Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004181

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53917/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

JL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Karim, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. I have made an order to anonymise the Appellant. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, it is my view that there is a need to protect the identity of the Appellant. This in the light of the fact that this is an asylum claim.

2. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, born in 2002.

3. The issue to decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge (‘the Judge’) Beg erred in law, in a decision dated 28 July 2025, when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent, dated 8 February 2024, to refuse his claim on protection and human rights grounds.

Background

4. The Appellant entered the UK on 5 September 2022. He claimed asylum on 4 November 2022.

5. His asylum claim is based on the fact that he was a member of the Awami League’s student wing in 2016, eventually becoming general secretary in his local branch. He was affiliated with an Awami League faction, supporting the Rabel group. He says that in 2019, he was attacked by members of the Golden Group faction. He says that he continued to be threatened and attacked by this group until 2021. He continued to receive threats from them via social media whilst in the UK. They have also threatened his family and damaged his family home in Bangladesh, forcing them to relocate. He states that false criminal cases were raised against him, some after the fall of the Awami League government. He fears that if he returned to Bangladesh, he will be at real risk because of his political opinion.

6. His hearing before the FtT took place on 28 July 2025. His appeal was dismissed on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds, in a decision dated 28 July 2025, by FtT Judge Beg.

Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission

7. The Appellant appealed the decision of the FtT in grounds dated 30 July 2025. I summarise the grounds of appeal advanced as follows:
1. The decision of the FtT is procedurally unfair.
2. The Judge erred in failing to properly determine risk on return.
3. The Judge has made mistakes of fact or failed to apply anxious scrutiny.
4. The Judge erred in assessing the claim under Paragraph 276ADE(vi) of the Immigration Rules / Article 8 ECHR, by failing to have regard to relevant matters.

8. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal by Judge DDH Stevenson in a decision dated 8 September 2025. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
1. The appellant appeals (in-time) against the tribunal’s decision to dismiss their appeal, promulgated on 28 July 2025.
2. Ground 1 contends that there was procedural unfairness; various findings were made against the appellant without the matters being raised in oral evidence or in submissions. It is further said that the judge conducted their own research. It is arguable that unfairness arose.
3. Ground 2 contends that the judge did not adequately assess the risk to the appellant, given that it was accepted that the appellant was a member of the student wing of the Awami League, and that background evidence confirmed the party was no longer in power, and certain affiliates had been banned. It is arguable that the judge failed to make findings on this aspect of the appeal.
4. Ground 3 submits that the judge made various mistakes of fact and/ or overlooked material evidence. Various examples are cited and the errors can be seen in the determination; this ground is arguable.
5. Ground 4 relates to the judge’s assessment under article 8 of the ECHR; it is said the judge failed to assess whether the appellant’s political activities and mental health would have a bearing on his ability to reintegrate into life in Bangladesh. The judge’s findings on Article 8 arguably depend on the assessment of whether the appellant might face difficulties as a result of his support for the Awami League, a matter which is arguably insufficiently considered. Likewise, the judge arguably did not adequately resolve the evidence as regards mental health provision in Bangladesh.
6. All grounds are arguable, permission to appeal is granted.

Submissions

9. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 6 November 2025. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives.

10. I had before me a composite bundle which was prepared for the Upper Tribunal and ran to 707 pages. The parties confirmed that there was no Rule 24 Reply.

Findings and Reasons
11. I have addressed below three of the grounds of appeal and only certain aspects of ground three. Whilst several issues are raised in the grounds of appeal, I consider that the issues I set out below are sufficient to find that there is a material error of law and that the decision must be set aside.

Ground 1

12. The grounds argue that at paras. 23 and 24 of the decision the Judge has made findings on matters which were not raised or put to him at any stage.

13. At para. 23 the Judge attaches little weight to a medical report from Bangladesh dated 17 February 2020. This is on the basis that it is unclear who wrote it, it refers to the Appellant having many tests as opposed to an X-ray, it refers to a major operation on his nose, and it is not written in the language medical professionals usually use. At para. 24 the Judge attaches limited weight to a letter from Al Falah Hospital dated 23 May 2019. This is on the basis the letter is not written by a Doctor but by a General Manager of the hospital, it does not spell out the injuries he suffered and what treatment he was given, it was not credible his injuries were caused as a result of being attacked by those in the Golden Group and violence in political rallies often occurs between opposing parties.

14. I have considered the refusal letter and the review. Neither of these documents addresses the medical documents (CB 652-659, 705-707). It seems this may be because these documents were produced after these refusal letter and review were written. I note that there is no Rule 24 in this case which suggests that any of the issues raised about these documents were put to the Appellant at the hearing or raised in submissions by the Judge or the Respondent. I remind myself of Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455,
20. Rule 2(4) requires the parties to help the Upper Tribunal to further the overriding objective. Although the terms of Rule 24 did not make service of a notice mandatory in this case, Rule 2 dictates that one should be served where the notice of appeal contains a complaint as to what happened at the hearing as the factual basis of a ground of appeal. A Rule 24 notice ought then to be served identifying whether that factual basis is in issue, and if so, highlighting the nature of the controversy. Only in that way can any dispute be identified in a way which enables orderly preparations to be made for it to be resolved at the appeal hearing, if necessary by evidence, so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense. If resolution of any dispute necessitates a witness statement from counsel, that will give rise to particular consequences which may include new counsel being instructed to conduct the appeal: see BW v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKUT 00568 (IAC) at [5].

15. Mr Ojo did not suggest before me the matters raised by the Judge at paras. 23-24 were raised in the FtT hearing.

16. Mr Karim refers me to Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 and TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48. Having regard to these decisions, I have come to the conclusion that it was unfair of the Judge to make the adverse findings she has on the Appellant’s medical documents when these matters were not raised at any point in the hearing or prior to the hearing. The Appellant has been denied the opportunity to explain or clarify his evidence or submissions in relation to these documents. He may have been able to address the matters raised if given the chance to do so.

17. The grounds also assert that the Appellant’s representative specifically made the argument in his submissions before the FtT, that it was not put to him that the criminal case documents were fraudulently obtained. Further, it is said that the Appellant was not cross examined on the two recent criminal cases issued against him since the fall of the Awami League government.

18. It is also asserted that the Judge referred to objective evidence which was not before the FtT or was no longer in the public domain, in particular the Fact Finding Mission Report dated 2017.

19. At paras. 32-33 the Judge discusses the criminal cases lodged against the Appellant. At para. 33 she specifically refers to the Judicial Magistrate Order dated 17 October 2024 and the warrant of arrest dated 17 October 2024. The Judge finds that the Appellant’s documents are not reliable or credible as forged or fraudulent documents (including court and police documents) can be easily obtained in Bangladesh. She refers to the CPIN on Political parties and affiliations dated September 2020, the CPIN dated December 2024 the Home Office Fact Finding Mission dated 2017, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Report dated December 2021 in coming to this conclusion; see paras. 34-36 decision.

20. Mr Ojo said that this was a matter that was raised in the Respondent’s Review (CB 707).

21. I have come the conclusion that the grounds do make out a material error of law on this issue for the following reasons:
a. I have considered the review and cross referenced the documents referred to there in the bundle. I note that this refers to a charge sheet dated 25 December 2019, a Judicial Magistrates Order dated 9 May 2024 and a First Information Report dated 18 May 2020.
b. I note that the Appellant produced two Judicial Magistrates Orders dated 1 September 2024 and 2 October 2024 which said a warrant should be issued against the Appellant and others for absconding (CB 206-207), Arrest Warrants dated 22 and 30 September 2024 (CB 208-209, 259), and a complaint made to the Judicial Magistrate Court naming the Appellant and many others (CB 210-222, 240-248). All of these documents are signed and sealed on 17 October 2024.
c. Having regard to the fact that the documents (listed at (b) above) were issued against the Appellant after the fall of the Awami League government and that the Judge appears to have misunderstood who initiated these cases (see Ground 2 below), I am of the view that there has been procedural unfairness in how these documents have been addressed.
d. Again, there is nothing before me in any Rule 24 reply which disputes the submission made by Mr Karim that no questions were put to the Appellant on these documents/cases (set out at (b) above) at the hearing. Mr Ojo did not suggest otherwise before me in his submissions. I have had regard to Ullah and TUI UK Ltd in coming to these conclusions.
e. I can also see from the grounds of appeal drafted by Mr Karim that the Fact Finding Mission Report dated 2017 is not available on the government website. I raised this at the hearing with Mr Ojo. He said that the CPIN was referred to in the review and that this document refers to the Fact Finding Mission. I have looked at the review and that refers to a CPIN template 2018 version 3 and highlights paragraphs 5.3.6 of that document. When I click on the link to that document in the review, I am taken to a Country Information Note on Bangladesh Documentation Version 1.0 dated January 2020. I have concerns about whether the description of the documents in the review and the document one is taken to are the same. Nonetheless, I note the quote at 5.3.6 of that document is the same as referred to in the review but that this does not in fact refer to the Fact Finding Mission dated 2017. A footnote in relation 5.3.7 does refer to the Fact Finding Mission, but when one clicks on the URL to that document it takes you to the CPINs on Bangladesh. The Fact Finding Mission is not available on the list of documents there. Given this, it is my view that the Appellant cannot have reasonably assumed or guessed that the Judge would turn to the Fact Finding Mission (from a footnote in a paragraph not relied on in the CPIN).
f. I note that Rule 24(1)(b) of The Tribunal (First-Tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum) Rules 2014 requires the Respondent to produce unpublished documents she refers to. I remind myself of MH (Respondent's bundle: documents not provided) Pakistan [2010] UKUT 168 (IAC) which held that “Rule 13 of the First Tier Tribunal Rules requires an unpublished document to be supplied to the Tribunal if it is mentioned in the Notice of, or Reasons for Refusal or if the Respondent relies on it. Because the Notice of, or Reasons for Refusal form the statement of the Respondent’s case, however, the Tribunal is likely to assume that a document mentioned in either, but not supplied to the Tribunal, is no longer relied on.”
g. I also note that the Judge refers to The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, in their Report, Bangladesh: Availability of fraudulent documents, especially identity documents, medical files and financial documents; state response (2017–December 2021) dated 24 December 2021. Mr Ojo referred me to 5.2.1 of the Country Information Note to show this document was referred to in there but in fact that reference refers to a Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Report dated 2010. I cannot see that this was a document referred to, which suggests that the FtT has carried out their own research of country information. This too is procedurally is unfair.

22. As per R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (vi) (‘R (Iran) & Ors’), this grounds makes out a material error.

Ground 2

23. It is also argued that the Judge has erred in failing to appreciate that the cases against the Appellant registered in September 2024 were not initiated by the Golden Group and the Judge wrongly assumed this.

24. I note that at para.37 of the decision the Judge finds that it is not credible “given that the Awami League is no longer in power, that the interim government or the police have the motivation to pursue criminal cases against him at the behest of one faction of the Awami League.” Further, at para. 43 she states “I do not find it credible that even if the appellant did have a dispute with the Golden group, that they are still adversely interested in him especially now that the Awami League are no longer in power.”

25. It is clear from paras. 37 and 43 of the decision that the Judge considered that the criminal cases came from a faction of the Awami League. The case before the Tribunal was that he was now being targeted in new false cases since the fall of the Awami League by the law enforcement and mob supporting the opposition (see CB 558). The Judge appears to have failed to appreciate this or that this was in line with the country evidence (see references in the CPIN as set out at para. 27 of my decision below). I find that this ground also makes out a material error, as per 9 (vii) of R (Iran) & Ors.

26. Furthermore, it is said in the grounds that the FtT failed to address, adequately or at all, whether the Appellant would be at risk from BNP members or other opposition parties in line with the country evidence.

27. I note that the background evidence before the Judge (CPIN December 2024) states the following, for example:
◦ 3.1.14 - In September 2024, in response to violence between factions, Dhaka university banned political activities by the student wings of JeI (the Bangladeshi Chhatra Shibir or Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)) and of the BNP’s Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dol (JCD). This was done with support from the interim government. The AL-affiliated BCL has been banned under Anti-Terrorism legislation for its role in violence under Hasina’s regime and during the protests
◦ 4.1.6 Hundreds of senior officials and AL leaders under the former government have been arrested and remanded into custody in relation to deaths that occurred during the protests. Some have been denied legal representation during the process. Other cases have been instigated against mayors, police officers, RAB, and members of AL auxiliary organisations. Political affiliation or the settling of personal scores may be a motive for filing criminal complaints. This is because Bangladeshi law allows for cases to be filed with the police by members of the public, and the interim government has no legal power to block the process.
◦ 12.2.6 Also reporting on the arrest of Asaduzzaman Noor, independent Indian news site, The Wire, opined that his arrest was part of a wider campaign, noting that ‘A disturbing outcome of the August 5 regime change has been a notable rise in legal actions targeting individuals associated with the Awami League government. While some lawsuits related to alleged crimes during the transition period were expected, many subsequent cases appear dubious, lacking substantial evidence and potentially serving as instruments of harassment.’
◦ 12.2.13 On 27 October Al Jazeera, an independent news organisation funded in part by the Qatari government noted: ‘…thousands of students formerly affiliated with the AL, whose once-powerful hold over Bangladesh’s campuses collapsed overnight. [They]…now face …imprisonment for their role in trying to suppress the popular revolt against Hasina and for the rights violations they allegedly committed while she was in power….Shahreen Ariana, a BCL leader from Rajshahi University, was arrested on October 18 on “forged charges,” according to her family… another BCL leader at Rajshahi University, was arrested on the same day. The district police, however, claimed that both faced prior cases, but refused to provide documents to back their claim. …On October 25, two more BCL leaders … were arrested while appearing for exams at Dhaka University.’
◦ 12.2.14 In the ICG livestream held on 4 November 2024, based on the transcript published on 5 November and CPIT’s own viewing of the YouTube video, Tom Kean opined: ‘[O]ne area where I think…[the interim government] has really failed is in managing the desire for retribution and making sure that it doesn’t become overly politicised. There have been …a lot of criminal complaints filed against a whole range of people for alleged involvement in killings and other violence in July and August and it’s really become quite messy. Police are arresting …a lot of people named in these complaints even when they seem to have no connection to the actual incident…’
◦ 12.2.16 The ICG noted: ‘…a messy legal process is playing out through local police stations and courts. Under Bangladeshi law, police have an obligation to accept criminal complaints from members of the public, and there are few limits on who can be named in these complaints. … ‘The process is open to abuse, and allegations have surfaced that it is being used to settle political scores well beyond the elite. Some complaints list hundreds of defendants, many of them unidentified….
◦ 12.3.3 On 27 October Al Jazeera noted: ‘The former powerbrokers on campuses and the AL’s muscle on the streets now face eviction, [and] retribution … for their role in trying to suppress the popular revolt against Hasina and for the rights violations they allegedly committed while she was in power…The violence… did not end with Hasina’s fall. The former perpetrators of state atrocities became the new targets as hundreds of AL politicians and members, including students, were attacked or killed. Many went into hiding or were detained while attempting to flee….The wave of violence against Awami League-affiliated students has spread across campuses. On the outskirts of the capital, former Jahangirnagar University BCL activist Shamim Ahmed was beaten to death on September 18, while Masud, another BCL leader, was killed by a mob in Rajshahi on September 7. “These are just the reported cases,” says Redwanul Karim Sagor, who goes by the name Sujon and was a senior BCL leader who is now in hiding. …“There have been more killings, arrests and fabricated cases against us, often in areas we’ve never even visited,” he said

28. I note that the Appellant’s membership of the Awami League student wing was accepted by the Respondent (see CB 654, para.7 of the refusal letter). I note that at para. 41 of the decision the Judge does refer to an Al Jazeera article on some student members of the Awami League being in hiding, as the BCL has been declared a terrorist organisation. I am not of the view that this alone adequately addresses the risks to the Appellant on this basis given the detail in the CPIN, as set out above at para. 27 of this decision. I find that this ground also makes out a material error, as per 9 (ii)(iii) of R (Iran) & Ors.

29. Moreover, the grounds assert that the Judge failed to consider that the Appellant would be unable to continue with his political activities on return to Bangladesh and that the Judge failed to make findings on the Appellant’s sur place activities.

30. Having considered the decision in full, I note that the Judge does say at para.42 of her decision that the Appellant can move to Dhaka or some area away from his home and continue his support of the Awami League.

31. I note there is evidence of sur place activities in the CB at p643 onwards. I note the CPIN dated December 2024 in fact indicates that the Appellant may not be able to carry out his political activities on return. See the following sections, for example:
• 12.1.2 ….‘Legally, the Awami League can hold rallies like the way the BNP did …But the government appeared to have decided to make the Awami League an exception. In a social media post Saturday, Muhammad Yunus’s Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam wrote that “the Awami League in its current form is a fascist party” and reiterated that there was no way the party would be allowed to hold protests in Bangladesh, adding that “anyone who would try to hold rally, gathering and processions by taking orders from the mass murderer and dictator Sheikh Hasina will face full force of the law enforcing agencies. The Interim Government won’t tolerate any violence or any attempt to break law and order situation in the country (sic)”.
• 12.1.3 AP News reported on events at an AL political rally held in Dhaka on 10 November 2024: ‘Rivals of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on Sunday thwarted a plan by her Awami League party to hold a rally in Bangladesh’s capital, seen as a potential first effort to make a comeback on the streets since she fled the country…On Sunday [10 November], activists of the …[BNP] and also members of the conservative Jamaat-e-Islami party took to the streets of Dhaka, filling up much of the area where the rally was scheduled to take place. Others, including hundreds of student protesters, also announced that they wouldn’t allow Hasina’s supporters to stand on the streets and hold the rally…Security was tight in the area, but witnesses and local media said that the protesters attacked several supporters of Hasina when they attempted to reach there…The Awami League party posted a number of videos on Facebook on Sunday showing its supporters being manhandled. Its party headquarters had earlier been vandalized.

32. I find that the Judge has not considered the country evidence on this issue adequately or at all. I find that this ground also makes out a material error, as per 9 (ii)(iii) of R (Iran) & Ors.

33. It follows from the above that the Judge has erred materially in her assessment of risk on return.

Ground 3

34. It is argued that the Judge has made a mistake of fact at para. 18 of her decision in stating that the Appellant’s witness, Mr Islam, was the Mayor of the Rabel group, as he was in fact the Mayor of Golapganj.

35. I note that at para. 18 of the decision the Judge does refer to Mr Islam being the Mayor of the Rabel group and states there is no documentary evidence to show this. I note that the witness statement of Mr Islam made clear that he was the Mayor of the Golapganj Municipality (CB 557 at paras. 3-4) and that there was evidence before the Tribunal which confirmed this (CB 560, 562-563).

36. Mr Ojo says that this is not a material error of law even if the Judge made an error on this issue. I note that this forms part of the reasons given for finding that the Appellant and his witness were not credible.. There has plainly been a mistake of fact on this issue and this is a material error, as per 9 (vii)) of R (Iran) & Ors. I remind myself that credibility is a holistic assessment and there are also other material errors in this decision, as I have set out above and below.

37. Mr Karim further argues that the Judge has made an error at para. 37 of her decision. Here she states that, “I find that the appellant has provided no explanation as to why he has not instructed a lawyer in Bangladesh, to represent him in the criminal cases against him. He would be able to do that from the United Kingdom as well as once he is back in Bangladesh”. He says that this overlooks the lawyer’s letter written by Md Chowdhury dated 7 February 2024.

38. I note that at para. 35 of the decision the Judge states that “In evidence the appellant said that he instructed a lawyer in Bangladesh to obtain the documents for him so that he could bring some evidence to support his appeal.”

39. I have considered the letter from Md. Chowdhury Advocate dated 7 February 2024. This states that he has come to know about his situation from his family and that he has requested copies of his cases and information in respect of the latest situation. He sets out the case numbers and explains that arrest warrants and attachment orders were issued against him, and that as he is absconding the trial of these cases is proceeding in his absence. He says that the verdict could be announced at any time after the trial. He states that the government are looking for him, as are members of rival groups. They are continuously pressuring his family to give out his whereabouts, and are intimidating and harassing his family for not doing so. He advises the Appellant not to return. He signs the letter, “Your appointed lawyer.”

40. It is not clear to me whether the Judge has considered the letter from Md. Chowdhury. The Judge refers to the Appellant’s oral evidence on a lawyer being instructed but not the actual letter. The lawyer refers to himself as being appointed by the Appellant, he appears to be acting on his instructions to obtain information and documents in the cases against him and to have knowledge about the same, he also to be providing him with legal advice in the letter. This evidence clearly went to the Appellant’s credibility and to the veracity of the prosecutions against him.

41. I am of the view that the Judge has either not had any or adequate regard to this letter or that she has not given any or adequate reasons for not accepting this letter or the detail within the same. I find that this ground makes out a material error, as per 9 (ii)(iii)(vii) of R (Iran) & Ors.

42. Whilst Mr Karim’s grounds of appeal do raise other matters and Mr Ojo did defend the decision on the other grounds, having regard to the number of errors I have found above and the issues that they go to in this appeal, I cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same had the above errors not occurred. As I have said above, credibility is a holistic assessment. Further, the Appellant’s claim is an asylum claim and deserves “the most anxious scrutiny”; see Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, at 531 and MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §66. I therefore find the errors I have set out and addressed above to be material.

Notice of Decision

43. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in this decision. The decision is set aside.

44. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard before any Judge aside from Judge Beg.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 February 2026