Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004220

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58055/2024
LP/14304/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

IT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hawkin, Counsel, instructed by Elias Yaman & Co Law Limited
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision dated 11th August 2025 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his claim for asylum.

Background

2. The Appellant is a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity.

3. He entered the United Kingdom on 18th July 2022 and claimed asylum the following day on the basis of purported fear arising from his claimed involvement with an anti-regime political party in Turkey, the HDP. The claim was refused on 14th March 2024 and that refusal was upheld by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) after a hearing held on 28th July 2025.

4. At paragraph 22 of his determination, dated 11th August 2025, the Judge concluded that the Appellant was not credible and that he had presented a “false claim for asylum”. He accepted, at paragraph 29, that the Appellant had been a youth member of the HDP and had undertaken some low-level political activity, but he rejected the Appellant’s account that he had been arrested, detained and asked to be an informant. He did not accept that the Turkish authorities have been searching for the Appellant. At paragraph 32 he concluded:

“… I do not find that the appellant has evidenced that he is of an ongoing interest to the authorities in Turkey. I find the claims that they have repeatedly been going to his family home to be an embellishment to his claim. I find the nature and extent of his political activities both in Turkey and associations in the United Kingdom to have been exaggerated. I find the point of the exaggeration is to attempt to elevate a profile of a person of interest and therefore risk upon return.”

5. Between paragraphs 23 and 28 the Judge outlined the reasons why he considered the Appellant not to be credible.

6. At paragraph 23 the Judge found that the Appellant had, within a witness statement, embellished his account:

“In his asylum interview record the appellant repeatedly mentions leafleting and hanging posters for the party (eg AIR question 11), there is no reference to attending demonstrations. In paragraph 13 of his witness statement (SB 256) the appellant lists a far greater list of activities including attending meetings, marches, demonstrations and protests. I find this to be an embellishment to his claim. I find his HDP activities were far more limited and took place when he was a youth member.”

7. At paragraph 28 the Judge criticised a lack of documentary evidence to support the Appellant’s account of attendance at a Kurdish community centre in the United Kingdom:

“The appellant states that he has attended a Kurdish community centre in Haringey in United Kingdom. He is there every fortnight or month. No documentary evidence has been provided from this organisation or any photographs to establish the same. I find he has sought to embellish his involvement within the Kurdish community and his role in politics.”

8. Permission to appeal was granted on 9th September 2025 by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on two of five grounds pursued:

“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in incorrectly reaching an adverse credibility finding based on an inconsistency between the Appellant’s AIR and witness statement. The IJ concludes that the witness statement seeks to embellish the Appellant’s account put in AIR however the witness statement pre-dates the AIR. This incorrect adverse finding may have impacted on the overall assessment on credibility and thus may be an arguable error of law.
…
5. The Appellant argues that the IJ was wrong in concluding that the Appellant had adduced no evidence of his attendance at the Kurdish Centre whilst failing to note the membership card. The IJ concludes that the Appellant has sought to embellish his involvement with the Kurdish community and role in politics in the UK based on this perceived lack of evidence. This was an error and appears material to this finding. This is an arguable error of law.
…
7. The Appellant has identified two errors as noted above which individually may not be material but cumulatively, given both impact on credibility, may have been material to the overall conclusion on the Appellant’s credibility. As such permission to appeal is granted on limited grounds.”

9. By Rule 24 response, dated 17th September 2025, the Respondent conceded the appeal, as follows:

“The respondent accepts that an error of law has been made in reference to grounds 1 and grounds 4. Given it links to adverse credibility findings it is submitted it should be returned to the FT.”

The hearing

10. The documents were contained within a 217-page composite bundle. The Appellant also relied upon a four-page skeleton argument, albeit that pursues arguments for which permission to appeal had not been granted and so was of extremely limited assistance.

11. At the hearing Ms Nolan, on behalf of the Respondent, stated that she was not aware of the concessions in the Rule 24 response and that she had prepared to resist the appeal. I reassured her that it would be necessary for me to determine the appeal, notwithstanding any apparent concessions, and she was therefore invited to make her oral submissions.

12. She argued that there had been no mistakes of fact by the Judge. He was correct to say that there were discrepancies between the accounts given in the Appellant’s witness statement and asylum interview. He did not expressly state when the witness statement had been prepared. Whilst the Appellant did disclose attendance at a demonstration in his asylum interview, this was only upon being asked directly, after previously detailing political activity which did not include demonstrations. Further, he answered in interview that he had attended one demonstration, whereby in his witness statement he said that he had attended demonstrations (plural), together with marches and protests.

13. In relation to documentation to show that the Appellant had been attending the Kurdish community centre, Ms Nolan highlighted the precise wording of the Judge’s determination and that it should be read as the Judge taking into account that the Appellant had failed to provide evidence of regular attendance. She stated that the membership card was not evidence of regular attendance.

14. Ms Nolan accepted that the Judge had not expressly acknowledged in his determination that the Appellant had disclosed attendance at a demonstration when asked in interview, nor did he expressly acknowledge the membership card.

15. Both Ms Nolan and Mr Hawkin agreed that, if I were to allow the appeal, the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete re-hearing as any material error of law relates to the assessment of credibility, a central feature of the asylum claim. Credibility would have to be assessed afresh. They agreed that, in those circumstances, no findings should be preserved.

Discussion

16. Throughout my consideration of the appeal, I had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 and Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, in relation to the powers of the Upper Tribunal and how they should be exercised.

17. There are material errors made by the Judge in his analysis of the evidence.

18. The first is at paragraph 12 of his determination, as outlined above. Whilst not explicit, it seems evident from the use of the word “embellishment” that the Judge had proceeded upon the basis that the witness statement post-dated the interview.

19. It is correct to note that there was discrepancy between the Appellant’s account in interview and his witness statement.

20. At paragraph 13 of his witness statement, dated 9th February 2024, the Appellant stated:

“My involvement was to help and assist during the 2014 elections in Turkey, by handing out leaflets, putting up posters, encouraging people to vote, visiting neighbourhoods, attending meetings in the buildings and in open air, attending marches, demonstrations and protests…”

21. When asked, at question 49, about his political involvement in the subsequent asylum interview, he replied:

“I was in the youth branch of HDP and I started to distribute the leaflet on the behalf of the party and I also was collecting some donations and preparing banners for the rally….”

22. In answer to questions 54 onwards, the Appellant explained that he had attended a demonstration in Turkey.

23. Given that the witness statement pre-dates the interview, the finding that his witness statement is an embellishment, ie that the Appellant is developing his account as time progresses, cannot be maintained. Similarly, the Judge was factually wrong in his finding that the Appellant had not mentioned demonstrations in interview. He did not qualify this by stating that the Appellant had stated in interview that he had only attended one demonstration. The fact that he did not acknowledge the answer to question 54 of the asylum interview gives rise to a real likelihood that it was overlooked.

24. Similarly, the finding that the Appellant had provided no documentation from the Kurdish Community Centre is wrong in fact, in light of the Appellant having provided a membership card.

25. There is force in Ms Nolan’s submission that the Judge was noting the lack of documentary evidence of regular attendance, such as witness evidence from other attendees; a letter from someone in authority or photographs. However, the membership card would arguably be documentary evidence of engagement with the centre and therefore required analysis. The Judge was required to assess the reliability of that documentary evidence or to explain why it does not advance the Appellant’s case. The fact that he did not do so, and the wording of his determination, gives rise to the real prospect that this piece of evidence was overlooked.

26. Credibility was a central feature of the appeal before the Judge. In assessing credibility, the Judge appears to have made two mistakes as to the nature of the evidence before him. It appears that he overlooked important evidence or otherwise failed to give it sufficient anxious scrutiny to that evidence. Whilst it is noted that there were other features identified as undermining the Appellant’s credibility, the identified mistakes fed into the overall assessment so as to render the overall credibility assessment unsound.

27. As such, the determination includes error of law which was material as it influenced the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility.

Disposal

28. The parties invited me to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

29. Section 12(2) of The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides that the Upper Tribunal, upon setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, may (i) remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or (ii) re-make the decision.

30. When deciding whether to remit the appeal or to retain it for the decision to be re-made, I gave careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal:

"[7.2] The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to re-make the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:-
a. the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
b. the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal."

31. I also took note of paragraph 7.3 which provides:

“Remaking rather than remitting will nevertheless constitute the normal approach to determining appeals where an error of law is found, even if some further fact finding is necessary.”

32. Having considered the practice statement recited and the decision of the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and that of the Upper Tribunal in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46, and in the light of the overriding objective, I am satisfied that the appeal falls within paragraph 7.2(b) as it will be necessary to undertake an assessment of all the factual evidence, oral and documentary, when reaching a decision.

33. The matter shall therefore be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. None of the findings of the Judge are preserved. The re-hearing shall be before a different judge.

Notice of Decision:

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12th November 2025