Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004254

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67226/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

RH
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Badar, Counsel instructed by Saint Martin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the Appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 9 August 2025 in which the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal was dismissed.

2. In summary the Appellant’s case is that he is a Bangladeshi national and was a member of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) from 2016 and then Jatiotabadi Chatro Dal (“JCD”). He became the General Secretary of the college branch. He claimed to organise protests and meetings as part of his role as General Secretary. In 2020, the Appellant was threatened by the Awami League (“AL”) and then attacked resulting in him being hospitalised. The police were unwilling to help. As a result, he went into hiding at his aunt’s home and then another relatives’ home until he left Bangladesh on 28 September 2022.

3. Although the Respondent accepted that the Appellant was a supporter of the BNP and JCD, it was not accepted that he was a general secretary for the party, that he organised protests and meetings or that he was threatened and attacked by the AL.

Preliminary issues

4. There were a number of procedural issues that were addressed at the outset of the hearing. Firstly, the Appellant’s representatives had filed a skeleton argument dated Friday 7th November 2025 for the hearing on Monday 10th November 2025, which was in breach of the Tribunal’s directions. Ms Lecointe had not received the skeleton argument and so it was shared with her and time given for her to consider its contents. Secondly, Ms Lecointe had not received the consolidated hearing bundle, although she had pulled together what she believed to the be the relevant documents individually. Thirdly, the consolidated hearing bundle did not include the supplementary Appellant’s bundle that was before the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Badar indicated that it was not relevant to the grounds of appeal and on that basis, I did not seek a copy. At this stage, before a short adjournment was given to the parties to take instructions and consider the documentation, I indicated to Mr Badar that I found the grounds of appeal relating to the standard of proof and the improved political situation very confused and that I would require assistance from him to understand those grounds of appeal.

5. Mr Badar made an application to admit the skeleton argument of 7 November 2025. He accepted it was filed in breach of directions and relied upon the reasons at paragraphs 1 and 2 of the skeleton argument to explain the late filing. These were firstly, that the Appellant had only recently instructed counsel and secondly, that the Appellant was facing financial hardship and was unable to fund the preparation of the skeleton argument until 6 November 2025. I was invited to admit the skeleton argument in the interests of justice. As for the consolidated hearing bundle the Appellant’s representatives did not serve the bundle on the Respondent in the mistaken belief, and contrary to the Practice Direction for the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal: Electronic filing of documents online – CE-file, dated 31 August 2023, that the Respondent would have access to it if uploaded to CE-file. The Practice Direction, which is referenced in the Upper Tribunal (IAC)’s standard directions states at §7:
“CE-File cannot be used to provide documents to another party. Documents which are required to be provided to another party must be sent or delivered to that party by another method permitted under rule 13.”

6. In response, Ms Lecointe submitted that the legal representatives should have been aware of the directions. Counsel did not draft the skeleton argument and so the instruction of counsel was irrelevant.

7. I decided not to admit the skeleton argument. There is no good reason for why it was filed late. Counsel did not draft the document and therefore the recent instruction of counsel is no explanation for it being filed late. The Upper Tribunal directions do not require a skeleton argument to be filed and served but provide for the timing, content and format of ‘any skeleton argument’ upon which a party intends to rely. If the Appellant was limited by his financial circumstances to enable a skeleton argument to be prepared, filed and served according to the Tribunal’s directions, he was not compelled to do so. The skeleton argument was not served on the Respondent at all, thus putting Ms Lecointe at a disadvantage. Having considered the contents of the skeleton argument I concluded that it would not assist me as it further confused the grounds of appeal, which I had already identified to Mr Badar. Therefore, in my judgment, it was not in the interests of justice to admit the skeleton argument.

Summary of grounds and submissions

8. I heard submissions from the representatives which are a matter of record.

9. The Appellant advanced six written grounds of appeal, Mr Badar was not the author of the grounds:
(1) The Judge erred in the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility in light of MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
(2) The Judge made irrational findings.
(3) The Judge did not properly assess risk on return taking the claim at its highest.
(4) Inadequate reasoning on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
(5) Error in article 8 ECHR assessment
(6) The Judge erred by not giving consideration to the Lucas approach with respect to adverse credibility findings.

10. The first ground of appeal relied upon a passage (no paragraph number provided) in MAH regarding the standard of proof, in that case the relevant standard was ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ and there being no requirement in law for corroboration. The grounds reference five adverse credibility findings in the Judge’s decision (§§36, 39, 42 and 45) and proceeded to make the following propositions.

11. Firstly, that the Respondent did not challenge the evidence in this appeal (§10 grounds of appeal). That is incorrect. The Respondent plainly challenged the evidence in the refusal decision and through cross examination at the hearing before the Judge. In his oral submissions, Mr Badar withdrew the first sentence of paragraph 10 of the grounds, which stated that the Respondent did not challenge the evidence in this case. He accepted that MAH was a case concerning the lower standard of proof and that as this was a Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) case that was an inappropriate authority to reference. In his submission, the author of the grounds was attempting to argue that the Judge applied too high a standard of proof. There was substantial corroborating evidence and the Judge requiring the Appellant to produce even further evidence was applying too high a standard, even on a balance of probabilities.

12. Secondly, that as the Appellant claimed asylum in July 2023 section 32 (2) of NABA applies and therefore the standard of proof applicable to the assessment of the Appellant’s subjective fear is the balance of probabilities. This is correct as per JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) but does not advance the Appellant’s argument any further.

13. Thirdly, the Judge did not have the balance of probabilities standard in mind when assessing the Appellant’s evidence.

14. Fourthly, by reference to some medical evidence produced by the Appellant from a Bangladeshi hospital the grounds contend that “on a reasonable degree of likelihood” the evidence was sufficient to make out that part of the Appellant’s case. Having accepted that the balance of probabilities applies in the previous paragraph, the grounds proceed to rely on the lower standard of proof, which does not apply. In respect of the medical evidence, the Appellant was badly injured and Mr Badar questioned what further evidence could have been obtained.

15. Finally, the grounds contend that the Judge required the Appellant to produce corroborative evidence, when there was no such requirement in law, as per MAH.

16. Ms Lecointe on behalf of the Respondent relied upon the Rule 24 response to the grounds, which concisely stated that the Judge had directed himself appropriately, the Judge was entitled to reach adverse credibility findings and conclude that there would be sufficiency of protection due to a change in the political situation and based on the objective evidence before him. The article 8 ECHR case was limited to issues arising from the alleged persecution, which was rejected.

17. In her oral response to the first ground, Ms Lecointe submitted that the Judge set out the correct framework pursuant to NABA 2022 and the 2-stage test explained in JCK. The Judge applied the correct framework and it cannot be said that the decision is irrational.

18. The second ground of appeal contended that the Judge’s assessment of the BNP letter, which said the Appellant had been “beaten to death” as exaggerated, ignored the Appellant’s explanation that this was hyperbolic language. Such phrasing was said to be common in Bangladeshi political discourse and that the Judge failed to consider this cultural context or apply the lower standard of proof. In amplification Mr Badar suggested that it was obvious that the Appellant was not beaten to death and the author of the BNP letter was trying to convey that the Appellant was severely beaten. As such, the Judge’s conclusion that the letter over exaggerates the account is irrational.

19. In criticizing the Appellant’s various accounts about where he went after he was discharged from hospital, the grounds contend that the Judge irrationally dismissed the Appellant’s step-by-step sequence of events as an inconsistency and without regard to trauma affecting his ability to recall.

20. The Appellant’s various accounts about who took him to hospital (BNP members, passers-by or local people) was explained by the Appellant’s nervousness at interview and that local people and party supporters were one and in the same. This was a minor variance in the evidence and does not go to the core of the account. Mr Badar further submitted that since the Appellant had been through a traumatic experience it was rational that it may take him a few questions to get to the answer. Mr Badar accepted there was no medical evidence to support the contention that the Appellant’s recall was impacted.

21. In finding an inconsistency between the BNP letter that the Appellant’s role as a general secretary ended in 2020 and the Appellant’s evidence that he continued in this position due to their being no elections, the Judge is said to have ignored the Appellant’s evidence of ongoing recognition by the party, even in the UK. The Judge’s finding is said to be perverse.

22. In finding discrepancies between the Appellant’s description of his injuries and the hospital report, the Judge is said to have failed to take the impact of the trauma on the Appellant’s memory into account or that the hospital records may be incomplete.

23. As for gaps in the evidence relating to the time, location and absence of evidence from the person taking photographs relied upon, the grounds contend that it was irrational for the judge to penalise the Appellant for evidential gaps that were attributable to a failure by his legal representatives. I note at this juncture there was no evidence from the Appellant’s legal representatives accepting responsibility for negligence in this regard or any complaint from the Appellant in relation to the same.

24. The grounds contend that the Judge treated the Appellant’s delay in claiming asylum as determinative, whereas the proper approach to s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 issues is that they are to be treated as a factor in the assessment as per JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878.

25. In concluding this ground of appeal, it is again submitted that the Judge ignored the corroborative evidence and the lower standard of proof.

26. Ms Lecointe submitted that the Appellant was on notice of the credibility issues and the Judge was entitled to examine whether the Appellant could answer them.

27. The third ground contends that even if the Appellant’s credibility was rejected the Judge erred in applying the JCK framework. It is said that the Judge relied upon an ‘outdated’ Country of Origin Information Note: Political situation (CPIN) dated December 2024. The ground acknowledges that by August 2025 the political landscape had evolved in that the AL had been ousted and the interim government which is aligned with the BNP ‘targets’ the AL and not the BNP. The ground then seeks to argue (§23) “If credible, the Appellant’s profile (general secretary, past attack) might still attract rouge AL elements, but the Judge did not consider if protection is available from the pro-BNP state.”

28. As above I indicated to Mr Badar that I found this ground very confused. Firstly, the December 2024 CPIN is the most up to date version that remains current on the Home Office website. Mr Badar accepted that the Judge referred to the current CPIN and the grounds were incorrect to suggest otherwise. Secondly, the ground begins from the perspective that the Appellant’s credibility is rejected but in the next paragraph it is put on the basis that if he is found credible, he may still attract adverse attention from rouge AL elements. Mr Badar clarified that the ground should read on the basis that if credibility is rejected and the Appellant were treated as a BNP supporter rather than in a leadership position, he may be at risk from rouge AL actors. He further drew my attention to paragraph 13.2.9 of the CPIN regarding law and order and submitted that AL officials remain in their roles:

“13.2.9 The ICG noted
‘…the interim government’s most pressing challenge when it took office on 8 August was to restore law and order. In the wake of Hasina’s departure, many police had abandoned their posts,… Police began returning to work on 12 August and political violence has since subsided, though not entirely. Mob violence, including lynchings, continues to break out, while arsonists have attacked the country’s industrial zones. Interim government officials have appealed to citizens not to take the law into their own hands.’”
29. Mr Badar had nothing to add to the fourth ground which he invited me to read together with ground 3. The ground contends that the Judge’s reasoning on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation was inadequate.

30. The fifth ground alleges the Judge’s assessment of proportionality under article 8 ECHR was flawed because the Judge gave significant weight to immigration control but only minimal weight to the Appellant’s private life developed since 2022. Mr Badar did not develop this ground of appeal any further, he was right to do so for the reasons below.

31. The final ground contends that the Judge failed to properly balance the positive findings, namely that it was accepted that the Appellant was a BNP supporter and that he was seriously injured (§42) against the negative findings when coming to a conclusion on the Appellant’s credibility as a whole.

32. Ms Lecointe dealt with the remaining grounds together and submitted that if the Appellant’s credibility is rejected, then as per the CPIN, there is no significant evidence that the Appellant would be at risk. I was referred to Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48, §2 and that the Respondent’s position is that the Judge took the correct approach.

33. I reserved my decision.

Decision

34. The change in the political situation in Bangladesh since the Appellant left in 2022 provides a complete answer to this appeal. Even if the Appellant were correct that the Judge had erred in the assessment of his credibility, which for the reasons I set out briefly below I do not accept, he would still need to demonstrate that the Judge had erred in his conclusions regarding objective risk, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Therefore, I will address Grounds 3 and 4 first.

35. The Judge summarised a number of paragraphs from the CPIN (§15-30) with the summary conclusion being (§15):

“Leaders, members, and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state and/or rogue state actors. Although politically motivated violence occurs, it has generally declined since the July and August protests. The number of people who are affected remains low in proportion to the size of the major parties.
Leaders, members, and supporters of the BNP Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.”
36. The Judge noted that there are no representatives from the former ruling AL party in the interim government and city mayors and hundreds of representatives from local government across the country have been dismissed who are loyal to the AL and replaced them with interim administrators. There have been major reshuffles in the police departments and removal of those loyal to the AL. Since the formation of the interim government thousands of political prisoners have been released and six commissions have been formed to reform key institutions and combat corruption.

37. The Appellant’s case in the grounds is that he would still be at risk from rogue AL elements and the Judge’s reasoning was insufficient. I reject that proposition. The Judge gave a detailed and fair summary of the objective material and clearly concluded that the evidence does not support the Appellant’s case of a real risk of harm from rogue actors (§48). The Judge was plainly aware of some continuing political violence (§§15 and 49) but to a much lower level and noted the large police and Army response.

38. Furthermore, in looking at the CPIN as a whole, as I was urged to do by Mr Badar, I note that AL members and supporters, as opposed to BNP members and supporters appear to be the target of non-state actors (see 3.2.3):

“Although there are reports of attacks across university campuses, mob violence, lynchings and arson, political violence has generally declined since the July and August protests. In late October 2024 Al Jazeera reported ‘hundreds’ of AL leaders, members and students had been attacked or killed, however this figure has not been widely reported or evidenced in other sources consulted. ICG noted in November 2024 that the scale of revenge killings has been much lower than expected”

39. Additionally, there is violence between BNP factions vying for power (see 3.2.4):

“Intra party violence occurs particularly during periods of heightened political unrest such as during, and because of, the July and August 2024 political protests. Since the formation of the interim government there are reports of violent clashes resulting in injuries and deaths between various factions of the BNP, mainly around control of former AL businesses. The BNP have reportedly taken action against over 1,000 of its leaders and members at various levels, in relation to intra and inter-party conflict, to limit retributive violence.”

40. I was not taken to any evidence that demonstrated a risk of attacks by AL elements. The passages on law and order relied upon by Mr Badar do not take this point any further. The evidence shows that the interim government have removed AL loyalists from major state institutions such as the police and national and local government, released political prisoners and set up reform commissions. The Judge had regard to all this material and made sustainable and reasoned conclusions further to it.

41. Ground 1 is confused about the standard of proof and ultimately misconceived. The Judge applied the correct standard of proof throughout.

42. Ground 2 is not made out. The Judge was entitled to reference deficiencies in the evidence.

43. As for Ground 5, the Judge’s decision cannot be faulted and is entirely consistent with the requirements of section 117B (1), (4) and (5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

44. Finally, in relation to Ground 6, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the negative credibility findings remained, notwithstanding some aspects of the Appellant’s claim were accepted.

Notice of Decision

45. The appeal is dismissed

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 January 2025