Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004165
First-tier Tribunal No: LP/03790/2025
PA/62960/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd May 2026
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

F B
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, Counsel instructed by ASR Advantage Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 13 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her husband and children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of her family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity

1. I have maintained the anonymity direction in place in the First-Tier Tribunal. It was not suggested that it should be lifted. The appellant has claimed asylum and her husband and children are her dependants. I consider that the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the asylum system, particularly where children’s best interests are involved, outweighs the public interest in open justice.

Background

2. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh, appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal, the decision of a First-Tier Tribunal Judge (“the FTTJ”) promulgated on 20 July 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of 24 April 2024 of her protection and human rights claims made on 9 November 2022.

3. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim, as summarised by the FTTJ was that she was at risk on return to Bangladesh due to experiencing harassment, assault and intimidation from MH, a powerful individual within the Chhatra League (the student wing of the Awami League). She claimed to fear being killed by him on return to Bangladesh, because she had refused to marry him and married her husband instead.

4. The FTTJ accepted the appellant’s account of being threatened and attacked by MH, whom he accepted to be a senior member of the Chhatra League who had political influence, whilst she was living in Bangladesh [23].

5. The FTTJ explained that since the appellant’s leaving Bangladesh in 2022 there had been significant changes to the political situation. She discussed what had happened with reference to the December 2024 CPIN on the political situation in Bangladesh.

6. Observing that the appellant’s case rested on MH’s power and influence as a result of his political affiliations [26], the FTTJ found that no evidence had been submitted to suggest that MH had retained any power and influence following the change in regime in 2024 and that the country background material as reflected in the CPIN indicated that the appellant would be able to seek protection from the authorities on return to Bangladesh, even if that might not have been available when the Awami League was in power [27]. She concluded at [28]:

“as a result of the change of regime, which means that the non-state actor which the Appellant fears (M.H.) no longer has the political or law enforcement support of the Awami League/ruling party, I do not find it reasonably likely that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.”

7. The FTTJ thereupon dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights claims and concluded that it would be in the best interests of the appellant’s children to return to Bangladesh with their parents.

Grounds; submissions
8. Ground one averred that the FTTJ erred in:

(i) failing to consider whether the appellant as a woman fleeing violence would have effective access to state protection. The case of SA (Divorced woman – illegitimate child) Bangladesh CG [2011] UKUT 00254 (IAC) was relied upon;

(ii) the FTTJ had failed to consider whether the appellant would be able to access state protection given that she had not been able to in the past and that MH had made threats and attacked the appellant’s family even after the appellant had left Bangladesh;

(iii) (marked as (iv) in the grounds) the FTTJ had failed to take into account the CPIN on women fearing gender-based violence which was relevant in the circumstances;

(iv) (marked as (v) in the grounds) there was no material evidence to support the finding that the case filed by MH against the appellant’s husband would not be pursued by the authorities in Bangladesh. There was therefore no proper reasoning to support [27];

(v) (marked as (vi) in the grounds) there was no material evidence that MH’s power had diminished or that the change in political situation had made any significant improvement in the appellant’s position bearing in mind SA and the appellant would not be able to access state protection.

9. Ground two averred a misdirection in law by failing to address internal relocation; ground three averred a misdirection in the humanitarian protection findings (relying entirely on grounds one and two) and ground four averred failing to conduct a lawful Article 8 and best interests’ assessment, again for the same reasons.

10. The skeleton argument dated 9 February added that the respondent had confirmed at the hearing that if the material facts of the appellant’s account were accepted, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not be in dispute. The FTTJ’s findings amounted to acceptance that MH was a powerful figure in Bangladesh and the appellant’s evidence was that he still continued to have political influence and that MH had attacked her family members in Bangladesh and continued to issue threats. The FTTJ’s decision was primarily based around the CPIN but she had erred into failing to take account of the position of the appellant as a woman who was a continuing target of MH who continued to have power and influence despite the change of government. The findings by the FTTJ were inconsistent or contrary to the appellant’s evidence.

11. In a rule 24 response, the respondent opposed the appeal, saying SA was not relevant and the other grounds were merely disagreements. The FTTJ was entitled to conclude that MH’s power would be diminished following the change of government in Bangladesh and the appellant had the burden of proving that MH remained a threat.

12. Mr Ahmed submitted at the hearing that looking at the record it was quite clear that the presenting officer had conceded that if MH had power and influence then the appellant would succeed. The FTTJ found that MH had power and influence. The appellant had adopted her witness statement, she was cross-examined, and it was the appellant’s case that she still feared persecution. Her oral evidence was found to be credible. Simply because the regime changed did not mean that a prominent person had lost his influence. If the presenting officer’s view was that it had not been accepted that the appellant would be at risk because it was not accepted that MH had retained power then that was one thing, but looking at the record, it was quite clear it was conceded by the presenting officer. The appellant’s case, irrespective of regime change, was that MH had retained political influence and power and in her circumstances she would not obtain sufficiency of protection.

13. He submitted that there was no evidence to conclude that the case against the appellant’s husband would necessarily be dropped; it was a law enforcement matter and there was simply nothing before the FTTJ to indicate that the case would not be pursued. MH had also been involved in that case and that would show that MH still had influence and power in Bangladesh. Regime change did not mean that all those loyal to the regime had been eradicated. He averred that there was no proper reasoning. He said he did not pursue the point relating to SA.

14. Mrs Abdul-Karim submitted that there was no concession. The FTTJ was looking at the position on the day. The FTTJ had found that MH had political influence [23] but that there had been changes to the political situation. The judge had looked at the objective position on the day. It was for the appellant to show that following the change in regime MH still had power and influence. It appeared that MH’s power came from his political influence which had completely changed. The Awami League were no longer in power, and it was up to the appellant to show in that context that MH still had power or influence. There was no evidence submitted to that effect. The country evidence supported the finding that the appellant would now have protection even if it had not previously been available and that entirely explained the FTTJ’s findings. There was no need to consider internal relocation.

15. Mr Ahmed replied that it was important to note that at the hearing the respondent’s position was that none of the evidence about MH was accepted. That was the pivotal point in the appeal. That was the reasons why the issues were set out in that way and that was why the FTTJ set out the position in relation to Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The appellant put her case on the basis that MH still had influence and power. A change of regime did not mean that the person lost all power and influence. In the appellant’s specific situation, she would not receive protection given her position and the threats which the family had received which were also credible. As the case concerned risk on return there needed to be anxious scrutiny and bearing in mind the context, the decision was unsafe and should be set aside.

Discussion and conclusions

16. The grounds of appeal make no reference to any concession. The first suggestion that there was a concession relevant to the argument that the FTTJ made an error of law was at [10] of the appellant’s skeleton argument which was filed in the week of the hearing before me. If there had been a clear relevant concession then one would expect that to form front and centre of the original argument in the grounds of appeal, and if necessary for a transcript to be obtained or the recording sought.

17. The FTTJ set out at [11] that there were two issues, firstly the credibility of the appellant’s account of what had happened whilst she was living in Bangladesh and secondly whether MH “has” power and influence over the Bangladesh authorities. These were two separate issues. She recorded at [12] that the presenting officer confirmed (the underlining for emphasis is mine) – “if the material facts of the Appellant’s account were to be accepted (i.e. including that MH is a powerful figure within Bangladesh) sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not be in dispute.”

18. MH’s power and influence was clearly an issue, and there was not simply one issue. I observe that the appellant’s skeleton argument, which was filed with all the evidence on which the appellant relied only on 8 July 2025 when the hearing before the FTTJ was on 11 July 2025, raised not only whether the appellant’s claim in respect of fear from MH was credible but also whether MH “has” power and influence over the Bangladesh authorities.

19. The respondent’s concession that sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not be in dispute if the material facts of the appellant’s account were to be accepted was therefore evidently made on the basis that it was not accepted that MH had, at the date of the hearing, power and influence over the Bangladesh authorities.

20. The FTTJ accepted the appellant’s account of being threatened and attacked by MH. She also found that MH had political influence [23] but it is clear from her findings that she was using “had” in the past tense because her findings were in relation to events that took place whilst the appellant was in Bangladesh, i.e. up to 15 April 2022 when the appellant left to come to the UK on a student visa. The FTTJ explained that the appellant’s case rested on MH’s power and influence as a result of his political affiliations [26].

21. The FTTJ was right to say that the appellant’s case rested on MH’s power and influence because of his political affiliations. In her witness statement, dated 4 July 2025 the appellant explained, referring to MH “Before I came to the UK I filed GD in Bangladesh against him. But the police did not take any action against him because of his involvement with then ruling party Awami League. On the other hand influenced by his political involvement the police took case against my husband.”

22. The witness statement, although made after the Awami League were no longer in power, does not aver that MH still has influence in another way or for other reasons. The reason given why the police did not take action against MH was his political involvement with the ruling party. The FTTJ found that no evidence had been submitted to suggest that MH had retained any power and influence following regime change. It is asserted by the appellant that it was her case that MH had retained power and influence, but I was not taken to the detail of any specific evidence she gave to that effect as I would expect to be if there was specific evidence beyond the mere assertion.

23. The grounds relied on SA, but Mr Ahmed rightly did not continue to rely on the case. That case dates from 2011 and is relevant to divorced women. It refers to the disinclination of the police to act upon complaints about domestic violence, but this is not a case of domestic violence, the appellant is married to someone else and MH is not part of her family.

24. There is nothing to indicate that the January 2024 CPIN on women fearing gender-based violence was before the FTTJ at the hearing or that the FTTJ was taken to any part of that CPIN or that arguments were made about the CPIN in submissions. The FTTJ cannot have erred in law in not referring to background material to which she was not taken.

25. It is right that the appellant alleged that MH had attacked her family and her husband’s family after she left Bangladesh. There are photographs and other evidence. It is not clear to me when this attack is said to have taken place, but it was referred to by the appellant in interview, so it was before the date of interview, on 5 March 2024, so before regime change. The appellant said in her witness statement that MH was “still” threatening her family and her husband’s family, but there was no further detail, and making threats is not itself evidence of power and influence with the authorities.

26. It was for the appellant to prove that sufficiency of protection would not be available to her in Bangladesh. Given that the appellant’s case was clearly as the FTTJ explained that MH had power because of his political affiliations, it was entirely open to the FTTJ on the evidence not to be satisfied given the regime change that he still had power and influence as at the date of the hearing. The FTTJ, referring to the material in the CPIN which included that the Chhatra League had been listed as a terrorist organisation [25 [a]] and that there had been reforms in the police force including a removal of those loyal to the Awami League [25 [d]] was perfectly entitled to conclude that the appellant would be able to seek protection from the authorities now, even though that might not have been available to her when the Awami League was in power.

27. The FTTJ made no error of law. There is nothing to show that she did not give anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s case. She correctly directed herself on the law (see [14] – [16]) and took account of all the evidence before her [5]. Her conclusion that although MH had political influence when the Awami League was in power, now the Awami League was not in power, the appellant would be able to seek protection from the authorities, is fully reasoned with reference to the evidence before her and the background material. It is clear to the appellant from the reasoning why she has not succeeded and the conclusions are not irrational or perverse.

28. The FTTJ concluded that it would appear unlikely that the case against the appellant’s husband would be pursued. That finding must have referred to the evidence in the CPIN at [25 [e]] but even if there were any error in the reasoning, it would not be material. That MH had been involved in a charge brought some years before (see [7] and [20]) was not evidence that he still had power and influence.

29. It would have been best practice for the FTTJ to make findings about internal relocation as it was in issue, but her failure to do so is not material given her findings on sufficiency of protection. The appellant could not be successful in her humanitarian protection claim given the FTTJ’s findings; there was no separate Article 8 claim [13] and so once the international protection claim failed, the human rights claim also failed and it would be in the best interests of the children to return to Bangladesh with their parents.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision contains no material error of law and stands. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 May 2026