Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004217

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65290/2024
LP/14207/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

CT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Burnard, Counsel, instructed by Wimbledon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Namibia, challenges, with the permission of the First-Tier Tribunal, the decision of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”), to dismiss her appeal against the respondent’s refusal (on 19 March 2024) of her protection and human rights’ claims made on 10 December 2022.
Anonymity
2. The First-Tier Tribunal made an anonymity order. I continue that anonymity order. I consider the appellant’s interests in confidentiality as an asylum seeker who is an accepted victim of abuse and rape outweigh the public interest in open justice.
Background
3. The appellant claimed asylum on the basis that in 2019 she had been forced to marry her “uncle” (in fact a much older cousin once removed), F. F repeatedly abused and raped her (forced marriage, abuse and rape was accepted by the respondent) and the appellant said her complaints were ignored by the local police. The appellant fled from the rural area in which she lived to Windhoek and filed a case against F. She said that she came to the UK because she feared F would be released if arrested and then retaliate against her. Her case was that she was unable to obtain sufficient protection from the authorities in Namibia and internal relocation would not avoid the risk as F would be able to find her anywhere, and relocation would also be unreasonable as she would have no means to survive as she did not have the support of family or friends. She claimed entitlement to asylum, rather than humanitarian protection, on the basis that she formed part of a particular social group (“PSG”) as a woman/ a female victim of domestic violence living in a country where gender-based violence was widespread, influenced by cultural norms and harmful traditional practices, and for whom there was insufficiency of protection.
4. The respondent placed weight on the fact the appellant had left Namibia before the outcome of the police investigation into F. They said that the police in Namibia were generally able to provide protection in these circumstances; whilst it was accepted F had power and influence within the family and the local area, there was nothing to evidence F had any power or influence in the rest of Namibia and could trace the appellant to another city. It was considered reasonable to expect the appellant to relocate; the respondent referred in the decision letter to governmental and third-party support available in Namibia, and to the appellant being educated and having been previously employed and having a supportive sister and daughter.
5. The FTJ concluded that the appellant did not qualify for asylum as she was not a member of a PSG [47] – [48] “..the Tribunal makes clear that if there had been evidence that the police had fully considered the complaint, but thereafter had taken no action, for example, if FU had not been charged with any offences, then the Tribunal would have been prepared to find that the appellant came within a particular social group. Such a group would be Herrero women who had been the victims of domestic abuse in Namibia and who had taken their circumstances to the traditional Community Court where they had received a negative outcome. It would be my view that in such circumstances, the state authorities, including the police, would here give significant weight to the decision of a Community Court, being the decision dated 31 March 2019 with reference to the appellant. There would potentially be evidence that the police failed to take any action themselves, deferring to the views of the Community Court, which had endorsed the demands of FU… the circumstances in this appeal are that the appellant did not give time for the police to conclude their investigations. Further, she did not pursue the police as to what was happening in that respect. Overall the appellant’s circumstances do not bring the appellant within a particular social group in Namibia and therefore she cannot succeed on grounds related to the Geneva Convention.”
6. In respect of sufficiency of protection, the FTJ found [49] “the fact that the appellant failed to allow the police an opportunity to conclude their investigation means that potentially state protection could be available.” In respect of internal relocation, he found [50] “it would be both reasonable and possible for the appellant to relocate to a major city, town or other urban area within Namibia, as referred to by the respondent in the decision letter.”
Error of law
7. There are four grounds of appeal; the grant of permission was unlimited. Ground 1, that the judge failed to take into account a material consideration that the Windhoek police did not offer the appellant protection when she made the complaint. Ground 2, that the judge failed to take into account a material consideration and give adequate reasons viz the CPIN evidence referred to at 26 of the appellant’s skeleton argument. Ground 3, that the judge made a material misdirection in law in determining risk on the basis that “potentially state protection could be available.” Ground 4, that the appellant failed to give adequate reasons when deciding that the appellant could relocate.
8. In the rule 24 response, the respondent accepted that errors of law were made (the references to the numbered grounds and the references in brackets are my observations):
(i) That there is not enough information as to why the FTJ concluded as he did in respect of internal relocation (ground 4);
(ii) That the FTJ made no findings in respect of the CPIN (ground 2);
(iii) That the FTJ erred when he stated that the police could offer her protection (it is not entirely clear what is meant but it appears to be referable to ground 1)
(iv) That it was an error to say state protection was available when the FTJ was unclear (ground 3).
9. Mr Tufan indicated that the respondent’s position had not changed; they accepted errors of law were made.
10. I agree that the FTJ made errors of law. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 are clear errors and clearly accepted as such in the rule 24 response. The principal problem with the decision is the FTJ concentrated to the detriment of all else on his conclusion that the appellant had failed to allow the police and the authorities to conclude their consideration of the allegation. This ignored the material in the CPIN on which the appellant relied to suggest that there would not in fact be sufficiency of protection, even if she had waited for the outcome of the investigation. It may be that the FTJ was not satisfied by that material, but he needed to explain why, even if only briefly (ground 2). As set out at paragraph 17 of the grounds “potentially state protection could be available” does not reflect the statutory test (ground 3). Whilst judges are rightly encouraged to give brief reasons only and I appreciate the FTJ referred to the reasons given in the refusal letter [50], the appellant had given evidence at the hearing as to internal relocation [22], [23] and her counsel had made submissions on the point [34] – [37]. That evidence and those submissions had responded to the points made in the reasons for refusal letter and the FTJ should have addressed them however briefly (ground 4).
11. Ground 1 is less clear (and the response is less clear), however the point mentioned is one which was the focus of the appellant’s submissions, and it has not obviously been considered by the judge.
12. The errors of law are material and mean that the FTJ’s decision must be set aside, as the errors affect all aspects of his decision, whether the appellant is a member of a PSG, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The representatives were agreed that no findings could be preserved and wished the remaking to take place straight away in the Upper Tribunal.
Remaking hearing – the evidence and submissions
13. I heard evidence from the appellant through an interpreter. The appellant confirmed the contents of her witness statement of 7 January 2025, Ms Burnard asked supplementary questions in chief and she was then cross-examined and re-examined, and I asked her questions. I refer to the contents of her evidence as necessary below when explaining my conclusions.
14. In submissions, Mr Tufan relied on the reasons for refusal letter and the review. Concerning whether the appellant formed part of a PSG, he said that whilst he agreed that female victims of domestic violence shared a common background, he relied on the refusal letter’s contentions that they did not have a distinct identity which would be perceived as different within society.
15. He contended that there was sufficiency of protection. Whilst the police may not have taken action locally, they did act in Windhoek, apprehended and detained F. Although the appellant was in Windhoek between April when she made the report and November when she left she had not gone to the necessary extent of finding out what had happened as a result of her complaint and it would not be difficult to do so – she could call the police station directly. This linked to credibility issues; did she really care about the complaint given she had left without finding out what happened. In her interview she said she did not ask the police for protection and she did not approach any relevant organisations. The CPIN itself suggested there was sufficiency of protection – he referred me to the section on p 41 indicating that F would have been dealt with adequately under Namibian law; he submitted that there was a functioning state and a police system which he said was effective to the Horvath standard.
16. As to internal relocation, he said that the appellant had started a small business on her own, so she had capacity to make a living. Her daughter was cared for. There was nothing to suggest that F could find her throughout Namibia. He was living in a rural area and the next village where the appellant’s mother lived had no electricity or phones. The appellant’s mother and daughter had state support and there was nothing to suggest that the appellant would not be able to get some support if her mother could; other family members might be poor but if need be, the appellant could be provided for.
17. Ms Burnard relied on her amended skeleton argument. She submitted that the appellant was a member of a PSG either by virtue of being female or by being a victim of domestic violence. She referred me to her submissions at [26] for the reasons the appellant was part of a PSG. In summary, domestic violence was largely tolerated by the population and in particular the belief that a husband was justified in beating his wife. There were deep rooted stereotypes and issues of community pressure; there were failings in enforcement and major problems with accessing protection.
18. When considering sufficiency of protection, I should, she submitted, look at what the appellant had done. She had reported the abuse to her father and grandfather and they had refused to help. She had tried to stop the marriage initially via the traditional authorities. She had tried to report her abuse to the local police, and they had refused to help her. She had travelled to Windhoek and tried to seek help there, but she did not have faith she would be protected immediately or in the longer term if F were released (see paragraph 10 of her witness statement). It had been suggested that she had not bothered to find out what had happened to F, but there was a reasonable explanation why she had not probed further. Her sister who had made a witness statement was terrified of F, her mother was not contactable, there was not much more which could be found out. F had been released as she anticipated. The appellant had not received protection at the time she made the report. The respondent had raised the question of whether she had asked for help. The appellant had said in evidence when she made her report that she told the police that she had nowhere to go and she did not want to go back to F, but they told her that there was nowhere else to take her. Whilst that was not obviously the same as the response to qn 76 of her asylum interview, the appellant was not asked in evidence to clarify that answer, the word protection was very broad, and the asylum interview was conducted in English which was not the appellant’s native language. It could not be said that there was a true inconsistency. The CPIN demonstrated that there were gaps in protection and enforcement; that was the appellant’s experience, and there was indeed a reasonable likelihood that she would be at risk for want of protection.
19. As far as internal relocation was concerned, F had a sister in Windhoek and people from F’s community went to Windhoek for their supplies. F had a nephew in Swakopmund. Namibia was sparsely populated, and F was a wealthy man in cattle owning terms and had the support of the appellant’s father, grandfather, the police and traditional authorities. The appellant would not be able to support herself and her daughter if she relocated. She had run a small business selling food but that was in the context of living with F – she did not have a bank account so no savings or financial fluidity. The CPIN suggested at 2.6.3 that relocation was more viable for those who could access support networks or were educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support themselves. That was not the case for this appellant. She would have to support herself completely. It was said her family could support her, but there was a strong difference between selling cattle to give her one-off support and sustained on-going support whilst she was living in Namibia, particularly in the context that her elders had forced her to marry F and were siding with him.
The legal framework
20. As this is a claim which post-dates the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) the statutory framework of that Act applies when considering whether the appellant qualifies for asylum.
21. Section 32 of NABA states:
“(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality…. as a result of that characteristic…..”
22. If it is found that the asylum seeker has the relevant characteristic or would have such a characteristic attributed to them and if they do in fact fear persecution, then under section 32 (4) and (5):
“(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality…..
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
23. Section 34 explains that protection can be provided by the State (although there are other possibilities, not relevant in this case) - under section 34 (2):
“(2) An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—
(a) the State…. takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and
(b) the asylum seeker is able to access the protection”.
24. If the appellant does not qualify for asylum, then the claim falls to be considered as a claim for humanitarian protection. In this case, under paragraph 339C immigration rules, a person who is not a refugee (and not otherwise excluded) qualifies for humanitarian protection if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and they are unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Serious harm includes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in their country of origin (paragraph 339CA).
Discussion and conclusions
25. I adapt the issues slightly from the skeleton argument and the review, following the framework set out in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100.
PSG ?
26. The first issue is whether on the balance of probabilities the appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for a Convention reason, in this case membership of a PSG. Under section 33 of NABA:
“(2) A group forms a particular social group for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention only if it meets both of the following conditions.
(3) The first condition is that members of the group share—
(a) an innate characteristic,
(b) a common background that cannot be changed, or
(c) a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.
(4) The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”
27. The real issue is the second condition. The appellant would meet the first condition. She is female (her innate characteristic) and shares a common background with other female victims of domestic violence.
28. When addressing the second condition in her skeleton argument, Ms Burnard referred at paragraph 24 to the case of WS v Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet (C-621/21), a judgment of the CJEU of 16 January 2024. Whilst of course that is not binding on me, it is helpful given the similarity of the test for PSG in the Qualification Directive to the NABA test.
29. Ms Burnard quotes [61] from that judgment as being the applicable test. It is not clear that the CJEU was specifically saying in the judgment that was the test, as [60] refers to the care needed to assess whether an applicant’s fear of being persecuted is well-founded in accordance with Article 4 (3) of the Directive (i.e. not simply whether they are a member of a PSG) and [61] begins “to that end, as stated in point x of paragraph 36 of the HCR guidelines on International Protection No 1, country of origin information should be collected..”. Paragraph 36 of those guidelines is about ensuring that gender-related claims of women are properly considered in the refugee status determination process and to that end, collecting relevant country of origin information. Such information is not just relevant to whether an applicant forms part of a PSG, but to other parts of considering the well-founded fear. Nevertheless, it all appears relevant, bearing in mind the test set out in Shah and Islam and others [1999] INLR 144, to whether women have a distinct identity in the sense of being perceived as different by surrounding society.
30. I quote the relevant part of [61] “the position of women before the law, their political rights, their social and economic rights, the cultural and social mores of the country and consequences for non-adherence, the prevalence of such harmful traditional practices, the incidence and forms of reported violence against women, the protection available to them, any penalties imposed on those who perpetrate the violence, and the risks that a woman might face on her return to her country of origin after making such a claim.”
31. I consider it helpful to look at the background material in that light. The only source of background material to which I was referred was the CPIN current at the date of hearing – CPIN – Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence - version 1.0 of September 2021. All paragraph references below are references to paragraphs within the CPIN. The references which follow are only a summary and not meant to be exhaustive or suggest that the references are the only material on the topic in the CPIN.
32. Position of women before the law – the constitution provides for equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex (3.1.1), but also specifically recognises that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered discrimination and need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the nation (3.1.2). Legislation covers a gamut of areas protecting women including gender discrimination, sexual violence, domestic violence, forced and early marriage, divorce, trafficking, property and inheritance rights (3.2.3).
33. Political rights – women participated in the political process (4.3.1), and they were helped by legislation (4.3.2). The government worked in practice to uphold political rights for all, and women held 46 National Assembly seats as of December 2020, although women were often discouraged from running for office and few women contested the November 2020 regional and local elections (4.3.4). Women constituted 46% of the Parliament after November 2020 and 38% of cabinet ministers were women, including traditionally male dominated industries (4.3.5). The proportional representation system was said to account for the more favourable representation after parliamentary elections than the first past the post system of regional elections (4.3.6).
34. Social and economic rights – 69.1% of women were in the labour force (as compared to 73.5% of men), a slightly higher percentage of women were educated to secondary level than men (48% as compared with 44%) and more women went to university (30% as compared with 15% of men) (4.1.1). Although 44% of households were headed by women, far more women than men did not own land or a house (4.1.2). In 2019, the United Nations Development Programme concluded that although Namibia was one of only 20 countries in the world where women and girls held higher levels of human development than men and boys (see 4.1.5 which refers to Namibia ranking 6th (out of 156) in the Global Gender Gap Index 2021, top in sub-Saharan Africa and above the UK in 23rd place) and although females had a longer life expectancy at birth and there had been noticeable achievements regarding gender, there were gender-based inequalities in multiple dimensions in Namibia, including gender based violence and violence against children; gender based economic inequalities, gender based inequalities in local representation and unequal access of women to land rights (4.1.4).
35. Cultural and social mores of the country - The picture is mixed. On the one hand, the law is very protective of women and as is reflected in the information referred to above women have good educational, political and employment opportunities as a rule – section 2.4 a of the CPIN appears an accurate summary of the material in the CPIN about treatment of women. On the other hand, despite this there are still patriarchal socio-cultural norms on gender roles in some areas (again 2.4.5 of the CPIN appears an accurate summary of the material). A relatively high percentage of the population, 28% of women and 22% of men believed that a husband was justified in beating his wife for at least one of the specified reasons (para 2.4.6 and para 4.2.1). When the link in the CPIN to the survey (which appears to be a comprehensive population survey on various matters) is followed it is clear that it does not mean that 28% of women considered a husband was justified in beating his wife if she refused to have sexual intercourse with him (in fact 8% of women and 3% of men agreed with that specific reason), it means that out of all the reasons given 28% of the women surveyed picked at least one of the 5 possible justifications they were given for beating a wife (burning the food, arguing, going out without telling the husband, neglecting the children, refusing to have sexual intercourse). Unsurprisingly increasing education and wealth and living in an urban area meant that respondents to the survey were less likely to consider a husband was justified in beating his wife.
36. The survey is more than 10 years old, and one might expect with women’s increasing participation in public life and the greater urbanisation of Namibia that the percentage of the population considering wife beating was justified would have reduced. However the UN HRC Compilation on Namibia noted that domestic violence and abuse were condoned or tolerated by the majority of the population (4.2.8). Whilst this is a UN source and therefore in principle expected to be reliable, I cannot follow the link from the report to the underlying data. The origin of the rather sweeping statement is simply not explained, and I am not clear what is meant by it. It does not seem to fit with the results of the survey I have referred to above, with gender-based violence being widely reported in the media (4.2.9) and the existence of public campaigns against gender-based violence (5.7) together with the First Lady actively promoting gender-based violence awareness and remedies (6.1.1) and various campaigns aimed at promoting behavioural change (para 6.1.5). The conclusion may be simply that the picture is very mixed, the government acknowledging that gender-based violence remained a serious concern (6.1.4); it would not be a serious concern given the positive attitude of the State, unless societal attitudes were resistant to change. That does not mean, and I am not satisfied on the evidence that the majority of the population condone domestic violence.
37. Of course, it is not simply attitudes to gender-based violence which are important under this head. Whilst there are strong gender equality attitudes, a majority still believe that women should have the main responsibility for the home and children, and 14% of Namibians experienced discrimination based on their gender during the previous year (4.2.4). The stigma attached to bearing children out of wedlock is disappearing however, 60% of women aged 15 -49 have never been married, and a newspaper noted that most children were being raised by single mothers (4.7.3 – 4.7.5). However certain harmful traditional practices and deep-rooted stereotypes persist (4.2.7), particularly traditional practices harmful to women and girls (5.4.7).
38. Incidence of gender-based violence – the data relied on comes from 2013, so it is old. 1 in 3 women aged 15 – 49 who have ever been married report experiencing physical, sexual and/or emotional violence and 28% of that same group report the same within the last 12 months (5.3.2). The US State Department report refers to such violence as endemic (5.3.1) and widespread (5.3.6) and the UN country team stated that despite the ongoing efforts, gender based violence, particularly the number of incidents of rape and intimate partner violence was still a great concern (5.4.7).
39. Protection available and penalties imposed – the criminal justice system is generally effective and there is an independent judiciary (2.5.3). There is political will to prevent violence against women, and many policies and objectives put in place (6.2.1).
40. Implementation continued to lag behind good intentions however, and it was said few significant strides were made in prevention or reduction of gender-based violence or in state responses to victims (7.2.5). Once rape cases reached the courts those convicted received significant sentences which were generally enforced (7.2.9) but there were problems such as long delays in the hearing of cases (7.2.2) and low levels of successful prosecution of gender-based violence (7.2.4). Factors hampering rape prosecutions included limited police capacity and the withdrawal of allegations by victims for reasons including the receipt of compensation, succumbing to family pressure, shame or threats, or simply being discouraged by the length of time involved in prosecuting a case (7.2.9).
41. There were however procedural safeguards such as protection orders (7.2.13) (7.2.14) and significant numbers of protection orders are made by the courts (7.1.12) although if rural women resided far from a magistrate’s court, then they would not be available to them (7.3.12). In respect of trafficking, the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking were fully met (Tier 1) (7.2.15). Gender based violence protection units were established across all regions (7.3.1). The US State Department report 2020 assessment was that gender-based violence units intervened when authorities received reports of domestic violence (7.3.4). It is clear however that not all places are “getting the message” and the further away a person is from the capital, the less available services were. This was a particular difficulty for marginalised communities (7.3.7).
42. Contrary to the way paragraph 26 (g) of the appellant’s skeleton argument could be read, not all shelters remained closed due to staffing and funding shortfalls, 8 shelters were operational as of June/July 2021 (2.5.6), (7.4.7) (7.4.8). Shelters operated on an as needed basis with social workers co-ordinating with volunteers (7.4.2). There were civil society organisations which helped women (8.1.1).
43. In short, I consider the policy summary in the CPIN at 2.5, from 2.5.2 to 2.5.6 overall adequately summarises the import of the background material referred to in the CPIN as to the protection generally available. It follows that even considering the material specifically referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument, I agree with the conclusion of the CPIN at 2.5.7 that the state has taken reasonable steps to prevent gender-based violence by operating an effective and generally accessible legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of gender based violence.
44. Conclusion relating to women as a PSG – I am not satisfied that women in Namibia form a PSG. They have an equal position before the law, they are well represented at Parliamentary level and have very good educational and employment opportunities. There is good legislation in place and no discrimination at a governmental level. The government meets its obligations in respect of trafficking. It is right that there are still patriarchal social and cultural norms and despite the state’s efforts, there is not only a high level of gender based violence but a reasonably high level of societal acceptance of such violence (although old survey data still indicates that the clear majority of those surveyed, both men and women, did not find such violence acceptable). It is not a topic which is hidden away or seen by the authorities as a family matter. It is a topic of publicity in the media and there are civil society efforts as well as governmental efforts, although not always effective, to improve the position and change attitudes. Although there are some difficulties with the protection offered to victims of gender-based violence as I have set out, the system is in general effective and accessible to victims. Overall, I am not satisfied that women in Namibia have a distinct identity because they are perceived as different by the surrounding society and therefore not satisfied that they form a PSG.
45. Conclusion relating to female victims of domestic violence as a PSG - I am not satisfied that female victims of domestic violence are a PSG either. There is obviously a narrower focus in considering whether they form a PSG, than when considering whether women generally form a PSG. I repeat there is a high level of gender-based violence but overall it is treated seriously by the state, both in legislation and by the courts. That there is a high level of gender-based violence does not in itself mean that female victims of domestic violence form a PSG (compare for example Albania where the CPIN on domestic violence against women evidences a similarly high level of such violence). There are clearly some difficulties in Namibia with achieving rape convictions, but that is a problem with which many societies (such as the UK) are grappling for several reasons and that does not mean that the protection offered is insufficient. Despite the progress of women’s equality in many areas, and the declining prevalence of the institution of marriage, there are still patriarchal and traditional attitudes and a high percentage (although not, I have found a majority) consider violence from a male partner acceptable in some circumstances. However although this indicates some level of victim-blaming or shaming, that is not a majority attitude; there have been efforts even if not evidently effective to change attitudes, and as I have set out above I consider that in general there is sufficient and accessible protection for victims of domestic violence. I am not satisfied therefore on the balance of probabilities that female victims of domestic violence have a distinct identity in Namibia because they are perceived as being different by the surrounding society and therefore not satisfied that they are a PSG.
46. It follows therefore that the appellant does not have a characteristic which could cause her to fear for a Refugee Convention reason. She cannot qualify for asylum, although she could potentially, depending on my other findings, qualify for humanitarian protection. In case I am wrong about the PSG issue and because in any event the asylum issue forms a useful framework for considering the facts, I continue to consider the other issues in the appeal following the asylum framework.
Subjective fear
47. The second issue, considering the matter in asylum terms on the basis I have explained, is whether the appellant in fact fears persecution as a victim of domestic violence.
48. The review suggested that the appellant had not demonstrated a subjective fear, but I consider that the appellant has, even on the balance of probabilities, demonstrated a subjective fear.
49. The respondent has accepted the appellant to be a victim of forced marriage to an older cousin who abused and raped her. Given that acceptance and given the detailed narrative, plausible against the background of country conditions, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the account the appellant gives of her marriage in 2019, its condition and circumstances is credible and reliable. The appellant comes from a rural area. Her grandfather arranged her marriage (when she was in her mid-thirties and already had a child from a former partner) to a cousin F (a farmer in the area with many cattle) then aged about 60. Her objections were dismissed. She was subjected to terrible abuse from the beginning of her marriage, including rape. She has scars from the abuse and has two teeth knocked out. The appellant explained in asylum interview that she told her father and her grandfather how she was being treated and they said that she was married and needed to go back and have children with her husband.
50. I am also satisfied that it is more likely than not that the account the appellant gives of going to the local police for help and not receiving it is true. The background material shows that there can be gaps in protection in rural and more marginalised communities where strong traditional beliefs are held. The appellant has also produced a copy of a complaint she made to the traditional authority about being made to marry and the statement that she made to the police in Windhoek in April 2022. The dismissed complaint about her marriage supports her contention of local traditional attitudes and the statement to the police explains that she received no satisfaction from the local police. The respondent considered in the refusal letter that little weight could be attached to the documents, but the documents are consistent with the appellant’s case, consistent with the actions of a victim of forced marriage and domestic violence, and it appears credible that the appellant would have copies of those documents.
51. The appellant clarified in evidence that the reason she reported F to the police in Windhoek was to buy her time to escape and leave the country, buying her time because she thought he would be arrested and might be put out of the way for a while. In other words, she had always intended to flee the country. Bearing in mind that the appellant is an accepted victim of abuse who complained to the police in her home area and did not achieve protection, I am satisfied that the appellant genuinely fears F if she returns. If the appellant were to return home, whatever the ability of the Windhoek police to protect her, her elders are supportive of the marriage. Ultimately, even if he is or was imprisoned, F will return home. It is difficult to see given the attitude of her elders how the appellant could return to her home or the area near her home and make a life for herself, separate from F, say in the home her mother and daughter share. Returning to such an area would mean she would be likely to be subjected to abuse again. I am satisfied that the appellant’s subjective fear of F in her home area or nearby is a genuine one.
Objective risk of persecution/serious harm
52. Is there a real risk of serious harm (or, if I am wrong, persecution) on return to the appellant’s home area? The lower standard applies to this test for both asylum and humanitarian protection. The lower standard in humanitarian protection cases is “substantial grounds for believing” and in asylum cases it can be expressed as a reasonable degree of likelihood, a reasonable chance, or a serious possibility. All these phrases express the same standard.
53. I have accepted that the appellant did not receive any assistance from the police in her home area. Even assuming (as I discuss below) that the police in Windhoek can take effective action against F, ultimately, as I have noted above, F will return home. Given my findings that the local police have not assisted in the past, the appellant has no-one to whom she can go locally for effective protection or to help her access the nearest magistrates’ court (and the CPIN evidences that there can be difficulties in that respect in rural areas). The pressure from the local community and her elders will be to return to F. In those circumstances, I consider that there is a real risk of serious harm to the appellant in her home area, harm from which she will not be effectively protected. Any effective protection from Windhoek, if the appellant still lives in her home area, is likely to be relatively short-lived.
54. I am not satisfied even to the lower standard however that the appellant would suffer harm in an urban area in Namibia for the reasons I address below.
55. Firstly, I am not satisfied to the lower standard applicable that F would be willing or able to pursue the appellant, himself or through others, to such an area or that her elders would come to take her back from such an area. I appreciate the letter from the appellant’s sister saying that F has threatened several times when he saw the sister that if the appellant returns to Namibia, he will kill her. However, the appellant’s evidence was that her plan, even before she made a complaint to the police, was to leave Namibia. She stayed in Windhoek with F’s sister from at least the making of the report in April to November when she left the country, under the pretence that she was waiting for stock to arrive. She said that while she was staying there she had pressure from her father and grandfather to return and F was looking for her. She could not remember when the police had found F, but her sister had told her, at a time when she was still in Namibia, that the police had found F. As the appellant said F was looking for her, there was clearly a time during the appellant’s stay in Windhoek that F was not in jail and apparently looking for her. It would have been easy to find her by making enquiries as she was staying with his sister, and to use force to bring her back or to harm her, himself or through others, if he really had the means to do so. It also is not consistent with the appellant making a report in April to the police and leaving 6 or 7 months later, in November, that she thought that F would be able to harm her in Windhoek at least in the short to medium term. I appreciate that the appellant’s sister had to sell cattle to help her financially and might not have been able to raise the money for her to leave in April, but if the appellant really thought that F was likely to be arrested but then released shortly thereafter and then come after her, she would surely have waited until she had her ticket to leave and then made the report. That F owns plenty of cattle does not mean that he would spend his wealth by hiring hitmen to kill the appellant and I am not satisfied even to the lower standard that simply because he is someone seen as wealthy in his local area he would have power and influence over the authorities in urban areas. I appreciate that F has a sister in Windhoek and a nephew in Swakopmund but it is not simply a question of discovering in which city the appellant might be living, and wanting to bring her home and/or to harm her, it is having the means or influence to harm her.
56. Secondly, I consider the police would afford the appellant sufficient protection from F in an urban area. I have explained above why I consider that not only is there an effective police and criminal justice system in Namibia, I consider it is also generally effective for victims of domestic violence, particularly in urban areas. I am not satisfied that protection to the Horvath standard is not generally available for victims of domestic violence in urban areas.
57. I am not satisfied even to the lower standard that the appellant asked specifically for protection (such as a court order or housing somewhere safe) and the police did not provide it. I appreciate that the appellant has given detail when asked about the abuse she suffered and that she has been accepted as credible as to that part of her account. However, by contrast, the picture the appellant paints of what happened after she fled is unclear and is not credible. The appellant has given different explanations at different times. Her witness statement indicates that it was because she was not provided with protection that she made the decision to flee the country (see paragraph 10, paragraph 17). By contrast in evidence to me she said that she had reported F to buy herself time to escape and leave the country and she had always wanted to leave the country. The picture the appellant has presented of what happened once she fled to Windhoek is unclear and not credible. The appellant said that F was looking for her, yet she was not brought back home or harmed during the time she was in Windhoek. Despite her intent to leave the country and her expressed fear of what would happen if F were released, the appellant did not leave for 6 or 7 months after making the report, or, looking at it another way, she made the report before she had her exit secured. As the appellant was determined to leave anyway, and she was not intending to go home, there would have been no need for her to ask the police for protection. Because of the different explanations and the incredible picture presented, I am not satisfied that the appellant asked specifically for protection and was not provided with it.
58. Although I agree with Mr Tufan that it would have been relatively easy for the appellant to find out what had happened with the investigation either by contacting the Windhoek police directly, or by giving her sister authority to do so (I cannot see how contacting the Windhoek police as opposed to asking the family would put the sister at risk), I do not agree that it is remarkable that the appellant did not make more effort to find out what had happened to F. She would not have been concerned to wait for the police investigation as she was determined to leave the country anyway. There would be no benefit to her in trying to find out what had happened once she had left as there was an obvious risk that the answers would not particularly help her case, that is either her inquiries would have shown that the police took meaningful action against F or that they were hampered in bringing charges because she had left the country.
59. Because I am not satisfied that the appellant asked specifically for protection from the police and did not receive assistance, and because there is nothing to show that the police did not deal properly with her complaint, I am not satisfied that the appellant would not be able to access protection from the police in Windhoek or another similar urban area if she were to do so on return. If she or her family were to continue to receive threats from F or she has other credible reasons for fearing F might harm her, she would be able to report those threats and fears to the police. As I have explained above, I consider there are substantial grounds for believing that such protection would not be effective in her home area however. She would therefore have to relocate internally to obtain protection.
Internal relocation
60. The appellant would have sufficiency of protection if she lived in an urban area away from F, such as suggested by the respondent. The question is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that it would not be reasonable or would be unduly harsh for her to relocate.
61. Although I have found the appellant’s account not to be completely credible in respect of asking the police for protection, I have found her account of her upbringing, her marriage, the abuse, and the pressure from her elders to be reliable. Against that background and bearing in mind country conditions I am satisfied to the lower standard that what the appellant says about her lack of skills and the likely support or lack of support from her family is credible.
62. I am satisfied that the appellant in the past did make money by selling food, but that was in the context where she was living at home, so she did not have to pay rent. She is unlikely to be able to live with F’s sister in Windhoek now she has separated from F. She cannot return to her sister who lives in her home area and her mother and daughter live in the next village to F, where I consider the appellant would have the same difficulties with risk from F and lack of protection. I do not consider it realistic for the appellant’s family to support her in the long term. I am satisfied to the low standard applicable that as the appellant says that not only could they not afford to do so because they are not working, they could not go against the wishes of their father and grandfather that she return to F. Whilst that does not mean that they would not be able to provide occasional assistance, and clearly the appellant’s sister felt able to sell cattle to help her, that is evidently different from offering the appellant permanent accommodation (if they live outside the village which the appellant’s sister does not) or permanent support. I appreciate that the appellant could ask for protection from the police on return and access a shelter, but there is nothing to indicate that the shelter provides more than basic protection or that a person would be able to stay there on an indefinite basis. There is nothing to suggest that living in a shelter equips a person such as the appellant with more marketable skills when they leave. The CPIN refers to the single parents support foundation which encourages single parents’ self-reliance, but there is no detail as to the practical help they give, and I note the website was not fully operational.
63. The other suggestion in the refusal letter is that the appellant could access the social protection system in Namibia. The respondent refers to the government’s social protection policy, but following the link, the paragraphs refer to a strategy to empower women and youth (youth enterprise funding and public procurements from businesses owned by women, youth and people with disabilities), to improve technical and vocational education and training, and tertiary education financial assistance. Although one paragraph refers to enhanced access to affordable housing for the poor and vulnerable, the policy is that financial help will be offered to speed up the construction of affordable housing and to allocate more funds to self-help groups. It is not clear how this would directly assist the appellant. Another paragraph is headed “towards comprehensive social protection” which tasks the “OMAs” to explore and implement solutions such as a national medical benefit fund, national pension fund and maternity grant and unemployment insurance. That a group have been tasked to explore and implement such solutions means that they are not yet in place.
64. The respondent also refers in the same reference to the UNICEF Namibia budget brief. Following the link, this does say that Namibia’s social protection system is one of the most developed in Africa, but also that the social protection spending is largely skewed towards the elderly, 98% of the population over the age of 60 receiving old age grants. 62.5% of the social protection spending is a combined old age grant and veterans grant, 19.5% a disability grant (for adults and children) and 18% a child grant. The report explains that the value of the child grant is 14.7% below the poverty line and 51.3% of children in Namibia are living in multidimensional poverty.
65. The appellant was candid that her daughter was receiving benefits from the government but explained that money was not enough for her mother and child. They were struggling financially and not able to afford school fees.
66. Given that the value of the child grant is below the poverty line, there are substantial grounds for believing that even if the appellant received the child grant instead of her mother, she and her daughter would still not be able to house themselves and feed themselves.
67. The respondent refers to assistance for voluntary return in the refusal letter, but that relates to Malaysia. There is reference to the IOM offering resettlement programmes in Namibia, but no further detail is given, and the link does not work.
68. Paragraph 2.6.3 of the CPIN explains that relocation is more likely to be viable if the woman can access accommodation and support networks, or is educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support herself. On my findings the appellant would be returning with nothing, and she is not particularly educated or skilled, having never previously earned money at a level to enable her to live on her own. She has always lived in a rural area, so has no particular skills for such jobs as are available in urban areas. Whilst if her daughter lived with her, she would have the benefit of a child grant, there are substantial grounds for believing that this would not be enough to house and feed them both. There are substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would not have more than the occasional support from family and no evidence of any other meaningful support. The appellant has nowhere obvious to go apart from her home area on return to Namibia and no consistent and reliable means of financial support or sufficient skills to support herself in terms of housing and feeding herself. Of course, it will not assist that she is likely to be stressed and fearful on return. In those circumstances, I consider internal relocation would not be reasonable and would be unduly harsh.
Conclusion
69. Although the appellant does not qualify for asylum, because I consider she would be at real risk of harm in her home area and there are substantial grounds for believing that internal relocation would not be reasonable and would be unduly harsh, she qualifies for humanitarian protection, and her return would be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
On remaking:
I dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds.
I allow the appeal on humanitarian protection and human rights’ grounds.
A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 January 2026