Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004253
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54448/2024
LP/12203/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARIA

Between

IN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Magsino of MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) granted an anonymity order in this appeal and no party before me requested that it be set aside. In the circumstances, I have taken into account the starting point for consideration of anonymity orders is the principle of open justice and find that in this case because the appellant claims a risk of persecution on return to the Philippines, the obligations of the United Kingdom (UK) under the Refugee Convention outweigh the principle of open justice and an anonymity order is appropriate.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of the Judge promulgated on 25 May 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 15 February 2024.
3. The parties know the detail of the appellant’s protection and human rights claim so I do not set it out in full.
4. In summary, the appellant a citizen of the Philippines aged over 50 years completed six years of education before entering a relationship with her future husband, H, with whom she later had six children and eventually married in 2001. H was physically abusive when drunk, exercised coercive control, and threatened to kill her if she sought help, leading her to conceal the abuse and treat injuries at home. The appellant obtained work abroad in Saudi Arabia where she worked as a nanny for several years, briefly returned to the Philippines in 2011, where she was again threatened by H. The appellant travelled to the UK in 2013 with her employers, whom she left shortly after arrival. H eventually threatened her again when he discovered she had a partner in the UK, though that relationship ended in 2018. She has had no contact with H since around 2010. The appellant remains in touch with her children (all still live in the Philippines). The appellant believes H still lives in the Philippines with a new partner. The appellant is currently working in the UK as a carer for a stroke victim, GM.
5. The respondent accepts the appellant has been subjected to domestic violence by H. The respondent does not accept that the appellant as a female victim of domestic violence in the Philippines meets the criteria to be a member of a particular social group or any other Convention reason. The respondent does not accept the appellant’s claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution. The respondent considered that there is sufficiency of protection in the Philippines and internal relocation is a reasonable option. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection and her claim under Article 8.
6. The Judge agreed with the respondent and dismissed the appeal.
Permission to appeal
7. The appellant’s application to the First-tier Tribunal seeking permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering.
8. The appellant renewed the application before the Upper Tribunal and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick (UTJ Ruddick) on 25 October 2025 on the basis that it was arguable that the Judge misdirected herself in finding the appellant’s description of the domestic violence she suffered did not amount to persecution. UTJ Ruddick considered the other ground challenging the Judge’s assessment of the availability of state protection and the reasonableness of internal relocation to have less merit but did not limit the grant of permission.
9. The matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi (UTJ Rastogi) on 5 January 2026 for an error of law hearing. Mr Dawodu of Counsel appeared for the appellant and Ms Simbi a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer appeared for the respondent.
10. At the start of the error‑of‑law hearing, the appellant’s counsel (Mr Dawodu) made an oral application to amend the grounds to add a new challenge based on procedural unfairness, namely, that the Judge improperly proceeded with the appeal in the appellant’s absence. This amendment had not previously been sought, despite grounds having been due within 14 days of 29 August 2025.
11. Mr Dawodu explained that he had only recently been instructed and identified the new ground upon review. The original grounds had been drafted by a different solicitor. Ms Simbi for the respondent was neutral and indicated that she could deal with the amended ground if given time.
12. Mr Dawodu stated that he needed further time to obtain instructions from his instructing solicitor, who was delayed returning from holiday.
13. UTJ Rastogi accepted the new ground had arguable merit. UTJ Rastogi noted the serious lateness of the application to amend the grounds and the potential waste of Tribunal resources if the matter were adjourned. Having considered all the circumstances UTJ Rastogi granted permission to amend the grounds and issued directions.
14. The appellant relies on amended grounds of appeal, which refine and consolidate those previously advanced and include an additional challenge based on procedural unfairness.
15. Ground 1 contends that the Judge acted unfairly in refusing an adjournment and proceeding in the appellant’s absence. The ground submits that, in circumstances of significant confusion regarding representation, including repeated changes of solicitors, contradictory communications, late and defective filings, and uncertainty as to who was properly instructed, the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant’s non‑attendance resulted from matters beyond her control. It is argued that the Judge did not adequately assess the appellant’s vulnerability or the importance of hearing oral evidence in a protection appeal.
16. Ground 2 already identified as arguable by UTJ Ruddick, asserts that the Judge misdirected herself in the assessment of past persecution by applying an unduly narrow threshold and underestimating the seriousness of the domestic abuse found.
17. Ground 3 challenges the conclusions on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, arguing that the Judge relied too heavily on theoretical mechanisms of protection and insufficiently engaged with evidence of practical barriers, local impunity, and the appellant’s personal circumstances.
18. Ground 4 concerns the Article 8 assessment, asserting that the Judge failed to carry out a structured analysis of the appellant’s relationship with GM, including dependency and the likely impact of her removal.
19. Ground 5 seeks to rely on a post‑decision Conclusive Grounds decision from the Single Competent Authority, dated 8 January 2026, confirming that the appellant is a victim of modern slavery; it is said to be material to credibility, vulnerability, risk on return, and proportionality.
Rule 24 Response:
20. The respondent filed and served a Rule 24 response opposing the appellant’s appeal. In brief, the respondent submits as follows:
a. Ground 1: There was no procedural unfairness, the respondent relies on the reasoning given by the Judge.
b. Ground 2: There was no misdirection in law as to whether the past treatment the appellant suffered amounted to persecution.
c. Ground 3 and 4: These are disagreements with the findings made by the Judge.
d. Ground 5: This does not identify any error of law.
The appellant’s response to the Rule 24 response
21. The appellant in summary responded as follows:
a. Ground 1: The appellant submits that this was not a routine non- attendance case. The Judge proceeded in the face of an acknowledged chaotic breakdown in representation leaving a vulnerable asylum seeker unrepresented. The Judge failed to conduct a fair balancing exercise placing disproportionate weight on the past non-compliance and listing inconvenience and insufficient regard to the prejudice to the appellant of being denied an opportunity to give evidence in a protection appeal.
b. Ground 2: The appellant contends the respondent’s assertion of no misdirection cannot stand in the light of the Upper Tribunal’s grant of permission. It is submitted that the Judge misunderstood that under section 31 of Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA) and the jurisprudence under the Refugee Convention persecution may consist of serious physical or psychological violence.
c. Ground 3: The appellant submits the Judge relied heavily on the existence of formal protection mechanisms and failed to grapple with the country evidence which indicated systemic underenforcement and practical barriers for women in the appellant’s position. Similarly in relation to internal relocation the conclusions are generic with little analysis of the appellant’s personal circumstances, vulnerability and risk of destitution or further exploitation.
d. Ground 4: The appellant contends that the Judge failed to carry out a structured proportionality assessment. The finding that there was no family life between the appellant and GM was reached without proper engagement with the intensity and reality of the appellant’s six day a week caring role for a vulnerable British Citizen or the emotional and welfare consequences of the respondent’s decision.
e. Ground 5: The appellant confirms that this is not advanced as an error of law but as an application to admit further evidence under Rule 15(2A). It is accepted that the NRM conclusive grounds decision post-dates the Judge’s decision and could not have been before the Judge. The appellant accepts that it need not be considered at the error of law stage but identifies it so that it may be considered as part of any remaking.
The Hearing
22. The appellant was represented by Mr Magsino and the respondent by Mr Pugh.
23. Having heard the submissions from both representatives I reserved my decision. I now set out my decisions and reasons and deal with the issue of the disposal of the appeal.
Findings and reasons
24. I remind myself of the many authorities including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] on the approach an appellate court or tribunal should take when considering findings of fact reached by a first instance judge.
25. An appellate tribunal must avoid the temptation of “island-hopping” and instead must look at the FTT’s reasoning as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
26. I have exercised that restraint and considered the Judge’s decision holistically.
27. Ground 1: Under Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (FtT) (IAC) Rules 2014 (“the Procedure Rules”), the Judge may proceed in a party’s absence if: (a) the party has been notified of the hearing or reasonable steps have been taken to notify, and (b) it is in the interests of justice to proceed. That second limb requires a fair balancing exercise tailored to the facts, particularly acute in protection appeals given the gravity of consequences and the significance of oral evidence to credibility.
28. The Judge expressly identified and applied the above legal framework. At [10] the Judge recorded that she was satisfied the appellant had been notified and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed.
29. The question for the Upper Tribunal is not whether a different judge might have adjourned the hearing but whether the Judge’s approach was unfair or outside the lawful scope of discretion such that the hearing was unfair or the decision unsafe.
30. Although analogies to relief from sanctions in civil litigation may be instructive (as the respondent notes), the Judge remains bound by the overriding objective and the need to ensure fairness particularly in dealing with claims under the Refugee Convention (see BR (Iran) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 198 at [18]).
31. I bear in mind the appellant’s submissions that fairness considerations are acute particularly in protection appeals and that oral evidence may be important. However, the Procedure Rules expressly contemplate proceeding in absence where the criteria of Rule 28 are met. The assessment will of course be fact-sensitive.
32. The appeal was managed on the MyHMCTS online portal in accordance with the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 November 2024 (the PD). The PD sets out the overriding objective of the Tribunal is to deal with cases fairly and justly. The PD also states that: “The parties must ensure they conduct proceedings with procedural rigour. The Tribunal will not overlook breaches of the requirements of the Procedure Rules, Practice Directions, Practice Statements and failures to comply with directions issued by the Tribunal.
33. The case-management history here was exceptional. The Judge noted repeated defects and late changes in representation and compliance and recorded that an adjournment application was refused by a legal officer as not being in accordance with the overriding objective.
34. The Judge sets out a detailed chronology and representation history at [7(a) – 7(k)] and explained at [8] that as matters stood, Mr Magsino was not on record (through MBM or Wellingtons) the Tribunal had not been notified of any other representative, and the appellant was therefore representing herself. Furthermore, the Judge noted that the appellant had been made aware of the hearing and reminded it was going ahead, with the time and place given to her directly.
35. While the representation history was plainly unsatisfactory, the Judge found the appellant had been personally reminded to attend the hearing even if unrepresented and there was no evidence substantiating the reasons advanced for non-attendance. On those findings, it cannot be said the appellant “lost the chance to attend” the hearing, rather, she was afforded the opportunity to attend and did not do so.
36. I find the Judge was entitled to attach significant weight to the following matters:
a. At [7(i)], the Tribunal emailed the appellant to remind her of the forthcoming hearing, providing the address and stating that she should attend even if she does not have legal representation.
b. The Judge had the relevant evidence relied on by the appellant as this had been uploaded on 2 May 2025 albeit that it contained a defective Appeal Skeleton Argument [7(f)].
c. At [8] that at the material time there was no representative on record. Mr Magsino was not on record, and the Tribunal had not been notified of any other representative,
d. the adjournment request advanced by Mr Magsino was considered by the Judge notwithstanding he was not on record as acting for the appellant. The Judge gives clear reasons for rejecting the application, including the lack of evidence supporting the asserted reasons for non-attendance and the unrealistic timescale sought [9].
37. Those findings provided a rational and lawful basis for concluding that proceeding was in the interests of justice. The appellant had clear direct notice and a specific reminder to attend the hearing even if unrepresented [7(i)]. Where a party is told that the hearing will proceed and she should attend even if unrepresented and the reasons asserted for non – attendance are unsupported [9(d)], it is not procedurally unfair for the Tribunal to proceed. The Judge’s reasons at [9] demonstrate the balancing exercise in substance: she addressed the asserted reasons for non-attendance, their lack of evidential support, and the practical listing consequences of adjourning, before reaching the Rule 28 conclusion at [10].
38. The appellant’s response submits that the Judge’s refusal to hear from Mr Magsino (who at the time was not on record as acting for the appellant) was symptomatic of an unfair approach. The Judge recorded that Mr Magsino arrived only as the Presenting Officer was concluding submissions [11]. He was not on record as acting for the appellant and although Mr Magsino indicated that he had a new letter of authority this had not been uploaded to the online portal as required. Mr Magsino was unaware of a witness statement from the appellant dated 3 May 2025 which had been uploaded by Mr Fahmy Mohamed of MBM (who was on record as acting for the appellant on 3 May). The Judge read out the witness statement of 3 May from the appellant which made various allegations about Mr Magsino’s conduct of her case. In those circumstances, the Judge was entitled to proceed with the hearing as the asserted authority remained unclear.
39. The Judge did not ignore Mr Magsino but recorded his assertions, noted the absence of an uploaded authority and recorded what followed [11-12]. The Judge at [9] undertakes a balancing exercise and the records reasons for proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the appellant and the conclusion on a consideration of Rule 28, expressly applying the “interests of justice” limb at [10]. Given the above, I find the Judge’s approach to the hearing in the circumstances did not cross the threshold of unfairness. Ground 1 does not disclose any error of law.
40. Ground 2: The amended grounds contend the Judge applied an unduly restrictive test for persecution by emphasising the absence of medical treatment and injury and by describing the threats as “empty”.
41. The Judge directed herself impeccably to the statutory definition of persecution under section 31 of NABA, identifying that persecution must be “sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition” and expressly recognising that persecution may include acts of physical or mental violence and threats by reference to the Home Office guidance extract set out at [31]. That careful self -direction demonstrates that the Judge did not misunderstand the legal test, rather she identified the correct threshold and evaluated the evidence against it.
42. The Judge expressly states she does not minimise the mental impact of the abuse the appellant suffered in the Philippines at [31] and [32]. The Judge correctly notes at [32] that past persecution or serious harm, or threats thereof, may be a serious indicator of the likelihood of future persecution under paragraph 339K Immigration Rules.
43. Read fairly, the Judge’s reference to a lack of medical treatment and the absence of injury following the knife incident were factors considered in the evaluation of the seriousness of the incidents alongside the acceptance that the abuse occurred. The conclusion at [32] that the abuse did not meet the “necessary threshold” on the evidence was an evaluative finding open to the Judge and the characterisation of the threats as empty was part of that overall assessment in the light of the long period without contact and the other facts set out at [33] to [37]. I find that Ground 2 does not disclose any error of law.
44. Ground 3: Ground 3 of the amended grounds of permission challenge the findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation on the basis that they are made on an under- appreciation of the seriousness of the appellant’s past ill treatment and an over-optimistic reading of the CPIN and other country material.
45. The Judge directed herself to the correct standard of protection, namely a practical standard that does not eliminate all risk (the Horvath standard), and applied this standard in substance by assessing whether the Philippines has a functioning system of criminal law and a reasonable willingness and ability to enforce it, expressly noting that protection is not required to provide a “100% guarantee”[44].
46. The Judge’s findings on protection are rooted in the country material before her and are set out in detail at [40] to [44], including the existence of VAW desks, protection orders, shelters, helplines, and the CPIN’s assessment of general willingness or ability of the authorities to protect.
47. In relation to internal relocation the Judge did not simply assert a generic ability of the appellant to relocate but gave reasons tied to the appellant’s circumstances, including her significant family ties in the Philippines due to her adult children and siblings living in the Philippines and her prior work history, her education and the absence of evidence that she would be forced into destitution or that her husband would or could trace her, concluding that relocation would be reasonable [45] to [47]. The respondent’s Rule 24 response correctly notes that this ground amounts to a disagreement with the findings and the burden rested on the appellant to show why relocation would be unreasonable. The Judge’s decision discloses no material error of law.
48. Ground 4: Ground 4 argues the Judge failed to adopt a structured approach to Article 8 and gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claimed caring relationship with GM.
49. The Judge addressed the essential stages required in an Article 8 analysis. The starting point being whether the appellant enjoys a family or private life in the United Kingdom and whether the respondent’s decision would interfere with it. The Judge at [57] makes a clear finding that the appellant has not shown that she had developed a family/private life in the UK such that Article 8 was engaged. The Judge explained that the Article 8 case advanced in the ASA was unsupported by evidence and the limited medical evidence relating to GM did not mention the appellant and it was recorded at a different address to that given by the appellant in her witness statement.
50. The family life claim related to GM who was a person outside the appellant’s core family unit and a finding of family life would ordinarily require evidence of dependency going beyond ordinary emotional ties. The Judge made a specific finding that there was no evidence supporting the assertion that GM relied on the appellant “24 hours a day, six days a week” or that GM would “suffer deeply” if the appellant were removed and concluded that alternative care arrangements could be made [63].
51. The Judge’s reasoning demonstrates that she resolved the key issues of Article 8 engagement and proportionality with reference to the evidence and the statutory framework. Ground 4 does not disclose any material error of law.
52. Ground 5: The appellant’s representative clarified that Ground 5 was not a separate error of law challenge but was an application under Rule 15(2A) to admit in evidence the NRM Conclusive grounds decision so that it may be considered in any remaking should an error of law be found.
53. The Judge at [50] to [51] records the appellant’s account of harsh domestic work for an employer in Saudi Arabia and noted that a very belated NRM referral had been made. The Judge finds on the evidence the appellant has not shown that she is a victim of modern slavery for the reasons given.
54. Since I have found no material error of law, the decision of the Judge stands, there will be no remaking. The Rule 15(2A) application is therefore not material to disposal and does not arise.
55. For the reasons given, I conclude that the grounds of challenge do not disclose a material error of law on the part of the Judge.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law and accordingly stands

N Haria
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 May 2026