Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004206
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00288/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

BHAVISH RAI PURAN
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 17 July 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds.

2. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings. The appellant relied on his Article 8 human rights to argue that deporting him to Mauritius would be disproportionate because there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in his removal. He argued that the judge, in dismissing this claim, did not provide adequate reasons in support of his findings.

The Relevant Parts of the FTT Decision

3. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the judge’s decision:

• The appellant’s broad immigration history was set out at [1]-[3] in which it was noted that he was born in Mauritius on 5 July 2001 and left for the UK in when he was 4 or 5 years old. He had limited leave to remain in the UK since 9 August 2006, before being granted indefinite leave to remain on 17 October 2012.

• At [5], the judge noted the appellant’s antecedent history as encompassing 7 convictions for 25 offences which included violent and public order matters prior to the most recent set of offences. At [52]-[53], the judge summarised the serious crimes which resulted in a sentence of imprisonment of 49 months and precipitated the deportation proceedings:

[52] I have considered the sentencing remarks of the Judge on 9 November 2022. The Appellant took a knife to an arranged meeting with the victim. The victim was stabbed in the ribcage and lower back. The Appellant kicked the victim 3 or 4 times whilst he was on the floor. The Appellant later bragged about the incident. It was only a matter of good fortune that the consequences were not much worse. There was a high culpability because of the use of a knife and the significant degree of planning or premeditation. The offence was committed whilst the Appellant was under the influence of drugs and alcohol. He was subject to a deferred sentence at the relevant time.

[53] In mitigation, the Appellant was relatively young at 21 years old. Although there was a history of criminality, there were no previous convictions for offences approaching the same level of seriousness. He was given 25 percent credit for his guilty pleas. He had demonstrated some remorse, he had been moved to an open prison, and he had been given a position with a degree of trust. The Judge did not consider him to be dangerous for the purposes of an extended sentence.

• In view of the length of his sentence, the appellant could only succeed in his human rights claim if the judge reached the conclusion that there were very compelling circumstances over and above either of the statutory exceptions set out at s.117C of the 2002 Act. The appellant’s case was put primarily on the strength of his private life. At [48] and [55], the judge concluded that the first two limbs of the private life exception had been established in that the appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The decisive issue in this context was whether there were very significant obstacles to integration on return to Mauritius. The judge addressed this issue between [56] and [67] before concluding that there were not very compelling circumstances at [68]:

[56] When considering whether there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Mauritius, I have regard to the report of Dr Khan (Consultant Psychiatrist) dated 23 October 2024.

[57] The report sets out the Appellant’s early life, involving social services, foster care and the history of alcohol and substance misuse. The Appellant had anger management issues and some history of self-harm. The Appellant was diagnosed as suffering from a recurrent depressive disorder, currently moderate without psychotic symptoms. If deported, it was opined that the Appellant’s mental health would decline, and his presentation would deteriorate. There is no material basis to question the report, and I attach reasonable weight to it.

[58] The Appellant confirmed that he was not currently taking any medication for any mental health issues, nor under the care of any medical professional.

[59] I also considered the reports of Professor Boswell (Mauritius County Expert) dated 14 February 2025 and 6 March 2025. Although the second report was referred to as an addendum report in the index, it appeared to be a self-contained report without any reference to the earlier report. It was not apparent how the second report differed from the first report or why it had been required. Mr Mohzam was unable to assist with these issues.

[60] I am satisfied that the writer was a suitably qualified expert. Aside from the mystery of the two reports, the writer tended at times towards adopting the position of an advocate rather than an objective country expert, for example, by commentating on the likely effect on the Appellant’s mental health and rehabilitation, if deported. However, I place some weight on the report’s more objective references to the Appellant’s position regarding employment, accommodation and treatment by the public and authorities, in Mauritius.

[61] When considering the report, I also have regard to the fact that the Appellant claims to have construction and demolition experience in the UK, and relevant occupational qualifications. These are skills that are likely to be transferable, at least to some extent. I also note that there are several homeless shelters in Mauritius. I further note that the report fails to mention the extended family in Mauritius, or the two visits made by the Appellant for 6 weeks and 2 weeks. However, I accept that the Appellant would not receive any material support or help from the extended family, in terms of finance, accommodation or employment.

[62] I accept the Appellant’s situation, economically and emotionally, would be much worse in Mauritius than in the UK. I accept that his mental health would be likely to decline to some extent following deportation. However, I do not find that there are very significant obstacles to integration. He has some knowledge of the country through personal experience and he has transferable employment skills. There are homeless shelters if required. Although the extended family would not be able to assist him in any material way, he would not be entirely alone.

[63] Although the Appellant would likely suffer some problems and disadvantages as a result of his criminal and drug history, I do not find that these problems would be materially worse than he would suffer in any other society, including the UK.

[64] Given that English is widely used in Mauritius, and the Appellant at least understands some of the local language, I do not find that the Appellant would face a significant language barrier.

[65] I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s mental health issues, even when considered alongside the other issues, amount to a serious obstacle. In this regard, I note that the Appellant is not currently subject to any medication, treatment or professional care.

[66] In all the circumstances, I do not find that there would be very serious obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Mauritius.

[67] Having regard to the above findings, the Appellant does not meet the requirements of Exception 1 or 2 of the 2002 Act, regardless of the length of sentence.

[68] I have regard to the fact of that the sentence of imprisonment was for 4 years and one month. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exception 1 and 2, that would outweigh the public interest in deportation.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

I. Ground 1 – the judge did not provide lawfully adequate reasons to support his finding that there would not be very significant obstacles to integration thereby vitiating the lawfulness of the conclusion reached on whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions.

II. Ground 2 – the judge did not undertake a lawful balancing exercise in assessing whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s removal.

5. In a decision dated 26 November 2025, a judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission for all grounds to be argued. The following observations were made in granting permission:

I find it arguable that the judge did not carry out an adequate assessment pursuant to section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act and/or he failed to give adequate reasons for finding there not to be very compelling circumstances. It is arguable that, the judge should have identified all the relevant factors and findings including any not captured in either Exception 1 and 2 and balanced them alongside the public interest in order to determine if the threshold of section 117C(6) was met.

6. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

7. The touchstone for considering inadequacy of reasoning as an error of law remains R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At [13]-[14] of the judgment of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning are articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57] the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.

8. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Mohzam agreed that the primary focus must be on the judge’s analysis of very significant obstacles because the appellant could only have overcome the high threshold of very compelling circumstances if he established his private life claim over and above the statutory exception. In short, there was no conceivable basis on which the human rights appeal could have succeeded on these facts if the appellant could not meet all three limbs of the statutory private life exception such that he could build on that platform to show that there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in his deportation as an offender who had been sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding 4 years.

9. In seeking to challenge the lawfulness of the judge’s reasoning going to the existence of very significant obstacles to integration on return to Mauritius, the appellant argued that three elements of the judge’s analysis were inadequately explained. Firstly, the judge did not adequately explain how the appellant’s two relatively brief visits to Mauritius might have helped him to overcome the palpable obstacles to integration. Secondly, in referring to the availability of homeless shelters, the judge did not adequately address how long the appellant might have to reside in such an institution or how such an arrangement could cohere with an absence of very significant obstacles. Thirdly, that the judge did not adequately account for the appellant’s mental health difficulties in assessing his integrative prospects on return.

10. Dealing with the first element, the point was expressed in this way in the grounds of appeal: “No reasoning was provided as to whether two short visits of 6 weeks and 2 weeks could reasonably establish cultural and social ties sufficient for integration”. This is to misstate the analytical task which the judge had to undertake. The question was not whether these visits established sufficient cultural and social ties for the purposes of integration. Instead, these were merely factors the judge considered in the assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles to integration. The judge was more than entitled to look to these aspects of the appellant’s background and tending to show a continued connection with Mauritius. It was a relevant factor, but it would be wrong to seek to characterise this as a decisive factor. At paragraph [61], the judge simply alluded to this feature of the evidence, together with others, to explain why the conclusion was reached that the appellant was not a stranger to the country and could rely on occupational skills he had developed in the UK to potentially find work. It is also fair to say that this particular observation was made in the context of pointing out a factor which the expert witness had not addressed. Seen in its proper context, the judge was not required to say any more than he did about this discrete feature of the evidence. It was not a central plank of the judicial analysis demanding a fuller reasoned analysis.

11. Turning to the second complaint, the judge stated at [62] that “there are homeless shelters if required”. Again, it is to be noted that that this single sentence comes in the context of a broader judicial analysis which referred to the appellant’s personal experience of Mauritius and “transferable employment skills”. Seen in its proper context, this observation was one facet of a multi-faceted assessment of whether very significant obstacles to integration existed. It was further acknowledged that the appellant would be worse off in Mauritius and may suffer a deterioration in his mental health. This reflects the broad evaluative assessment the judge was performing. In referring to homeless shelters if required, the judge was not finding that such an eventuality was an inevitability but fairly recognising some of the challenges the appellant might face. This can in no way be reshaped into a finding that the appellant had established that he would be homeless on return to Mauritius. In acknowledging the possibility of turning to a homeless shelter, the judge was not required to embark on a wholly speculative exploration of how long he might be assisted by such a facility. Instead, the judge was required to assess whether very significant obstacles to integration exist. The totality of the judge’s balanced reasoning fully explains why he came to the conclusion he did. The appellant can be in no doubt as to why he did not persuade the judge of his case on this aspect of his case.

12. Thirdly, it is readily apparent from a fair reading of the judge’s decision that he took full account of the appellant’s mental health issues in coming to the conclusion that there would not be very significant obstacles to integration. The evidence is canvassed at [21] and [56]-[58] before the conclusion was reached, at [62], that his mental health was likely to decline on being deported. This was a factor for the judge to consider in the overarching assessment of whether very significant obstacles existed. I am entirely satisfied that the judge was not required to say any more than he did to come to a lawful conclusion on this question.

13. The remainder of the appellant’s complaints about the judge’s analysis of the private life exception were manifestly disagreements with the conclusions reached, not errors of law. The judge’s findings on this essential foundation for the real test of very compelling circumstances were more than adequately reasoned in law. The appellant can be in no reasonable doubt about why he did not succeed on this decisive point.

14. When it comes to ground two and the challenge to the overall balancing exercise under the rubric of very compelling circumstances, the reality is that the appellant could only establish this elevated threshold if he first met the requirements of the statutory private life exception. He fell short for lawfully adequate judicial reasons which meant that he simply could not establish a sufficiently strong private life claim over and above that threshold to outweigh the strong public interest in his removal as a serious foreign criminal who had been sentenced to a period of imprisonment in excess of 4 years.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision did not involve an error of law and I dismiss the appeal.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 March 2026