Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004208

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52902/2023
LP/00731/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

TL (China)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Cleghorn, Counsel, Instructed by MDL Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of China. His protection claim is based upon his indebtedness to loan sharks in China, the threats and violence he experienced as a result, and his subsequent exploitation after leaving the country. He also relies upon his mental health difficulties, including symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder.
2. By a decision promulgated on 13 May 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Fisher (the ‘Judge’) dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights claims.
3. The appellant sought permission to appeal. Permission was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 31 October 2025 on the basis that it is arguable that the Judge failed to undertake a holistic assessment of whether internal relocation within China would be unduly harsh, having regard to the appellant’s mental health, the operation of the hukou system, and his individual profile as a rural ethnic Han male.
Anonymity Direction
4. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction, and I have no reason to dispense with that direction.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The Judge accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality. He further accepted the core factual account, finding it reasonably likely that the appellant had borrowed a substantial sum of money from loan sharks in China, had been unable to repay, and had been subjected to threats and violence as a consequence.
6. The Judge also accepted that the appellant would not be able to obtain a sufficiency of protection in his local area.
7. Notwithstanding those findings, the Judge dismissed the appeal. He concluded that the appellant would not be at real risk on return to China and that internal relocation would be available and reasonable. In doing so, he relied upon the country guidance decision in ZC & Others (Risk – illegal exit – loan sharks) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00028 and concluded that Ms Cleghorn had not ‘advanced any sufficient grounds to enable me to do so’: to depart from it [15]. He relies on the Upper Tribunal suggesting that failed asylum seekers indebted to loan sharks would not come to any harm.
8. The appellant has two main lines of argument. Firstly, that the appellant’s mental health issues would be an obstacle to his return to China. He deals with this comprehensively at paragraph 13 and concludes ‘I am not satisfied that the appellant’s mental disorder would prove to be the obstacle suggested’ [13].
9. In respect of the submission that the Hukou system would alert the appellant’s traffickers to his return, he analyses the evidence and following ZC states ‘I am not persuaded that anyone would be looking after him after such a long period of time... The Upper Tribunal held that there was no evidence to suggest that the authorities would pass on their details to unlawfully operating groups.’
10. He referred to HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027 at [16]. He concludes that he is satisfied that the appellant could relocate to one of the cities on the east coast.
Grounds of Appeal
11. The Grounds of Appeal are threefold.
12. Ground 1 contends that the Judge erred in his application of the country guidance in ZC. It is argued that the Judge treated himself as rigidly bound by that decision without properly engaging with the more recent country evidence relied upon, including evidence relating to internal migration, the hukou system, and the risks faced by vulnerable rural migrants.
13. Ground 2, which is the principal ground upon which permission was granted, contends that the Judge failed to conduct a holistic assessment of whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh. It is said that the Judge considered individual factors — such as the availability of medication and the appellant’s past “resourcefulness” — in isolation, rather than assessing the cumulative impact of the appellant’s mental health, his vulnerability as a victim of exploitation, and the practical obstacles to relocation identified in the background evidence.
14. Ground 3 contends that the Judge made a material error of fact in concluding that the appellant’s sister would be able to provide support on return, in circumstances where the evidence did not establish the existence or nature of any meaningful ongoing relationship.
Submissions
15. Ms Cleghorn acknowledged that there is overlap between the grounds because all go to the reasonableness of the appellant relocating. She relies on the CPIN (AB152) and submits that this description applies to the appellant as a Han rural migrant. She submits that it is clear from the appellant’s skeleton argument (‘ASA’) that the appellant is not in touch with his family. She states that the Judge failed to consider the unique factual circumstances of this particular appellant as having no family support away from China a long time, a Han rural migrant of accepted psychological issues. In terms of medication, she submits that the Judge did not address whether this particular appellant could obtain medication or could only access it in cities. She submits that the Judge concludes that mental health will improve on medication without basis.
16. She asserts that there are good reasons for the Judge to depart from ZC, considering that it was decided in 2009 and the Judge had up to date evidence before him. Finally, that that case was about risk on exit and loan sharks and there is only one paragraph on internal relocation, but it was not the central issue. Essentially the country guidance was nothing to do with this appellant. She submits that the Judge had to decide the position at the time of hearing, taking into account the appellant’s mental health condition and that any action (resourceful or otherwise) prior to catastrophic mental health breakdown would not assist him.
17. For the respondent, reliance was placed on the Rule 24 response. It was submitted that the Judge directed himself appropriately, took account of the relevant evidence, and was entitled to reach the conclusions he did. It was further submitted that the Grounds of Appeal amounted to a disagreement with findings properly open to the Judge.
18. Dealing with the specifics, Ms Isherwood submitted that whilst the ASA asserts there is no family contact, the witness statement simply says that they are not close and have not been in touch since January 2022. It’s therefore open to the Judge to find that she may provide emotional support.
19. In respect of departure from the country guidance, she relies on the fact that the Judge notes that there are insufficient grounds for him to depart and she relies on AAR (Ethiopia) CG 2022 UKUT 0001, headnote 6. She submits that at [15] the Judge is considering whether to depart from the country guidance and declines to do so.
20. He is entitled to find that the appellant has been resourceful because he has managed to maintain himself in the UK. She notes that the ASA focuses on the appellant's mental health and the Judge correctly considered medical treatment available as well as medication.
Discussion
21. I first need to address the legal basis of both the decision and the grounds of appeal because reference is made to the private life test of very significant obstacles whereas the focus is, and always has been, on risk and relocation.
22. In the decision it is clear that the Judge was dealing with the asylum appeal as the heading indicates immediately before paragraph 7. The human rights claim is dealt with at the end, at paragraph 19. As such, the entire focus of the First-tier decision was on the risk on return and the possibility of relocation. I compare this to the skeleton in which the focus was also on the international protection claim. Article 8 is dealt with at paragraph 36 and does not refer to very significant obstacles or paragraph 276 ADE. This position is to be contrasted with the application for permission to appeal which refers expressly to the ‘flawed assessment as to whether it would be unduly harsh/276 ADE’. The rule 24 response also notes that the Judge doesn’t use the term ‘unduly harsh’ but submits it is not an error of law.
23. I was not addressed on this specific point today and rely on Ms Cleghorn’s submissions outlined above. I proceed on the basis that the decision on risk on return and the reasonableness of relocation is the basis of this appeal. There is of course overlap between the issues albeit the protection claim will apply a lower burden of proof.
24. I remind myself that the task of the Upper Tribunal is not to remake findings of fact, but to determine whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law which was material to the outcome. I refer to the guidance in more detail below.
25. I found the decision to be well balanced with the Judge providing detailed analysis of the medical evidence which underpins the issue of relocation. He gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt as he found his evidence to be ‘extremely vague’ being unable to recall the name of the individual he owes money to or when he stopped repaying the loan. He made no adverse credibility finding based on this lack of detail [10]. Furthermore, he found it reasonably likely that the appellant was in debt to a loan shark and had been threatened.
26. He concluded that the appellant could not return to his home area due to the inadequacy of state protection. Paragraph 13 deals with Ms Cleghorn’s submission that his mental health issues would be an obstacle to his return. He cites the reference in the CPIN that he was taken to and provides analysis of the evidence in some detail. He notes that ‘treatment is available’ based on the objective evidence and that his medication can be obtained. It is in the context of this finding that he goes on to state ‘In my judgement his mental health would improve and stabilise further once titration of his medication has taken place’. Having set out both in medical and objective evidence in detail I take it that this is his conclusion based on the medical evidence and the fact that medication would be available in China. I conclude this because he immediately goes on to say that the appellant’s mental health would not prove to be the obstacle suggested.
27. It is at this point in the same paragraph that the appellant is stated to be a ‘resourceful individual’. In other words, as part of the Judge’s analysis of the obstacles his mental health may create, he appears to conclude that treatment and medication are available and that the appellant is resourceful because he has continuously worked. Based on the evidence before him I consider the Judge to be entitled to find that the appellant has been resourceful. I do not consider that this reasoning elides materially different contexts. In other words, he appears to be considering the appellant’s experiences in the UK with his ability to either manage in China and/or obtain medical assistance.
28. It is submitted that the Judge was not entitled to make a finding that the appellant’s sister ‘could provide emotional support at the least’. It is significant that the Judge does not suggest that his sister would provide any other support but simply refers to emotional support at the least. I accept Ms Isherwood’s submission that whilst the ASA states there is no family contact, the appellant’s witness statement is more nuanced. He says that he does not maintain regular contact with his sister ‘as she is a married woman, she has her own family life and I knew she has enough troubles for having to look after the parents and her own family’ (paragraph 7 AB33). In the absence of evidence of a rift, I do not accept that the Judge could not reach this conclusion based on the witness evidence.
29. In respect of the deficiencies of the Hukou system, the Judge notes the references provided to him by Ms Cleghorn at [14] sets out the difficulties as well as the comment that the government has continued to address some of the vulnerabilities whilst acknowledging that there are still issues with ethnic Han migrants and acknowledges that this would refer to the appellant. He therefore demonstrates that he has considered this point but relies on ZC and expressly states that insufficient grounds had been advanced to enable him to depart from it.
30. Before me today Ms Cleghorn advances a slightly different case to that that which was presented to the Judge. She suggests that whilst categorised as country guidance the reference to there being no evidence to suggest that there would be risk to the appellant was not one of the core issues. In this regard I accept Ms Isherwood’s submissions that I be guided by headnote 6 in AAR (Ethiopia) which states ‘A party that before the First-tier Tribunal has failed to address extant country guidance or has failed to demonstrate proper grounds for departure from it is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal against a decision founded on the guidance’ [26].
31. In that case, Judge O’Callaghan (sitting with the Vice President) noted that ‘country guidance must be applied with some degree of subtlety as it doesn’t cover every permutation of fact or circumstance. In other words, it is a starting point ‘It will carry considerable weight even in the case for departure from the guidance is justified, or where the question to be answered is somewhat different from that answered by the country guidance decision’ referring to SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD 2019 EWCA CIV160 [23]. Addressing Ms Cleghorn’s submission, whilst the reference relied upon by the respondent and quoted by the Judge may not have been one of the core issues in the case it still carries weight even if the direct questions in the present appeal were not upon all fours with the country guidance that was focussed on illegal exits.
32. In my view the Judge has considered the submissions on the Hukou system, considered whether to depart from country guidance and has concluded that there was insufficient grounds for him to do so. He is therefore entitled to follow its conclusion that the authorities would not pass on details to unlawful groups and that there would be no risk to the appellant. In considering risk he considers other factors such as the length of time since he took out the loan.
33. At this point it may be instructive for me to set out what I consider to be the guidance that it is appropriate to follow in cases of this nature.
34. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 which was recently set out and approved by Lady Justice Falk in Alexander Isaac Hamilton v Mark Colin Barrow (1), Claire Michelle Barrow (2) and Matin Welsh (3) [2024] EWCA Civ 888 and also by Green LJ in Hafiz Aman Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26]. The latter emphasised that
“the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30]”
35. It is helpful to set out the guidance given in Volpi by Lord Justice Lewison;
i. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
ii. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
iii. The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iv. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
v. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
vi. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vii. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.[2]
36. As Ms Cleghorn submitted, there is overlap between the three grounds and I deal with them together. I do not accept that the Judge erred in law in failing to take a holistic approach to relocation or failed to depart from country guidance. I remind myself that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. As recently endorsed in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688, I acknowledge the approach in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 set out at [72]. As stated in R (Iran) v SSHD (2005) EWCA Civ 982 “A finding might only be set aside for error of law on the grounds of perversity if it was irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, or one that was wholly unsupported by the evidence”. I conclude that the present appeal cannot reach this high threshold.
37. Specifically dealing with the submission that findings of fact were erroneous, based on the guidance set out above I am not satisfied that the findings of fact could be construed as ‘plainly wrong’.
38. The Judge provided a balanced decision, finding a number of factors in favour of the appellant. He considers the key submissions made to him and sets out the evidence that he was taken to. He relies on appropriate country guidance and determines that there have been insufficient grounds for him to depart from it. Whilst the key issues in that guidance are not the central ones in this appeal, it nevertheless makes robust comments in relation to one of the central points, namely the safety of return in the context of loan sharks. The Judge is entitled to rely upon such guidance, having expressly stated that insufficient reasons had been advanced to depart from it.
Conclusion
39. I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision to follow country guidance in the context of this appeal.
40. In his assessment of the risk of return to a new location (using the lower burden than ADE276), I conclude that there has not been a material error of law based on the guidance set out above.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

05/02/2026