Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004238
UI-2025-004508
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56342/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

VA (Turkey)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter, Counsel instructed by Dynamic Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6th May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Ketteley (“the Judge”; alternatively, “the FtT”), promulgated on 11 August 2025, dismissing the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.
2. The appeal first came before me for a substantive hearing on 5 March 2026. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Slatter made two applications. I refused his application to rely on late evidence but granted permission for him to rely on an Additional Ground which I refer to below.
3. Permission to appeal was originally granted by the First‑tier Tribunal on Grounds 1 and 5, and subsequently by Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley on Grounds 2, 4 and 6. Permission was refused on Ground 3. Following my Directions, the appellant has lodged further Grounds of Appeal setting out the Additional Ground. All grounds on which permission was granted therefore fall to be decided in this error‑of‑law jurisdiction.
4. The Upper Tribunal’s role is confined to identifying a material error of law in the FtT’s determination. The principles in R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 govern this analysis. The Tribunal must not remake findings of fact unless an error of law is found.
Background
5. The appellant is a national of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity. He claims to have been politically active from around 2000 onwards, initially through HADEP and later through successive pro‑Kurdish parties, culminating in an asserted membership of the HDP in 2022.
6. He alleges two arrests:
• the first in 2011, during which he says he was detained and ill‑treated;
• the second in November 2022, when he claims he was tortured, forced to sign documents, and required to report weekly thereafter.
7. He states that, after failing to comply, the authorities visited his family home looking for him. He left Turkey on 30 December 2022, travelling via Spain before claiming asylum on arrival in the UK.
8. The Secretary of State rejected his claim, finding his account inconsistent, insufficiently detailed, and unsupported by credible evidence.
9. Both parties rely on an appeal bundle of 461 pages (“AB”).
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
10. The Judge accepted that the appellant is Kurdish and a Turkish national. However, he did not accept his core claim to be a committed HDP activist or someone of interest to the Turkish authorities.
11. The Judge found multiple inconsistencies, including:
a. differing accounts of previous arrests;
b. discrepancies about his passport;
c. inconsistency regarding injuries allegedly sustained in detention;
d. limited or late documentary evidence of HDP involvement.
12. The FtT also found that the appellant’s claimed sur place activities in the UK were minimal, unsupported, and appeared to have been undertaken to bolster an unpersuasive claim.
13. The Judge concluded that the appellant had not been persecuted in the past and would not be at real risk on return. Breach of Article 8 was not argued.
14. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
Grounds of Appeal
15. The appellant relies on his original Grounds on which permission was sought together with amended Grounds of Appeal pursuant to the recent Direction. He also relies on an Error of Law Skeleton Argument.
Ground 1 – Family political profile
16. The appellant argues that the FtT erred by failing to assess risk arising from his claimed membership of a politically significant family, many of whom were allegedly targeted for HDP‑related activities.
Ground 2 – Perverse and illogical reasons; arrests/detentions
17. This Ground relates to the potential discrepancy in the evidence as to the number of arrests or detentions. It is submitted that the Judge’s reasoning is illogical that he originally said he’d been arrested many times and then in his substantive interview said he’d been detained twice in 2011 and 2022. The illogicality is based on the fact that such a change being a reduction of detentions was a “disemellishment” and the error is the failure to consider the actual nature of the discrepancy.
18. In the additional Grounds the emphasis is changed to “the FtT erred in finding that there had been a change in the appellant’s account regarding the number of times he had been detained” It makes the distinction between the number of times the appellant had been arrested and the number of times he had been detained.
Ground 4 – Corroboration and country background material
19. The appellant argues that the FtT failed to consider whether background evidence made it reasonable to expect corroboration of HDP activities.
Ground 5 – Illogical and irrational findings: failure to accept supporter status as set out
20. The appellant argues that, having accepted photographs of him at HDP events, it was irrational for the FtT not to accept that he was at least a supporter.
Ground 6 – Illogical and Irrational findings: sur place political activity in the UK:
21. It is submitted that the FtT failed to consider whether his UK‑based Kurdish organisational membership placed him at risk, regardless of the motive for joining.
Additional Ground – Misdirection in law: Standard of Proof
22. It is submitted that at paragraph 42 of the decision the Judge applied the civil standard of proof. Based on JCK v SSHD (Botswana) (2024) UKUT100 (IAC) this is a material error of law.
Discussion
Appellate approach
23. I remind myself at the outset that there must be appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. As recently endorsed in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688, I acknowledge the approach in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 set out at [72].
24. I direct myself that the correct approach to assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision was explained by Brooke LJ in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 and I note the examples he sets out at [9].
25. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 which was recently set out and approved by Lady Justice Falk in Alexander Isaac Hamilton v Mark Colin Barrow (1), Claire Michelle Barrow (2) and Matin Welsh (3) [2024] EWCA Civ 888 and also by Green LJ in Hafiz Aman Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26]. The latter emphasised that;
“the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30]”
26. It is helpful to set out the guidance given in Volpi by Lord Justice Lewison;
i. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
ii. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
iii. The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iv. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
v. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
vi. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vii. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.[2]
27. I now consider each ground in turn, applying the principles set out above.
Ground 1 – Family political profile
28. In the Grounds of Appeal, it is submitted that the core component of the appellant’s claim concerned his membership of a political family. The absence of findings gives rise to a material error of law and family profile is relevant to risk on return. Mr Slatter submits that there is no assessment of the risk of the appellant belonging to a political family and relies on references to the family in the appellant’s witness statement and asylum interview (AB436). He submits that the closest the Judge comes to making findings on family is at paragraph 37 where he refers to a cousin who lives in Germany but notes the lack of evidence from him.
29. He submits that the wording of Issue 1 was not an attempt to limit the Judge’s findings and that Judge needed to make a finding of fact about his family. He submits that the Country Guidance caselaw identifies family involvement in politics as a risk factor.
30. Ms Isherwood relies on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) which has recently been endorsed in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370. She relies on both cases to endorse the approach that the Judge is entitled to rely on the issues before him and that the First-tier Tribunal procedures give appellants ample opportunity to clarify their case and that the appellant is therefore not now entitled to widen the issues to encompass his family’s politics.
31. The Judge did not make express findings on the political activities of the appellant’s family members. However, I agree with Ms Isherwood that this was not advanced before the FtT as a standalone risk category on which the Judge was requested, or required, to make findings. The FtT is required to resolve the issues actually placed before it; it is not obliged to reconstruct or reformulate the appellant’s case.
32. Whilst I note that at paragraph 2 of the appellant’s FtT skeleton argument he refers to the appellant being from “A politically active family” nowhere else does it refer to that factor as an issue to be determined or a finding to be made. Specifically, it is not referred to in the schedule of issues which I refer to further below. As set out in Lata, proceedings before the IAC are not a form of rolling reconsideration of the issues. The burden is not on the Judge to consider all potential issues if not expressly relied on. As set out in the headnote “unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a Judge’s decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a Judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal.”
33. I do not accept Mr Slatter’s submission that there is a distinction between issues identified and findings of fact that needed to be made. The caselaw is clear that if an appellant wishes a finding of fact to be made as being directly relevant to their appeal, it needs to be raised with the Judge. The Judge is alive to the involvement of family members as referred to in paragraph 37 and the Judge’s reference to the Country Guidance in IA at paragraph 41 indicates satisfactorily that he did consider all the relevant issues including the appellant’s family. I deal below with the standard of proof that he applied.
34. The omission did not amount to a material error of law. The ground fails.
Ground 2 – Perverse and illogical reasons; arrests/detentions
35. In the appellant’s screening interview, he stated “I have been arrested many times... every year for the last few years” (question 5.3 SCR, AB412). Later in his full asylum interview he stated that he had been detained twice in May 2011 and November 2022 (Q58 AB439). The Judge regarded these two references to demonstrate a change in the appellant’s account which undermined his credibility.
36. Whether a change in account inflates or diminishes the seriousness of the claim is not determinative. Under R (Iran), the key question is whether the discrepancy affects reliability.
37. Against the background of multiple other inconsistencies, the FtT was entitled to view the shifting narrative as undermining credibility. Mr Slatter draws attention to the appellant’s explanation in his witness statement. The Judge can be assumed to have considered the appellant’s written evidence statement (per Volpi cited above) and he expressly refers to the appellant’s oral evidence before him relating to the timing of his detentions/arrests and quotes the appellant referring to his “second arrest.” I don’t accept Mr Slatter’s potential distinction between detentions and arrest. The appellant himself is quoted as referring to his second detention as an arrest [33] and his statement makes no distinction (paragraph 22). The section of the decision relating to detention is thorough and appropriately analysed. There is no misdirection or irrationality.
38. This ground does not disclose an error of law.
Ground 4 – Corroboration and country‑background risk
39. In the Grounds of Appeal, it is submitted that “the Judge noted adversely the absence of corroborative evidence that the appellant had been an activist”. It goes on to submit that the Judge has fundamentally erred in failing to take into account any country background information. In the new Error or Law Skeleton the only reference is the failure to take into account relevant country information and this was the only submission made at the hearing.
40. Ms Isherwood addresses both aspects of the Ground. She distinguishes between the absence of documents that the appellant himself had identified referred to paragraph 36. The appellant “confirmed in oral evidence that he brought the documentation with him from Turkey. He was asked why he was not provided the documentation he now relies upon to the Home Office in support of his asylum claim to which he said that he had given it to his lawyer.” The Judge also relies on the absence of a witness statement from the appellant’s cousin in Germany [37] and directs himself on MAH (Egypt) v SSHD (2023) EWCA CIV 216. As such, the Grounds appear to mis-state the position as the Judge was perfectly entitled to follow the guidance in MAH and rely on the lack of potentially available documentation or evidence when considering the credibility of the appellant’s account.
41. The reference to the country background evidence in the CPIN is problematical because as Ms Isherwood points out, the Upper Tribunal Permission to Appeal raised the point that it would be necessary to show whether country of origin evidence was available. Although this was in relation to Ground 6 the appellant was on notice of this issue. In this regard Ms Isherwood relies on the Rule 24 response dated 27/11/2025 which points out the difficulty that the country evidence does not appear to have been put to the First-tier Tribunal; “More fundamentally it was not the appellant’s evidence that the reason why he did not have more documentary evidence linking him to the HDP was because he was concerned that holding too much evidence would create problems for himself in the future.” As it suggests, the appellant did not give this explanation in cross examination.
42. The Judge did not fault the appellant for failing to provide documents that might be dangerous to hold in Turkey. Rather, he noted that the appellant claimed to possess certain documents and to have brought them with him, yet failed to provide them to the respondent at any stage.
43. That was a legitimate credibility consideration, consistent with MAH (Egypt) v SSHD (2023) EWCA CIV 216. The Judge specifically reminds himself of the court of appeal’s guidance in that case at paragraph 37.
44. Because the appellant does not assert in evidence that the lack of documentation is due to the risk in Turkey and because there is no submission that this specific point was put to the Judge, the Judge’s analysis does not disclose any error of law. The Ground fails.
Ground 5 – Illogical and irrational findings: failure to accept supporter status as set out
45. The Judge accepted that the appellant appeared in photographs at HDP events but concluded that this did not establish the long‑standing, regular political involvement he claimed.
46. The Tribunal’s task was to assess the political profile said to place the appellant at risk, not to determine whether he ever attended an event. It was open to the Judge to conclude that two events and a late membership form could not substantiate a decade‑long history of support and activism. In my view the Judge is clear that whilst he finds the appellant attended two events he considers this in the context of his involvement of over a decade and specifically reaches his conclusion that he was not a supporter as claimed. There is no inconsistency between accepting he may have attended two events and rejecting the appellant’s assertion of a history of activism.
47. As submitted at the hearing and in the new Skeleton, Mr Slatter relies on the failure to consider the risk arising from the appellant’s attendance at those events. As currently set out and relied upon, the Ground fails because the Judge’s conclusion was rational and adequately reasoned. The decision deals with assessment of risk under Issue 2 which I deal with below.
Ground 6 – Illogical and irrational findings: Sur place political activity in the UK and Additional Ground - Misdirection in law: Standard of Proof
48. I deal with both of these grounds together as they relate to assessment of risk.
49. The appellant joined a UK‑based Kurdish political organisation after the refusal of his asylum claim. The FtT accepted this but found no evidence of meaningful activism and concluded that the timing suggested an attempt to strengthen the asylum claim.
50. Whilst the appellant makes submissions as to the reasons for risk in the Skeleton Argument, I have no information as to whether or not the appellant argued at the hearing that mere membership absent activism placed him at risk nor whether he relied on any country evidence supporting such proposition.
51. At [44] the Judge specifically refers to his membership of the KDP in London and suggests that it is an attempt to bolster his weak asylum claim. However, for the reasons given below the Judge’s treatment of the risk concerning this point is inadequate.
52. The Additional Ground of Appeal arises due to the sloppy characterisation of the issues at paragraph 12 of the appellant’s original skeleton argument. Issue 1 invites the Judge to make findings on the appellant’s narrative which he does appropriately and in detail. Issue 2 appears to reflect two parts of the two-stage test set out in JCK. The first part of the sentence states “whether on the balance of probabilities, he has a characteristic which would cause him to fear persecution for reasons of his political opinion.” This may or may not reflect the subjective element under the first part of the first limb in JCK.
53. Issue 2 then goes on to state “and whether it is reasonably likely he will face persecution on return as a result.” This may or may not reflect the objective second limb of the test.
54. Whilst the Judge refers to JCK under the legal framework he adopts the appellant’s Issues without challenge and does not attempt to unravel the two competing standards overtly referred to in Issue 2.
55. The analysis which the Judge sets out between paragraphs 41 and 44 does not differentiate between the two aspects of Issue 2. The Judge starts by correctly directing himself to follow the factors in IA and others (Risk, Guidelines, Separatist) [2003] UKIAT 34 and the guidance in IK (Returnees-Records-IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312. He then goes on to set out relevant points based on his findings. However, he does not consider them to be “sufficiently weighty factors in the overall assessment of risk as to give rise, on the balance of probabilities, to the appellant being at risk on return to Turkey following the guidance set out by the Upper Tribunal in Country Guidance” [42].
56. Ms Isherwood submits that this is simply a slip of the pen and whilst clearly an error it is therefore not material given the Judge’s careful analysis of the evidence.
57. I cannot accept this submission due to the importance of applying the lower standard of proof to asylum claims and specifically to the assessment of risk on return. Because the Judge fails to separate out the two aspects of Issue 2 and makes express reference to the civil standard not to the lower standard, on the face of the decision he has applied the wrong test to the central issue in an asylum appeal. Such an error is material because it cannot be said not to have made a difference to the outcome, namely his assessment of risk.
58. The Judge goes on to conclude that the appellant’s sur place activities are an attempt to bolster his claim. He concludes that he would not face a risk of persecution on account of these activities. However, in this analysis he does not refer to which standard of proof he is applying and because of his reference to the incorrect standard immediately before, I cannot be satisfied that the correct standard has been applied. For this reason, the appellant succeeds under Ground 6 as well as the Additional Ground.
Conclusion
59. In relation to Grounds 1 to 5 (absent 3) I am not satisfied that the Judge was plainly wrong pursuant to the guidance in Volpi. Bearing in mind the very high hurdle that perversity represents I adopt the comment in R (Iran) that practitioners use of the words “irrational” and “perverse” are completely inappropriate [12, 13]. The findings of fact that he was invited to make under Issue 1 are preserved in respect of grounds 2, 4 and 5 (no findings being made in respect of the issues in Ground 1). No appeal was made in respect of his findings under s8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and these findings are preserved (acknowledging, as the Judge did, the application of SM (Section 8; Judge’s process) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00116). In summary the following points are preserved:
a. Section 8; paragraph 30.
b. Turkish passport: paragraph 31.
c. Detention by Turkish authorities; paragraphs 32 – 34.
d. Involvement with HDP; paragraphs 35 – 38.
60. I do not preserve any findings of fact in respect of sur place activities because of the risk that use of the wrong standard of proof may have infected his analysis of these events and the appellant’s participation in them.
61. I find that there has been a material Error of Law in relation to Ground 6 and the Additional Ground and that these errors are material.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of an error of law and is set aside with the findings preserved as set out above.
The appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

V S Rae-Reeves
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

07/05/2026