors were unaware if the appellant would attend.

10. The appellant did not attend the hearing on 24 February 2026. The court clerk made a telephone call to the appellant shortly after 10am. However, the appellant indicated he was not feeling well and would not be attending. The appellant did not ask for the hearing be adjourned.

11. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Upper Tribunal Rules, I decided to proceed with the error of law hearing in the absence of the appellant. The notice of hearing had been posted to the appellant on 28 January, so reasonable steps had been taken to notify him of the hearing date. The court clerk had also spoken to him on the telephone on the morning of the hearing and he had not requested a further adjournment. Given the hearing had been adjourned previously and there was now an error of law appeal bundle which included all of the documents before the First-tier Tribunal judge, as well as the appellant’s grounds of appeal, I concluded it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the appellant’s absence. Further, Ms. Nolan, who represented the Secretary of State, submitted that the medical evidence did not suggest the appellant suffered from any particular vulnerability which might otherwise suggest the hearing should not proceed.

12. I heard brief submissions from Miss. Nolan, who relied upon the Secretary of State’s Rule 24 Notice but whom clarified that although the judge had found the appellant suffered from “significant” ill health this did not amount to a finding that the threshold test in AM Zimbabwe [2020] UKSC 17 had been met.
The Grounds:
13. Although I am sympathetic to the appellant’s ill-health, I am unable to conclude that the judge erred in law in reaching the decision to reject the appellant’s human rights appeal.

14. The first ground of appeal alleges the judge failed to properly assess the seriousness of the appellant’s medical conditions and that his conclusion regarding the threshold test in AM Zimbabwe [2020] UKSC 17 not being met was irrational or inadequately reasoned. However, for the reasons set out below, I do find the judge fell into error.

15. Following AM Zimbabwe [2020] UKSC 17, which confirmed that Paposhvilli v Belgium [2016] ECHR 1113 should be followed, an appellant must demonstrate substantial grounds for believing that he, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy [183]. As Lord Wilson indicated at [23], in the first instance, it is for an appellant to adduce evidence capable of showing substantial grounds for believing that, if removed, he would be exposed to a real risk of subjection of treatment contrary to Article 3.

16. At [15] the judge understandably concluded that the appellant suffers from “significant” health conditions. However, this did not mean that the judge had to accept the threshold test in AM Zimbabwe [2020] UKSC 17 had been met. The judge properly considered the medical evidence presented by the appellant, as set out at [6], and it is clear from the reasoning at [15] that the judge concluded the available evidence was, however, insufficient to meet the Article 3 threshold. This is because it did not demonstrate substantial grounds for believing the appellant, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

17. The judge’s reasons at [15] for declining to reach such a finding are neither irrational, nor inadequate. The evidence presented did not include a prognosis about the future course of the appellant’s health whether he remained in the United Kingdom, or was returned to Bangladesh. Beyond the appellant’s prescription referred to in the GP’s letter of June 2024, there was no information about the appellant’s anticipated future medical needs. There was no evidence that the medicine referred to in the appellant’s the current prescription would not be provided in Bangladesh. There was no evidence to suggest that absent such medication, the appellant would face a real risk of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in his life expectancy. Further, the GP’s letter from June 2024 referenced the doctor’s belief “that it would be difficult for him to travel long distances on public transports, but he should be able to attend local appointments or tribunal hearings” but it did not advise against travel, and it did not suggest the appellant would not be fit to fly. At first instance the appellant’s representative had submitted that his removal would result in “intense suffering or significant reduction in life expectancy” [9] and the “respondent could not reasonably remove the Appellant to Bangladesh without risking his life given he was a heart patient” but this was nowhere borne out in the supporting medical evidence.

18. The second ground of appeal overlaps with the first ground. The appellant submits that the judge failed to resolve a conflict in the background evidence about the availability of medical treatment in Bangladesh. On the one hand a quantitative study from 2024 had referred to dysfunction in the Bangladeshi healthcare system, on the other hand a 2022 CPIN had presented a more optimistic view of the healthcare system in Bangladesh. I agree with the respondent that it was unnecessary for the judge to make findings about the general state of healthcare in Bangladesh. The appellant had not provided evidence to demonstrate what his future medical needs were likely to be, nor about the impact on him if they were not met. Consequently, the judge did not need to resolve differences in the evidence regarding the available healthcare provision in Bangladesh in general, because it did not take matters any further in view of the limitations in the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s assertion that his removal would expose him to a real risk of subjection of treatment contrary to Article 3.

19. For the reasons set out above, the medical evidence in this appeal did not reach the required threshold to demonstrate a prima facie violation of Article 3. The Decision does not contain any error of law and so must be upheld.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of First-tier Tribunal judge M. Symes dated 14 July 2025 does not contain an error of law. The error of law appeal is dismissed and the First-tier Tribunal decision is upheld.
K. Howarth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 February 2026