Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004166

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53511/2024
LP/12953/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No attendance
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh, born in 2002. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his protection appeal. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 15 July 2025. Permission to appeal was granted on 9 September 2025.
Preliminary Issue: Adjournment
2. The error of law hearing in this appeal was first listed for 6 November 2025. On 20 October 2025 the appellant applied for an adjournment, relying on his physical and mental health difficulties and the fact that he was unrepresented.
3. Following receipt of a letter from the appellant’s GP, Dr S Gurung, dated 28 October 2025, the Tribunal granted an adjournment. In a note dated 31 October 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce recorded that the adjournment was granted because the appellant was awaiting the results of blood tests in relation to reported memory loss and because his solicitors had come off the record only a few days before the application, leaving him limited time to secure alternative representation. The adjournment was granted for a period of four weeks only.
4. The error of law hearing was subsequently listed for 15 December 2025. On 27 November 2025 the appellant again applied for an adjournment, enclosing evidence relating to his medication, back exercises and medical appointments. He reported ongoing physical and mental health difficulties, including depression, anxiety and memory loss. He had been referred to the Mental Health Together team on 31 October 2025 and had attended the Psychosexual Therapy Service on 18 November 2025. A further letter from his GP dated 20 November 2025 confirmed ongoing mental health symptoms with memory concerns. The results of the appellant’s memory tests showed slightly low folate with no anaemia, with the remainder of the tests within normal limits, and were to be forwarded to the mental health team. The appellant was also noted to have chronic back pain, for which he used a support brace, and some ENT symptoms. The GP recorded that the appellant reported that his mental health symptoms would affect his ability to attend the hearing. The hearing listed for 15 December 2025 was adjourned.
5. The hearing was then relisted for 28 January 2026. On 19 January 2026 the appellant made a further application for an adjournment, submitting that his physical and mental health difficulties prevented him from preparing for or attending the hearing. He enclosed a letter from Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust dated 4 January 2026.
6. That application was refused by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens in a detailed decision dated 22 January 2026. Judge Owens concluded that, although the appellant plainly experiences mental health difficulties and physical symptoms, the medical evidence did not demonstrate that he lacked capacity or that he was medically unfit to attend or participate in a hearing. She noted that the GP evidence was framed by reference to the appellant’s own reported view rather than an independent clinical assessment, that the memory test results were largely within normal limits, and that the appellant was able to function in daily life, including working part-time and attending appointments. Judge Owens further observed that the Tribunal is experienced in managing cases involving litigants in person and vulnerable appellants and can make reasonable adjustments. She also took into account the absence of evidence of recent attempts to secure representation and the fact that the appeal had already been adjourned twice.
7. Following that refusal, the appellant submitted a further medical letter from his GP, Dr Gurung, dated 21 January 2026. The letter records ongoing symptoms and treatment and states that the appellant reports that he does not feel able to attend the hearing.
8. I refused to adjourn the hearing for the same reasons given by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens. There has been no material change in the appellant’s circumstances or in the medical evidence since her decision. The medical evidence does not establish that the appellant is unable to attend or participate in an error of law hearing, and I was satisfied that further delay would be contrary to the overriding objective and an unjustified use of Tribunal resources. I was satisfied that it was fair and in the interests of justice to refuse to adjourn the hearing.
9. Applying rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, I was satisfied that the appellant had been notified of the hearing and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in his absence. The appeal had already been adjourned on more than one occasion and this was an error of law hearing only, requiring no oral evidence from the appellant. Detailed grounds of appeal prepared by the appellant’s former legal representatives, Londonium Solicitors, were before the Tribunal. In all the circumstances I considered that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the appellant’s absence.
Background
10. The appellant claimed asylum on the basis of his political opinion, asserting membership of Chatra Dal in Bangladesh and sur place activity in the United Kingdom connected to BNP-linked organisations. He claimed to have been targeted in Bangladesh, including by the bringing of a false criminal case against him, and to face a real risk on return.
11. The respondent accepted the appellant’s nationality and identity but rejected all other aspects of the appellant’s account.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
12. The appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) sitting at Taylor House on 3 July 2025. The appellant was represented and gave evidence. He was treated as a vulnerable witness.
13. The Judge accepted that the appellant had been a member of Chatra Dal in Bangladesh and a member of Jubodal UK. However, the Judge rejected the claim that a false criminal case had been brought against the appellant, rejected the claimed visits by the authorities, attached limited weight to documentary, medical, CCTV and expert evidence, and found that certain Facebook posts relied upon by the appellant were false.
14. Taking the evidence cumulatively and considering the country material, including the post-August 2024 political situation in Bangladesh, the Judge concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return and dismissed the appeal.
Grounds of appeal
15. The grounds of appeal contend, in summary, that the Judge:
(i) misapplied the legal framework and standard of proof;
(ii) failed to give adequate reasons, particularly in relation to documentary and social media evidence;
(iii) unfairly weighed the evidence; and
(iv) erred in the assessment of risk on return in light of changes in the country situation.
16. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 9 September 2025. The grant of permission states as follows:
‘Some of the assertions made in the grounds of appeal are simply an attempt to repeat a case as it was before the Tribunal, rather than identify arguable errors of law. Notwithstanding this, although I do not consider there is any argument in relation to the Judge’s approach to the expert report, I do consider it to be just about arguable that the Judge erred in his treatment of the documentary evidence at [26] – and in particular the Facebook posts at [28] and [29]. In particular, it is just about arguable the Judge has erred in making a finding that the Facebook posts were “created” by the Appellant and are therefore “false “given the evidence available to the Judge. Ground 2 and 3 are therefore arguable.
Grounds 1 and 4 have less apparent merit but, taking a pragmatic approach, I do not restrict permission’.
Error of Law Hearing
17. The appellant did not attend the hearing and was not represented. The respondent opposed the appeal and relied on the Rule 24 response. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Simpson submitted that none of the grounds disclosed a material error of law. In relation to Grounds 2 and 3, he submitted that the First-tier Tribunal Judge gave adequate and sustainable reasons for the weight attached to the expert report, documentary evidence, CCTV material and social media posts, and that the findings were properly open to the Judge applying established principles, including those in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 00439. He emphasised that the appellant had been unable to explain how key documents and evidence were obtained and that inconsistencies in the dating and content of the Facebook posts were plainly identified and rationally resolved.
18. As to Grounds 1 and 4, Mr Simpson submitted that the Judge had correctly directed herself to the applicable legal framework and was entitled, on the evidence and the country material before her, to conclude that the appellant would not be at real risk on return in light of the changed political situation in Bangladesh. Overall, the respondent’s position was that the grounds amounted to no more than disagreement with findings of fact and the weight attached to the evidence, and that the decision disclosed no error of law.
Decision and reasons
19. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal.
20. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
Ground 1
21. In Ground 1, the appellant contends that the Judge erred in law by applying the incorrect legal framework and standard of proof when assessing the asylum claim. The appellant argues that, although the Judge correctly directed herself to the two-stage test under section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘NABA’), she erred in her application of that framework. In particular, it is contended that, having accepted that the appellant was a long-standing member and local office-holder of Chatra Dal, a BNP-affiliated organisation, the Judge failed properly to assess whether this profile gave rise to a real risk of persecution. The appellant submits that the Judge placed undue emphasis on the absence of evidence of personal targeting by the authorities, thereby overlooking country material indicating that low-level and mid-ranking BNP and Chatra Dal members may be at risk of ill-treatment even where incidents go unreported or do not attract wider attention. It is further argued that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant’s role as a named local office bearer would be sufficient to bring him to the attention of hostile actors, particularly in the context of heightened political tensions before and after the 2024 protests in Bangladesh.
22. I do not accept this ground of appeal. Although the Judge accepted that the appellant had been a member of Chatra Dal in Bangladesh and had held a local position, the Judge did not find that the appellant’s political activities or profile were such as to give rise to a real risk of persecution on return. That assessment was grounded in the Judge’s sustainable findings that the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the authorities, that the claimed false criminal case and alleged visits by the authorities were not reliable, and that the appellant’s sur place activities were limited in nature. Those findings were open to the Judge on the evidence and were properly reached.
23. The appellant’s submission seeks to elevate membership and a local role within Chatra Dal into an automatic risk category. The Judge was not required to do so. The assessment of risk is fact-sensitive and depends on the individual’s actual profile and activities as found. The Judge was entitled to conclude, on the evidence before her, that the appellant was a low-level member whose activities had not brought him to the attention of the state or of hostile actors, and that mere membership, without more, was insufficient to establish a real risk of persecution.
24. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the Judge did not require proof of personal targeting as a legal precondition. Rather, she assessed whether, on the appellant’s own circumstances and in light of the country material, there was a reasonable likelihood of persecution. The Judge expressly considered the background evidence relating to political violence and the post-2024 situation in Bangladesh, and explained why, in the absence of a credible history of targeting or a significant political profile, the risk threshold was not met. That was a rational and lawful conclusion.
25. The Judge was also entitled to take into account the absence of reliable evidence that the appellant’s role as a local office bearer was publicly prominent or likely to bring him to the attention of hostile actors. The Judge’s finding that the appellant’s profile was insufficiently high-level to give rise to risk was one that was reasonably open to her and disclosed no misdirection or failure to consider relevant material.
26. Furthermore, the Judge did not apply the balance of probabilities to the assessment of future risk. At paragraphs 12–13 of the determination, the Judge correctly directed herself to the two-stage approach under section 32 of NABA 2022, expressly distinguishing between matters to be assessed on the balance of probabilities and those to be assessed on whether persecution is reasonably likely. When assessing risk on return, the Judge framed the issue in terms of whether the appellant would be at “real risk” and concluded, at paragraph 33, that the appellant had not demonstrated that he was “reasonably likely to be at real risk of persecution/ill-treatment on return”. There is nothing in the decision to suggest that the Judge misunderstood or misapplied the applicable standard of proof. Read fairly and as a whole, the determination demonstrates that the Judge applied the correct legal framework.
27. Ground 1 therefore discloses no error of law.
Ground 2
28. In Ground 2, the appellant contends that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting key elements of the appellant’s evidence. It is argued that, at paragraph 21, the Judge gave limited weight to the expert report of MXD on the basis of insufficient document analysis, without adequately explaining why the expert’s broader contextual assessment and professional experience as a legal practitioner and human rights advocate in Bangladesh could not be relied upon. The appellant further submits that, at paragraphs 22 and 26, the Judge rejected CCTV footage and medical documentation solely because the appellant could not explain how they were obtained, without considering whether that deficiency undermined the substantive reliability of the evidence or whether clarification could have been sought. Finally, the appellant challenges the rejection of Facebook posts at paragraphs 25 and 28 as contrived, arguing that this conclusion was speculative, unsupported by expert digital or forensic analysis, and that the Judge’s finding that the appellant had created false posts was not justified on the evidence and amounted to a material error of law.
29. I do not accept this ground of appeal. The First-tier Tribunal Judge gave clear, detailed and logical reasons for the weight attached to each category of evidence, and those reasons were properly open to her on the material before her.
30. In relation to the expert report of MXD, the Judge did not reject the report wholesale, nor did she overlook the expert’s professional background. Rather, she explained why she was unable to place significant weight on the report in circumstances where the expert’s conclusions regarding the authenticity of documents were generic and unsupported by detailed analysis of the specific documents relied upon, such as their format, emblems, annotations or provenance. The Judge was entitled to consider that, where document verification was central to the appellant’s claim, an expert opinion lacking detailed engagement with the documents themselves was of limited probative value. That assessment involved the weighing of expert evidence, which lies squarely within the Judge’s evaluative discretion, and does not disclose any error of law.
31. As to the CCTV footage and medical documentation, the Judge did not reject this evidence on a purely technical or procedural basis. She was entitled to take into account the appellant’s inability to explain how this evidence had been obtained, particularly where concerns about the reliability and provenance of documents from Bangladesh had been raised by the respondent and were supported by the country material. In that context, the absence of any explanation as to the chain of custody or transmission of the evidence was a relevant consideration going to weight. The Judge was not required to speculate as to alternative explanations, nor was she obliged to invite further clarification or adjourn the proceedings to permit the appellant to remedy evidential deficiencies. The burden of proof rested on the appellant, and it was for him to present his case and evidence in a form capable of being relied upon.
32. In respect of the Facebook posts, the Judge identified clear and material discrepancies in both their dates and content. In particular, a post dated January 2020 and a further post dated August 2020 purported to refer to a physical attack on the appellant said to have occurred on 17 December 2020. The Judge was entitled to regard it as inherently implausible that posts describing an alleged attack could pre-date the incident itself by several months. These discrepancies were expressly put to the appellant in cross-examination. He was unable to provide an explanation, stating that he did not know how this could have occurred. The Judge also noted that the appellant had not provided a full Facebook download, despite this issue having been raised in the respondent’s review. Although the appellant’s representative submitted that the dating errors were so obvious as to undermine any suggestion of fabrication, the Judge was entitled to reject that submission. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the posts were false. No expert digital or forensic analysis was required in order to reach that conclusion. The inconsistencies were apparent on the face of the material and fell to be assessed as part of the Judge’s ordinary evaluation of credibility.
33. Read fairly and as a whole, the determination demonstrates that the Judge considered all of the material evidence, gave clear and intelligible reasons for the weight she attached to it, and reached findings that were rational and open to her. This ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and does not disclose a material error of law.
Ground 3
34. In Ground 3 the appellant contends that the Judge subjected the appellant’s documentary and supporting evidence to excessive and unfair scrutiny, while accepting the respondent’s assertions and country material uncritically. It is argued that, although the background evidence recognises the prevalence of false criminal cases and police harassment of opposition figures, the Judge failed to engage with that context when assessing the appellant’s claimed experiences. The appellant further submits that the Judge effectively required corroboration of each element of the claim, dismissing otherwise consistent oral and documentary evidence on the basis of ‘peripheral inconsistencies’ or the manner in which evidence was transmitted, rather than assessing the substance of the evidence in the round.
35. I do not accept this ground of appeal. When the First-tier Tribunal decision is read as a whole, it is clear that the Judge did not subject the appellant’s evidence to excessive or unfair scrutiny, nor did she adopt the respondent’s position uncritically. Rather, she carried out a careful evaluative assessment of all the evidence before her, as she was required to do.
36. The Judge was entitled to scrutinise the appellant’s documentary evidence with care, particularly in circumstances where the respondent had raised concerns, supported by country material regarding the prevalence of false or unreliable documents emanating from Bangladesh. The Judge did not reject the appellant’s evidence simply because corroboration was lacking. Instead, she assessed the reliability and probative value of the evidence in the round, taking into account internal inconsistencies, deficiencies in provenance, and the appellant’s inability to explain how certain documents were obtained. That approach is consistent with established authority and does not amount to an impermissible requirement for corroboration.
37. Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the Judge did not ignore the background evidence acknowledging that false criminal cases and harassment of opposition figures can occur. The Judge was entitled, however, to distinguish between general country conditions and the appellant’s individual circumstances. Having rejected the appellant’s account of being personally targeted, including the claimed false criminal case and visits by the authorities, the Judge was not required to accept that the appellant’s experiences fell within the broader patterns described in the country evidence. The mere existence of such practices does not relieve an appellant of the burden of demonstrating that they are reasonably likely to be personally affected.
38. The Judge did not treat the inconsistencies identified in the appellant’s evidence as peripheral, nor did she rely on the mode of transmission of documents in isolation. In particular, the discrepancies in the Facebook material went to the core of the appellant’s account, as they concerned posts relied upon to demonstrate past attacks and ongoing political targeting. Those inconsistencies were therefore properly treated as material. The Judge considered these matters cumulatively as part of a holistic assessment of credibility. The fact that the Judge made a number of findings favourable to the appellant, including accepting his membership of Chatra Dal, further undermines any suggestion that she approached the evidence with a closed or unduly sceptical mind.
39. Read as a whole, the determination demonstrates that the Judge applied the correct legal approach, assessed all of the evidence with appropriate care, and reached findings that were rational and open to her. This ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and does not disclose a material error of law.
Ground 4
40. In Ground 4, the appellant argues that the First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in her assessment of risk on return by placing undue reliance on the August 2024 political transition in Bangladesh to conclude that the risk of persecution had diminished. It is submitted that this conclusion was premature and speculative, given that the CPIN recognises that politically motivated violence, although reduced, remains ongoing. The appellant contends that the Judge failed to assess whether BNP-affiliated individuals, particularly those with identifiable local roles, continue to face reprisals or harassment, and failed to consider the cumulative risk arising from the appellant’s accepted political background, claimed past threats, and ongoing political association in the United Kingdom. It is further argued that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant would be required to conceal his political opinion on return, contrary to the principles in HJ (Iran).
41. I do not accept this ground of appeal. The Judge’s assessment of risk on return was neither speculative nor based on an over-simplified view of the country situation. She was entitled to take into account the August 2024 political transition as part of the objective evidence and to have regard to the December 2024 Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’), which records that, although politically motivated violence has occurred, it has generally declined since mid-2024. The Judge did not treat the political transition as determinative but considered it alongside her findings on the appellant’s individual circumstances.
42. The Judge did not overlook the possibility that BNP-affiliated individuals may continue to face ill-treatment. Rather, having made sustainable findings that the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the authorities, that the claimed false criminal case and alleged visits were not reliable, and that his political activities were limited in nature, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant had not demonstrated a real risk of persecution on return. She was not required to speculate about hypothetical risks from residual state actors or rival political groups in the absence of a credible evidential basis linking such risks to the appellant personally.
43. Nor did the Judge fail to consider the appellant’s political profile cumulatively. She accepted his past membership and local role within Chatra Dal and his membership of Jubodal UK, but found that these factors did not amount to a significant or prominent political profile. The Judge was entitled to conclude that mere membership or a historical local role, without evidence of prominence or adverse attention, was insufficient to establish a real risk. The appellant’s submissions seek to elevate accepted political association into an automatic risk category, which the Judge was not required to do.
44. The Judge’s conclusions are consistent with the December 2024 CPIN, which does not support the existence of a generalised risk to BNP members or affiliates, but instead indicates that risk is now fact-sensitive and dependent on individual profile, including prominence, visibility, and prior targeting. In light of the Judge’s findings on the appellant’s lack of adverse attention and limited political activity, her conclusion that the appellant did not fall within any category of individual at risk was one that was properly open to her.
45. There is also no substance to the contention that the Judge failed to apply the principles in HJ (Iran). Having found that the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution by reason of his political opinion, the Judge was not required to conduct a separate analysis of concealment. Her conclusion that the appellant’s sur place activities, and those previously carried out in Bangladesh, were insufficient to trigger risk on return was a rational factual finding.
46. Read as a whole, the determination demonstrates that the Judge assessed both the country evidence and the appellant’s individual circumstances holistically and reached conclusions that were lawful and adequately reasoned. This ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluative assessment of risk and does not disclose a material error of law.
47. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
48. The decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision shall stand.

S. Anzani
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

06 February 2026