Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004227
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00468/2022
HU/53004/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MOYOSORE AIRAT ADEBAYO
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No representation
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 10 February 2022 refusing her application for entry clearance on family life grounds.
2. The appellant’s appeal was initially dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 21 February 2024. However, in a decision promulgated on 29 June 2026, I set aside that decision on the basis that it was vitiated by a material error of law. A copy of the error of law decision is appended to this decision. The appeal now comes before me for remaking.
3. For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed.
Background
4. The background to the case is set out in the error of law decision and is not therefore repeated here.
The respondent’s decision
5. On 5 November 2021, the appellant applied for leave to enter the United Kingdom to join her adult daughter, Ms Olubukola Aina-Osunnuga. According to the visa application form, the appellant described herself as being frail, lonely and in need of regular and adequate care. She further explained that she had no one to look after her in Nigeria and that this was affecting her mental and physical health. She added that she could not move to Canada, where her three other adult children live, because of “visa issues”.
6. In her decision dated 10 February 2022 refusing that application, the respondent considered the appellant’s circumstances under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules, in particular the provisions relating to entry clearance as an adult dependant relative (section EC-DR). However, the respondent did not accept that the appellant met the dependency requirements under paragraphs E-ECDR.2.4 and 2.5 (then in force):
“E-ECDR.2.4. The applicant or, if the applicant and their partner are the sponsor’s parents or grandparents, the applicant’s partner, must as a result of age, illness or disability require long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
E-ECDR.2.5. The applicant or, if the applicant and their partner are the sponsor’s parents or grandparents, the applicant’s partner, must be unable, even with the practical and financial help of the sponsor, to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, because-
(a) it is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it; or
(b) it is not affordable.”
7. The respondent made the following findings in respect of the appellant’s inability to meet the dependency requirements:
a. The appellant’s nephew, who lived a 30 minute drive away, could continue to care for her.
b. The evidence did not demonstrate that the appellant required long term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
c. The evidence from the Amazing Heart Centre showed that the appellant was receiving the necessary treatment and medication for her conditions.
d. The appellant had £8,770.30 in savings.
e. The appellant had a carer at weekends, and there was no reason why that arrangement could not continue.
f. The appellant had failed to demonstrate that the level of care that she requires would be unavailable to her in Nigeria.
8. Furthermore, the respondent was not satisfied that there were any exceptional circumstances or compelling factors to the case that meant the appellant should be granted leave to enter outside of the Rules on family life grounds under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
The issues
9. The following issues fall to be determined in this appeal:
a. Whether the appellant meets the requirements of paragraphs E-ECDR.2.4 and 2.5 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules (as in force at the date of decision);
b. Whether the appellant and the sponsor enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR; and
c. If the appellant and the sponsor do enjoy protected family life, does the respondent’s decision to refuse leave to enter amount to a disproportionate interference with that family life?
The hearing
10. The respondent was represented by Ms Ahmed. The appellant was not legally represented, but Ms Aina-Osunuga (“the sponsor”) attended and represented her mother’s interests.
11. I had before me the following material:
a. The consolidated error of law bundle containing the evidence relied upon by both parties before the First-tier Tribunal.
b. The sponsor’s letter dated 21 September 2021, which accompanied the appellant’s application for leave to enter and was provided by the sponsor during the hearing.
c. The appellant’s witness statement dated 7 January 2024, which had been omitted from the error of law bundle and was provided by the sponsor during the hearing.
d. A letter from the sponsor dated 17 August 2026 providing an update on the appellant’s current circumstances.
12. The sponsor’s letter dated 17 August 2026 was filed on 18 August 2026, 13 days after the deadline specified in the directions accompanying the error of law decision had expired. I am satisfied that the delay was both serious and significant and note that no explanation has been provided for it. Nevertheless, having considered all the circumstances of the case, including the importance of procedural discipline and compliance with the Procedure Rules, the limited prejudice to the respondent, the appellant’s lack of legal representation, and the fact that this was the only evidence before me concerning the appellant’s current circumstances, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to admit the letter.
13. During the hearing, the Tribunal also provided the sponsor with printed copies of the principal authorities upon which Ms Ahmed sought to rely.
14. The sponsor adopted her two written statements, dated 14 November 2022 and 17 August 2026, respectively, and was cross-examined by Ms Ahmed. Her oral evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings and is not repeated here except where necessary.
15. As the sponsor was not legally represented, I invited Ms Ahmed to divide her submissions into two parts: first, whether the appellant met the requirements for entry clearance under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules; and secondly, the appellant’s claim under Article 8 ECHR. I then afforded the sponsor an opportunity to make separate submissions on each aspect of the appeal.
Preliminary issue
16. At the outset of the hearing, I invited the parties’ submissions on whether the dependency requirements of the Immigration Rules fell to be assessed by reference to the evidence available at the date of the hearing or at the date of the respondent’s decision1. Ms Ahmed indicated that she was unable to assist on that issue. The sponsor submitted that I should take into account evidence post-dating the respondent’s decision.
17. Having considered the issue, and for the reasons I indicated at the hearing, I concluded that compliance with the Immigration Rules falls to be assessed by reference to the circumstances at the date of the respondent’s decision. That conclusion is supported by paragraph 27 of the Rules, which provides:
“An application for entry clearance is to be decided in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of the decision, except that an applicant will not be refused an entry clearance where entry is sought in one of the categories contained in paragraphs 296-316 or paragraph EC-C of Appendix FM solely on account of his attaining the age of 18 years between receipt of his application and the date of the decision on it.”
18. That said, while post-decision evidence cannot ordinarily be relied upon to show that requirements of the Rules, which were not met at the date of decision, were subsequently satisfied, I am satisfied that the reference to the “circumstances existing at the time of the decision” means that post-decision evidence may be considered insofar as it demonstrates the true position at the date of decision. However, in carrying out the Article 8 proportionality assessment, the Tribunal is entitled to consider the circumstances appertaining at the date of hearing, including relevant post-decision developments.
19. It follows that the observation I made at [14] of the error of law decision was incorrect. That does not, however, affect the correctness of my decision to set aside the determination of the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was a human rights appeal and the judge failed to give any consideration to the appellant’s and sponsor’s rights under Article 8. That omission was material irrespective of the point addressed above.
The parties’ submissions
The respondent
20. Ms Ahmed submitted that the appellant did not meet the requirements of paragraphs E-ECDR.2.4 and 2.5 of Appendix FM. Relying on the refusal decision and the authorities of BritCits v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368 and Ribeli v Entry Clearance Officer, Pretoria [2018] EWCA Civ 611, Ms Ahmed argued that the adult dependent relative provisions are intentionally stringent and require cogent evidence that an applicant both requires long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks and is unable to obtain the necessary care in their country of residence. She submitted that the medical evidence did not establish that the appellant required long-term personal care, and that some of the medical evidence should be given limited weight because of its lack of detail and provenance. In relation to the availability of care, Ms Ahmed submitted that the sponsor’s own evidence demonstrated that the appellant received assistance from friends, neighbours and members of her local mosque, and that the sponsor had accepted that a paid carer could be arranged. The sponsor’s concerns regarding the safety and reliability of carers in Nigeria were said to be speculative, generalised and unsupported by evidence. Ms Ahmed further submitted that there was insufficient evidence that the appellant lacked the means to fund care in Nigeria and accordingly the requirements of the Immigration Rules were not met.
21. On Article 8 ECHR, Ms Ahmed submitted that the evidence did not establish family life between the appellant and sponsor going beyond the normal emotional ties between an adult child and an elderly parent. She noted the absence of documentary evidence of any financial support, regular communication between the sponsor and the appellant or other forms of dependency. In the alternative, even if Article 8(1) were engaged, she submitted that refusal of entry clearance was proportionate. The appellant could not satisfy the Immigration Rules, which weighed heavily in the public interest, and there was no evidence of exceptional circumstances or of any significant impact on the sponsor's daughter. The sponsor’s concerns and distress about her mother’s situation were understandable but did not outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.
The appellant
22. The sponsor submitted that the appellant required the support of close family members and that the assistance currently provided in Nigeria was informal, inconsistent and not guaranteed. She emphasised that, although neighbours, friends and others occasionally assisted the appellant, such support was voluntary and could not be relied upon whenever help was needed. She maintained that obtaining dependable care and supporting evidence from Nigeria had proved extremely difficult despite considerable effort and expense over several years. The sponsor also disputed the suggestion that the appellant could readily obtain appropriate and trustworthy care in Nigeria, maintaining that suitable care was not realistically available to her mother on a consistent basis. She submitted that the appellant did not seek access to public funds in the United Kingdom but simply required family support in her old age.
23. In relation to Article 8, the sponsor relied upon the emotional impact upon her of being unable to care for her mother and the continuing anxiety caused by her mother's circumstances in Nigeria. She submitted that she had done everything she could to obtain evidence in support of the appeal and that the refusal failed properly to reflect the realities of her mother’s situation. She invited the Tribunal to allow the appeal.
The legal framework
24. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are paragraphs E-ECDR.2.4 and 2.5 of Appendix FM as set out at [6] above.
25. Article 8 of the ECHR concerns the right to respect for private and family life. It says:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
26. In so far as the appellant relies on Article 8 outside the Rules, it is for her to show that Article 8(1) is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities and I may consider evidence up until the date of the hearing.
Discussion and Findings
Whether the appellant meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules
Does the appellant require long-term personal care?
27. Paragraph E-ECDR.2.4 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules requires an applicant to demonstrate that they have a disability that requires long-term personal care to assist them in performing everyday tasks. In the present case, there is insufficient evidence before me to show that the appellant is unable to carry out such tasks.
28. The high point of the appellant’s evidence is the series of letters obtained from medical professionals in Nigeria.
29. First, there is a letter from Lagos University Teaching Hospital dated 15 May 2023, which records that the appellant was admitted on 16 December 2016 “with a one-day history of weakness of the right and lower limbs of a day durations”. An assessment concluded she suffers from hypertensive heart disease. It says that she was discharged 12 days later on admission to the cardiology and neurology medical outpatient clinic. The letter goes on to say that in 2022, she was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes mellitus for which was placed on hypoglycaemic agents and referred to the endocrinology clinic. She is currently taking the following medication on a daily basis: telmisartan 80 mg daily, indapamide 1.5 mg, S-amlodipine 2.5 mg, Glucophage 500 mg, rivaroxaban 20 mg daily, pregabalin 75 mg and atorvastatin 40 mg. Ms Ahmed accepted that weight can be attached to this letter, but she submitted that it does not show that the appellant is unable to perform essential daily tasks or requires personal care. The sponsor explained that this was the standard format of a letter issued by a government hospital in Nigeria; she said that they do not provide recommendation letters.
30. This letter post-dates the refusal of leave to enter, but I am satisfied that it can be relied upon to shed light on the appellant’s health on the date of decision. Nevertheless, the fact remains that while that letter is helpful to the extent that it details the appellant’s health conditions and the medication that she takes, it does not support her claim to require personal care to carry out essential daily tasks.
31. Secondly, the appellant relies upon two documents provided by the Amazing Heart Centre in Lagos. The first is a letter headed “medical report” dated 23 September 2021 written by Dr A.D. Olusegun-Joseph, a consultant cardiologist. He writes that the appellant has been a patient of the hospital for more than eight years and is being treated for biventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease precipitated by arterial fibrillation. He goes on to state:
“Her physical and other activities have been affected by multiple morbidities and old age over the years. She seems to have declining ability to coordinate activities well, easily forgets things now and has nagging arthritis.”
Later, the letter adds:
“It is recommended that a Nurse or Carer reminds her to take her medication, personal care, assist with movements and other exigencies. It is also recommended that a close family is staying with her for emotional and moral support.”
32. The second letter is dated 1 August 2023 and therefore post-dates the respondent’s decision. It does not shed light on the state of affairs at the date of decision, and I therefore address its contents separately, as part of the Article 8 assessment.
33. Ms Ahmed contended that little weight could be attached to the Amazing Heart Centre’s letters because they provided insufficient detail to substantiate the doctor’s conclusion that the appellant requires personal care. The sponsor said that because the Amazing Heart Centre is a private clinic, unlike the Teaching Hospital, they were willing to provide a recommendation in exchange for a fee, which she said was common practice in Nigeria. On consideration, I attach weight to the letter so far as it details the appellant’s medical history; for reasons I discuss below, I attach less weight to the assertion made regarding the personal care that she requires.
34. The third document is a letter addressed to the Upper Tribunal dated 2 February 2026 written by Dr Mustapha Mukail, the medical director of Ibadan North East Health Authority. It therefore post-dates the respondent’s decision by some margin. I set out the contents of the letter in full:
“Letter to support that the health care system in Nigeria is Poor.
The Ibadan North East local government is writing a support letter to Mrs Moyosore Airat Adebayo (14/08/1945) as she is old and frail, has diabetes, hypertensive heart disease and affected by multiple co-morbidities. She is unable to get the required care due to the poor health care facilities and demands of health care system here in Nigeria.
The country struggles with poor public access and quality due to shortage of medical professionals, inadequate infrastructure, underfunding, over population and emigration of skilled health care workers.
Please provide her all the necessary support to make sure she is adequately taken care and join her daughter in the United Kingdom.
Thank you for your consideration.”
35. During cross-examination, Ms Ahmed asked the sponsor why the appellant had produced a letter from a doctor in Ibadan when she lives in Lagos. The sponsor explained that she was having difficulties in obtaining evidence to support the appellant’s appeal. She said that a cousin of hers who lives in the United Kingdom was travelling to Ibadan, where she originally came from, and offered to help obtain some evidence. Asked whether Dr Mukail had examined the appellant, the sponsor asserted that he had. Ms Ahmed, however, contended that little weight could be attached to Dr Mukail’s letter on the basis that he is not the appellant’s doctor.
36. On reflection, even if Dr Mukail’s letter could be said to shed light on the appellant’s circumstances at the date of decision, I attach little weight to it. First, it is significant that he is not said to be one of the appellant’s treating physicians. Rather, the evidence is that he agreed to write the letter at the request of the sponsor’s cousin and, on the appellant’s own evidence, likely in return for a fee. Secondly, even if Dr Mukail did examine the appellant, as the sponsor contends, I approach that claim with caution. The appellant resides in Lagos, and there is nothing in the letter to suggest that Dr Mukail has ever met or treated her. At best, it would appear that any examination could only have been on a single occasion. Thirdly, leaving aside the somewhat surprising fact that a medical director employed by a local government authority would, without qualification, characterise his country’s healthcare system as poor, there is nothing in the evidence from Lagos University Teaching Hospital or Amazing Heart Centre to suggest that the appellant is receiving inadequate medical treatment. On the contrary, the evidence from the institutions responsible for her care indicates that she has access to, and is receiving, an appropriate standard of treatment from both the state and the private sector. Indeed, that evidence tends to undermine, rather than support, the broader assertions made by Dr Mukail regarding the inadequacy of healthcare provision in Nigeria.
37. Considering the evidence as a whole, including the testimony of both the appellant and the sponsor, I accept that the appellant is of advanced age and suffers from diabetes, hypertensive heart disease, and arthritis, none of which is uncommon for a person of her age. I also accept that she takes a number of different medications daily and that, as an elderly person, she is likely to require some degree of support. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence before me is sufficient to establish that she has a disability requiring long-term personal care in order to perform everyday tasks.
38. As I have already explained, the letter from Lagos University Teaching Hospital is silent on that issue. Little weight can be attached to Dr Mukail’s letter which, in any event, is concerned primarily with the state of the healthcare system in Nigeria. Although the 2021 letter from Amazing Heart Centre states that the appellant requires care, I bear in mind the sponsor’s evidence that this was obtained upon payment of a fee, which may have affected the contents. Moreover, I accept Ms Ahmed’s submission that those letters lack sufficient detail as to the appellant’s inability to carry out day-to-day activities, the extent of any personal care required, and the reasons why such care could only be provided by a family member.
Is adequate care available and affordable?
39. Even if I had found that the appellant met the requirements of paragraph E-ECDR.2.4, I am not in any event satisfied that she has met the requirements of paragraph E-ECDR.2.5, which requires an applicant to demonstrate that the care they require is (a) not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it; or (b) not affordable.
40. Certainly, at the date of decision, there was evidence that the appellant was receiving support from her nephew, Hassan Akindele, who lived approximately 30 minutes away by car. There is now evidence that Mr Akindele is no longer able to assist the appellant. However, as that is a post-decision development, I address it separately below in the context of Article 8. There was also reference in the evidence to the appellant receiving assistance from a carer at weekends. During the hearing, the sponsor stated that the carer and the nephew were in fact the same person. I note that this is consistent with the evidence she gave before the First-tier Tribunal, and I therefore accept that to be the case.
41. I accept that, at the date of decision, Mr Akindele was unable to provide the appellant with continuous assistance and that there were occasions when both the appellant and the sponsor found it difficult to contact him. However, Ms Ahmed also submitted that the evidence, in particular the most recent statement of the sponsor, demonstrates that the appellant received support from a number of other individuals, including friends, neighbours, and members of her local mosque. While I accept the sponsor’s evidence that the care provided by those individuals is informal and dependent upon their goodwill, I am satisfied, when their assistance is considered cumulatively with that provided by Mr Akindele, that the appellant had access to a network of people capable of offering practical support, and that support extended to matters such as shopping, transportation, and attending medical appointments.
42. I am also satisfied that there is no good reason why a professional carer could not be obtained for the appellant in Lagos. In cross-examination, the sponsor did not suggest that carers were unavailable in Nigeria or that they are unaffordable. Rather, her concern was that they could not be trusted to act in the appellant’s best interests. The sponsor explained that Nigeria experiences high levels of crime and that she feared her mother, as a vulnerable elderly woman, might be exposed to exploitation or abuse. In support of that contention, the appellant relies on an online article published by The Guardian (Nigeria) on 25 August 2022 entitled “Lagos residents lament use of ‘Korope’ by kidnappers, armed robbers”. Although the article post-dates the respondent’s decision, I have considered it insofar as it is said to illuminate conditions in Nigeria at the relevant time. A “Korope” is a small commercial minibus commonly used for local transport in Lagos.
43. Whilst I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the article, it does not support the proposition that professional carers in Nigeria cannot be trusted to care for elderly clients. As Ms Ahmed submitted, the sponsor’s assertion was broad and generalised and does not establish that suitable care would be unavailable to the appellant. Furthermore, as noted by the respondent in the decision letter, the appellant held savings of £8,770.30 at the relevant time, and the sponsor is self-employed in the United Kingdom and has her own income. There is no evidential basis for concluding that, between them, and if necessary, with the assistance of the appellant’s other adult children in the United Kingdom and Canada, they would be unable to meet the cost of engaging a professional carer. Indeed, the evidence falls well short of demonstrating that such care was either unavailable or unaffordable, or that such care cannot be combined with the support provided by Mr Akindele and others.
44. Finally, I am also satisfied that medical treatment is both available and affordable to the appellant. As already noted, she has received treatment from both the state-run Lagos University Teaching Hospital and the private Amazing Heart Centre. The evidence demonstrates that she has been prescribed a range of medications for her various conditions and, on the evidence before me, has, thus far, encountered no apparent difficulty in obtaining or funding that treatment. As I have explained above, insofar as Dr Mukail’s letter suggests that the appellant is only able to access a poor level of healthcare, I attach little weight to it.
45. For these reasons, I find that the appellant does not meet the requirements for leave to enter as an adult dependent relative under the Immigration Rules.
Whether the refusal of entry clearance breaches the sponsor and appellant’s right to a family life
Whether Article 8(1) is engaged
46. I must first consider whether the appellant and the sponsor enjoy family life for the purposes of Article 8(1) ECHR. The starting point is that “family life” within the meaning of Article 8(1) is ordinarily confined to the core family unit. The relationship between an adult child and a parent will not, without more, constitute family life for Article 8 purposes. Rather, there must be “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”: see IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 at [113].
47. In the present case, I readily accept that the sponsor cares deeply for her mother. I also accept that she is concerned about the appellant’s wellbeing and, to some extent, feels helpless as a result of the geographical distance between them. Equally, I accept that the appellant would prefer to spend her remaining years in close proximity to her daughters in the United Kingdom and that she would regard this as preferable to relying on the assistance of friends, neighbours, or a paid carer in Nigeria.
48. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes a relationship of dependence going beyond the normal emotional ties that would be expected between an adult child and an elderly parent living in different countries. In reaching that conclusion, I take into account that, because of her commitments in the United Kingdom, the sponsor has been able to visit the appellant only twice since 2014. I also accept Ms Ahmed's submission that there is insufficient evidence of, first, regular or substantial financial support from the sponsor to the appellant and, secondly, as to the nature and frequency of their contact. Whilst I accept that they communicate by telephone and that the sponsor may, as she claims, send money to Nigeria from time to time, the evidence before me falls short of demonstrating the kind of additional dependency required by the authorities.
49. Taking the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor involves dependency extending beyond the normal emotional ties between an adult child and a parent. Accordingly, I find that they do not enjoy family life for the purposes of Article 8(1). That finding alone means that the appellant cannot succeed with her appeal.
50. Even if I am wrong about that conclusion, and family life exists for the purposes of Article 8(1), the appeal would nevertheless fail for the reasons set out below.
Proportionality
51. If Article 8(1) is engaged, the respondent’s decision would not amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant and the sponsor’s right to a family life.
52. I remind myself that family life is a unitary concept and that Article 8 may, in certain circumstances, impose a positive obligation on a state to admit a family member to its territory. However, that does not mean that a state is required to admit every member of a person’s extended family to the United Kingdom. As the Court of Appeal observed in IA at [100], the existence of family life does not automatically give rise to an obligation to facilitate family reunion in every case. The question remains whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the refusal of entry clearance strikes a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the public interest.
53. On the respondent’s side of the scale, I take into account that the appellant does not meet the requirements for entry under the Rules, which is a weighty, although not determinative, consideration.
54. I accept that the appellant is likely to speak English. I also accept that the appellant is capable of being supported by the sponsor and, in that respect, is unlikely to be burden on public funds. These, however, are neutral factors in the balance.
55. I therefore turn to the factors weighing in the appellant’s favour.
56. I begin with the post-decision evidence. First, the appellant’s nephew, Mr Akindele, has provided two short statements, dated 8 November 2022 and 28 July 2023 respectively. In the first, he states that, from 26 November 2022, he would be unable to continue supporting the appellant because of a work contract outside the city and “immediate family commitments”. In the second, he states that, from 26 November 2022, he has been unable to provide care to her. The two statements are otherwise materially identical. I attach little weight to them. Neither is supported by a statement of truth. More importantly, as Ms Ahmed submitted, both statements post-date the respondent’s decision in circumstances where the respondent expressly relied upon the support provided by Mr Akindele when making that decision. They must therefore be approached with a degree of caution. Furthermore, I also agree with Ms Ahmed that the statements are brief and lack detail. For example, they do not identify where Mr Akindele would be working, the duration of the contract, or the nature of the family commitments said to prevent him from assisting the appellant.
57. Secondly, there is a further letter from Amazing Heart Centre, which expands upon the matters addressed in the earlier correspondence. It says:
“[The appellant] is unable to walk properly because of old age and lagging arthritis. She needs a nurse/carer to help do everyday task [sic] such as washing, dressing, cooking and grocery shopping. She requires assistance to keep track of her medications to ensure she takes the right dosage at the right time. She is inadequately taken of due [sic] to insufficient medical expertise and advanced medical equipment. It is recommended that a close family is staying with her for emotional and moral support.”
58. I accept that, by the date of the hearing, and having regard to her age and medical conditions, it is more likely than not that the appellant requires some assistance with activities of daily living, including washing, dressing, cooking, and grocery shopping. However, for the reasons already given when considering the appellant’s case under the Immigration Rules, I remain satisfied that she is able to obtain support from her nephew, friends, neighbours, and members of her local mosque. I am also satisfied that it would be reasonably open to the appellant and the sponsor to arrange professional care. I accept that such support may not provide the same level of comfort, reassurance, or personal attention as care delivered by a close family member. I attach some weight to that consideration. However, on the facts of this case, I do not regard it as a determinative factor.
59. As for the assertion in the Amazing Heart Centre letter that the appellant is inadequately cared for because of insufficient medical expertise, that is, to say the least, a surprising observation coming from one of the institutions responsible for treating her heart condition. Insofar as the author may have been referring to medical care provided elsewhere, the assertion is unsupported by any meaningful explanation or detail, for example the shortcomings in the care said to be available to her, or the “advanced medical equipment” to which she is said to require access. Nor is it supported by any other cogent evidence. I therefore attach little weight to it. (I refer to the absence of any other cogent evidence because, for the reasons already given, I attach little weight to Dr Mukail’s letter and, even considering the letters cumulatively, I do not regard them as providing reliable support for the proposition that the appellant is unable to obtain an adequate level of healthcare in Nigeria.)
60. I bear in mind that it is the sponsor, rather than the appellant, who is within the jurisdiction of the ECHR. Accordingly, the principal focus of the proportionality assessment must be upon the sponsor's circumstances: see IA at [142]. As I have already indicated, I accept that the sponsor is genuinely concerned for her mother's welfare, that she has encountered difficulties in communicating with those in Nigeria who assist the appellant, and that she would prefer the appellant to live with her in the United Kingdom. I accept that these circumstances have caused the sponsor a degree of distress and anxiety. However, whilst the sponsor states in her most recent letter that her mother's situation has affected her mental health, she confirmed in cross-examination that she has neither sought medical advice nor received any formal diagnosis in relation to those concerns.
61. I also accept that the appellant would prefer to reside in the United Kingdom with the sponsor. However, neither the appellant nor the sponsor could have had any legitimate expectation, at the time the sponsor left Nigeria, that the appellant would subsequently be permitted to join her in the United Kingdom. To that extent, the respondent's decision may be said to preserve the status quo rather than disrupt an existing pattern of family life. As I have found above, the appellant, who has spent almost all of her life in Nigeria, can continue to be supported and cared for by her nephew, friends, neighbours, members of the mosque and professional carers if necessary. Furthermore, she can continue to access healthcare providers in Lagos using her own funds or, if necessary, with the support of her adult children in the United Kingdom and Canada. She can also continue to maintain contact with the sponsor through telephone calls and occasional visits.
62. Drawing all these matters together, and having weighed the factors on both sides of the balance, I conclude that even if I had found that the appellant and sponsor enjoyed family life for the purposes of Article 8(1), the refusal of entry clearance would represent a proportionate interference with that family life. The impact of the decision on the appellant and the sponsor would not be such as to outweigh the strong public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. Accordingly, the appeal would in any event fail under Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th August 2026

Annex: The error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004227
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00468/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MOYOSORE AIRAT ADEBAYO
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No representation
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor (“the judge”), promulgated on 21 February 2024, dismissing her appeal on human rights grounds against the respondent’s decision dated 10 February 2022 refusing her application for entry clearance.
2. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
Background
3. The appellant is a national of Nigeria. She was born in 1945. On 5 November 2021, she applied for entry clearance as the dependent family member of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom. She was sponsored by her daughter, Ms Olubakola Mojisola Aina-Osunuga. However, in her decision dated 10 February 2022, the respondent refused the application on the basis that she was not satisfied that the appellant required long term personal care to carry out everyday tasks or that such care would be unavailable to her in Nigeria.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant exercised her right of appeal against the respondent’s decision. Her appeal was heard by the judge on 19 February 2024 and the decision was promulgated three days later. In dismissing the appeal, the judge found that, at the date of decision, the appellant, although aged 78 and suffering from various medical conditions requiring treatment, was able to care for herself with some informal support from friends and had not demonstrated a need for long‑term personal care. The judge considered later medical evidence suggesting a deterioration in her health, but treated it as post‑decision evidence and therefore not material to the assessment under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) as at the date of decision. In any event, the judge found that the requirements of the Rules were not met, because the appellant had accepted that care was available and affordable in Nigeria, but had provided no independent evidence of its unavailability or that no reasonable care could be provided. The judge therefore found that the appellant did not meet the requirements for entry clearance under the Rules as of the date of decision.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. On 13 October 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam granted permission to appeal on a narrow basis: that the judge arguably erred by failing to determine the appeal under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The hearing
6. The respondent was represented by Ms A Nolan. The appellant was not legally represented, but Ms Aina-Osunuga attended on her mother’s behalf.
7. Ms Nolan submitted that while it was correct that the judge had failed to consider the appellant’s circumstances under Article 8, this error was immaterial because, having found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Rules, it was inevitable that he would have found the refusal of entry clearance to be proportionate.
8. I explained to Ms Aina-Osunuga that I did not need to hear from her, as I was satisfied that the judge had made a material error of law and that I would allow her mother’s appeal. I gave brief reasons for my decision and indicated that I would provide fuller reasons in my written decision.
Consideration
9. Under s.82(1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), a person may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision made by the Secretary of State to refuse a human rights claim. There is no question, in the present case, that the respondent’s decision of 10 February 2022 was a refusal of a human rights claim. Section 84(2) provides that an appeal under s.82(1)(b) “must be brought on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998”, i.e. that a public authority must not act in a way which is incompatible with an ECHR right.
10. Section 85 sets out the matters to be considered by a First-tier Tribunal judge. It includes, at subsection (4) (as amended), the following:
“In an appeal under section 82(1) against a decision the Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal may consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including a matter arising after the date of decision.”
11. Finally, s.86 requires the Tribunal to determine (a) any matter raised as a ground of appeal; and (b) any matter which s.85 requires it to consider.
12. What is striking about the judge’s decision is the complete absence of any consideration of the appellant and her sponsor’s Article 8 rights. The judge simply finds that the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Rules, and proceeds to dismiss her appeal on that basis alone.
13. While the appellant’s failure to meet the requirements of the Rules would be a weighty factor on the respondent’s side of the balance when carrying out the proportionality assessment under Article 8, it is not determinative. I am therefore unable to accept Ms Nolan’s submission that the appeal would inevitably have been dismissed. It is clear from paragraph [13] that the judge considered himself constrained to take into account only the evidence that was before the respondent at the date of decision. Even if that were correct in relation to the Rules, it was not so in relation to the Article 8 assessment: see s.85(4) of the 2002 Act.
14. In fact, I am satisfied that the judge was not precluded from considering whether the appellant met the requirements of the Rules as at the date of the hearing. One provision that requires assessment by reference to the date of application is paragraph E‑ECDR.2.1, which requires the sponsor to be aged 18 years or over and to be either a British citizen, present and settled in the United Kingdom, a person with refugee leave or humanitarian protection, or a person in the United Kingdom with limited leave under Appendix EU (see Begum (employment income; Rules/Article 8) [2021] UKUT 00115 (IAC)). By contrast, paragraphs E‑ECDR.2.4 and E‑ECDR.2.5, which were in issue in the present appeal, contain no such temporal restriction.
15. I bear in mind that, at paragraph [14], the judge did, in the alternative, consider whether the post‑decision evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the requirements of the adult dependent relative rules had been met, but concluded that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving that she would be unable to access adequate personal and healthcare in Nigeria. There is no direct challenge to those findings. However, had the judge undertaken the required assessment under Article 8, he would also have needed to consider the circumstances of the appellant’s daughter in the United Kingdom and the impact of the refusal of entry clearance on her family life with the appellant (see IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516). The nature of that family life may well have been relevant to the level of care available to the appellant in Nigeria, given that, although professional carers can provide practical support, they may be unable to replicate close familial relationships. The judge’s failure to address these matters means that I cannot be satisfied that the appeal would necessarily have been dismissed even if he had considered Article 8.
Disposal
16. I remind myself that there is a presumption that an appeal should be retained by the Upper Tribunal unless the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal were tainted by procedural unfairness, or unless the nature or extent of the fact-finding required to remake the decision would be extensive. In the present case, there was no procedural unfairness. As to fact-finding, I am satisfied that it will not be extensive, even taking into account that the findings relating to the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the Rules as at the date of decision cannot be preserved. Given the appellant’s age and health, it would not, in any event, be in her interests for the case to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, where it is likely to take some time to be reheard. Accordingly, applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, I conclude that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for rehearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside with no findings preserved.
The decision will be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions:
(1) The remaking of this appeal is to be listed for the first available date with a time estimate of 3 hours.
(2) Any updating evidence either party wishes to rely upon must be electronically filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party 21-days prior to the remaking hearing.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th June 2026