Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004178
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66313/2023
LP/13561/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

MI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Imanovic, Counsel
For the Respondent: Keerley, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 10 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry, promulgated on 30 March 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 11 December 2023 to refuse his protection claim made on 2 March 2021. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering on 8 September 2025 on grounds A to D, F and G. Permission was refused on ground E, which related to Article 3 risks.
3. The anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal is maintained.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is a Pakistani national born on 1 January 1989. He is from Ghaki, Dak-Khana, Enayat Village, Tahsil Mamond, Bajaur, an area close to the Afghan border where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has had a presence since approximately 2006.
5. The respondent conceded the appellant’s identity and nationality, and that he had worked as a village security guard and night watchman for the Bajaur Scouts, a paramilitary force officered by the Pakistan Army. The central issues in dispute before the First-tier Tribunal were whether the appellant’s claim that he was accused of assisting the Taliban with a bombing plan was true, whether he had come to the adverse attention of both the military and the Taliban as a result, and whether he could avail himself of state protection or internally relocate.
6. The appellant’s account, in summary, was as follows. In 2014, he was recruited by village elders to serve as a guard and patrol officer in the Bajaur Scouts. During his service, the Taliban sent threatening night letters to him and other watchmen warning them to stop working for the Pakistan Army. He reported this to village elders, who told him to continue his duties. On a particular night, he was unwell and given a drip by the village doctor. A colleague covered his shift. On that night, the Taliban detonated a bomb destroying a water pipeline belonging to the army. The colleague who replaced him was killed. The appellant was accused by the army of having prior knowledge of the bombing and of assisting the Taliban, the basis for the suspicion being his absence from work that night. Since fleeing Pakistan, the Taliban have continued to visit his family home, and his father was abducted and beaten by the army.
7. The appellant entered the United Kingdom clandestinely on 1 December 2015. He did not claim asylum until 2 March 2021, a delay of some five years. His claim was refused by the respondent on 11 December 2023.
8. The appellant relied upon an expert report from Dr Owen Bennett-Jones dated 29 June 2024, a witness statement dated 14 June 2024, and a Bajaur Scout Authority letter. A skeleton argument was filed by his solicitors, Mr Onkar Singh Shoker of H & McLaws Solicitors Ltd, dated 1 December 2025.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. The First-tier Tribunal Judge accepted at paragraph 13 that the appellant had been asked to act as a night watchman and given a permit to carry weapons to fulfil this role. At paragraph 14, the judge accepted that the Taliban sent night letters to the appellant and other villagers instructing them to stop their activities. However, the judge did not accept the core of the appellant’s claim. At paragraph 16, the judge stated: “The appellant does not explain why anyone would reach the conclusion that he was involved in the bombing. Given he was trusted with the task of being a village night watchman, tasked with protecting the villagers and carrying a weapon, surely, this suggests that his superiors trusted him and would have believed him if he had denied involvement, if they deemed it necessary to ask him at all. I do not accept the appellant’s account.”
10. At paragraph 17, the judge noted that because the appellant claimed he was ill and a doctor was called who administered a drip, “it would therefore follow that inquiries could be made with the doctor confirming that the appellant was sick, if there were any doubts as to his reason for not attending work.” At paragraph 18, the judge identified an inconsistency: “In his screening interview the appellant claimed in 2021 that the bombing incident occurred 6 years ago, while in his substantive interview in 2023 the appellant claims the bombing occurred 9 years ago. This inconsistency further leads me to doubt the appellant’s account.”
11. At paragraph 19, the judge found: “The appellant’s claim that the Taliban have been visiting his home every week for 10 years is simply not credible nor reasonable. Given the night letters were to stop the watchmen doing the work they were doing, it does not follow that they would expend the time, effort and resources to visit the appellant’s family home every week for 10 years, to look for him or to threaten his family about work he was no longer doing, given he left in 2015. I note also that the appellant was accused of assisting the Taliban, why then would they be looking for him for 10 years. I do not find the appellant’s claim credible.” At paragraph 20, the judge applied section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and found the appellant’s very late asylum claim significantly damaged his credibility, noting “I find his actions were not consistent with the actions of a genuine asylum seeker.”
12. The judge considered the expert report of Dr Owen Bennett-Jones at paragraphs 21 and 22. At paragraph 21, the judge stated: “I have considered the expert report prepared by Dr Owen Bennett-Jones dated 29th June 2024. Given I do not accept the appellant’s account that he has come to the adverse attention of the army, the risk factors highlighted in the report, such as the appellant being at risk on entry if he is on a list held by the army, do not apply to the appellant. The report states if the army have accused the appellant of assisting the Taliban he would be at risk. Given I do not accept this aspect of the appellant’s account, I find the appellant would not face a risk on return on this basis.” At paragraph 22, the judge stated: “The report states that the appellant can relocate if he is at risk from the Taliban in his local area. It also confirms the appellant’s claim that the Taliban were present in his area in 2014, as it was an area of conflict with lots of killing. The report states the situation has improved but there is still some conflict. The appellant’s claim that the Taliban send night letters is also consistent with the report.”
13. At paragraph 23, the judge found: “Given the appellant was a night watchman, given this would have attracted the ire of the Taliban, I find the appellant can seek state protection on return to Pakistan. It is clear on the appellant’s account that the authorities in his home area took steps and efforts to protect the village and villagers;I find the appellant can seek state protection on his return.” At paragraph 24, the judge found the appellant could internally relocate. At paragraph 25, the judge concluded the appellant had failed to prove to the lower standard that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. The appeal was dismissed on asylum grounds, humanitarian protection grounds, and Article 8 grounds.
The Grounds of Appeal and Skeleton Argument
14. The grounds on which permission was granted, as developed in the skeleton argument dated 1 December 2025, can be summarised as follows. First, it is said the judge misapplied the standard of proof and produced a flawed credibility assessment (grounds A and B). The skeleton argument contends the judge placed undue and determinative weight on the discrepancy over the timing of the bombing, without having regard to the appellant’s limited education, memory difficulties, lack of accurate timekeeping resources, and his later clarification by reference to an expired Bajaur Scouts permit. It is said this amounts to a failure to apply the lower standard of proof (real risk) as set out in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11 and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. The skeleton further contends the judge failed to evaluate the evidence holistically, contrary to JT (Cameroon) [2008] EWCA Civ 878, noting that core aspects of the appellant’s background were accepted or unchallenged, including his service as a Bajaur Scouts patrol officer, receipt of a Taliban night letter, and the abduction and mistreatment of his father by the Pakistan Army.
15. Second, it is argued that the judge inadequately engaged with the expert report of Dr Owen Bennett-Jones (ground C). It is said the report demonstrated the entrenched presence of the Taliban/TTP in Bajaur, the prevalence of enforced disappearances and abuses by Pakistan’s military intelligence, the heightened suspicion facing absent Bajaur Scout officers, and the practical impossibility of safe internal relocation.
16. Third, it is argued that the internal relocation test was misapplied (ground D), contrary to Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 and AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49. The expert and objective evidence specifically relating to ID verification requirements, SIM-card registration, tenancy checks, and ethnic neighbour hooding demonstrated that relocation would not avert the risk and would in any event be unduly harsh.
17. Fourth, it is argued that the judge failed to make findings on unchallenged evidence that both the Taliban and Pakistan Army continued to visit the appellant’s family home, interrogate relatives, and abduct his father (ground F).
18. Fifth, it is argued that the judge rejected the appellant’s credibility prior to engaging with the expert report (ground G), contrary to Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367 and MOJ and Others (Return to Mogadishu) [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), which requires expert evidence to be considered as part of the overall factual matrix, not as a secondary check.
19. Judge Pickering granted permission on grounds A to D, F and G, refusing permission on ground E. At paragraph 4 of her decision, Judge Pickering noted that, contrary to what was asserted in ground C, the expert report was considered at paragraph 21 of the decision. However, she found that “it is at least arguable that the Judge appears to have given the impression of making findings regarding credibility before considering the expert report”, citing Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367. At paragraph 5, she found that grounds A, B, D and F were impacted by ground G because they concerned the credibility assessment, and that the internal relocation assessment was impacted by factors personal to the appellant and the expert report.
The Appellant’s Submissions
20. It was submitted, that the credibility assessment was erroneous because the judge failed to take into account the appellant’s explanations. It was submitted that at paragraph 18 of the decision the judge made adverse credibility findings regarding the timing of the bombings, but the appellant had explained this inconsistency in his witness statement at paragraphs 36 to 43. It was further submitted that the judge stated at paragraphs 16 to 17 that the appellant had failed to explain why the army had reached its conclusions or why the Taliban would still be after him, but that these matters had been addressed in the asylum interview at questions 20, 23 and 31, and in the witness statement at paragraphs 24 to 30.
21. In relation to the expert report, it was submitted the judge failed to give consideration to the report at the point of making credibility findings. Reliance was placed in particular on paragraph 29 of the report, where the expert found that even having knowledge or prior suspicion was sufficient to attract the adverse attention of the authorities. It was submitted the judge started from the wrong premise at paragraph 19 by focusing on the fact that the appellant had merely been accused, when the expert evidence showed that accusation or suspicion alone was sufficient to place an individual at risk. It was submitted the judge had put the cart before the horse, contrary to Mibanga, by concluding on credibility before properly and holistically assessing the expert evidence.
22. It was submitted that the judge’s findings on state protection and internal relocation were infected by the flawed credibility assessment. It was argued the judge had oversimplified the expert’s evidence at paragraph 22, because the expert had identified that while moving away might reduce the risk from the Taliban, it would not eliminate it, and that due to SIM card registration, tenancy checks and similar requirements, the appellant could be traced by the authorities wherever he relocated. It was further submitted that the judge had failed to make findings on the evidence that the appellant’s father had been beaten and interrogated by the army.

The Respondent’s Submissions
23. The Respondent submitted, in relation to grounds C and G, that the judge did consider the expert report at paragraphs 21 and 22 of the decision. That the expert report did not contain any assessment of the plausibility of the appellant’s account or his credibility. At paragraphs 7 to 9 of the report, Dr Bennett-Jones simply reiterated the appellant’s account and then provided his opinion on risk on return. The expert made no assessment of credibility. The case of QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC), was relied upon which clarifies the Mibanga duty: where the expert report has low relevance to credibility because it merely accepts the appellant’s account and assesses risk on return, the judge cannot be criticised for not exploring the report in greater depth when assessing credibility.
24. In relation to grounds A and B, it was submitted there was nothing in the judgment demonstrating the judge applied the wrong standard of proof. The timing discrepancy at paragraph 18 was not the sole basis of the adverse credibility finding. The judge gave separate and detailed reasons at paragraphs 16, 17, 19 and 20. The presenting officer submitted the judge assessed the evidence holistically. In relation to ground D, the presenting officer submitted that even if there were any error in the internal relocation assessment, it was immaterial because the judge’s finding on sufficiency of protection at paragraph 23 had not been challenged. In relation to ground F, the presenting officer relied on JK (Democratic Republic of Congo) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 831 and submitted the judge was not required to deal with every point.
25. In reply, it was accepted there was reference to the expert report in the decision but submitted it only appeared at paragraphs 21 and 22, after the judge had already found against the appellant on credibility. It was maintained that no real substance was given to the expert report at the point credibility findings were made. It was submitted the expert evidence was relevant to the credibility assessment because it demonstrated that mere suspicion of involvement was sufficient to attract adverse attention. In relation to state protection, it was submitted that the grounds did challenge this through the expert evidence, which was central to all the grounds.
Discussion and Findings
26. The starting point is that the Upper Tribunal will only interfere with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal where it is shown that the judge made a material error of law. It is not the function of the Upper Tribunal to substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the judge who heard the appeal. A judge is not required to deal with every point raised or to set out every step in their reasoning. What is required is that the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome, and that the judge has not made a finding that no reasonable judge, properly directing themselves, could have reached.
Ground G: Sequencing of expert evidence and credibility
27. I deal first with ground G, as Judge Pickering identified this as the ground which impacted the others. The skeleton argument at paragraphs 11 and 12 contends the judge rejected the appellant’s credibility before engaging with the expert report, contrary to Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367 and MOJ and Others (Return to Mogadishu) [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC).
28. I am not satisfied that the judge erred in this regard. The duty in Mibanga requires a judge to take expert evidence into account as part of the overall assessment rather than treating it as a mere check after credibility has already been determined. However, the nature and scope of the expert report is critical to this analysis.
29. Dr Bennett-Jones’s report did not contain any assessment of the plausibility or credibility of the appellant’s account. At paragraphs 7 to 9, the expert simply reiterated the appellant’s account and then provided his opinion on risk on return, sufficiency of protection, and internal relocation, proceeding on the assumption that the account was true. The expert made no independent assessment of whether the appellant’s claim was likely to be genuine. In QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC), it is explained that where an expert report has low relevance to the credibility assessment because it merely accepts the appellant’s account at face value and then assesses risk on return, the Mibanga duty is not engaged to the same degree. The judge was not required to explore the expert report in greater depth before reaching conclusions on credibility. The reference to MOJ does not assist the appellant; that case concerned the proper use of country guidance in the factual matrix. Here, the expert report was not country guidance and did not address the plausibility of the appellant’s account.
30. Moreover, the judge did engage with the expert report at paragraphs 21 and 22. At paragraph 21, the judge expressly stated that she had “considered the expert report prepared by Dr Owen Bennett-Jones dated 29th June 2024.” At paragraph 22, the judge noted the report’s findings on the Taliban’s presence, the improvement in the situation, and the consistency of the night letters account with the report. Whilst the skeleton contends this engagement came only after the credibility findings, the structure of a decision does not of itself demonstrate that a judge approached the evidence with a closed mind or formed a premature view. What matters is that the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome, and in my judgment it does. Ground G is not made out.
Grounds A and B: Credibility assessment and standard of proof
31. Grounds A and B, as developed at paragraphs 2 to 5 of the skeleton argument, contend that the judge placed undue and determinative weight on the timing discrepancy, failed to have regard to the appellant’s limited education, memory difficulties and lack of accurate timekeeping, failed to consider his later clarification by reference to the expired Bajaur Scouts permit, and failed to apply the lower standard of proof as set out in Karanakaran and HK v SSHD. The skeleton further contends the judge failed to assess the evidence holistically contrary to JT (Cameroon) [2008] EWCA Civ 878.
32. I am not persuaded that the judge erred. Reading the decision as a whole, it is clear that the adverse credibility finding was not based on a single discrepancy or elevated to a determinative finding. The judge gave multiple, separate and independent reasons for not accepting the appellant’s account. At paragraph 16, the judge found it implausible that the army would accuse the appellant of involvement in the bombing, given his trusted role, stating “surely, this suggests that his superiors trusted him and would have believed him if he had denied involvement, if they deemed it necessary to ask him at all.” At paragraph 17, the judge noted inquiries could have been made with the doctor to verify the appellant’s illness. At paragraph 18, the judge identified the timing inconsistency, expressly noting “this inconsistency further leads me to doubt the appellant’s account,” indicating it was an additional factor rather than the sole or determinative basis for the adverse finding. At paragraph 19, the judge found “the appellant’s claim that the Taliban have been visiting his home every week for 10 years is simply not credible nor reasonable.” At paragraph 20, the judge applied section 8 and found that the five-year delay in claiming asylum meant “his actions were not consistent with the actions of a genuine asylum seeker.”
33. These are findings that were open to the judge on the evidence. The skeleton’s complaint that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s limited education, memory difficulties and later clarification by reference to the Bajaur Scouts permit does not establish an error of law. The judge was aware of the appellant’s background and was entitled to assess the weight to be given to these explanations. The discrepancy between saying the bombing was 6 years ago and 9 years ago was one the judge was entitled to note, particularly in the context of the wider pattern of inconsistency and implausibility identified across paragraphs 16 to 20. There is nothing in the decision to suggest the wrong standard of proof was applied; indeed, the judge expressly directed themselves by reference to Karanakaran at paragraph 11 of the decision. Karanakaran and HK require a holistic assessment to the lower standard; they do not preclude a judge from making adverse credibility findings where, as here, there are multiple cogent reasons for doing so.
34. As to the complaint that the judge failed to assess the evidence “in the round” contrary to JT (Cameroon), the skeleton argues that core aspects of the account were accepted or unchallenged, including the appellant’s role in the Bajaur Scouts, the receipt of night letters, and the mistreatment of his father. However, the judge did accept the first two of these matters. At paragraph 13, the judge accepted the appellant’s claim that “in 2014, he was asked, along with other male villagers, to act as night watchmen and given a permit to carry weapons to fulfil this role, has been accepted.” At paragraph 14, the judge stated: “I accept the Taliban sent threatening night letters to the appellant and other villagers, instructing them to stop their activities.” What the judge did not accept was the further claim that the army accused the appellant of involvement in the bombing and that both the army and the Taliban continued to pursue him as a result. A judge is entitled to accept parts of an appellant’s account whilst rejecting others. The fact that some background facts were accepted does not render the adverse findings on the central disputed issues irrational or unreasonable, nor does it demonstrate a failure to assess the evidence cumulatively. Grounds A and B are not made out.
Ground C: Engagement with expert evidence
35. The skeleton at paragraphs 6 and 7 contends the judge inadequately engaged with the expert report, which demonstrated the entrenched presence of the Taliban/TTP in Bajaur, the prevalence of enforced disappearances and abuses by Pakistan’s military intelligence, the heightened suspicion facing absent Bajaur Scout officers, and the practical impossibility of safe internal relocation.
36. For the reasons already given in relation to ground G, I find the judge did engage with the report at paragraphs 21 and 22. The expert’s observations about heightened suspicion facing absent Bajaur Scout officers and enforced disappearances were predicated on the appellant’s core account being true — namely, that he had been accused of involvement in the bombing and had come to the adverse attention of the army. Having made sustainable adverse credibility findings on that core account, the judge was entitled to conclude, as she did at paragraph 21, that “the risk factors highlighted in the report, such as the appellant being at risk on entry if he is on a list held by the army, do not apply to the appellant.” The judge was not required to set out and analyse every paragraph of the expert report. Ground C is not made out.
Ground D: Internal relocation
37. The skeleton at paragraphs 8 and 9 contends the internal relocation test was misapplied, contrary to Januzi and AH (Sudan). It is argued that the expert and objective evidence on ID verification requirements, SIM-card registration, tenancy checks, and ethnic neighbour hooding demonstrated that relocation would not avert the risk and would in any event be unduly harsh.
38. I accept the respondent’s submission that even if there were any deficiency in the internal relocation assessment, the judge made a clear and unchallenged finding on sufficiency of protection at paragraph 23. The judge found: “It is clear on the appellant’s account that the authorities in his home area took steps and efforts to protect the village and villagers; I find the appellant can seek state protection on his return.” This finding was not specifically challenged in the grounds of appeal or the skeleton argument.
39. I note that it was submitted in reply that the expert evidence was central to all the grounds, including state protection. However, the grounds and the skeleton argument do not contain any specific or particularised challenge to the sufficiency of protection finding at paragraph 23. The internal relocation ground is directed specifically at the relocation test under Januzi and AH (Sudan), not at sufficiency of protection. In any event, having found the appellant’s core account not credible, the questions of internal relocation and its practical implications, fall away. Ground D is not made out.
Ground F: Risk to family members
40. The skeleton at paragraph 10 contends the judge failed to make findings on unchallenged evidence that both the Taliban and Pakistan Army continued to visit the appellant’s family home, interrogate relatives, and abduct his father.
41. Having found the core of the appellant’s account not credible, the judge was not required to make separate and specific findings on every ancillary piece of evidence. The evidence about the family’s ongoing treatment formed part of the same narrative that the judge rejected. The assertion that this evidence was “unchallenged” overstates the position; the respondent did not accept this evidence in the refusal letter, and the judge’s detailed and cogent findings on credibility at paragraphs 16 to 20 were sufficient to sustain the overall adverse assessment. A judge is not required to deal with every point; what matters is that the findings made are adequately reasoned and address the central issues. Ground F is not made out.
Conclusion
42. For the reasons set out above, I find that the First-tier Tribunal Judge was entitled to make the findings they did. The decision contains detailed and cogent reasons for the adverse credibility findings at paragraphs 16 to 20. The judge correctly directed themselves as to the applicable standard of proof at paragraph 11, citing Karanakaran. They engaged with the expert report at paragraphs 21 and 22. Having found the core of the appellant’s account not credible, the judge was entitled to find that the risk factors in the report did not apply, and was further entitled to reach the findings they did on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. I have found no errors of law in the decision.
43. The appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
1. There is no error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber