UI-2025-004259

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 08 Jun 2026
• Promulgation date: 22 Jun 2026
• Publication date: 07 Jul 2026
• Last updated on: 07 Jul 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004259
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01551/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd June 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE


Between

AIGARS BALSEVICS
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms H Masood, instructed by Thames Hill Solicitors

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice on 8 June 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside, in a decision promulgated on 11 March 2026, of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The appellant is a Latvian national, born on 16 June 1981. He entered the UK in 2003 or 2004 to study and remained in the UK thereafter exercising his Treaty rights. He is a businessman who owns a number of pubs in his home town of Wisbech, Cambridgeshire. On 10 May 2012 he was convicted in Latvia of robbery and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. He was extradited to Latvia, but returned to the UK under supervision of the Latvian Probation and continued to adhere to reporting conditions by way of visits to Latvia, complying with the terms of his suspended sentence. In 2015 the appellant became a councillor on Wisbech council and subsequently, in 2019, became Deputy Mayor and eventually Mayor in 2020. He has two children, both British citizens, born 2015 and 2017 respectively (a son and daughter) to his ex-partner VL, with whom they reside. On 14 August 2020 the appellant was granted settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS).
3. On 11 August 2023 the appellant was convicted of two counts of rape committed on 24 May 2021 and was sentenced to six and a half years’ (78 months) imprisonment, following a trial at which he pleaded not guilty. The offences were committed against his then employee and are described in detail in the Crown Court Judge’s Sentencing Remarks (“JSR”) at pages 388 of the error of law bundle, the OASys report at page 136 of the consolidated bundle, and the First-tier Tribunal’s decision at [13] to [14]. There is also a BBC report at page 372 of the error of law bundle, which is clearly less reliable in its detail of the incident. The appellant was specifically not made subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) but is subject to a lifetime adherence to the Sexual Offender Register. He is still serving his sentence. His sentence expiry and licence expiry date is 10 February 2030, and his conditional release date is 11 December 2027.
4. As a result of his conviction, the respondent gave the appellant notice of intention to deport him, and he was served with a Stage One deportation decision dated 22 November 2023 notifying him that section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 applied. He was given a right of appeal against that decision under regulation 6 of the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 which he exercised on 3 January 2024.
5. Written representations were then made on the appellant’s behalf on 15 January 2024, amounting to a human rights claim. It was explained that the appellant’s marriage had broken down some time previously and that, as a result of his offending the appellant had lost his public office and his public standing in the UK. He was in regular contact with his children whilst in prison. He had a girlfriend of two years, a citizen of Poland, who visited him in prison. It was submitted that the appellant had a close relationship with his children and that there were very compelling circumstances outweighing the need for his deportation on the basis of his family and private life. The appellant provided various letters of support and character references with his application, together with evidence of his relationship with his partner and with his children.
6. On 29 July 2024 the respondent made a Stage Two decision refusing the appellant’s human rights claim. On 6 August 2024 the respondent signed a deportation order against the appellant under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007.
7. In the decision of 29 July 2024, the respondent considered the exceptions to deportation in paragraph 13.2.3 and 13.2.4 of the immigration rules. It was not accepted that the appellant fell within either exception. The respondent accepted that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his two children and that it would be unduly harsh for the children to live in Latvia as they were settled in the UK and had no connection to Latvia. However, the respondent did not accept that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s children to remain in the UK whilst he was deported, as they could remain with their mother who was their main carer. The respondent also accepted that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner and that it would be unduly harsh to expect his partner to live in Latvia, but did not accept that it would be unduly harsh for his partner to remain in the UK whilst he was deported. The respondent did not accept that there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Latvia and concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances outweighing the public interest in his deportation. The respondent concluded that the appellant’s deportation was proportionate and did not breach his Article 8 human rights.
8. The appellant appealed against that decision under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The two appeals were linked and came before the First-tier Tribunal on 31 March 2025. In a decision promulgated on 2 April 2025, the First-tier Tribunal Judge formally dismissed the appeal against the Stage 1 decision, it being accepted on behalf of the appellant that no positive submissions could be made in light of Vargova (EU national: post 31 December 2020 offending: deportation) [2024] UKUT 336. However the judge allowed the appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds.
9. The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and two witnesses. He found that the evidence of the risk the appellant posed was mixed, but that there were agreed goals which he was working towards, and that there was no challenge to his claims of a genuine desire to change and his expressions of remorse. It was noted that there had been prior alcohol abuse, which was related to the appellant’s offending, and that the appellant had stopped drinking before being sent to custody. The judge had before him a psychological report from Dr John Cordwell, a chartered & registered forensic psychologist, which he took into account. He noted references to domestic abuse inflicted by the appellant on his ex-partner, the mother of the children, and had regard to a social work report from Laurence Chester which referred to the children having been present when the abuse took place. The judge had regard to the appellant’s prior conviction in Latvia, for which he received a suspended sentence that had since expired. The judge noted that the appellant retained ownership of several pubs which were being run by a friend and also owned two mortgaged properties in the UK. It was also noted that the appellant had family in Latvia, namely a sister, his mother and step-father.
10. The judge, addressing the appellant’s private life first, found that he could not meet the private life exception to deportation because he had not been in the UK for most of his life and there were no very significant obstacles to his integration in Latvia, although he was just persuaded that the appellant was socially integrated in the UK. The judge did not find the very compelling circumstances test to be met in relation to the appellant’s private life. However, turning to family life, the judge considered that the appellant was a devoted father and was persuaded by the assertion from the children’s mother, via the social worker’s report, that she would not allow the children to visit Latvia for fear that he might not let them return to the UK. He found that the irreparable damage caused as a result of the separation of the children from their father would be unduly harsh and amounted to very compelling circumstances. On that basis the judge allowed the appeal.
11. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision on the grounds that the judge had failed to apply the correct legal tests when considering whether there were unduly harsh consequences and very compelling circumstances outweighing the public interest in deportation, and that even if the correct test was applied, the judge had failed to give legally adequate reasons for finding that there were unduly harsh consequences and very compelling circumstances.
Upper Tribunal: Error of Law
12. The matter came before myself on 20 February 2026 to determine whether or not the first-tier Tribunal’s decision contained any errors of law. In a decision promulgated on 11 March 2026 I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on the following basis:
“Analysis
20. I have had careful regard to the decisions in AA and KB and have taken care not to base my decision on what would essentially be a disagreement with the judge’s decision. I have had regard to what the Court said at [38] of AA, namely that:
“Different tribunals might have reached a different conclusion, but it is inherent in the evaluative exercise involved in these fact sensitive decisions that there is a range of reasonable conclusions which a judge might reach, and the error of law here under consideration is only made out if the FTT Judge’s conclusion is outside that range.”
21. I do not disagree with Ms Masood’s submission that the judge directed himself throughout the decision on the relevant tests for ‘unduly harsh’ and ‘very compelling circumstances’, and was mindful of the elevated thresholds that had to be met. However, in my view, the difficulty in the judge’s decision lies in how those tests and thresholds were applied and the reasons provided for concluding that they were met, which leads, in my view, to the judge’s conclusion being outside the range of reasonable conclusions.
22. Although the judge’s decision is a lengthy and detailed one, the crux of the decision and the actual findings leading to the judge’s decision to allow the appeal are very limited. It is clear from [82] of the judge’s decision that the only basis upon which he found the ‘unduly harsh’ and ‘very compelling circumstances’ threshold to be met was the children’s mother’s assertion, reported through the social worker’s report at paragraph 9.20, that she would not take the children to Latvia as she was afraid the appellant would not let them return to the UK. The judge found, at [83], that that would have irreparable damage on the close relationship between the appellant and his children. However at no point did the judge explain what he meant by “irreparable damage” nor how that could be considered as ‘unduly harsh’. That is particularly relevant given the judge’s earlier findings at [53] to [56] relating to the children and their circumstances and needs, which he said did not identify any particular detriment, as well as the concerns arising from the children having witnessed domestic abuse by the appellant.
23. Of more concern, even if it could be said that the judge’s findings sufficed in that regard, is the judge’s approach to the ‘very compelling circumstances’ issue. Whilst the judge was expressly mindful, at [4], [8], and [62] of his decision, of the need for there to be circumstances over and above those in the exceptions to deportation in order for the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test to be met, he did not make any attempt at identifying what those factors or circumstances were. The judge made clear at [74] to [77] that the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test was not met in relation to the appellant’s private life and that he was not able to meet the private life exception itself in any event. The only ‘very compelling circumstance’ appears, therefore, from his findings at [82] to [84], to be exactly the same factor as leading to the ‘unduly harsh’ conclusion. Indeed it is difficult to see how, having found at [84] that he was “just about satisfied” the ‘unduly harsh’ hurdle was passed, the judge was then able to find that the additional hurdle of ‘very compelling circumstances’ could have been met. I agree with Mr Sheikh that the judge appears to have elided the two tests at that point and failed to provide proper reasons for reaching the conclusions that he did.
24. In the circumstances I agree with the respondent that the judge, albeit setting out the correct tests and saying that he was applying those tests, failed properly to apply them in practice and failed to give legally adequate reasons for his findings and conclusions. In my view the grounds properly identify material errors in the judge’s decision which make the judge’s conclusions unsustainable. The decision has, therefore, to be set aside and re-made.
25. As for the onward disposal of the appeal, Ms Masood submitted that in the event of a material error of law being found, that would infect the judge’s entire decision such that a de novo hearing in the First-tier Tribunal would be appropriate. I do not agree. There has been no challenge to the judge’s findings at [64] to [77] on the appellant’s private life, either with regard to the exception to deportation in 13.2.3 of the immigration rules or to his findings on ‘very compelling circumstances’ above that exception. Those findings do not contain errors of law and can be preserved.
26. Mr Sheikh asked me to re-make the decision by dismissing the appeal without a further hearing, whereas Ms Masood requested a further hearing, albeit accepting that there was no further evidence to be considered. It seems to me that, since the appellant was not present at the hearing, the interests of fairness require that there be a further hearing in the Upper Tribunal so that the appellant has a full and fair opportunity to put his case to me.
27. Accordingly, I set aside the judge’s decision in relation to family life and will re-make the decision at a resumed hearing, on the family life exception to deportation in 13.2.4 and 13.2.5(e) and the issue of ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the exceptions to deportation.”
Upper Tribunal: Re-making the Decision
13. The matter then came before me for a resumed hearing on 8 June 2026. The appellant was produced for the hearing and gave oral evidence. I also heard oral evidence from four other witnesses, Zilvinas Skersys, Kristina Fedina, Steven Tierney and Jonathan Farmer. Mr Farmer’s wife, Susan Farmer, also appeared at the hearing and was willing to give oral evidence but Mr Simpson did not wish to cross-examine her and accepted her statement as her evidence. The appellant relied upon an updated consolidated appeal bundle containing the evidence and witness statements/ letters and professional reports previously relied upon in the First-tier Tribunal together with supplemental statements for himself and Ms Fedina, and a statement from a new witness, Mr Skersys, as well as evidence of further courses completed. I confirm that I have read through and considered all the documentary evidence in full, whether or not specifically referred to in my decision. I provide a summary of the oral evidence as follows.
14. The appellant adopted his witness statements as his evidence in chief, subject to some minor amendments, and was cross-examined by Mr Simpson. He said that his businesses were being run by his friend. He had three business/pubs which were going well, but would not go so well if he was not involved as he put in long hours of work when running them. He owned two houses as well. One had a charge on it because of the legal fees he owed and the other needed a lot of work doing to it, but both were occupied. The appellant said that, with respect to the businesses, there was nothing to sell as the properties were all leasehold. He received rent from the people living in the properties but he did not otherwise receive any financial assistance from friends. His ex-partner and children lived in one property. When asked why his ex-partner had not come to court to give evidence, the appellant said that she was no longer his partner. She had provided a statement for the previous hearing. The appellant confirmed that he had not seen his children since he began his prison sentence on 31 July 2023 and that his only contact with them was by way of telephone and video calls. It would not be the same if he was in Latvia as he would not be able to afford the calls if he had to close his businesses. The appellant said that his separation from his children was causing them harm as they wanted to see him in person. They were aware that he was in prison. The appellant confirmed that the children witnessed domestic abuse but he said that it was only words, when he and their mother argued, and there was no violence. He said that he did not pose any risk to his children. When asked to respond to the reference in the OASys report to him posing a risk to children, he said that he would never drink again. The OASys report was out of date and a new one would be produced in July as they were done every two years. He had undertaken a lot of courses since the report was produced.
15. The appellant said that he would never take his children away and had never tried to do so, but had just wanted to see them. He had never caused any harm to his children. He denied having had a restraining order against him in relation to his children. There was just an injunction in relation to his ex-partner. His children needed their father. If he was deported the children would not continue to be cared for in the same way as currently as he would not be able to provide them with financial support and help pay for their accommodation. At the time he committed domestic abuse he was not aware of the harm he was doing to his ex-partner and children as he was drinking a lot but he now understood. He realised now what he had lost and the suffering that he had caused to his children and family. He did not accept that he had no respect for women. Mr Simpson referred the appellant to the OASys report which recorded that he denied being aware that the rape victim had not consented. He said that that was a misunderstanding as the report was done by video call. The appellant said that the BBC report referring to the victim trying to leave the room and to him grabbing her was not correct, and he said that there was no such violence. He agreed, however, that the Judges Sentencing Remarks referring to him pushing her down had occurred and accepted that there was some violence in that respect. The appellant confirmed that he had completed a victim awareness course and had provided his solicitors with evidence of that even though it did not appear in the bundle.
16. When re-examined by Ms Masood, the appellant explained that payments shown in his bank statement to Maxis were for rent paid to him by people living in the pubs. He said that he completed the victim awareness course in November 2025 and he learned how his crime had affected his victim, his family and society. With regard to the reference in the social worker’s report to him trying to take the children, the appellant said that that was when he and his ex-partner separated and that he had had contact with his children since then, He would see them two or three times a week and take them to school and swimming. Social services were never involved.
17. I then heard oral evidence from Zilvinas Skersys who adopted his witness statement as his evidence and confirmed that he was running the appellant’s pubs and businesses. He said that he had never run pubs before. He only worked part-time in the pubs. He was not able to say whether or not the businesses would be successful if the appellant got someone in who could run the pubs. Mr Skersys confirmed that he would send money to the appellant to support his children. He said that he had known the family for 16 years. He was surprised when the appellant was convicted of rape. He was not aware that the appellant had previously had an injunction issued against him and was surprised that legal action had had to be taken against him. When asked if it could be, therefore, that he did not know the appellant as well as he thought, Mr Skersys said that he did not know that. He knew that the appellant looked after the children.
18. Ms Fedina then gave her evidence, adopting her statements and confirming that she had never known the appellant to be disrespectful to women. She said that she was very close to the appellant and was surprised when he was convicted of rape. She was not aware of the injunction limiting contact with his ex-partner. When asked if it could be said in the circumstances that she did not know the appellant as well as she had thought, Ms Fedina said that she was surprised as she had known him for many years. She said that she knew the appellant’s ex-partner very well. She did not accept that his ex-partner could look after the children herself as they needed to be looked after by both parents. Ms Fedina confirmed that her husband sent money to the appellant and she confirmed that they would send money to him if needed.
19. Mr Tierney adopted his statement as his evidence in chief and explained how the appellant was the type of councillor who did a lot of good work. By way of example he said that when calls were received from people late at night who had language difficulties, the appellant would always help out. Mr Tierney said that he believed in giving people second chances. He had visited the appellant in prison and he truly believed that he wanted to be a good person. When cross-examined, Mr Tierney said that he and the appellant were colleagues on the town council and he also considered him to be a friend. He was surprised when the appellant was convicted. As to whether he was aware of the injunction taken out by his ex-partner, Mr Tierney said that he had heard rumours about it although he did not ask for details. He was aware that they had a tempestuous relationship. He was aware of the appellant’s failings but believed that everyone should have a second chance. He had never sent any money to the appellant.
20. Finally, Mr Farmer gave his evidence before me. He adopted his statement and was cross-examined by Mr Simpson. He said that he had known the appellant for about ten years. The appellant had stayed at his house on occasions and had had meals at his house. He had been to the appellant’s children’s christenings and they also served on the council together. The appellant’s pub was also his nearest pub. He was surprised when he heard about the rape conviction. He was vaguely aware of the injunction taken out by the appellant’s ex-partner. When asked whether he was surprised that legal action had had to be taken against the appellant, Mr Farmer said that knowing the woman concerned it did not surprise him as she was possibly not the most stable of women. The appellant was besotted with his children and worried about them. He was worried about who their mother was hanging about with. When put to him by Mr Simpson that the social worker’s report confirmed that the appellant’s ex-partner provided full support for the children, Mr Farmer said that she does the best that she can. When asked if he would say that he did not know the appellant as well as he claimed given the legal conviction, Mr Farmer said that if he had thought that the appellant was a rapist he would have stayed clear of him. When put to him that they were nevertheless still friends, he said that it was a longstanding relationship. He had never sent the appellant any money.
21. That completed the oral evidence. I then heard submissions from both parties.
22. Mr Simpson relied upon the high threshold for meeting the ‘unduly harsh’ test, as set out in KO (Nigeria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53 and the test in regard to ‘very compelling circumstances’ in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 662. With regard to the ‘unduly harsh’ test, he relied upon the fact that there had been no physical contact between the appellant and his children for three years and that contact was only by phone or video, and submitted that the situation would be the same if he were deported. The social worker’s report did not suggest that there would be serious harm caused to the appellant’s children by his deportation and there was a lack of any evidence since that report to address the issue. Mr Simpson relied upon the fact that there had been an injunction issued to protect the appellant’s ex-partner and the children, although he noted that the appellant claimed that the injunction only applied to his ex-partner. He submitted that the social worker’s report was limited in that it was based on a two hour telephone call with only limited input from the appellant’s son but that, at its highest the social worker’s report did not show that it would be unduly harsh for the children to be separated from their father. The only other evidence came from the witnesses, but they were shocked by the rape conviction and were unaware of the history of abuse. The OASys report concluded that the appellant posed a risk to the children. The evidence from the appellant’s ex-partner, the social worker and the OASys report, when taken together, suggested that it would not be in the best interests of the children for the appellant to be in their lives. He submitted that the ‘unduly harsh’ test was therefore not met.
23. As for the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test, Mr Simpson submitted that the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal on exception one carried over. With regard to the appellant’s financial circumstances, he could put someone in place to run the businesses. He could also sell his assets to make money. Two of the witnesses said that they helped out financially. Mr Simpson submitted that the appellant had committed a serious offence and was still a risk to the public. He had not accepted responsibility for the offence but blamed it on his alcohol intake. The forensic psychologist’s report was inconsistent with the evidence in its reference to the level of violence or force used. Mr Simpson also relied on the fact that the appellant had not provided evidence of completing the course which had replaced the Horizon course or that he had completed a victim awareness course. He relied on the case of Majera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1597 in relation to the weight to be given to rehabilitation and submitted that the evidence did not show that the appellant was rehabilitated but that even if he was, that could only have limited weight in reducing the public interest in his deportation. There were insufficient positive factors in the appellant’s case to meet the high threshold of ‘very compelling circumstances’. The appeal should be dismissed.
24. Ms Masood, in her submissions, relied upon her skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal. She submitted that the ‘unduly harsh’ test was met in the appellant’s case as the impact of his deportation on his children would be very significant. She relied upon the social worker’s report of the account given to him by the appellant’s ex-partner and the fact that there was no evidence of intervention by social services. She also relied upon the forensic psychologist’s report and submitted that the respondent had placed too much weight on the injunction whereas that was irrelevant because the appellant had since had very regular contact with his children and was a very hands on parent. They stayed over with him and did lots of activities together. The respondent was wrong to say that the appellant was a risk to the children. His ex-partner said that he was an amazing parent and confirmed that he was never violent. That painted a very different picture to the one the respondent sought to present. There remained a dependency upon the appellant even though he was in prison. There was a proper reason why the children had not visited the prison. Further, the appellant provided financial support to the children. Ms Masood submitted that there would be an impact on the children as his ex-partner said that she would not take them to Latvia, so there would be no physical contact between them at all until they were adults. The Respondent’s argument that the situation would be no different to currently was misconceived because there was a qualitative difference between telephone and video calls for an indefinite period when there was no hope of the children being able to see their father again, and calls having to suffice until 2027 when he would be released. Ms Masood relied upon the social worker’s report at [12.4] in that regard. The respondent’s suggestion of no lasting impact on the children was completely unrealistic as the impact upon them would be devastating. Ms Masood referred to various parts of the social worker’s report in support of her submission. She submitted that the question was not one of the fitness of the children’s mother to look after them but rather the impact on the children of losing their father. Ms Masood referred to [12] and [42] of AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, where it was found to be misleading to seek some “ordinary” level of harshness and that there was an infinitely variable range of circumstances, and she submitted that it would be an error to search for some particular level of dependency that was required. She submitted that the ‘unduly harsh’ test was met in this case.
25. Ms Masood submitted that in any event there were ‘very compelling circumstances’. She referred to the case of Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74 in submitting that a full proportionality assessment was required and that it was not necessary for exceptions one and two to be met if there were otherwise other factors which amounted to very compelling circumstances. She referred to the various relevant factors as set out in her skeleton argument at [29] and submitted that rehabilitation was relevant. In regard to rehabilitation Ms Masood relied upon HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 and Majera and submitted that the appellant’s case fell within the territory of ‘social re-integration’ as referred to at [45] of Majera. She submitted that it was clear from the appellant’s evidence that he was remorseful and was unlikely to reoffend. The OASys report was out of date and was due to be updated. She relied upon the forensic psychologist’s report which confirmed that the appellant had accepted responsibility for his behaviour. His offending was not a pattern of behaviour. There was nothing in the OASys report to suggest that he was blaming the victim, but he simply could not recall her consenting, whereas he now accepted that she did not. The forensic psychologist’s report made clear that the appellant had stopped drinking and had been abstinent since July2022. There was no evidence of sexual deviance. The evidence of the courses completed in prison showed that he was rehabilitated. The criteria for the Horizons course had changed and so he no longer needed to do that course. He had engaged in interventions and wanted to change. There was also the evidence of the witnesses which mitigated the public interest and confirmed the active role the appellant played in the community. She submitted that it was telling that there were people who felt sufficiently strongly to come to three court hearings and to travel all the way to London for today’s hearing. The appellant was community spirited and made a positive contribution to the community. His deportation would impact on the community and on the businesses he had. He would be less able to financially support his children if he lost the businesses. Ms Masood submitted that even if the exceptions to deportation were not met, there was sufficient to outweigh the public interest in deportation and the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test was met.
Analysis
26. The starting point for the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal is the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal, from [64] to [77], which were that the appellant could not meet the private life exception to deportation and that there were no ‘very compelling circumstances’ in regard to his private life. The issues to be determined by me, therefore, are the ‘unduly harsh’ consideration in relation to the appellant’s children and whether there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ outweighing the public interest in deportation. Given the length of the appellant’s sentence he needs to demonstrate ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the exceptions to deportation, in accordance with section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I should add that the appellant’s relationship with a new partner, mentioned in the deportation decision, has since ended, and that that is no longer a relevant consideration.
27. There is no dispute between the parties as to the relevant statutory framework, the relevant authorities and the established tests for ‘unduly harsh’ and ‘very compelling circumstances’ as set out in those authorities. Ms Masood has helpfully set those out in her skeleton argument and both parties referred to them in their submissions as I have mentioned above. I do not propose to repeat them.
28. I start by addressing the question of whether the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on his children. It is accepted by the respondent that it would be unduly harsh for them to relocate to Latvia and so the question relates solely to the separation of the appellant from his children as a result of his deportation.
29. It is Ms Masood’s submission that the impact of the appellant’s deportation would be devastating for the children. However there is limited evidence to support such a submission, and certainly nothing recent. As Mr Simpson pointed out, there is no update to the social worker’s report from Laurence Chester, which was prepared over a year and a half ago, and neither is there any updated statement from the appellant’s ex-partner VL, who also was not in attendance at the hearing to give evidence in support of the appeal.
30. Turning to the independent social worker’s report it is relevant to note, as acknowledged by Mr Chester himself in section 4, that there were limitations to his assessment given that his contact with the family was only one to two hours by video. It is evident from the report that the majority of that contact was with VL, with only limited time with the children. Further, Mr Chester made clear that he was not venturing into any risk assessment of the appellant with respect to the children, as he had no information or knowledge of the appellant’s own insight into his behaviour which would enable him to reach any conclusions on risk. He also stated at para 9.11 that a more detailed assessment of the children would be required to determine how they had been affected by the domestic abuse they witnessed. It is therefore the case that the social worker’s conclusions and opinion in regard to the family’s circumstances and the impact on the appellant’s children of his deportation are of limited value and certainly cannot carry the weight that would be given to a report based on an ongoing assessment with home visits and full interviews with the children. Likewise, Mr Chester acknowledged at para 12.2 that his assessment did not seek to offer a view on the clinical aspects of the children’s mental health needs, although he was concerned about the future risks to their emotional wellbeing. That is relevant when considering that the appellant has not sought to provide a psychological report giving an insight into the impact on the children’s mental health of their separation and his impending deportation, the only psychological evidence being related to his risk of re-offending.
31. Nevertheless Mr Chester’s report provides some insight into the nature of the appellant’s relationship with VL and their children, particularly from the point of view of VL who provided the majority of the information from which Mr Chester was able to reach his conclusions, and involves some consideration of the risks faced by the children. The report refers to Mr Chester being informed by the appellant’s solicitors about a restraining order VL took out against him in regard to domestic abuse she experienced from the appellant, which VL said included conditions as to contact with the children (paras 4.3, 9.2 and 9.28). At para 9.28 Mr Chester spoke of VL acting protectively towards the children by obtaining the legal orders which ensured hers and the children’s safety. VL told Mr Chester (para 9.2) that on one occasion the appellant tried to take the children, and that the children witnessed the domestic abuse that had occurred. As is apparent from para 9.3 she had not thought about the children witnessing the abuse when she said that the appellant was a good father. The report also refers at para 9.4 to VL explaining that social services contacted her in 2020 and that she was supported by Women’s Aid. It was Ms Masood’s submission that there was no evidence of intervention by social services in relation to the appellant’s fitness to be a parent, but clearly there was some form of intervention by the courts and social services, even if only indirectly affecting the appellant’s involvement with the children. Mr Chester’s record of what VL told him, at para 9.5, also refers to the appellant’s son having night terrors and sleep walking and being afraid of the appellant breaking into their house and taking him from her, and at para 9.9 Mr Chester opined that he had been significantly impacted by witnessing the abuse against his mother. At para 9.11 Mr Chester opined that that represented ‘significant harm’, albeit accepting that there was a need for a more detailed assessment.
32. As for the children’s needs being met by the appellant and their dependency upon him, Mr Chester records VL as saying, at para 9.12, that she was meeting all of their needs and that there was no dependency on him. Mr Chester’s own opinion was that there was a level of dependency upon the appellant, although at 9.13 he said that he was not so clear on what was the level of dependency the children had on their father emotionally. He recorded at paras 9.13 and 10.16 that the children spoke of a close relationship and bond with their father (with reference to the answers recorded at section 10), and he considered therefore that there was a degree of emotional dependency as well as a level of financial dependence. At para 9.16 he spoke of the benefits of future physical contact, subject to safeguarding checks. He opined at paras 9.14 and 10.18 that the children would suffer significant emotional stress if the appellant were deported, which was likely to meet the threshold of ‘significant harm’. His assessment at section 12 of the nature of that harm was, however, limited and largely generalised and speculative, and was tempered somewhat by the opinion at para 9.19 and 11.1(d) that the children “may” experience significant emotional harm if the appellant was forcibly separated from them.
33. It was Mr Simpson’s submission that the overall tenor of the social worker’s report was that, whilst the children missed their father and whilst it was beneficial for the children to have a father figure, and whilst the appellant’s deportation would affect that father-children relationship, the children would not necessarily benefit from the appellant as that father figure. Ms Masood, understandably, interpreted the report rather differently and placed more reliance on the sections referring to the children’s close bonds with their father and the emotional harm caused by his deportation. It is apparent to me from Mr Chester’s report that the children were missing their father and wanted to be with him, that they had maintained regular contact with him albeit limited to telephone and video calls with no direct contact whilst he was in prison, and that his deportation would be very upsetting for them. However it is also apparent that they have been adversely affected by his past behaviour and risk further emotional harm in the absence of any substantial change in his behaviour. In that respect I note para 9.10 of the report where Mr Chester states that:
“There are multiple possible implications for the impact of domestic abuse on [M] and [J], which also allow for them to have a loving relationship with their father, even though he is an abusive parent. This can be because the children, naturally, have formed attachments to their father from a very young age. It is usual for this emotional bond to persist even in the face of abuse or mistreatment. They may still crave love, approval and attention from their father, despite his harmful behaviour.”
34. In the circumstances it seems to me that the social worker’s report is limited in the weight that can be attributed to it, given the brevity of the assessment and given that Mr Chester clearly had insufficient evidence before him to enable him to reach a more substantive conclusion. He was evidently being cautious in his findings in the absence of any current risk assessment, as is apparent from his comments at paras 10.18, 11.1(f) and 11.2, and as such I cannot give any material weight to his reference to the children suffering serious harm consequent upon their separation from their father.
35. The only other evidence of the appellant’s relationship with his children and the impact of deportation upon them is the statement from VL. However there is some tension between the evidence in her statement and her evidence as recorded by Mr Chester in his report, in particular as regards the role the appellant played in the children’s lives. It was the appellant’s evidence that the children would stay with him regularly and he would be involved in taking them to their activities, particularly his son’s swimming lessons. That also appeared to be VL’s evidence in her statement, where she referred to him being an amazing and supportive father, to helping physically whenever the children needed support, and to him helping with school runs and activities some time after the injunction had been granted to her when they had made peace with each other. VL also referred to her hope for co-parenting to be re-introduced once the appellant had served his sentence. Yet according to Mr Chester’s report at para 9.5, VL told him that “for the past 4 years, he could not take them out, but it's me that wants him to be here, for the children to have a father. I hope he comes out of prison a better person and we can arrange contact. The kids really do want him. I would want the contact supervised and maybe for him to be risk assessed by the local authority.” The suggestion there was that the appellant’s level of contact with his children was not as claimed. I do, nevertheless, take note of para 4.3 of Mr Chester’s report where he reported that he was informed by the appellant’s solicitor that the appellant had been permitted contact with the children subsequent to the restraining order. That is confirmed in Dr Cordwell’s report at para 3.3.3 where he refers to contact progressing to two to three nights a week after three months of his separation from VL.
36. The evidence is therefore rather unclear and contradictory in regard to the nature and extent of the contact. However the respondent has not challenged the appellant’s evidence as to his role with the children and I therefore proceed on the basis that there was a level of co-parenting with VL prior to his imprisonment. I do so with some caution nevertheless, given the discrepancy in the evidence, and particularly given the lack of any other supporting evidence as to the nature and extent of the role he played. I accept that the various witness statements refer to the appellant as being a caring and loving father to his children and to his commitment to his children, and indeed Mr Farmer gave oral evidence to the effect that the appellant was besotted with his children. However I have to agree with Mr Simpson that the witnesses did not appear to know the appellant as well as they believed given their shock at his conviction and considering that only Mr Tierney and Mr Farmer had any knowledge of the fact that VL had taken out a restraining order against him. That seems to me to be particularly surprising, especially considering that Ms Fedina claimed to be very close to VL. Other than a few photographs of the appellant with his children, there was no independent evidence of the role he played in their lives prior to his imprisonment, such as letters from their schools or other such evidence that could reasonably be expected to have been obtained, and nothing further from VL or from the children themselves.
37. In any event, even on the basis that the appellant was engaged with his children prior to his imprisonment as claimed, the lack of up-to-date evidence or a more detailed report from the social worker, the lack of any further evidence from VL and the lack of any evidence from the children themselves all mean that it is difficult to give weight to the claim that the appellant’s deportation would have a devastating impact upon his children. They would continue to be looked after by their mother, their main care-giver, as has happened for the past six years when the appellant and VL separated. They have not had physical contact with their father for three years. There is no evidence to suggest that VL is not able to provide the children with the care they require in the appellant’s absence or that she is lacking in any respect as a sole parent. Although Mr Farmer made some vague adverse suggestions as to her parenting abilities in his evidence, that was not supported by any of the other evidence, and not at all in the professional report of Mr Chester or indeed even by the appellant himself. The evidence does not show that their separation would cause them serious harm.
38. I have given careful consideration to the matter which particularly concerned the First-tier Tribunal and upon which Ms Masood relied, namely that the appellant’s deportation would mean a permanent separation from his children. That was based upon VL’s answer to Mr Chester, as recorded at para 9.20 of his report, that the children would have to maintain their relationship with the children by telephone as she would not take them to Latvia since she was worried he would not let them come back. I agree with Ms Masood that telephone and video communication between a father and his children is not a proper substitute for his physical presence if that was to be a permanent situation. However I do not agree that such a statement suggests that VL would prevent the appellant from seeing their father ever again. It does not preclude the possibility of the family meeting in a third country. Indeed VL’s evidence in her statement was that she acknowledged the significance of the appellant in her children’s lives, and her evidence to Mr Chester at para 9.5 was that she wanted him in their lives even if she did not want him herself. In such circumstances it seems reasonable to conclude that she would not want the children to suffer by being apart from their father on a permanent basis when there were options available for them to meet. Her stated confidence that the appellant would do anything for his kids is certainly not consistent with a claim that she believed that he would seek to take them away from their own mother. In the circumstances I do not accept that the appellant’s deportation would have to result in a permanent separation from his children until their adulthood, and I do not accept that the evidence suggests that it would.
39. In any event, and for the reasons given, when considering all the evidence as a whole, and having regard to the significant limitations of that evidence, it seems to me that the evidence falls well short of demonstrating that it would be ‘unduly harsh’ on the children if the appellant were to be deported. Separation of children from parents is an unfortunate consequence of criminal offending and cannot in itself be sufficient reason to conclude that deportation is unduly harsh. For all these reasons I do not accept that the ‘unduly harsh’ test has been met.
40. It is the case, therefore, that the appellant cannot demonstrate an exception to deportation on family or private life grounds. Ms Masood relies upon the authorities of Yalcin and Majera in submitting that there may nevertheless be aspects of an offender's private or family life that do not fall within the exceptions but which, by themselves or in combination with circumstances that do fall within the exceptions, afford a sufficiently compelling reason to conclude that deportation would be disproportionate. It is the case that the First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK, although he considered the issue to be very finely balanced (at [73]). It also the case that it is conceded that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his children and that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s children to relocate to Latvia. There are therefore elements within the exceptions which are met.
41. With that in mind, I turn to the ‘very compelling circumstances’ consideration. The starting point is the strength of the public interest in deporting foreign offenders which, in this case, is a very weighty consideration given the nature and seriousness of the appellant’s offending. The appellant received a lengthy sentence of six and a half years’ imprisonment, although I do note that the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks (JSR) confirm that that was the shortest sentence that could be given in the circumstances. Whilst it is the case that the appellant is not a serial offender and that he had not previously committed offences of a sexual nature, his offending was particularly significant owing to the responsible position he held in his community and the relationship he had with his victim, namely as her employer. The nature of the offence is set out in the JSR which refer, at C, to the victim trying to get away from the appellant and trying to leave the bedroom after being raped, but where he grabbed her again and pushed her down on her knees and orally raped her, with the incident only coming to an end when the victim’s child started crying in another room. The JSR also refer at F to the impact on the victim being profound and long lasting. This was therefore a serious offence with serious consequences.
42. The weight to be given to the public interest, and in particular to the need for public protection, has also to be considered in light of evidence of rehabilitation and the risk of further offending, which the Court in HA (Iraq) discussed at [58]:
“In a case where the only evidence of rehabilitation is the fact that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance. If, on the other hand, there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending then that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending.”
and as clarified in Majera at [45]:
“Those cases treat rehabilitation as a factor on the other side of the equation: where present, it can mitigate the need for public protection and reduce the weight attributable to that component of the public interest in deportation.”
43. I therefore consider those matters as they apply to the appellant.
44. With regard to the risk the appellant currently poses in the community, that is difficult to ascertain owing the absence of any recent evidence, and considering that he has not yet been exposed to the community, his earliest conditional release date being 11 December 2027. The OASys report is now almost two years old (dated 31 July 2024), but aside from the psychological assessment from Dr Cordwell which is itself not recent (dated 31 December 2024), and the appellant’s own evidence and that of his witnesses, there is nothing else before me.
45. The OASys report refers at R4.4 to the appellant being a low risk of re-offending, although at page 181 the OSP direct contact sexual reoffending risk is stated to be in the medium category. At R10.3 and R10.6 the OASys report refers to the appellant being a medium risk of serious harm to known adults, a high risk to the public and a medium risk to children, and therefore in the event that he offended again the risk of him causing serious harm was clearly considered to be significant. Dr Cordwell, in his report, stated however at para 4.3.2 that “There remains no evidence to indicate that Mr. Balsevics’ sexual offending behaviour meets the nature, frequency and intensity of it being regarded as chronic, diverse or it being an escalation in sexual behaviour” and at para 6.0.5 he assessed the appellant as demonstrating “a low-moderate risk of future sexual offending at the current time”. At para 6.0.7 he provided a reason why his assessment as to risk differed from that in the OASys report, namely the fact that the RSVP (risk of sexual violence protocol) assessment employed for his report was a more current and up to date assessment of the appellant’s risk of further sexual offending, using RSVP-V2. However Dr Cordwell also made clear in his report that the psychological formulation he developed for the appellant was to be treated as a tentative working hypothesis which needed to be updated and adapted in the light of any information emerging through further psychological assessments, therapies or risk management considerations.
46. In terms of remorse for his offending, whilst the appellant says that he now accepts that the victim did not consent to sexual activity and is remorseful as to the harm he caused, the OASys report refers to him demonstrating a lack of awareness as to the meaning and implications of consent at that time. The report, at 2.8 (page 137) and R6.1 (page 166), states that whilst he initially agreed, during the OASys assessment, that the victim may have said no, he later said that he did not recall her saying no to him. He claimed to have been acting under the influence of alcohol, although the OASys report at 2.8 refers to him also denying having been intoxicated and being only tipsy. At para 9.5 the report refers to alcohol having acted as a disinhibitor but not the main motivation. Dr Cordwell also refers to the appellant’s heavy drinking, at para 3.4.2 of his report, and at para 3.5.2 refers to the rape incident and the appellant’s rather mixed account of whether or not he believed the victim to have been consenting at the time, as repeated at para 4.3.3, and as consistent with the OASys assessment. He refers at para 4.3.3 to the appellant now accepting responsibility and culpability for his actions, and at 5.0.2 to the appellant experiencing shame and remorse for his sexual offending and the impacts of his behaviour on the victim, on his family and the consequences to himself. There is therefore evidence suggesting that the appellant is now remorseful.
47. As for the issue of rehabilitation, it is the case that OASys report refers, at section 10 (page 152) to the appellant complying with the prison regime and being an enhanced level prisoner, to being eligible for the Horizon programme, a programme specifically designed to address sexual offending, and to being keen to complete a victim awareness intervention which would help to reduce the risk of serious harm he posed to the community. There is a sentence plan attached to the OASys form attesting to the appellant’s plans for positive engagement in interventions to address his offending behaviour. That is also reflected in Dr Cordwell’s report at para 3.6.1 and 4.3.10 where he refers to the appellant being engaged and compliant with the structure and regime of custody and at para 4.4.3 to him being engaged in a number of treatment interventions in custody. Both the OASys report and Dr Cordwell’s reports refer to him being abstinent from alcohol since July 2022. Of course that is assisted by him being in prison, although his oral evidence was that if he wanted to drink he would have been able to even in prison. Clearly the real test will be on his release. In addition to the references in Dr Cordwell’s report at paras 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 to the appellant having completed a number of courses in prison, there is also separate evidence in the form of course certificates in the consolidated bundles, including those from more recent courses completed, which go some way to showing a desire to address his offending behaviour. However, as pointed out in the respondent’s review at [9], there is limited evidence of the requirements of the courses he completed and no evidence to show that they have reduced the risk he posed. As confirmed in the letter of 22 January 2026 “OMiC: Planned Supervision Session” at page 200 of the bundle, the appellant no longer met the criteria for the Horizon Programme, but instead completed a Positive Futures workbook (it is not clear why he did not meet the criteria). There is no evidence to support his claim to have completed a victim awareness course, although he said that he provided his solicitor with the certificate.
48. The appellant claims that a shortly anticipated updated OASys report would reflect his own view that he is rehabilitated, that he would not offend again and that he poses no risk. However, there is no such report available in the meantime. There is indeed an absence of any other independent supporting evidence, such as reports from prison officers or his offender manager to support the appellant’s claim. A letter dated 14 November 2025 at page 193 of the consolidated bundle refers to unsuccessful attempts to contact the appellant’s POM but that previous notes confirmed high-risk status. The closest to such evidence is the letter from of 22 January 2026 entitled “OMiC: Planned Supervision Session” following contact with the appellant’s POM from his previous prison but, aside from a reference to a future recommendation to a cat D category prisoner, the letter is essentially just a record of a previous supervision session with the POM rather than a character reference. As for the appellant’s own assertions, those clearly carry only limited weight in the absence of supporting evidence. It is the case that the appellant’s offending was under the influence of alcohol, and that his claim to have been abstinent from alcohol is not challenged. However the abstinence has been sustained for the most part at a time when the appellant has been in prison with alcohol not as readily available as it was when he worked in his pubs, although I accept there was a period of abstinence prior to his detention. That can provide only limited assurance.
49. It is the case, therefore, that both the OASys report and Dr Cordwell’s reports attest to the appellant being remorseful and seeking to address his offending behaviour. His claims of remorse have not been challenged by the respondent and appear to be genuine. It is also the case that there is some divergence between the conclusions in the reports as to the level of risk the appellant continued to pose. That said, however, both reports attest to the appellant remaining a risk to the public and to known adults and children. Both Dr Cordwell and the author of the OASys assessment considered the appellant to continue to pose more than a low risk of further sexual offending at that time. The evidence of rehabilitation is limited, and there is nothing aside from the appellant’s own assertions to suggest that the level of risk has reduced, or at least materially reduced. The appellant’s witnesses all suggest that he acted out of character and that he would no longer be a risk to the community, but they did not expect him to have offended in the first place and their evidence is therefore of little weight in assessing risk. In terms of what is said at [45] of Majera, therefore, the appellant has not demonstrated a level of rehabilitation sufficient to “mitigate the need for public protection and reduce the weight attributable to that component of the public interest in deportation”.
50. The appellant also relies on rehabilitation in the context of social re-integration, as consistent with what was said at [45] of Majera, in terms of the benefits he conferred on the community as the owner of three pubs and as a member and councillor on Wisbech Town Council, the Deputy Mayor from 2019 to 2020 and the Mayor from 2020 to 2021. The witnesses, and in particular Mr Farmer and Mr Tierney, stressed their views that the appellant was a changed person whose criminal offending was out of character and who should be given a second chance and would give back positively as he had done previously, emphasising his charitable work and his dedication to the community. However, as already mentioned above, the witnesses clearly did not know the appellant as well as they thought they did. In any event, as Mr Simpson submitted, those were matters which pre-dated the appellant’s criminal offending and did not previously prevent him from committing the offences he did.
51. Drawing all of the above together, and having considered the limited evidence available of rehabilitation, I do not accept that the appellant has demonstrated that he no longer poses a risk to the community and it cannot be said that he has put his criminal past behind him by making a valuable contribution to society. I therefore turn to other factors relevant to a proportionality assessment and a consideration of ‘very compelling circumstances’.
52. It is the case that the appellant is a hard-working man who has been employed for all his adult life in Latvia and the UK, who has lived in the UK for many years, since 2003, who has contributed greatly to his community and who has strong ties to the community. He has, I have accepted, a close relationship with his children, albeit that he has had no physical contact with them for three years. Considering Mr Chester’s report of how much his children miss him, of their regular telephone/ video contact and their desire to be reunited with him, I accept that their best interests would appear to be for him to remain in the UK with them, and I give appropriate weight to that important factor. In addition, the appellant has, since 2022, refrained from drinking and has undertaken many courses and interventions in prison to address his offending and his behaviour. He is a Samaritan Listener. He has many friends who support him in his appeal, either by way of letters or statements, or attending the hearing to give oral evidence, including former employees and colleagues from the town council.
53. The appellant claims that his enforced removal to Latvia would result in his businesses having to close and to him being unable to pay for his children’s activities and provide other financial support. However I do not accept that to be the case. His businesses are currently being run by his friend Mr Skersys and have not closed down during the three years of his absence. Mr Skersys’s oral evidence was that he only worked part-time and had had no such previous experience, so the businesses were not doing as well as previously, and in his statement of 27 May 2026 said that he had only committed to helping the appellant for a further six months. However he did not deny the possibility of the appellant getting someone else in who had more experience to run the businesses in his absence. Indeed there seems to be no reason why it could not be the case that the businesses could be run by the appellant from outside the UK, with direct assistance from someone living in the UK. According to the evidence before me, the appellant’s pubs have already earned a positive reputation and are popular and successful, and there is no reason why that would not continue to be the case. There is no external evidence to show that the business have materially suffered through the appellant’s absence as he claims. The appellant has only supplied his personal bank statements from Barclays Bank. In the worst case scenario the businesses could be sold to raise some cash, albeit that the appellant claims that the assets are limited, with the premises being leased and not owned by him, although the evidence does not show that selling the businesses would be necessary.
54. In addition the appellant owns two houses, one of which is rented out and the other of which is occupied by VL and the children. Although the appellant said he would have difficulty selling the properties if he needed the capital from the properties, because one had a lien for the outstanding payment for his legal fees and the other needed a lot of work on it, the rent would continue to provide some income, together with the income from the businesses. In addition, VL continues to work and can contribute to the financial support of the children, and there is evidence from two of the witnesses that they are already providing some financial help, with no suggestion that they could not continue to do so until the appellant got back on his feet. Furthermore, there is no reason why the appellant could not find employment in Latvia, considering the success he demonstrated in building up his businesses in the UK. There is no evidence to suggest that his convictions would prevent him from finding employment or building up businesses in Latvia any more than they would in the UK.
55. In summary, therefore, the appellant has committed a serious criminal offence, he is considered in the only professional reports available to be a risk to the public and to children, albeit at best a low to medium risk, he has a history of abuse of his ex-partner to the extent that she had to take out a restraining order against him and has been assessed as causing harm to his children who witnessed the abuse, although he has yet to be risk assessed to ascertain his future level of risk, as Mr Cordwell made clear in his report. The evidence of his rehabilitation is limited. Although the best interests of the children are for him to remain with them in the UK, they have not lived with him for six years and have had no direct physical contact with him for three, there is no evidence that they have been neglected in any way but they have been looked after well by their mother and have been able to continue with their many activities. They could continue their contact by telephone and video call, which is free on WhatsApp. As mentioned above, it may be that arrangements could be made for the family to meet in a third country from time to time until the children are old enough to travel alone. The evidence does not show that they would be seriously harmed as a result of the separation. The appellant retains family ties in Latvia and it has been found by the First-tier Tribunal that there would be no very significant obstacles to his integration in Latvia. Taking all of these considerations into account, the evidence, in my view, falls short of demonstrating very compelling circumstances outweighing the public interest in deportation.
56. I would reach the same conclusion even if I had found that the appellant met the requirements of the family life exception to deportation on the grounds of it being unduly harsh on the children for him to be deported (which I have not found to be the case). The factors in the appellant’s favour, namely his relationship with his children and their best interests, his length of residence in and ties to the UK, his prior standing in the community and the benefits he conferred on his community, and his expressions of remorse at his offending and attempts to address his offending behaviour and move forward, are outweighed by the nature and seriousness of his offending, his past treatment of his partner and the adverse effect that that had on his children and the limited evidence of any material rehabilitation or material reduction in the level of risk of causing serious harm.
57. As such, I find that the appellant’s removal to Latvia, pursuant to the deportation order issued against him, would not be disproportionate and would not be in breach of Article 8.
DECISION
58. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant’s human rights appeal.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 June 2026