Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH- -V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-004249
First-tier Tribunal: PA/59195/2023
LP/12107/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 9 December 2025
On 5th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

WAHEED FAROOK
(anonymity direction NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Murphy of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecoint, a Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Pakistan born on 1 November 1992, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulholland (the judge) promulgated on 27 June 2025, which dismissed his appeal under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules.

2. The Appellant’s case is that he is the primary carer of his British citizen father, Mr Muhammad Farooq, and that removal would compel his father to leave the United Kingdom, thereby engaging the Zambrano principle (where removal of primary carer would deprive child / another EU citizen including a British national) of his right of EU citizenship.

3. Permission to appeal was initially refused by FtT Judge Thomas on 25 August 2025 but subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds on 9 October 2025. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 response opposing the appeal on 14 October 2025.

Background

4. A chronology of key events is as follows:

• 09.11.23 refusal of admn under EUSS
• 06.06.2025 FtT hearing before Judge Mulholland in the First‑tier Tribunal (FTT). The Appellant argued his father would be compelled to leave UK if removed.
• 27.06.2025 Decision promulgated. The judge dismissed the appeal. Judge relied on statutory care provision and gave little weight to psychiatric/social work reports.
• 11.07.2025 Grounds of appeal lodged. The Appellant alleged errors of law: failure to follow Devaseelan (extent to which earlier tribunal’s findings may be departed from-A appears to say that the judge not entitled to take account of earlier judge’s adverse credit finding ), failure to engage with Dr Ali’s report, misdirection on compulsion.
• 25.08.2025 Permission to appeal refused. FtT Judge Thomas found no material error of law and considered reasoning adequate.
• 04.09.2025 Renewed grounds submitted. The appellant expanded arguments on expert evidence, emotional dependency, credibility, father’s evidence, misapplication of Zambrano.
• 09.10.2025 Permission to appeal granted by UT Judge Reeds. Held grounds arguable, especially failure to engage with psychiatric evidence and emotional dependency.
• 14.10.2025 Rule 24 response filed. Respondent (Home Office) opposed appeal and argued FtTJ directed herself appropriately, and the weight of evidence was for judge.
• 08.12.2025 Upper Tribunal hearing. Upper Tribunal heard argument that there were material errors of law in FtTJ’s decision. It was argued that the decision should be set aside and the appeal remitted to FtT for rehearing before a different judge.

Issues

Grounds of Appeal

5. The appellant advances five grounds:

• Ground 1: The FtTJ erred in her approach to expert evidence, attaching little weight to psychiatric and social work reports on the basis that they had not considered the legal test of compulsion.

• Ground 2: Failure to properly address emotional and psychological dependency, particularly the father’s reliance on the appellant for reassurance and stability.

• Ground 3: Improper reliance on prior adverse credibility findings of UT Judge Blundell without making fresh credibility assessments.

• Ground 4: Failure to engage with the father’s oral and written evidence, dismissing it as irrelevant despite its centrality to the issue of compulsion.

• Ground 5: Misapplication of the Zambrano test, focusing on speculative statutory care provision rather than the practical reality of emotional dependency.

Respondent’s Position

5. The Respondent opposes the appeal, submitting that:

• The FtTJ was entitled to give limited weight to the expert reports, weight being a matter for the judge.

• Emotional dependency was addressed at paragraph 20 of the FtTJ’s decision.

• Reliance on prior credibility findings was appropriate given the proximity of the earlier Upper Tribunal decision.

• The FtTJ did summarise the father’s evidence and took it into account.

• The FtTJ directed herself to the correct legal test and was entitled to conclude that statutory care provision would suffice.

The hearing

6. The submissions were difficult to follow due to the fact that the advocates were not working off the same consolidated bundle (the bundle) as the advocates. Mr Murphy was working principally off a hard copy where the numbers did not match those on the PDF. I will refer to those PDF numbers where the bundle is referred to below. Ms Lecoint did not have the consolidated bundle at all.

7. Mr Murphy criticised the judge for his approach to the experts’ reports and in particular the report obtained by Dr Galappathie, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, and Dr Ali, a counselling psychologist. They had prepared reports in 2025 -i.e. since the hearing before the UT in which Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell (Judge Blundell) rejected an earlier appeal by the appellant. Mr Murphy said that those reports were crucial to his client’s case as they not only dealt with the practical considerations connected with the care of Mr Farooq’s father but also give emotional effect of Mr Farouk’s removal to Pakistan. Mr Murphy described the support the appellant gave to his father as “unique” in the sense that no one else would be able to provide that level of support. However, his father would feel emotionally compelled to remove to Pakistan. If he were removed the Zambrano principle would be engaged. He said that the judge’s error had been compounded by a failure to consider the evidence of Dr Ali, whose report had been produced during the present appeal. This was also a Devaseelan case in that the UT had rejected the appellant’s account in June 2023. However, it was incumbent upon the FTT in this appeal to make appropriate findings on based on the new evidence that had been obtained.

8. He went on to deal with ground of 4 (failure to engage with the father’s oral or written evidence). Departure of his son from the UK and the feeling he has developed that “nobody else can provide the care that he requires other than his son” with whom he has a strong bond. He also referred to paragraph’s 136 of Doctor Ali’s report, which contains his professional opinion that although some of Mr Farouk’s senior’s basic physical needs might be met through expanded professional care, his opinion was nevertheless that Mr Farooq’s overall care would be at risk. His medical needs would not be sufficiently or safely met without consistent familiar and holistic support provided by his son, therefore.

9. I was also referred to the appellant’s father’s witness statement at paragraph 11 on page 32 in which he indicates that he felt compelled to join his son in Pakistan if he were removed. The local authority is not able to provide him with 24 hours physical, yet alone emotional, support.

10. Mr Murphy submitted that is client’s’ father’s health had deteriorated since the hearing before Judge Blundell and the expert evidence corroborated this. He said that the expert evidence had been produced since that hearing. He said there was an absence of information in the decision or analysis of this expert evidence. He repeated his client’s needs would not be met in Pakistan.

11. Next Mr Murphy referred to the social worker (Miss Seymour’s) report at 75, who indicated the local authority’s inability to provide 24-hour care for Mr Yaqoob senior. He cross-referenced this evidence to his client’s father’s witness statement. Referring to page 75 of the pdf where Miss Seymour describes Mr Farooq’s medical circumstances as having deteriorated, his suffering from medical incontinence and requiring aides including a commode. He said it was unclear from the judge’s decision which of this evidence if any he had accepted. Zambrano was relevant as the respondent acknowledged. The judge had acknowledged it was an issue in paragraph 5 of his decision. Mr Murphy said that the judge posed the wrong question, the correct question having been: whether “the British citizen would in practice be unable to reside in the UK….if the person in fact left the UK for an indefinite period” (EU 14 of Appendix EU quoted at paragraph 15 of the appellant’s skeleton argument). The judge ought to have looked at the practical situation “on the ground” but he did not and answered his own question incorrectly.

12. Ms Lecoint relied on written response given by the respondent dated 14 May 2025 at 279. The respondent did not accept that the circumstance’s had changed materially since the reasons for refusal of November 2023. She relied on the earlier decision of the UT in 2023 which I note included the present judge on the panel. She relied on the Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702 principle. It was noted that the UT decision arose as a consequence of a two-stage process which included the hearing of fresh evidence at the adjourned hearing in June 2023 and conclusions which included the rejection of the appellant's claim to having to remain in the UK to care for his father. The judge had been entitled to decide the case as he had done, without reviewing all the evidence. In any event, the evidence the judge did refer to was more than sufficient to reject the application.

13. Turning to the first two specific grounds, Ms Lecoint referred to the psychological and social work assessments. Possibly, the UT in granting permission (see paragraph 3 at page 3) had wrongly considered the judge had required one or more expert to consider the legal test when that was not necessarily what the judge was saying (see paragraphs 18 and 19 of the decision at 22) . The principal issue Ms Lecoint thought was whether the appellant’s father would be compelled to leave the UK. The evidence did not support the conclusion. The judge had been entitled to consider the points made by the respondent in her review as well. The crucial question was one of weight and she referred to the case of Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 was therefore relevant. It supported the well-known principle that the trial judge’s assessment of a witness should be given significant weight by an appeal court or tribunal, even where there were errors.

14. She referred to the review at page pointing out that Dr Galappathie had been subject to restrictions on his accepting instructions due to shortcomings noted in his evidence and methods in the case of CE (Cameroon) [2023] UKUT IAC -PA 01112 2020. He had also been subject to restrictions from the General Medical Council. The tribunal had been entitled to attach little weight to his evidence, as the respondent pointed out in paragraph 15 at page 28. One of the further representations, dated 14th of May 2025 (PDF page 283), pointed out that Dr Galappathie had acknowledged his own shortcomings. The respondent did not consider that the “new evidence” obtained since the hearing before UT was determinative of the issues in the current appeal. A number of criticisms were levelled at the “new evidence” including psychiatric report’s assessment and diagnosis of the father’s condition which did not appear to be based on psychometric? assessment (see paragraph 17 for review at page 283). A deficiency in the psychiatric assessment was that the appellant declined the necessary support for his father’s condition which would have assisted with the father’s care needs. The impression Ms Lecoint left was of the expert going to go to some lengths” to support the appellant’s case. The FTT reviewed the appellant’s father’s care needs carefully. If necessary, the father would be able to return to Pakistan, as noted by the UT in 2023 (see paragraph 28 et seq at page 138). Ms Lecoint did not accept the decline in the appellant’s father’s health since 2023, stating that there was no proper analysis of this or explanation of the evidence in support the assertion made. It was not even accepted by the respondent that the appellant was the primary carer is for Mr Farooq senior. Paid carers were provided who gave assistance which would be available should Mr Farooq leave the UK and indeed similar carers would be available for Mr Farooq senior in Pakistan. Ms Lecoint also argued that there was an absence of objective analysis of the appellant’s father’s care needs, in the light of the previous refusal. The availability of more support and an assessment in relation to his housing allocation as noted in paragraph 9 to 11 of the May 2025 respondent’s review and page paragraph 27 of that document at pages 281 – 286. That document goes on to say that there are a number of other issues that need to be taken into account. It was unreasonable, according to the respondent, to draw a conclusion from the social worker that the appellant’s father would be compelled to leave the UK and the respondent maintained her submission before the U T, which was invited to place little weight on the appellant’s social worker’s report as had the FTT apparently. The FTT had been entitled to reach its decision based on the expert evidence and was entitled to be critical of the expert evidence.

15. An issue also arose as to the appellant’s credibility which the judge dealt with at paragraph 11. The judge said there that his analysis of the integrity the appellant’s was informed by Judge Blundell’s decision. The judge was satisfied that there were significant shortcomings in relation to his credibility, his criminality having included a sexual assault in the UK and a lengthy period of time living unlawfully in the UK. There had also been a failure to justify the alleged lack of amenities in Pakistan compared to the UK so as to prevent his father’s return to that country.

16. She went on to deal grounds 3 (improper reliance on prior adverse credibility findings and failure to make fresh credibility assessments) and 4 (failure to engage with the appellant’s father’s oral and written evidence, dismissing at as irrelevant when in fact it was central to the issue of his compulsion to return to Pakistan). Ms Lecoint said there had been no failure to consider the oral evidence and she referred me to the review at paragraph 11 et seq on page 282 et seq where the respondent had explained a number of factors damaged the appellant’s credibility including his unlawful residence in the UK for a long period of time, the numerous hopeless applications and his criminality. It was accepted that the judge had to make his own assessment of the credibility of the new evidence submitted but this is what he had done at paragraph 7 of his decision (at page 20). There the judge indicates that he took full account of the evidence received. The respondent relied on the negative credibility assessment made by the UT in 2023 stating that it showed significant shortcomings in the appellant’s evidence and approach to this matter generally. By reference to Volpi I was invited to attach significant weight to findings made by the FTT and it was submitted the appellant had failed to demonstrate any material error in the decision of the FTT. The findings were to stand, therefore.

17. Finally, Ms Lecoint referred to ground five which dealt with the misapplication of the Zambrano test. She said that this had to be dealt with in the context of Devaseelan and the findings made by the earlier tribunal stood. It was submitted the judge had given full effect of the Zambrano principle. I was invited to dismiss the appeal.

18. Mr Murphy responded to say that because he accepted the Devaseelan principle and conceded that the earlier judge’s findings of fact had to be respected, but the absence of judicial comment on new evidence by the judge was a different matter. Both Dr Galappathie and Miss Seymour’s reports were relatively recent and judge had to demonstrate they had been considered. Any misgivings about the appellant’s credibility, were secondary to the effect of returning the appellant’s father to Pakistan in breach, he said, of the Zambrano principle. The appellant clearly was the primary carer as is clear from paragraph 15 of the decision. Only two hours care would be available every 24-hours, so a great deal of additional care would be required. The judge would have been able to reject the evidence of Dr Galluppathie, Miss Seymour and Doctor Ali had he demonstrated that he had gone through the relevant stages in the process of appraising their evidence. Since he had not done so, his conclusion was flawed.

19. I was invited to dismiss the appeal and remit the appeal to the FTT for a re-hearing.

Discussion and conclusions

20. I note that the appeal that came before the UT in May 2023 related to the FTT’s rejection of an appeal the appellant had made against the respondent’s decision to reject the appellant’s claim for leave to remain either under Appendix FM or article 8 of the ECHR. The factual basis of such claim was very similar to the present one, which is grounded in Appendix EU based on the Zambrano principle (see paragraph 8 et seq of the earlier UT decision). I note that the appellant has now, essentially, made the same argument (that his removal from the UK would work so harshly on his father’s physical or mental health as to compel the latter to go to Pakistan and that this tips the balance in favour of his being allowed to remain). That argument has now been rejected by four judges, including the writer following the last appeal before the UT.

21. The principal issue the UT now has to consider is whether the judge demonstrated in his decision that he paid sufficient regard to the evidence of the “experts”, whose reports were before the FTT. An earlier version of Miss Seymour’s report appears to have been considered in the earlier UT decision but the reports by Doctors Ali and Galappathie were not before the UT at the time of the earlier decision, nor had Miss Seymour’s latest report dated 12 February 2025 been prepared. Those experts’ reports were to assist on the issue of whether the appellant met the requirements for settled status (also known as indefinite leave to enter or remain) or pre-settled status (also known as limited leave to enter or remain) under the EU Settlement Scheme. The principal features of that scheme in relation to establishing a Zambrano right arising out of the care the appellant provided to his father were as follows:

1) That the appellant was the primary carer of his father, a British citizen;

2) That the eligibility criteria in conditions 1 and 2 of EU 11 of Appendix EU (the eligibility requirements) were met;

3) That the appellant established a “Zambrano right” to reside at the specified date (11 pm on 31 December 2020);

4) That Zambrano right had continued for a continuous period of at least five years at the date he made his application.

22. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant was exercising a “Zambrano right to reside” within the definition of Annex 1 to Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules-hence the other conditions did not need to be considered.

23. The test is a practical one, assuming the appellant was the primary carer of his father, a British citizen, of “compulsion”: would his removal compel his father to leave the UK? The test: whether in fact his father would be compelled to leave the UK for an indefinite period. It is fact specific, as the respondent commented in her refusal.

24. A failure to demonstrate a passing acquaintance with expert evidence, to which weight could attach, would be a potential error of law. The question is: whether in substance the judge had considered the evidence and whether if so that might have made a material difference to the outcome.?

25. The judge recorded at paragraph 9 numerous health conditions from which the appellant’s father suffered and this evidence was important when applying the above test. However, the judge was entitled to take into account the integrity and honesty of the appellant and attach little weight to his evidence. To what extent ought the experts’ evidence have been part of the overall assessment of the evidence the judge was required to carry out? The judge’s principal finding was that the appellant’s care for the sponsor, although no doubt genuine and important, did not displace the duty of the local authority both under the Care Act 2014 and other legislation to provide care and support for him.

26. I am satisfied that Grounds 1 (onerous approach to expert evidence) and 2 (failure to address psychological dependency) are not made out. The FtTJ’s reasoning at paragraphs 18–20 adequately engaged with the evidence including the psychiatric evidence. It is unsatisfactory that the judge failed to refer to the detailed report of Dr Ali, although I have commented on the fact that she possesses a diploma in counselling psychology and largely repeats what the sponsor told her. Nevertheless, I have no reason to suppose her conclusions were not of some assistance to the FTT. In addition, expert witnesses are not required to apply a “legal test” and the reference at 18 of the judge’s decision is infelicitous. However, it is unclear whether the judge is referring to the Zambrano test or the wider framework for social care in the UK. Dr Ali and the other “experts” were to provide professional evidence which the Tribunal had to assess against the legal framework, i.e., that was the judge’s role- not he expert’s. As far as Dr Galappathie’s evidence was concerned, the respondent is surely justified in the adverse comment contained in her review of the current appeal at electronic page 279 in the bundle.

27. The FtTJ accepted that the appellant provided unique emotional support which “someone else” could not replicate, yet this did not amount to compulsion in practice. The judge grappled with the father’s emotional and psychological dependency making express reference (at paragraph 17) to the effect on Mr Farooq’s mental wellbeing as a consequence of his son’s removal. The failure to refer expressly to Dr Ali’s report does not in my view constitute a material error of law when seen in its context.

28. I do not consider grounds 1 and 2, the principal grounds on which permission was given by Judge Reeds, to be made out. The other grounds were identified by her as ones was that could be raised “in their context” but were not, obviously, ones which had obvious merit.

29. Ground 3 is not made out. Devaseelan permits earlier findings to be a starting point, the FtTJ did not treat them as determinative but reassessed credibility in light of fresh evidence. Therefore, this did not represent a material error of law.

30. Ground 4 is not established either. The FtTJ’s statement that “nothing turned on the father’s evidence” was erroneous given that the father’s dependency was the central issue. His oral and written evidence required proper engagement, but this comment has been taken out of context and, when the whole decision is read, it is clear that the judge did consider the father’s evidence. Clearly the judge did appraise the father’s evidence as demonstrated later in the decision (see paragraph 13).

31. Ground 5 is likewise not made out. The FtTJ clearly understood and applied the Zambrano test. It was entitled to focus on statutory care provision and decide on the practical reality of whether Mr Farooq would, in fact, feel compelled to leave the UK with his son.

32. Accordingly, I have concluded that there was no material error of law in the decision of the first-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

Signed Date 18th December 2025

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury