Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004226
First‑tier Tribunal No: PA/63462/2024
LP/13465/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

RA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Thompson, Counsel instructed by Londinium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh, appeals with the permission of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Turner against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Webber (the judge) dated 9 August 2025.
Background
2. The appellant and his wife arrived in the UK on 20 February 2022. The appellant's wife had been granted a student visa and the appellant was her dependant.
3. The appellant claimed asylum on 4 April 2023. The appellant claimed that he had been a member of the BNP since July 2018 and feared the former ruling party, the Awami League, who had threatened him. He also claimed that there were very significant obstacles to his integration into Bangladesh and that his removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with his family and private life. The appellant's wife and daughter are dependents on his claim.
4. In a decision dated 23 April 2024 the respondent refused the appellant's protection and human rights claim.
The Appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against that decision and the appeal came before the judge on 27 June 2025.
6. In a decision dated 9 August 2025 the judge dismissed the appellant's appeal. The judge rejected the appellant's account, finding the Appellant not to be credible. Alternatively, the judge considered that the appellant would not be at risk even if his account was accepted because the country situation had changed and there had been a change in government. The judge concluded and that there were not very significant obstacles to his integration into Bangladesh, or that his removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with his family and private life.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant appealed against the judge's decision and the appellant was granted permission to appeal on the following limited grounds:
(1) The judge erred in his assessment of the appellant's evidence, by
(i) failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness and failing to consider the medical evidence relating to his mental health and whether it impacted on the appellant's ability to give a clear and consistent account; and
(ii) failing to apply R v Lucas [1981] 1 WLR 1411 by attributing the appellant’s inconsistencies to dishonesty.
(2) The judge erred in requiring corroborative evidence, i.e. WhatsApp evidence and/or failed to consider the appellant's explanation why he did not have that WhatsApp evidence.
8. The respondent provided a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
9. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr Thompson on behalf of the appellant and Ms Isherwood on behalf of the respondent. I reserved my decision which I now give.

Discussion
Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence
10. I am not persuaded that the judge erred in his assessment of the appellant's evidence.
11. There was no request that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness or that the judge apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance (the Guidance Note) in the appellant's skeleton argument and the judge does not record that such a submission was made before him.
12. The judge does record that it was submitted on the appellant's behalf that the appellant was a "somewhat vulnerable individual who lacked confidence in interview and that he was led by the interviewer to some degree". I am satisfied that that does not amount to a request for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness.
13. The appellant has not claimed that the hearing was procedurally unfair as a result of the appellant not being treated as a vulnerable witness and I note that the Court of Appeal in Khan v Secretary of State [2026] EWCA Civ 148 found at [37] that:
"The fact that a tribunal has not taken the steps set out in the Guidance Note does not necessarily mean that the tribunal has erred in law, still less that its decision on an appeal is legally flawed."
14. It has not been submitted, and I am satisfied that there has not been procedural unfairness which materially affects the judge's decision.
15. Alternatively it was submitted that the judge did not consider the impact of the appellant's vulnerability in his assessment of the Appellant’s evidence.
16. The only medical evidence before the judge was a letter from Newham Talking Therapies. That letter states:
"Your patient has self‑referred to our service for Talking Therapy. We have briefly assessed [the Appellant’s] difficulties and their current problem seems to be related to low mood and anxiety in the context of his pending asylum claim and his caring responsibilities. He reports being the main carer for his wife and daughter and worrying a lot about whether they will be able to receive the medical treatment they need if they are not allowed to stay in the UK. Below is a summary of their assessment scores on a measure of depression, PHQ/9 and anxiety GAD/7."
17. The letter provides a summary of the Appellant’s assessment scores on a measure of depression and anxiety. The Appellant’s score for depression is 14, which is in the moderate range. The Appellant’s score for anxiety is 17, which is in the severe range. The letter records that the Appellant was interested in pursuing guided self‑help sessions to address his difficulties and that would involve eight sessions with a psychological wellbeing practitioner.
18. I am satisfied that that the judge considered the submissions made in respect of the Appellant’s vulnerability and the letter from Newham Talking Therapies. as they are recorded in the judge’s decision at [29].
19. The judge also considered the appellant's own evidence in which he addressed his inconsistencies in interview in the decision at [24]. The judge notes:
"He said in his statement that inconsistencies in his interviews were not due to deception but because he suffers from anxiety and depression which affects his cognitive functioning, especially under stress. He said he was nervous, shaking and unable to recall timelines and details. He said that the mental health challenges he faces are a direct result of his traumatic experience and ongoing fears."
20. I am satisfied that the judge considered that evidence and submissions in his assessment of the appellant’s credibility at [36]. The judge concluded that the appellant "was just too inconsistent on the most important points at the core of his claim (in particular the timing and nature of the threats)" and attached significant weight to those inconsistencies.
21. The judge considered the appellant's evidence that he was stressed and tense at the time of his interviews and suffers from anxiety and depression, but noted that the appellant had not provided any significant medical evidence. The judge considered the letter from Newham Talking Therapies, but did not attach much weight to that evidence. The judge gave clearly adequate reasons for coming to that conclusion. The judge noted the passage of time since the appellant’s interviews. The letter is dated 16 June 2025 and the appellant's interviews took place on 20 March 2024 and 16 April 2024. The judge also noted the nature of the self‑referral and the lack of detail in the assessment. The judge was entitled not to attach much weight to the letter from Newham Talking Therapies for the reasons he gave.
22. I am therefore satisfied that the judge was aware that it was claimed that the appellant was “somewhat vulnerable” and plainly considered whether it impacted on his assessment of the appellant's evidence. The judge was entitled to find that the appellant “was just too inconsistent on the most important points at the core of his claim.”
23. The judge plainly considered whether there were alternative explanations for the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. Having rejected those explanations the judge was entitled to find that they could be attributed to dishonesty and to reject the appellant’s account.
Corroborative evidence
24. The appellant's claim that the judge materially erred in law by requiring corroborative evidence is not made out. Contrary to what is claimed in the grounds, the judge does not in fact criticise the appellant for being unable to produce a WhatsApp call recording or screenshot of the threatening call that he claimed he received after arriving in the UK.
25. The judge considers that the appellant could have claimed asylum shortly after his arrival in the UK when he received the threat and the judge also notes that the appellant's evidence that he lost his phone subsequently which contained the evidence of that threat. I am satisfied that the judge does not hold the absence of that evidence against the appellant.
26. The judge records the appellant's oral evidence at [16] that he “provided photos of him at rallies in Bangladesh but perhaps the people from the solicitors' firm did not submit them." The judge rejects that aspect of the appellant's evidence at [34], noting that if the appellant had provided that evidence to his solicitors of attendance at BNP rallies in Bangladesh then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he would expect the solicitors to have served that evidence.
27. I note that nothing has been provided to me from the appellant's representatives to corroborate the appellant's account that he provided them with photos that they then did not serve on the Tribunal.
28. The judge did not unlawfully require corroborative evidence but simply rejected the appellant's claim that he had provided evidence to his representatives that was not before the judge, and that finding was plainly open to the judge.
Materiality
29. Finally, I am satisfied that, even if the judge had erred in his assessment of the appellant's credibility, any such error would not be material.
30. Having found that the appellant had not proved to the relevant standard that he was the local BNP leader and had been targeted by the Awami League, he then went on to consider the appellant’s claim at its highest. The judge states at [38]:
"Even if he had been threatened as claimed, the December 2024 CPIN sets out the reduced risk to BMP members following the fall of the Awami League."
31. The judge sets out some of the evidence from the respondent’s CPIN and in particular that “leaders, members, supporters of the BNP Jamaat‑e‑Islami and their auxiliary student and youth organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.” Having set out that evidence, the judge then concluded:
"The appellant does not have a well‑founded fear of persecution by the Bangladeshi authorities or Awami League because of any activities he has undertook on behalf of the BMP."
32. I’m satisfied that finding was open to the judge on the evidence before him and that it renders any error in the assessment of the appellant's credibility immaterial.
Notice of Decision
1. The appellant's appeal is dismissed.
2. The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and it accordingly stands.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 July 2026